SEP 26 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Rafael Borras
Under Secretary for Management
Department of Homeland Security

Michael J. Fisher
Chief, U.S. Border Patrol
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

FROM: Carlton L. Mann
Acting Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels

Attached for your action is our final report, *CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels*. We incorporated the formal comments from the Department, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the final report.

The report contains two recommendations to U.S. Customs and Border Protection and two recommendations to the Department to enhance the overall effectiveness of counter-tunnel efforts. We received one consolidated response from the Department and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Your offices concurred with three of the recommendations and did not provide sufficient detail for concurrence or non-concurrence with one recommendation. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-1, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of each recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, recommendations 1, 2, and 3 will remain open and resolved, and recommendation 4 will remain open and unresolved.

During this audit, it came to our attention that a family member of a senior OIG official was employed by an entity associated with this audit. To ensure that this impairment did not affect our findings and conclusions, we thoroughly reexamined our work on this audit, as well as results. Through this reexamination, we verified that the impairment did not affect our results; our evidence is sound and fully supports our findings and conclusions.
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100.

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Abbreviations

  CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
  DHS Department of Homeland Security
  HSI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations
  OIG Office of Inspector General
Executive Summary

Illicit cross-border tunnels along the southwest border of the United States represent a significant and growing threat to border security. Criminals primarily use the tunnels to transport illegal narcotics into the United States. Since 1990, law enforcement officials have discovered more than 140 tunnels that have breached the U.S. border, with an 80 percent increase in tunnel activity occurring since 2008. We performed this audit to determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has developed an operational strategy to detect and remediate cross-border tunnels, and has acquired tunnel detection technology.

CBP detects and remediates cross-border tunnels as part of its overall border security and law enforcement missions. It has modified its field operations to better detect and respond to the threats posed by the tunnels. However, CBP does not have the technological capability to detect illicit cross-border tunnels routinely and accurately. Until CBP has this capability, criminals may continue to build cross-border tunnels undetected.

CBP is creating a program to address capability gaps in countering the cross-border tunnel threat. As part of this effort, CBP is drafting the documents required by the DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001 to develop and acquire tunnel detection technology. Additionally, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to the Department-wide counter-tunnel efforts.

The program must address the mission needs of both CBP and Homeland Security Investigations, a directorate of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, because both have concurrent mission responsibility for combating cross-border tunnels. However, the program has not matured to a point where it demonstrates how it will consider the needs of Homeland Security Investigations. The Department has ultimate responsibility for approving CBP’s acquisition program, as well as allocating resources and making decisions to counter the tunnel threat. If the program does not take into account the needs of both components, there is an increased risk of not achieving the Department’s goal of disrupting criminal organizations that engage in cross-border smuggling.

We are making two recommendations to CBP to improve consideration of the needs of both CBP and Homeland Security Investigations. We are also making two recommendations to the Department to improve coordination and oversight of CBP and Homeland Security Investigations counter-tunnel efforts. The Department and CBP agreed with three of our recommendations and did not provide sufficient detail for concurrence or non-concurrence with one recommendation.
Background

The illegal use of cross-border tunnels is a significant homeland security vulnerability and an unchecked method of entry into the United States. Since 1990, law enforcement officials have discovered more than 140 cross-border tunnels, with an 80 percent increase in tunneling activity occurring since 2008. The increase in the number of tunnels over the past 4 years may be attributed to border fencing and an increased number of Border Patrol Agents. Tunnels are primarily used to smuggle narcotics. Law enforcement has recovered approximately 169,000 pounds of narcotics, valued at more than $200 million, from drug traffickers using tunnels. Criminals also attempt to use cross-border tunnels to smuggle contraband, currency, and weapons.

An illicit tunnel is an underground passageway used to conceal the movement of humans or contraband with the intent of circumventing the border defenses of the United States. It must be purposefully constructed, cross the U.S. border, and have an entry or exit point.

