



## OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

September 26, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Janet Napolitano  
Secretary

FROM: Charles Edwards  
Acting Inspector General 

SUBJECT: United States Secret Service Cartagena Review-Phase One  
United States Secret Service  
Washington, DC

CASE NUMBER: 112-USSS-OSI-00800

Attached is our Report of Investigation (ROI) on the above subject.

The ROI is furnished for whatever action you consider appropriate and no reply is necessary. However, should you take any action in response to our ROI, please inform this office so that we can update our records. Please destroy the ROI upon disposition of this matter.

Should you have any questions regarding the contents of the ROI or need additional information, you may contact me at (202) 254- or my Assistant Inspector General for Investigations (AIGI), John E. Dupuy at (202) 254-.

Attachment

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION**

**I12-USSS-OSI-00800**

**USSS Cartagena Review**



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## Executive Summary

Independent Review of the Cartagena, Colombia Incident Involving United States Secret Service Employees

### Synopsis

In response to a joint request by Senators Lieberman and Collins to conduct an independent inquiry into alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees around the time of the President's April 2012 trip to Cartagena, Colombia, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, initiated an investigation. The President travelled to Cartagena to attend the Summit of the Americas.

The objectives of our investigation were (1) to determine the details of the incident in Cartagena, and (2) to assess USSS' cooperation with our investigation. This report contains the results of our investigation into the details of the incident in Cartagena.

As part of our investigation of misconduct reported prior to the President's April 2012 visit to Cartagena, we interviewed or attempted to interview 251 USSS personnel. Based on our interviews and review of records, we identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. We determined that one of the female Colombian nationals involved in the incident was known to the Intelligence Community. However, we found no evidence that the actions of USSS personnel had compromised any sensitive information.

While the scope of the investigation was limited to the conduct of DHS personnel in Cartagena, we did obtain hotel records that suggested female foreign nationals signed in as guests to rooms registered to one White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

During our investigation, we attempted but were not able to interview the female Colombian nationals involved in the incident. Nor were we able to obtain records for 14 of the 15 hotels used by official U.S. Government personnel to determine whether similar misconduct occurred during the time USSS personnel were in Cartagena, between April 1st and April 17, 2012. We made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records.

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However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter.

## Details

### Methodology

Upon initiating our investigation, we independently identified USSS personnel who directly supported the Cartagena visit and other potential witnesses who may have had information regarding the Cartagena trip. We identified the personnel directly involved in the incident, as well as the potential witnesses, through documentary sources including official travel records, hotel registries, country clearance cables, personnel assignments, and USSS and U.S. Embassy records.

Of the 251 USSS employees we interviewed or attempted to interview, 32 employees declined to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Before conducting an interview, we informed employees that our investigation was separate and distinct from the investigation conducted by the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility.<sup>1</sup> In addition, depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. In addition, we asked employees to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Twenty-two of the 219 USSS employees who were interviewed did not sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity or Kalkines) form and/or Non-Disclosure Agreement, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed.

We also attempted to interview eight additional current and former employees regarding issues related to the USSS personnel in Cartagena, but were unable to contact them.

### Results of Interviews and Review of Records

Based on our interviews and review of records, we identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported

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<sup>1</sup> On May 30, 2012, OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after preliminary reports indicated that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility did not provide any employee rights advisements during interviews conducted as part of its investigation of this incident. By not providing such advisements, the office may have potentially "tainted" information obtained during, or as a result of, these interviews. After consulting with DOJ, we decided to conduct new interviews to ensure that our information was obtained voluntarily, and therefore, would be usable in any potential criminal or administrative proceeding.

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in April 2012, around the time of advance activities for the President's visit to Cartagena. These encounters took place at the Hotel Caribe, the Hilton Cartagena Hotel and at a private residence.

Our investigation determined that 12 of the 13 USSS employees met 13 female Colombian nationals at bars or clubs and returned with them to their rooms at the Hotel Caribe or the Hilton Cartagena Hotel. In addition, one USSS employee met a female Colombian national at a private residence; we attempted to interview this employee but he refused. We interviewed the remaining 12 USSS employees who had personal encounters with the 13 female Colombian nationals. Through our interviews, we learned that following their encounters, 3 females left the rooms without asking for money, 5 females asked for money and were paid, and 4 females asked for money but were not paid. In addition, one female, who asked to be paid but was not, brought a Colombian police officer to the door of the USSS employee's room; the employee did not answer the door. As a result, she was paid by another USSS employee and left.

During our investigation, USSS personnel alleged that a White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals. We reviewed the registry from the Hilton Cartagena Hotel for this time period, which showed names of two people who we identified as the non-DHS employees associated with the White House, registered in two separate rooms. The names of three females were listed as visitors to these two rooms during the advance activities for the President's visit. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

We also reviewed travel vouchers from Cartagena submitted by 7 of the 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. We found no evidence of any claims for reimbursement for overnight guest fees, a fee charged by the hotels for the female Colombian nationals who visited the 12 USSS employees. The remaining 6 USSS employees did not submit travel vouchers.

During our interviews, we asked USSS employees whether they were aware of incidents similar to those that occurred in Cartagena and whether they thought this incident was indicative of larger organizational or cultural issues within the USSS. One hundred twenty-three interviewees believed the incident was an anomaly, 5 said the underlying organizational culture played a role, and 11 relayed knowledge of similar misconduct occurring on other occasions.

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### **National Security**

As part of our investigation, we identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; we could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. We queried the Intelligence Community to determine whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported. The other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.

During our interviews, no USSS personnel reported any potential loss or disclosure of national security information or any specified threat to the President directly related to the Cartagena incident. More specifically, we found no evidence that the actions of USSS personnel had potentially compromised any sensitive information.

### **Reporting of Contact with Foreign Nationals**

As part of our investigation, we reviewed USSS reports of contact with foreign nationals dated between December 16, 2008 and June 15, 2012, to determine whether contact with foreign nationals had been reported and documented as required<sup>2</sup> and to identify any contacts with foreign nationals similar to that in Cartagena. We found that 105 reports of contact with foreign nationals had been filed by USSS personnel before the Cartagena incident. Following the Cartagena incident and a subsequent reported change in USSS policy, 423 new reports of contact with foreign nationals were filed for contacts dating back to 1976. Of the 423, one report was filed for the Cartagena trip.

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<sup>2</sup>

Director of Central Intelligence Directive, *DCI Directive No. 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)* dated July 2, 1998 and *Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC-12*, dated August 5, 1993 contain requirements for reporting contact with foreign nationals.

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# Homeland Security

## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

<i>Case Number:</i>	I12-USSS-OSI-00800
<i>Case Title:</i>	USSS Cartagena Review United States Secret Service (USSS) Washington, D.C.
<i>Report Status:</i>	Final- Phase One
<i>Alleged Violation(s):</i>	Independent Review of Cartagena, Colombia Incident

### SYNOPSIS

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation on May 23, 2012, based upon a Congressional request that OIG conduct an independent inquiry into the alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012. During the inquiry, OIG also received reports that USSS employees had engaged in similar misconduct on other occasions and reports of broader organizational issues within the USSS.

OIG interviewed or attempted to interview 251 USSS personnel associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, totaling 283 interviews. Before questioning these employees, OIG advised them that our investigation was completely separate from the investigation previously conducted by the USSS, Office of Professional Responsibility. In addition, depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. Of the 251 personnel, 32 employees declined to participate in a voluntary interview and to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Twenty-two of the 219 USSS employees who participated did not sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity or Kalkines) form and/or Non-Disclosure Agreement, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed.

Based on interviews and review of records, OIG identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. A 14<sup>th</sup> USSS

<i>Reporting Agent</i>		<i>Distribution:</i>	
Name: [REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	OSI	Original
Title: Special Agent in Charge- Miami	Date: [REDACTED]	Headquarters	cc
	09/26/2012	Component(s)	cc
<i>Approving Official</i>		Other	cc
Name: [REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]		
Title: Special Agent in Charge- OSI	Date: [REDACTED]		
	09/26/2012		

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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employee who was initially identified by the USSS as involved in misconduct was subsequently determined by USSS and OIG to have been misidentified.

While the scope of the investigation was limited to the conduct of DHS personnel in Cartagena, OIG did obtain hotel records that suggested female foreign nationals signed in as guests to rooms registered to one White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

OIG identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; OIG could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. OIG queried the IC as to whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported, the other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.

OIG made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records. However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter.

Our investigation developed no evidence to suggest that the actions of USSS personnel in Cartagena had potentially comprised the safety and security of the President or any sensitive information during this trip.

### **Other Allegations Reported:**

Evidence obtained during this investigation suggested USSS officials reportedly knew of the IC interest in one female foreign national (FFN), but apparently never reported this information to the OIG or to the Congress until after OIG became aware of this issue during our investigation. The OIG has initiated another investigation, which will be conducted and reported separately.

Certain USSS employees interviewed also reported organizational issues and specific misconduct allegations that have been either referred to OIG Inspections Division or are under OIG review as independent investigative matters. OIG confirmed incidents of prostitution solicitation during official visits in two other foreign countries, El Salvador and Panama.

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# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

## DETAILS

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation on May 23, 2012, based upon a Congressional request that OIG conduct an independent inquiry into the alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012. Specifically, OIG was asked to determine whether USSS employees had engaged in similar misconduct on other occasions and whether this incident was indicative of broader organizational issues within the USSS.<sup>1</sup> The OIG Office of Investigations (INV) was tasked with the initial phase which included the re-investigation of the Cartagena incident.

On May 30, 2012, the OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after USSS employees reported that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) did not provide USSS personnel with any employee rights advisements during the interviews conducted as part of their investigation of this incident. After consulting with the DOJ, OIG decided that the OIG would conduct an entirely new investigation to ensure that the information OIG obtained during our interviews was obtained voluntarily and therefore useable in any potential criminal or administrative proceeding.<sup>2</sup>

### **Allegation 1: U.S. Secret Service and other official personnel allegedly solicited prostitutes in Cartagena, Colombia, while on official government travel.**

When OIG initiated our investigation, OIG independently identified both the USSS personnel who had supported the Cartagena visit and other potential witnesses in the position to have information or insight regarding the Cartagena trip. These individuals were identified through documentary sources, to include: official travel records, hotel registries, country clearance cables, foreign personnel assignments, USSS and U.S. Embassy records, etc.<sup>3</sup>

Based upon our review of these documentary sources, OIG identified and conducted 283 interviews of 251 related USSS personnel. Depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. OIG generally provided each interviewee with their Advice of Rights and a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), and notified them that our investigation was completely

<sup>1</sup> (Exhibit # 1, 365, 366)

<sup>2</sup> (Exhibit # 3)

<sup>3</sup> (Exhibits # 2, 5, 10, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 365)

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separate and distinct from the previous USSS RES investigation of the matter. Some personnel OIG interviewed declined to sign the Rights and NDA forms OIG presented to them, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed. Of the 251 personnel, 32 employees declined to participate in a voluntary interview and to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Despite repeated efforts, OIG was unable to establish contact with eight USSS employees in request for voluntary interviews who OIG had identified as potentially having information relevant to our investigation.<sup>4</sup>

Based on our interviews and review of records, OIG identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported in April 2012, around the time of advance activities for the President's visit to Cartagena. These encounters took place at the Hotel Caribe, the Hilton Cartagena Hotel and in a private residence.<sup>5</sup>

Our investigation determined that 12 of the 13 USSS employees met 13 female Colombian nationals at bars or clubs and returned with them to their rooms at the Hotel Caribe, and the Hilton Cartagena Hotel. In addition, one USSS employee met a female Colombian national at a private residence; OIG attempted to interview this employee but he refused. OIG interviewed 12 USSS employees who had personal encounters with the 13 female Colombian nationals. The final USSS employee failed to appear for an interview despite being compelled to do so. Through our interviews, OIG learned that following their encounters, 3 females left the rooms without asking for money, 5 females asked for money and were paid, and 4 females asked for money but were not paid. In addition, one female, who asked to be paid but was not, brought a Colombian police officer to the door of the USSS employee's room; the employee did not answer the door. As a result, she was paid by another USSS employee and left. A 14<sup>th</sup> USSS employee who was initially identified by the USSS as involved in misconduct was subsequently determined by USSS and OIG to have been misidentified.

### Employee #1- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was compelled, and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the "Warnings and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information" (Kalkines), which he signed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

<sup>4</sup> (Exhibits # 75, 83, 88, 92, 102, 104, 105, 109, 111, 113, 120, 144, 149, 153, 163, 171, 173, 176, 177, 181, 213, 218, 219, 258, 259, 260, 263, 270, 280, 282, 288, 301, 365)

<sup>5</sup> (Exhibits # 365, 366)

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] was in Cartagena, Colombia as part of the advance team in preparation for the Presidential visit to Colombia. He [REDACTED] a cargo plane carrying approximately [REDACTED]. The cargo plane arrived in Cartagena at approximately 2:00 a.m. on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012. There were a total of [REDACTED] cargo planes [REDACTED] was delayed due to mechanical problems and the SAs in the [REDACTED] cargo plane in Colombia were required to immediately report for duty [REDACTED] the SAs who had arrived in Colombia [REDACTED] at the Hotel Caribe so that they could pick up their diplomatic passports and credentials [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C., regarding what time they should meet for dinner, and they agreed to meet at [REDACTED] at the hotel lobby. When they met at the lobby there were approximately [REDACTED] USSS SAs who were going to join them for dinner. An unknown USSS SA in the group either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and he suggested a restaurant for dinner. They departed as a group to the unknown restaurant. After their meal, the group decided to go to a bar [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had approximately [REDACTED] drinks each, and [REDACTED] decided that they wanted to go "[REDACTED]" at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] agreed that they would [REDACTED] in an effort not to [REDACTED]. They [REDACTED] outside of the bar and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told him that he was taking them to [REDACTED] was unable to verify the name of the club when they arrived.