There are three main types of tunnels: rudimentary, interconnecting, and sophisticated.

**Rudimentary tunnels** are shallow, crudely constructed, and travel only a short distance. Rudimentary tunnels often cause a sinkhole, or ground surface collapse.

*Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.*
Interconnecting tunnels are constructed to connect with existing subterranean infrastructure, such as storm drains or sewers, to gain cross-border access.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Sophisticated tunnels are elaborately constructed and may use shoring, ventilation, electricity, and rail systems. Such tunnels have stretched more than 2,000 feet. Often the tunnel entrances and exits are located within existing structures, such as in residences or warehouses.

Figure 1 breaks down the percentage of detected tunnel types.

**Figure 1. Percentage of Detected Tunnels by Type as of December 2010**

Source: DHS OIG from HSI Baseline Assessment of Illegal Tunnel Activity, December 2010.

Through 2010, the majority of cross-border discovered tunnels were in Arizona and California. Geography and surrounding infrastructure heavily influence the number and type of tunnels constructed in different areas along the southwest border. For example, in Nogales the existing underground drainage and sewage system provides opportunities for interconnecting tunnels. In San Diego, the clay-like soil facilitates the construction of sophisticated tunnels, and the buildings on both sides of the border allow for the concealment of tunnel entry and exit points. In contrast, areas along the border with surface water, such as the Rio Grande in Texas, are at a low risk for tunneling activity. Figure 2 illustrates the detected tunnels by State and tunnel type.

**Figure 2. Detected Tunnels, Classified by State and Type, as of December 2010**

Source: DHS OIG from HSI Baseline Assessment of Illegal Tunnel Activity, December 2010.
Note: This graph does not include tunnels for which there were insufficient reporting data.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a strategic goal to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations that engage in smuggling and trafficking across the U.S. border. CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) have mission responsibilities to combat narcotics smuggling and trafficking, which include countering threats from the construction and use of cross-border tunnels. CBP’s responsibilities for combating tunnel threats include detecting and remediating tunnels. HSI is responsible for investigating individuals and criminal organizations engaged in illegal tunneling activity. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate supports CBP’s tunnel detection efforts by assisting with the development and evaluation of detection technology.

We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP has developed an operational strategy to detect and remediate illegal cross-border tunnels, and has acquired tunnel detection technology.

Results of Audit

CBP detects and remediates illicit cross-border tunnels as part of its overall border security and law enforcement missions. CBP has modified its operations to better detect and respond to the threats posed by the different types of tunnels. However, CBP does not have the technology to allow it to detect tunnels routinely and accurately. CBP has stated that it can best address this capability gap through the acquisition of tunnel detection technology. Until CBP has this detection capability, criminals may continue to build cross-border tunnels undetected.

CBP is creating a program to address capability gaps in countering the cross-border tunnel threat. As part of this effort, CBP is drafting the documents required to develop and acquire tunnel detection technology. Additionally, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to DHS-wide counter-tunnel efforts. The program must address the mission needs of both CBP and HSI, because both have concurrent mission responsibility for combating cross-border tunnels. However, the program has not matured to a point where it demonstrates how it will consider the needs of HSI. The Department has ultimate responsibility for approving CBP’s acquisition program, as well as allocating resources and making decisions to counter the tunnel threat. If the program does not take into account the needs of both components, there is an increased risk of not achieving the Department’s goal of disrupting criminal organizations that engage in cross-border smuggling.
CBP Counter-Tunnel Strategy and Need for Tunnel Detection Technology

CBP’s Strategy for Counter-Tunnel Efforts

CBP addresses the illicit cross-border tunnel threat as part of its overall strategy to secure the U.S. borders and facilitate legitimate trade and travel. Within CBP, the Office of Border Patrol has primary responsibility for preventing the entry of those who attempt to enter the United States illegally or smuggle goods into the country between the ports of entry.