When they arrived, the bouncer escorted them into the club and they sat at a table inside of the club. The club [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] females introduced themselves to [REDACTED] individually. [REDACTED] of the females sat down at their table and asked if [REDACTED] could buy them drinks and they agreed. [REDACTED] he approached another female named [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown and started talking to her. It seemed to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] " [REDACTED]?" [REDACTED] stated that it would cost the equivalent of \$100 U.S. dollars. [REDACTED] tried negotiating with [REDACTED] for a better price; however she stated she had already given him a good price and that the price was not negotiable. [REDACTED] then stated to [REDACTED] that he would also need to pay a tax. [REDACTED] was having problems understanding her Spanish at that point and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that if he wanted to take her out of the club he would have to pay [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] of the tax and they both agreed to take the women back to their hotel. [REDACTED] paid approximately [REDACTED] the \$100 he negotiated with the female. The females [REDACTED] along with the [REDACTED] females departed the club [REDACTED] arrived at the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED] he feared that the club could have had cameras and he would be vulnerable to blackmail if he were recorded having sex with her at the club.

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Once at the hotel, the females approached the hotel counter and signed a form. They gave the hotel employee their identification cards (IDs). [REDACTED] signed them in and [REDACTED] did not recall seeing a clause in the form stating that all guests had to depart the hotel by 6 a.m. the next day. [REDACTED] had to pay a \$20 fee to the hotel so that they would be able to take the females to their room. After they finished signing the females in, [REDACTED] departed ways and went to their respective rooms with their prostitutes. [REDACTED] stated that he and [REDACTED] had sex in his hotel room. She wanted to stay the night and [REDACTED] asked her whether she would charge an additional fee if she did. She stated no. At approximately [REDACTED] while they were sleeping [REDACTED] escorted her to the lobby of the hotel and gave her money for a cab and she departed the hotel. [REDACTED] did not tell [REDACTED] why he was in Cartagena, nor did he tell her that he was a USSS SA. He did not release any classified or sensitive information to the prostitute. The only other USSS employee who solicited prostitutes that he knew of was [REDACTED]. He was not aware of any other U.S. government employees that were involved. When asked why there were so many USSS employees involved that were not aware of each other he stated that considering how much USSS SAs travel, they learn what is permissible and legal in certain locations overseas and what is not.

The USSS had an initial briefing [REDACTED] at approximately [REDACTED]. No mention of prostitutes was made during the briefing, but [REDACTED] remarked that [REDACTED] before the briefing and [REDACTED]. In retrospect, he believed that [REDACTED] may have already known about the prostitutes before the briefing and [REDACTED] due to the fact that they were [REDACTED].

At approximately [REDACTED] were emailed by [REDACTED], USSS, and told to report to [REDACTED]. They were not told the nature of the meeting. Before they arrived at the hotel for the meeting with [REDACTED] they made an agreement between themselves. If [REDACTED] asked them regarding their behavior the previous night they would respond that they met some women that night and took them home. [REDACTED] was concerned about answering [REDACTED] questions regarding the previous night due to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. When they arrived at the hotel they asked [REDACTED] what was going on and [REDACTED] stated that a ' [REDACTED] guy had messed up.' [REDACTED] then believed that they were being called [REDACTED] to discuss the ' [REDACTED] guy.'

[REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] regarding his involvement with prostitutes in Cartagena. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was not voluntary, and he felt that if he did not answer [REDACTED] questions he would be found to be insubordinate by the USSS. [REDACTED] was not administered any rights during his interview with [REDACTED] also stated at the beginning of the interview something to the effect of ' [REDACTED].' [REDACTED] stated he answered the questions truthfully and the interview was concluded.

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At approximately [REDACTED] received another email that they needed to report again to [REDACTED] reported to the hotel and [REDACTED], later identified by the OIG as a [REDACTED], came out of [REDACTED] and told them [REDACTED] told them they could return to their hotel. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he would be able to [REDACTED] not to take any prostitutes back to their hotels. [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] " [REDACTED] email and advised the USSS personnel [REDACTED] that they should not take prostitutes back to their hotel rooms.

[REDACTED] and the other USSS employees who solicited prostitutes were sent home, and he was notified by [REDACTED] that he needed to report to USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) on [REDACTED] 2012 for an interview. [REDACTED] was also notified to report to the interview on the same day. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he needed to [REDACTED]. At that point, [REDACTED] believed that he was going to be removed from duty temporarily as punishment. [REDACTED] was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] and another unknown SA. [REDACTED] asked the SAs if he [REDACTED] brought out a form which stated he was being compelled to speak to the SAs. The form did not say Kalkines nor did it explicitly state that he was not going to be prosecuted criminally. [REDACTED] why the form did not state that, [REDACTED] since the form stated the interview was related to an administrative action criminal immunity was implied. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that if [REDACTED] tone and body language implied that [REDACTED] if he did not cooperate. [REDACTED] decided to cooperate [REDACTED] felt compelled and he felt like he was in a custodial interview. He felt that if he talked to the SAs he would not be criminally prosecuted by the USSS. The SAs did not address [REDACTED] during the interview. [REDACTED] stated he answered their questions truthfully and [REDACTED] told him that he could tell that [REDACTED] was telling the truth during the interview. They asked him if the female knew who [REDACTED] was and he stated she did not. They did not ask any questions regarding the release of sensitive information to the prostitute. They [REDACTED] also stated to the SAs that [REDACTED].

[Agent's Note: The OIG determined that the "Do Not Admit" list was a notice that is disseminated to all USSS personnel when USSS employees were placed on administrative leave for an issue. The notice advised USSS personnel not to admit an individual to USSS property and was a method of sharing information with all employees.]

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█████ stated that to his knowledge, none of the USSS personnel involved in the Cartagena incident had been put on a "Do Not Admit" list. █████ believed the reason they were not put on a "Do Not Admit" list was because the USSS did not consider them a security risk. He also believed that USSS personnel who were well-connected were not put on the list due to their connections. [Agent's Note: The OIG later determined some personnel involved in Cartagena had been placed on the "Do Not Admit list" and disseminated to all USSS employees.]

█████ was contacted to report to the USSS Headquarters on █████ reported to Headquarters and was taken to a room where █████ were seated. █████ stated to █████ that they had █████ and that █████ added, that they █████ the matter. █████ picked up a piece of paper █████ The paper was █████ copies of newspaper articles detailing the press coverage of the incident. At that time, █████ asked █████ if he had given █████ the form yet. █████ then stated, " █████ went into the hallway and spoke to █████ with the door closed. █████ told them █████ they should go ahead with any action that they felt they needed to take █████ The USSS was █████ to his knowledge; however, █████ was placed on administrative leave. He still had the form and would be able to provide it to DHS OIG █████ █████ advised █████ that he was still a USSS employee and that he needed to report to the USSS if they contacted him.

On or about █████ 2012, █████ was called to USSS headquarters. █████ gave █████ a █████ form for his signature. He asked █████ was voluntary and they stated it was. █████ stated to them, " █████ "

On █████ 2012, two notices were sent by USSS to █████, stating that the USSS was in the process of revoking █████ security clearance and that the USSS was █████ pending the outcome of the USSS █████ was told that some time in the future █████ felt █████ was being used as punishment unfairly because there was no █████ Despite the fact that OIG was conducting an independent investigation, the USSS was still conducting personnel actions without knowledge of the outcome of the DHS OIG investigation. █████ stated that action was not done to the other USSS personnel involved with the Cartagena incident and █████ being used as scapegoats by the USSS. █████ also stated

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

there were also criminal leaks within the USSS because [REDACTED]

### Employee # 2- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was compelled and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Kalkines), which he signed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] stated he arrived in Cartagena, Colombia on April [REDACTED] 2012. Later in the day on April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] at the Caribe hotel in Cartagena, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] prostitution was legal in Colombia.