Modified Operations to Detect and Respond to Threats

The type of tunnel—rudimentary, interconnecting, or sophisticated—dictates CBP’s method of detection and response. CBP has modified its operations to address the different types of tunnels. For example:

- CBP conducts routine patrols to detect sinkholes and ground surface collapses associated with rudimentary tunnels.
- CBP has created teams of Border Patrol Agents to patrol and stop illegal activity in existing storm drain and sewer infrastructure in response to the interconnecting tunnel threat. These teams also map the existing infrastructure in high-risk areas.
- CBP participates in counter-tunnel task forces led by HSI. These task forces gather information concerning border-area criminal activity. The resulting intelligence has proven useful in locating sophisticated tunnels. The task forces also conduct criminal investigations to assist in the prosecution of those involved in illegal tunneling activity.
- CBP remediates discovered tunnels. Remediation involves closing the tunnel with concrete or other material, rendering it unusable.

CBP also uses intelligence to identify areas at high risk for illegal cross-border tunnels. This intelligence can either be actionable, identifying the location of a specific tunnel, or strategic, identifying trends across the southwest border. CBP has developed a tunnel threat map that uses the locations of prior tunnel discoveries, soil conditions, and geography to identify areas along the southwest border at high risk for tunneling activity.
Although CBP has modified its operations to address the tunnel threat, it does not have the technological capability to detect tunneling activity routinely and accurately. Until CBP has this capability, criminals may continue to build cross-border tunnels undetected. CBP has stated that it can best address this capability gap through the development and acquisition of detection technology. However, CBP has not been able to identify any existing tunnel detection technology that functions effectively in its operating environment.

**CBP’s Efforts To Acquire Technology**

In 2008, CBP began collaborating with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, other Federal partners, and private industry to develop and acquire tunnel detection technology. As part of this collaboration, CBP conducted market research, but concluded that existing commercial technologies do not meet its needs. CBP is piloting and evaluating commercial and Department of Defense tunnel detection technologies, but these pilot programs are not yet complete. Even if one of these piloted technologies proves to be effective, CBP does not have an acquisition program in place to procure that technology.

In March 2010, CBP designated the Office of Border Patrol as the lead office responsible for tunnel detection efforts. The Office of Border Patrol determined a need to develop a Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. This program will provide CBP with the authority and funding it needs to develop and acquire technologies. To guide program development, CBP formed an Integrated Product Team, which includes members from the Office of Border Patrol, HSI, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, and other stakeholders. The Integrated Product Team is responsible for drafting the acquisition planning documents that CBP and DHS require to create a program. In conjunction with the acquisition effort, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to Department-wide counter-tunnel efforts.

**Creation of a Tunnel Detection Technology Acquisition Program**

In accordance with the *DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001*, several key documents must be in place and approved by CBP before DHS approves the program. Figure 3 presents these key documents.
Figure 3. Key Acquisition Documents To Be Developed Prior to Program Approval

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Answers the question...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Needs Statement</td>
<td>What do we need?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
<td>How will it be employed in the field?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Alternatives</td>
<td>What is our best option in terms of cost, schedule, and performance?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To date, the only program document that the Integrated Product Team has prepared is a draft copy of the Mission Needs Statement. The statement identifies CBP mission needs and capability gaps related to cross-border tunnels. However, because Mission Needs Statements are not required to consider the operational dependencies of other components, this document, as appropriate, does not define or assess the interdependencies between CBP and HSI.

To meet the Department’s strategic goal of preventing the cross-border smuggling of narcotics, the program needs to address both the investigative needs of HSI and the detection capability requirements of CBP. HSI conducts criminal investigations and is operationally dependant on CBP’s use of technology not interfering with its investigative efforts. For example, to support HSI investigations, tunnel detection technology may need to operate covertly so as to not alert criminals to the presence of law enforcement.

CBP has not completed the documentation required for program approval, and is not required to do so before the Department approves the Mission Needs Statement in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. Thus, the program has not matured to a point where it can demonstrate how it will consider the needs of HSI. If the program does not address the needs and operational dependencies of HSI, it may not achieve the Department’s strategic goals.