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED]; however, [REDACTED] decided to accompany [REDACTED]. That evening [REDACTED] took a taxi to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] could not remember the name of the establishment. [REDACTED] patronized exclusively by Caucasian males, who he believed to be mostly USSS and United States military personnel. [REDACTED] stated he did not know the other USSS personnel or if any White House staff was at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] sat at a table [REDACTED] in order to [REDACTED] because [REDACTED]. At some point during their visit at the establishment, [REDACTED] each began conversations with females, purchased drinks for the females, and asked the females whether they were interested in going back to the hotel with them. The female [REDACTED] was talking to was named [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown (LNU).

[REDACTED] paid [REDACTED] of 150,000 pesos to the establishment; [REDACTED] paid a 200,000 pesos fee for his prostitute to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] paid a total of 400,000 pesos for his prostitute to [REDACTED], which allowed the females to leave the establishment with them. [REDACTED], and the [REDACTED] prostitutes then left the strip club [REDACTED] to the Hotel Caribe. When they walked into the hotel lobby the prostitutes gave the hotel clerk their identification and they signed a form. [REDACTED] believed the hotel charged a fee for extra occupants in the rooms and the form was so [REDACTED] could be charged the extra occupancy fee. [REDACTED] believed the hotel

<sup>6</sup> (Exhibits # 123, 365, 366)

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was complicit in prostitution activities. Once the hotel forms had been signed [REDACTED] and his prostitute went to [REDACTED] room and [REDACTED] and his prostitute went to [REDACTED] room.

[REDACTED] and the prostitute engaged in sexual activities. [REDACTED] LNU spent the night with [REDACTED] and she left the next morning at approximately [REDACTED]. When she left, [REDACTED] gave her approximately 20,000 pesos so she could catch a taxi.

On April [REDACTED], 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] he attended a briefing. Right before the briefing began, [REDACTED], USSS, Miami, FL, whom [REDACTED] noticed [REDACTED] did not understand [REDACTED] behavior at that time.

After the briefing [REDACTED] were paged and it was at that point [REDACTED] knew something was amiss. [REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] in Cartagena, Colombia, after the briefing. [REDACTED] was not administered any rights during that interview. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was compelled, and that failure to submit to the interview would result in his probable termination.

[REDACTED] began the interview with [REDACTED] stating there had been speculation that USSS agents had solicited prostitutes and that her team was in the process of reviewing hotel video recordings. She added that she was going to brief the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia about the incident.

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that she was going to conduct his interview because of [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was asked to recount the events of April [REDACTED], 2012.

[REDACTED] stated he was asked whether he had secured sensitive or classified documents while he was with the Colombian prostitute on April [REDACTED], 2012. [REDACTED] was not asked whether he had disclosed classified information to the prostitute or whether he knew if she had a criminal background; however, [REDACTED] told USSS investigators he had secured all sensitive or classified documents [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he was interviewed again on [REDACTED] 2012, in Washington, D.C., by [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] was read an administrative warning during that interview.

[REDACTED] stated he was told during that interview there would be no "criminal effect" to the interview and he understood that to mean it was administrative in nature. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was not voluntary, that it was compelled, and that failure to submit to the interview would result in adverse action against him.

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stated that prior to the interview on , 2012, received a telephone call from , USSS, Washington, D.C, in which . Also prior to the interview, briefly spoke to , who stated to that .

stated he had been completely forthcoming during and after interview, nothing was promised to concerning punishment. At some point after interview, spoke to , USSS, Washington, D.C. told that , and that had heard from many people that had been very honest about the Cartagena incident, and that punishment for his participation in the Cartagena incident.

stated that he later asked , another USSS agent who had worked in , why . told .

stated he was instructed to meet with USSS, Washington, D.C, on , 2012. told he had been " and that had been truthful and honest. handed a prepared statement which contained language that told " " then told " " , which was within 48 hours of returning from Cartagena, Colombia.

On , 2012, stated that received a telephone call from USSS, Washington, D.C, during which instructed that was to appear at USSS Headquarters for an administrative interview. stated that .

stated he presented himself for interview on 2012, at USSS Headquarters and that conducted the interview. Upon arriving at the interview was read his Garrity Warnings and was told the interview was voluntary. At that point, he realized the interview was not administrative as they had told .

During that interview was asked whether he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination the statements he made during that interview were memorialized in the form of a sworn statement. stated that this interview focused on .

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[REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] alleged sexual encounters [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he was allowed to [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED] and that he felt coerced to sign [REDACTED] provided to him by [REDACTED] felt he was supposed to be given due process when [REDACTED] and that opportunity was not afforded to him since [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] suspected there was a leak within USSS top management because [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he felt the focus of the investigation by USSS was to get the perpetrators to resign in order for the Director to save face, not to obtain the facts about what happened in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] also admitted to the OIG that [REDACTED]

### Employee # 3- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," [REDACTED] at the advice of his attorney. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] began working for the USSS on [REDACTED] and was assigned to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he was assigned on the trip to Cartagena, Colombia in April of 2012. [REDACTED] was assigned to be [REDACTED]. Prior to leaving for Cartagena, Colombia, [REDACTED] stated he received emails from Protective Operations detailing the information for the trip and also sent and received emails from [REDACTED] talking about the trip. [REDACTED] a USSS SA assigned to Cartagena, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated he did not have the emails because he was placed on administrative leave on [REDACTED], 2012, and had to turn in all his government issued property so he no longer had access to his laptop or government email account.

[REDACTED] stated he arrived in Cartagena, Colombia on April [REDACTED] 2012, and stayed at the Hotel Caribe. After checking in, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] all [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] of them went [REDACTED]. Once [REDACTED].

<sup>7</sup> (Exhibits # 26, 365, 366)

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██████████, they returned to the Hotel Caribe ██████████ stated he ██████████ before ██████████.

██████████ stated ██████████ decided to eat at ██████████ restaurant and then head to a nightclub. ██████████ did not recall the name of the restaurant and nightclub. While at the nightclub, ██████████ began talking to ██████████ females that were standing around him. The ██████████ females spoke broken English. As the night progressed, ██████████ decided to leave the nightclub and go back to his hotel room. ██████████ along with ██████████ and the ██████████ females left the nightclub and went back to Hotel Caribe.

When ██████████ and the ██████████ females arrived at Hotel Caribe, ██████████ went their separate ways. ██████████ went his way with ██████████ females and ██████████ signed in ██████████ females who went with him to his room. ██████████ stated the front desk hotel attendant told him there was a fee for guests, so ██████████ paid the fee to the hotel attendant.

██████████ stated when they got to the room he put on some music and ██████████ continued socializing. The females began soliciting ██████████ for sexual services and ██████████ responded by telling the ladies he was not interested in that kind of service. ██████████ stated he then escorted ██████████ out of the hotel and went back to his room and fell asleep. ██████████ stated he did not know ██████████ were prostitutes but as soon as he realized it, he let ██████████ know he was not interested in doing business with them. ██████████ stated ██████████ were not disappointed with him, did not cause a scene or make any accusations against him to the local authorities. ██████████ stated he did not engage in sexual relations in exchange for money, nor was he involved in illicit behavior during the Cartagena, Colombia assignment.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ received an email instructing him to report to the hotel where the President was staying for an interview at ██████████ arrived and met with ██████████ ██████████ was not given any type of warnings prior to this informal interview. ██████████ was advised that he was being interviewed because he had signed in ██████████ to his room. ██████████ explained what happened in his hotel room then left the interview. Fifteen minutes later, ██████████ was notified that he would be departing Colombia to go back to his Field Office.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ arrived in ██████████ and was approached by the ██████████ ██████████ of the USSS ██████████ Field Office and was told he would be interviewed by USSS Inspectors the following day in Washington D.C.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ met with USSS Inspectors and was interviewed. ██████████ did not recall if he was given any type of warnings prior to this interview. ██████████ provided a written statement. ██████████ stated he was willing ██████████ on that written statement. ██████████ was then told he was being placed on administrative leave. ██████████ took his badge and gun and told ██████████ that if

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[REDACTED] also stated [REDACTED] ”.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], USSS. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] he had two options, to resign or be removed from the agency. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] he was [REDACTED] since he had [REDACTED] so they would [REDACTED] also advised [REDACTED] that if [REDACTED] SF-50 personnel action would reflect [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] he may still lose his security clearance in the process. [REDACTED] continued by stating [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] could [REDACTED] and departed the field office.

Approximately [REDACTED] later, [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] and asked [REDACTED] to come in [REDACTED] returned to the [REDACTED] and met with [REDACTED] who also wanted [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] was present and told [REDACTED] that the two options he gave [REDACTED] earlier was an “oversight” by [REDACTED] as well. [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] and determined [REDACTED] at that time [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] should [REDACTED].

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] sent an email to USSS management stating [REDACTED] so he [REDACTED]. Later that day, [REDACTED] was asked to come to the USSS [REDACTED]. When he arrived, [REDACTED] was asked by [REDACTED] to submit to a drug screen. After passing the drug test, [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that he was willing [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a copy of this email.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] was scheduled to take a polygraph test at [REDACTED] was administered the Basic National Security Polygraph examination [REDACTED]. The exam ended at approximately [REDACTED] was told by the polygrapher, “[REDACTED].” Following this examination, the USSS Inspectors requested [REDACTED] which was to focus on [REDACTED] his original written statement provided by [REDACTED] regarding payment for sex. [REDACTED] agreed to [REDACTED] which started at approximately [REDACTED] and ended at [REDACTED]. The inspectors advised [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] there was nothing to hide.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] he had two options, resign or have his clearance revoked. [REDACTED] realized by losing his clearance, he would not be able to work for the USSS because there was no position in that agency that would allow someone to be employed without a clearance. [REDACTED] stated he gave in to the pressure and submitted his resignation effective [REDACTED] has [REDACTED]

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█████ stated he had heard rumors of other USSS SAs engaging in activity with prostitutes in Cartagena, Colombia. Specifically ██████ heard USSS ██████ refused to pay a prostitute for services rendered and that a third USSS ██████ had attended ██████ where he paid for prostitution services ██████

### Employee # 4- ██████

The OIG interviewed ██████, USSS, ██████. Prior to questioning, ██████ was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. ██████ was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, after questioning, ██████ was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. ██████ provided the following information in substance:

█████ started with USSS in ██████ and was assigned to ██████. He was assigned to ██████. Despite the fact that he is assigned to ██████, he estimated he spends approximately ██████ percent of his time working protection for the President, Vice President, and foreign dignitaries. ██████ traveled on ██████ traveled internationally for protection details ██████. He had never been disciplined until April ██████ 2012, when he was placed on administrated leave. ██████ stated he never solicited a prostitute or engaged in illegal activity while employed by USSS.

On ██████ 2012, ██████ was notified that he would be traveling to Cartagena and assigned ██████. On April ██████ 2012, ██████ flew to Cartagena and checked into the El Caribe Hotel. ██████ was assigned ██████, along with ██████, USSS ██████, Field Office, ██████, and other SA's whose names ██████ could not remember. ██████ team leaders were ██████ worked with a number of other USSS SAs that were assigned to other teams, who he recognized but did not know their names. He also worked with a few U.S. military members who were assigned as ██████, but he did not know their names either.

On April ██████ 2012, ██████, so he went to ██████ where ██████. About ██████ went to ██████ with ██████ individuals whose names he could not remember, where they had dinner. ██████ could not remember the name of the restaurant. ██████ stated he had ██████ drinks at dinner. During the dinner, ██████. After they paid, ██████

<sup>8</sup> (Exhibits # 82, 365, 366)

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led them to a club [REDACTED] the restaurant. [REDACTED] could not remember the name of the club, but said they arrived about [REDACTED]

While at the club, the group danced with women and bought them drinks. All of the drinks [REDACTED], although [REDACTED] cover his portion of the tab. [REDACTED] did not have any receipts from the night as he used cash to pay for all his expenses. About [REDACTED] left the club with [REDACTED], presumably going back to the hotel. About [REDACTED] left with [REDACTED] women and [REDACTED] back to the hotel, which took approximately [REDACTED]. When they arrived at the hotel, he had to sign [REDACTED] into the hotel. The hotel required that he pay a fee of approximately \$20 USD to take [REDACTED] to his room, which [REDACTED] described as a "guest fee." [REDACTED] paid the fee for [REDACTED] paid the fee for [REDACTED], and then [REDACTED] went to his room with [REDACTED] leaving [REDACTED] in the lobby. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] had taken [REDACTED] to his room in the past, but declined to elaborate when asked about the circumstances.

[REDACTED] entered his hotel room and talked for approximately 15 minutes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sexual intercourse or any sexual acts at any point. [REDACTED] was in his room for a total of [REDACTED]. He did not believe anyone actually saw [REDACTED] enter or exit his room, although [REDACTED] knew he took [REDACTED] to his room.

[REDACTED] did not give his contact information to [REDACTED] nor did he obtain her contact information. [REDACTED] believed that she gave the hotel her contact information, but other than that would not know how to contact [REDACTED] if he returned to Cartagena. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he was a tourist from the U.S., but did not tell her his occupation, nor did he ask her occupation. [REDACTED] did not ask any questions about the U.S. government, USSS, or anything about the U.S. other than the fact that she mentioned she would like to visit the U.S. at some point in her life. [REDACTED] did not have any classified information, any documentation regarding the Presidential visit to Cartagena, [REDACTED] in his room. [REDACTED] did have [REDACTED] his credentials locked in the safe in his room. [REDACTED] believed he may have had his personal travel documentation, such as plane tickets and receipts, in a bag in his room. [REDACTED] was carrying his USSS blackberry, but it was locked with a password.