To mitigate this risk, CBP plans to develop an Analysis of Alternatives. This analysis will identify alternative ways of filling the capability gaps identified in the Mission Needs Statement. It should consider the capabilities provided by both CBP and HSI, and identify a solution at an optimum level of cost, schedule, and risk. To support the Analysis of Alternatives, CBP plans to fund a study, to be completed in June 2013, of how to address joint capabilities through existing processes or procedures. Additionally, the Integrated Product Team plans to draft a Concept of Operations document to describe how acquired technology will be employed in the field.
Departmental Responsibility

Acquisition programs go through both component and departmental review. The DHS Under Secretary for Management is designated as the Chief Acquisition Officer, and has the final approval authority for major acquisition programs, including the CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology program. As such, it is ultimately a departmental responsibility to ensure that CBP identifies and considers key operational dependencies, relationships, and corresponding program risks for both CBP and HSI before approving the program.

Because illicit cross-border tunnels are a departmental issue, the capabilities and strategies to counter this threat need to be developed jointly, optimized to meet departmental needs, and ensure unity of effort. Although the CBP Program Management Office seeks to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to DHS tunnel threat efforts, it cannot make decisions regarding the best way to assign counter-tunnel resources outside of CBP. Because this office may not have sufficient information and authority to make strategic decisions affecting both CBP and HSI, a departmentally designated authority is needed that can make these strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Chief, U.S. Border Patrol:

Recommendation #1:

Conduct the planned study of how CBP can address tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes and procedures in support of the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.

Recommendation #2:

Complete the planned Concept of Operations document describing how the identified capabilities need to function from a cross-component perspective to support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Management:
Recommendation #3:

Provide oversight to ensure that CBP identifies and considers key operational dependencies, relationships, and corresponding program risks for CBP’s Tunnel Detection and Technology Program efforts prior to approving the program.

Recommendation #4:

Designate an authority to provide leadership, strategy, and coordination of DHS counter-tunnel efforts. This authority should have the information and ability to make strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures across DHS components.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

The Department and CBP provided comments on the draft of this report. A copy of the response in its entirety is included in appendix B. CBP also provided technical comments and suggested revisions to our report in a separate document. We reviewed CBP’s technical comments and made changes throughout our report where appropriate.

Management Comments to Recommendation #1

Concur. CBP awarded the contract to conduct the planned study on August 31, 2012. The study’s results are expected to be available between May and August 2013. The results will be used to determine how CBP will address tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes and procedures that support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. The estimated completion date is September 2013.

OIG Analysis

We consider the ongoing action taken by CBP to be responsive to the recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of how CBP has addressed its tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes and procedures that support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program from the planned study’s results.
Management Comments to Recommendation # 2

Concur. CBP plans to complete the planned Concept of Operations document with an expected approval date by September 30, 2013.

OIG Analysis

We consider the ongoing action taken by CBP to be responsive to the recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of the approved Concept of Operations document.

Management Comments to Recommendation # 3

Concur. DHS plans to review in FY 2013 the CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology program against established thresholds in DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01. Additionally, the DHS Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management manages and implements the Department’s acquisition and governance policy and process, and provides senior leaders and program managers objective analysis of major investments. The estimated completion date is December 31, 2012.

OIG Analysis

We consider the ongoing action taken by Department to be responsive to the recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of the signed Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the official record of the Acquisition Decision Event that provides approval for CBP’s Tunnel Detection and Technology program. This document should describe the approval or other decisions made during consideration of approval of the program and any action items that need to be satisfied as a condition of the decision.

Management Comments to Recommendation # 4

The Department responded that the Under Secretary of Management is not the best individual to make a determination for whether a designated authority is needed. The Department stated that the DHS Office of Policy is the appropriate Office to address this recommendation because it has responsibility for developing DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning to promote and ensure quality, consistency, and integration across all Homeland Security missions. It
also provides thought leadership and analysis to the Secretary and other Department leaders to facilitate decision making. The Office of Policy will ensure this recommendation is addressed with the Deputy Secretary for her consideration, as appropriate. The estimated completion date is September 30, 2012.