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On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED], he attended [REDACTED] at which point [REDACTED]. Later in the day, he was told to be at the hotel at [REDACTED]. When he arrived at the hotel, he discovered that there had been some sort of altercation the prior night with [REDACTED] and a foreign national woman in the hotel hallway. He could not remember who told him this information.

[REDACTED] stated he was called to an interview with [REDACTED], USSS, Miami Field Office. [REDACTED] was not given any type of rights advisements or warnings, but stated he felt that it was a voluntary interview; however, [REDACTED] believed that if he did not cooperate with the interview, he would be sent back to the U.S. immediately and disciplined, but no one told him this specifically. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] the events of the night prior, explaining that when [REDACTED] and she left. [REDACTED] did not specifically state whether [REDACTED] or not, nor did [REDACTED] specifically ask him. [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] was willing to take a polygraph, which he agreed to do. After the interview was complete, [REDACTED] was told to check in with his supervisor for further instructions. [REDACTED] was then told he would be returning to the U.S. the next morning.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] left Cartagena to fly to Miami at about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was instructed to be at USSS headquarters at [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], 2012, to be interviewed. He then left Miami to fly to Washington, D.C., at about [REDACTED]. and, after going to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] arrived home about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he did not sleep on the night of [REDACTED], 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS Headquarters at about [REDACTED] and interviewed with FNU [REDACTED] Inspector, USSS. [REDACTED] was given some sort of rights advisements or warnings, but could not remember what type of warning it was. [REDACTED] stated he believed that the interview was voluntary; however, he felt if he did not cooperate he would receive disciplinary action. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] the same information that he told [REDACTED] but specified that [REDACTED] provided a typed statement. [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] was willing to take a polygraph, which he agreed to do. [REDACTED] was then scheduled for a polygraph for [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he did not sleep on the nights of [REDACTED], 2012 to [REDACTED], 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS headquarters at about [REDACTED] where he met with [REDACTED] Polygraphers, USSS, who conducted a national security polygraph of [REDACTED] and did not ask any guided questions about the Cartagena incident. However, [REDACTED] did address the incident when explaining his contact with foreign nationals. [REDACTED] was told [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] everything about his contact with foreign nationals. He believed that [REDACTED]

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which [REDACTED] question about contact with foreign nationals. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] a few times between approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and was told [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] although he saw [REDACTED]. At about [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and was told to return on [REDACTED] 2012 at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS Headquarters at [REDACTED] and met with [REDACTED] again. He was administered the national security polygraph [REDACTED], and was told he [REDACTED]. It became clear that [REDACTED] and the polygraphers were [REDACTED]. About [REDACTED] walked [REDACTED] out, telling him that [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED]. The next step would be [REDACTED] indicated that it would be best if [REDACTED] resigned rather than be fired. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] seek legal advice. [REDACTED] was placed on administrative leave and turned in his USSS issued equipment.

On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] resigned [REDACTED] so that he could [REDACTED] consulting with legal counsel. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] placed on administrative leave as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed that those SAs who [REDACTED] were allowed to keep their jobs.

[REDACTED] stated he did not believe that he violated any regulations or laws. On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] stated he had attended a counterintelligence briefing at [REDACTED] along with many other SAs, wherein they were told that "one night stands" with foreign nationals were acceptable and only needed to be reported if the relationship continued. [REDACTED] provided signed statements from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED] to corroborate this information.

[REDACTED] believed he was a scapegoat and was being pressured to resign due to the media scrutiny of the situation. He was concerned about the veracity of the information the USSS used to evaluate him. In particular, the USSS stated that he received an in country briefing and packet that noted that he could not have a foreign national in his room. [REDACTED] stated he never received this information. During the bus ride from the airport to the hotel, there was a USSS employee who gave them tourist type information about the area, but did not discuss any regulations. At no point did he receive a packet discussing country specific regulations.

[REDACTED] still has all of the official emails related to the Cartagena trip and did not delete any of them. [REDACTED] did delete some of the unofficial emails between him and other agents in order to clear up

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room on his blackberry. [REDACTED] deleted some of these before the night of April 11, 2012 and some after.

[REDACTED] stated he did not have any direct or second hand knowledge of any USSS employee paying for sexual intercourse or sexual acts in Cartagena. [REDACTED] stated he heard that [REDACTED] USSS, later identified by the OIG as [REDACTED], was being pressured to resign as a result of the Cartagena incident. [REDACTED] apparently [REDACTED] knowledge of several other incidents similar to the situation in Cartagena, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not remember where he heard this information from, but believed that USSS "had files" on all of these incidents.<sup>9</sup>

### Employee # 5- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] began his career with USSS on [REDACTED], and had been [REDACTED] worked for USSS [REDACTED], for [REDACTED]; and with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] traveled to Cartagena to be a [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012. The official email notification was the only information he received concerning the trip. [REDACTED] had no Top Secret or classified information in his possession. [REDACTED] was interviewed by USSS RES and received the appropriate advisements during his interview which he believed was voluntary. [REDACTED] provided a detailed sworn statement to USSS RES and submitted to a polygraph exam concerning his statement and national security items.

In Cartagena, [REDACTED] direct supervisors were [REDACTED] traveled with USSS [REDACTED] spent time with them off duty. [REDACTED] visited a local restaurant and bar with [REDACTED] on the evening of Wednesday, April 11, 2012. The other SAs involved in the Cartagena incident were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no direct knowledge of the allegations concerning [REDACTED]. Later that evening, the [REDACTED] were at a typical, non-strip club establishment. [REDACTED] were talking and having a few beers. Eventually, [REDACTED] met a girl who was dancing and bought her some drinks.

<sup>9</sup> (Exhibits # 86, 365, 366)

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[REDACTED] and the woman left the club together in a cab and returned to the Caribe Hotel. [REDACTED] and the woman went to [REDACTED] room, where they had a few beers over 45 minutes. [REDACTED], when the woman said that if he wanted her to stay longer, it would be "more money", which [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] denied knowing she was a prostitute until she asked for money, [REDACTED].

After the situation in Cartagena unfolded, [REDACTED] was interviewed locally by USSS management and sent back to the U.S., departing on [REDACTED], April [REDACTED] 2012. [REDACTED] was placed on paid administrative leave for [REDACTED] which was later lifted. [REDACTED] believed the egregious acts in Cartagena were swiftly addressed and taken care of. [REDACTED] declined to provide a signed statement, citing he had given one to USSS RES.<sup>10</sup>

### Employee # 6- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] employee of the USSS; therefore, he was not administered rights advisements prior to questioning. He submitted to a voluntary interview. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] stated he was previously interviewed by [REDACTED], USSS, RES, Washington, D.C., following the Cartagena incident. [REDACTED] was not provided any warnings prior to either of the two interviews. He did not believe either interview was voluntary because he was told by his SAC, [REDACTED], to participate in the interviews. He believed he would have received some type of discipline for failure to comply with the interviews.