**OIG Analysis**

Although we consider the ongoing action by the Office of Policy to be responsive to the recommendation, the Department did not provide sufficient detail for concurrence or non-concurrence with the recommendation. Therefore, until the Office of Policy addresses the recommendation with the Deputy Secretary, we will consider the recommendation open and unresolved. The Office of Policy needs to ensure that a designated authority is established to maintain a unity of effort for CBP and HSI in developing capabilities and strategies to counter tunnel threats since both have concurrent mission responsibilities for combating cross-border tunnels.
Appendix A
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.

We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP has developed an operational strategy to detect and remediate illegal cross-border tunnels, and has acquired tunnel detection technology. We limited the scope of our audit to illicit cross-border underground tunnels along the southwest border between the United States and Mexico. We did not continue this audit past our survey phase because the program under review is being established and CBP is drafting the preliminary acquisition documents. However, we determined that there was sufficient information to provide an audit report on the status of the program and make recommendations to mitigate risks.

We reviewed Federal, Department, and CBP policies, processes, and strategies related to acquisition and counternarcotics. These included the DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001; CBP Draft Program Process Lifecycle Guide, Version 1; and CBP National Tunnel Remediation Task Team Handbook; as well as the Office of National Drug Control Policy National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy; DHS Counternarcotics Doctrine; DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016; and CBP Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2009 to 2014. We also reviewed CBP and HSI reports on illicit tunnel activity and discoveries, including HSI’s Baseline Assessment of Illegal Tunnel Activity, December 2010; CBP’s Cross-Border Tunnels, Fiscal Year 2011 Report to Congress, First Semiannual Report, May 2011; and CBP’s Tunnel Remediation Situation Report, January 2012.

We also reviewed documentation related to CBP operations on the southwest border and its Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. This included the CBP Cross-Border Tunnel Threat Integrated Products Team Charter, the draft CBP Cross-Border Tunnel Threat Operations Preliminary Mission Need Statement, CBP Tunnel Program Draft Operational Requirements Document, as well as the CBP California Corridor Unified Command Charter and the Homeland Security Advisory Council Southwest Border Task Force Report, Third Set of Recommendations, Fall 2011.
Additionally, we reviewed documentation related to the development and evaluation of tunnel detection-related technologies. This included the Raytheon *Tunnel Threat Map* reports, the HSI *Tunnel Detection Capability Assessment*, and the CBP *Technology Evaluation and Sustainment* reports.

We visited the Office of Border Patrol, San Diego Sector, and observed illicit cross-border tunnels currently secured by the Office of Border Patrol that were awaiting remediation. We also observed a previously remediated tunnel that CBP is using to test tunnel detection technologies.

We interviewed senior officials within DHS, including those from CBP, HSI, and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate.

We conducted this performance audit between December 2011 and March 2012 pursuant to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS), except that we identified an impairment to our independence in appearance. Following completion of our audit, it came to our attention that a family member of a senior OIG official was employed by an entity associated with this audit. In our opinion, the impairment to our independence in appearance did not affect the findings and conclusions developed during this audit.

GAGAS requires that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives, and that the impairment to our independence in appearance did not affect this evidence or any findings and conclusions.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles K. Edwards  
Acting Inspector General

FROM: Jim H. Crumpacker  
Director  
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office

SUBJECT: Draft Report, "CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels" (Project Number 12-041-AUD-CBP)

Dear Mr. Edwards:

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) work in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

The Department is pleased to note OIG's positive recognition that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has modified its operations to better detect and respond to the threats posed by different types of illicit subterranean cross-border tunnels. DHS devotes significant levels of personnel, technology, and resources in support of our border security efforts, working 24/7 with state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement to target illicit networks trafficking in people, drugs, weapons, and money.