[REDACTED] stated he had [REDACTED] polygraph [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was hired by the USSS on [REDACTED], and spent [REDACTED] before he resigned from the USSS [REDACTED] under duress. [REDACTED] was assigned as [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he was in Cartagena from April [REDACTED] 2012, through April [REDACTED] 2012. [REDACTED] went on the detail to Colombia. [REDACTED] was designated as [REDACTED] stayed at the Caribe Hotel while in Cartagena. [REDACTED] claimed that he arrived on the car plane early [REDACTED] morning at approximately 7:00 a.m. and then checked into the hotel [REDACTED], he stayed around the hotel until he went to dinner. At approximately [REDACTED] traveled to [REDACTED] for dinner and returned to the hotel.

<sup>10</sup> (Exhibits # 124, 365, 366)

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any sexual encounter between the two of them. [REDACTED] stated that he did not go to that bar looking for prostitutes and that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED] stated that he would never pay for a prostitute.

The following day, [REDACTED] was in conference with [REDACTED] asked him if he had hired a prostitute the previous evening. [REDACTED] advised him that he did not hire a prostitute and [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] to make arrangements to meet with [REDACTED] for an interview.

[REDACTED] stated he was interviewed by [REDACTED], wherein he advised [REDACTED] of what took place the previous night. [REDACTED] was confused because [REDACTED] was asking him questions about other incidents with other USSS employees and U.S. Military Personnel which occurred the previous evening. [REDACTED] stated he advised [REDACTED] that he was with [REDACTED], but ran into a few USSS employees from [REDACTED] was then advised he would be traveling back to the U.S. the following morning.

The [REDACTED] following the incident, [REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] USSS, RES, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated he was not given any employee rights prior to the interview. The only thing [REDACTED] was advised of was that the interview was an important matter and that he needed to be truthful in the interview. [REDACTED] stated he was asked what happened and he provided a chronology of the incident. At the conclusion of the RES interview, [REDACTED] provided a statement and was advised he would be contacted for further action.

[REDACTED] stated that either Tuesday or Wednesday following the interview, he was called to RES to take a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] was with RES for approximately [REDACTED] hours and took the polygraph then was sent home. [REDACTED] was then contacted by SAC [REDACTED] polygraph examination. [REDACTED] claimed on [REDACTED] polygraph examination, there were [REDACTED] questions and he was advised that [REDACTED] was asked again if he knew she was a prostitute, and he again stated that he did not know that she was a prostitute.

[REDACTED] stated that he was shown by USSS Inspectors a written statement about [REDACTED] did not know who the statement was from, but later discovered it was not the statement of [REDACTED] because the USSS had not even interviewed [REDACTED] because they could not locate her. On Friday of that week, [REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] Office in Washington, D.C. whose name he could not remember. [REDACTED] two options, either to resign or wait out the process of his termination. [REDACTED] advised him that the USSS would revoke his security clearance because of [REDACTED] his actions in Colombia, and then he would be terminated.

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During the meeting with [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] by the name of [REDACTED] from Human Resources came into to the office and asked if [REDACTED] had any questions. According to [REDACTED] he signed the resignation papers under duress. [REDACTED] felt that he was singled out because [REDACTED] was lying about the incident and the USSS needed someone to blame. [REDACTED] believed this because [REDACTED] were never disciplined for their actions in Colombia, which were the same as his actions.<sup>11</sup>

### Employee # 7- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] had been employed with the USSS since [REDACTED]. Prior to becoming a [REDACTED] stated he worked as [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED]. From April [REDACTED]-13, 2012, [REDACTED] was assigned to the USSS mission in Cartagena in support of the President. [REDACTED] was assigned to [REDACTED]. During his shift, [REDACTED] team leader was [REDACTED]. In total, the [REDACTED] consisted of [REDACTED]. Specifically, [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] were assigned to [REDACTED].

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] arrived in Cartagena [REDACTED]. After checking into his room at the Hotel Caribe, [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] went to dinner with [REDACTED] that was located approximately [REDACTED] from the hotel. Following dinner, [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] that may have included [REDACTED] in its name.

While at [REDACTED], and after conversing with [REDACTED] women sitting at a table, [REDACTED] motioned for [REDACTED] to come join him and the women. [REDACTED] felt the women were Colombian because they did not speak fluent English. Initially, [REDACTED] did not talk much based on his limited ability to speak Spanish, the noise of the sports bar, and that he was watching television. At some point thereafter, [REDACTED] left the group and went to talk to another woman in [REDACTED].

<sup>11</sup> (Exhibits # 118A, 365, 366)

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On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] departed [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] of the women and returned with them to the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED], when the group left. [REDACTED] did not recall seeing any additional USSS personnel while at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] did not recall the names of the women he and [REDACTED] departed with, but described them. At the Hotel Caribe, [REDACTED] had to register [REDACTED] women at the front desk in order for them to go to their rooms. Specifically, [REDACTED] females had to present their identification to a representative of the Colombian National Police (CNP) so that they could be logged into the hotel.

[REDACTED] stated that he and his female acquaintance went to [REDACTED] hotel room and engaged in consensual sexual relations. [REDACTED] denied that the sexual relations were done in exchange for money. Similarly, [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] register his female acquaintance ([REDACTED] into the Hotel Caribe and they proceeded to [REDACTED] hotel room, located [REDACTED] hotel room.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] female acquaintance [REDACTED] the woman who was still with [REDACTED] female acquaintance [REDACTED] stated in English, "[REDACTED]." Subsequently, the female ([REDACTED] entered [REDACTED] room and [REDACTED] stated, [REDACTED] and demanded \$250. At some point thereafter, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] went out into the hallway. Despite [REDACTED] sending numerous emails to [REDACTED] via his USSS-issued Blackberry device, [REDACTED] was not able to contact [REDACTED].

While in the hallway with the women, [REDACTED] requested [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED], but described him. In the hallway and in the presence of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] "[REDACTED]." [REDACTED] stated she never asked [REDACTED] for any money.

[REDACTED] someone should pay the female accompanying [REDACTED] to resolve the matter without causing further incident. Around the same time, [REDACTED] came upon the group [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] to watch his room [REDACTED].

Using his personal [REDACTED], [REDACTED]. Subsequently, [REDACTED] returned to the vicinity of his room. [REDACTED] asked him to handle the complaint.

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[REDACTED] women subsequently left the hallway and departed the hotel.

During the incident [REDACTED], [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] was in his room based on the shadows from underneath [REDACTED] door. [REDACTED] did not have any contact with [REDACTED] until approximately [REDACTED] on April [REDACTED] 2012, when he [REDACTED] attended a briefing. When [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] before the briefing, [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] reply to [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not concerned about the [REDACTED], but rather was very upset that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not further explain the situation to [REDACTED] which was the last substantive discussion between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] regarding the matter. Amongst [REDACTED] in Cartagena, numerous emails, via their USSS-issued Blackberry devices, were exchanged regarding the incident.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Hilton Hotel by the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not issued any warnings during the interview which lasted approximately twenty minutes. [REDACTED] understood that the interview was administrative, and related to his suitability of retaining his security clearance. [REDACTED] described the interview as "definitely voluntary," but would have "not ended up so well" if he did not participate in the interview. [REDACTED] further described his participation as "volun-told."