Smugglers and other cross-border criminal organizations use a wide range of ever-evolving methods to attempt to move their contraband into the United States, making our mission more complex and challenging. When tunnels are detected, DHS personnel follow established protocols for coordination, confirmation, assessment, investigation, exploitation, and remediation.

Since March 2010, CBP's Office of Border Patrol (OBP) has led CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology Program efforts with support from the CBP Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition. This program has worked to integrate DHS, CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other efforts into a single entity that addresses tunnel-related activities and technology.

The successes have been many, such as the discovery, using state-of-the-art electronic surveillance technology and other investigative techniques, last November of a sophisticated 400-yard underground cross-border tunnel near San Diego that was over 40 feet deep and equipped with rail, lighting, and ventilation systems. DHS is committed to providing its
frontline agents and officers with the tools they need to effectively achieve their mission of securing America’s borders and facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade.

The draft report contained four recommendations with which DHS concurs. Specifically, OIG recommended:

**Recommendation 1:** That the Chief, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) conduct the planned study of how CBP can address tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes and procedures in support of the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.

**Response:** Concur. The contract to conduct a planned study is scheduled to be awarded at the end of August 2012. Expected deliverables are: Doctrine, Training Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities plus Regulations, Grants, and Standards (DOTMLPF+R/G/S). The study is expected to take 9 to 12 months and should be available between May and August 2013. USBP will review the results then determine how CBP will address tunnel detection capabilities through processes and procedures that support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2013

**Recommendation 2:** That the Chief, USBP, complete the planned Concept of Operations document describing how the identified capabilities need to function from a cross-component perspective to support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.

**Response:** Concur. OBP will complete the planned Concept of Operations document. The projected approval date for the Preliminary Concept of Operations is September 18, 2012. The process for approval of the Concept of Operations will be initiated the following day. Specifically, a Mission Needs Statement will be prepared and tentatively approved by October 18, 2012. Approval by an Acquisition Review Committee is expected by February 28, 2013. After receiving the DOTMLPF+R/G/S study results in August 2013, the Operation Requirement Document will be drafted and submitted for approval. The Concept of Operations is expected to be approved by September 30, 2013.

**Recommendation 3:** That the DHS Under Secretary for Management provide oversight to ensure that CBP identifies and considers key operational dependencies, relationships, and corresponding program risks for CBP’s Tunnel Detection and Technology Program efforts prior to approving the program.

**Response:** Concur. DHS reviews its acquisition portfolio annually to develop the Major Acquisition Oversight List. Acquisition and service programs are reviewed against the thresholds established in DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01. For Fiscal Year 2013, the CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology program will be reviewed in accordance with the guidance. The DHS Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management manages and implements the Department’s acquisition and governance policy and process, and provides senior leaders and program managers objective analysis of major investments. ECD: December 31, 2012
Recommendation 4: That the Under Secretary for Management designate an authority to provide leadership, strategy, and coordination of DHS counter-tunnel efforts. This authority should have the information and ability to make strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures across DHS components.

Response: The DHS Under Secretary for Management is not the most appropriate individual to determine whether this designation is needed and, if so, to make it. The DHS Office of Policy is responsible for developing DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning to promote and ensure quality, consistency, and integration across all Homeland Security missions. It also provides thought leadership and analysis to the Secretary and other Department leaders to facilitate decision making. Along these lines, the Office of Policy will ensure this recommendation is addressed with the Deputy Secretary for her consideration, as appropriate.
ECD: September 30, 2012

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical comments were provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Appendix C

Major Contributors to This Report

Brooke Bebow, Director
Maryann Pereira, Audit Manager
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Nick Jathar, Auditor
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Appendix D
Report Distribution

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Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Under Secretary for Management
Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Audit Liaison, Management Directorate
Audit Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Audit Liaison, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

**Office of Management and Budget**

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

**Congress**

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate
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The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.