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was notified via email that he was directed to return to the U.S. On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] Hotel Caribe lobby to start their departure. In addition to [REDACTED], the following additional USSS personnel were identified by [REDACTED] as being sent home on April [REDACTED] 2012: [REDACTED] personnel. In total and including [REDACTED] he reported twelve personnel were sent home. By way of commercial air carriers, the group departed Cartagena and travelled [REDACTED] on their return to the U.S. While in [REDACTED]

Approximately [REDACTED] after his departure from Cartagena, [REDACTED] participated in a polygraph examination given by the USSS RES. [REDACTED] advised he took national security, integrity, and criminal-focused polygraph examinations. During these examinations, [REDACTED] was not issued any warnings. However, [REDACTED] did confer with his attorney prior to taking the examinations. [REDACTED] was subsequently reinstated.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> (Exhibits # 119, 291, 365, 366)

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### Employee # 8- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, the OIG advised [REDACTED] that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. Additionally, the OIG administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which [REDACTED] signed and agreed to be interviewed. [REDACTED] was verbally administered his "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he stated that he would take under advisement, but [REDACTED] did not sign the warnings form. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] made several verbal statements. [REDACTED] denied that he ever solicited a prostitute and stated that he engaged in a consensual sexual encounter with a woman he identified as [REDACTED] LNU, whom he believed was a Colombian National. He declined to provide a statement regarding the incident because he had already provided one to USSS RES. Additionally, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] LNU after he was contacted by RES and that [REDACTED] they engaged in sex for money. [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a copy of the statement that he provided to RES and the statement from [REDACTED] LNU.<sup>13</sup>

### Employee # 9- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] who was [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he signed. During the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated he was interviewed as part of the Cartagena investigation on April [REDACTED] 2012, by USSS [REDACTED] was not given warnings and was under the impression he had to provide a statement. [REDACTED] did not believe the interview was voluntary and believed the USSS would "let go of me" had he not submitted to the interview. [REDACTED] in connection with the investigation.

[REDACTED] began with the USSS [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] was given [REDACTED] but was later [REDACTED] believed he was [REDACTED] assigned to the [REDACTED] where he [REDACTED] on or about [REDACTED].

<sup>13</sup> (Exhibits # 120, 365, 366)

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In Cartagena, [REDACTED] was assigned the [REDACTED], but never got the [REDACTED]. His supervisor in Cartagena was [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] the Cartagena trip. [REDACTED] team members in Cartagena included [REDACTED] [REDACTED] arrived in Cartagena on [REDACTED], April [REDACTED], 2012, departed on the morning of [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, and stayed at the Hotel Caribe.

While in Cartagena, [REDACTED] and his team members visited restaurants, bars and nightclubs; but he did not recall the names of the venues. [REDACTED] visited a bar for drinks [REDACTED] dinner was held on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, at [REDACTED] restaurant that [REDACTED] Everyone from the team was in attendance. While at dinner, the team members shared approximately two bottles of wine. After dinner, [REDACTED] left the restaurant with the team members and walked around the city to different bars. He did not [REDACTED] members on the team, including [REDACTED]. The team went "bar-hopping" at two or three different bars. The crowd of people dispersed as the night went on and ended the night at a bar where they met girls. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] the majority of the night where they were met by [REDACTED] and two other U.S. government employees and engaged them in conversation.

After growing tired of the conversation with them, [REDACTED] joined [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were talking to several girls. The girls spoke in Spanish, which [REDACTED] could somewhat understand but could not speak. [REDACTED] no one was fluent. [REDACTED] talked about leaving the bar and going back to the hotel. [REDACTED] ended up leaving with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said they would be bringing the girls back to the hotel. There were [REDACTED] girls that went back to the hotel with them. The woman that was with [REDACTED] that was not with anyone in particular. When they arrived to the hotel, Colombian police checked their identification, but [REDACTED] He was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] checked the girls in at the front desk. [REDACTED] appeared to know the process of checking the girls into the hotel.

[REDACTED] said he had a lot to drink and was very tired. He said when he entered his room, he used the restroom while the female he was with was playing with her hair in the mirror. When he returned from the restroom, they sat on the bed and watched the television show, "Jersey Shore." He later told her that he was tired and asked her to leave. She began arguing with him in Spanish, but he could not understand what she was saying. He understood her references to time and money, [REDACTED]. She became upset and [REDACTED] spoke in Spanish. She then [REDACTED] translated what she said. [REDACTED] the female stated he

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owed her \$150 USD and if he did not pay she would call the police. Not wanting the female to call the police, [REDACTED] He gave her \$150 USD and she left the hotel. [REDACTED] said he did not have any sexual relations with the female and did not know her name. He said she did kiss him on the cheek.

[REDACTED] said he suspected the females were prostitutes when he initially met them at the nightclub. That was [REDACTED] time hanging out with [REDACTED] He knew them all to be [REDACTED] and knew they had a reputation of going to bars and picking up girls. [REDACTED] said he never would have taken the female to his room and believed he was [REDACTED].

On the afternoon of [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] at the Hilton Hotel. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had left with girls and the girl that came to his room threw a fit. [REDACTED] did not recall if he told [REDACTED] that he paid the girl to leave his room. [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] and some of the other team members [REDACTED] received emails from upper level management regarding incidents that took place the night before. [REDACTED] lay low and not to do anything stupid. [REDACTED] had not spoken to [REDACTED] about what had taken place in his hotel room the night before.

Later that afternoon around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received an email [REDACTED] [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] USSS. The email was related to conduct and contact with foreign nationals. After receiving that email, [REDACTED] got nervous, but did not think it was related to him. He did not think he had done anything to rise to that level. [REDACTED] wondered what happened and suspected someone had been arrested. [REDACTED] involved in the incidents related to the emails. [REDACTED] what occurred the night before. He did not seem nervous about it until [REDACTED] met with them.

[REDACTED] did not know what occurred with [REDACTED] and the girls that they brought to their room. He did not know if [REDACTED] had sexual relations with them or if they paid them any money for their services or time. [REDACTED] said the "culture of the team" was that you do not want to know anybody's personal business. There was a "brotherhood" where you do not ask questions about personal business unless you are close friends. Prior to joining, [REDACTED] thought the team would consist of guys that were womanizers, but once on the team he realized that was not the case. [REDACTED] stated most were described as "good guys," but there were some "bad eggs" in the bunch such as [REDACTED], as he later learned.

Around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received an email instructing him to report to a specific room at [REDACTED] did not know who he would be meeting with. Upon arriving, [REDACTED]

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entered the room and immediately recognized [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to take [REDACTED] through the night and tell [REDACTED] what happened. [REDACTED] relayed the story and received no feedback. After the meeting, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] they were continuing to look into the matter and to keep his telephone close. [REDACTED] also said they were considering sending people home.

[REDACTED] went out to eat and waited to hear back from [REDACTED]. Around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received a logistical email stating he was to report for a flight [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] checked out of the hotel [REDACTED] to the airport with approximately 10 to 11 other people that consisted of [REDACTED] including [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] got word that he needed to contact a supervisor in Cartagena. He used [REDACTED] Blackberry to make the call [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] someone met with [REDACTED] and informed him [REDACTED] after it was learned [REDACTED] employee (name unknown) signed a girl into the hotel [REDACTED]. Upon a review of the video in the hotel, it was determined [REDACTED] was not involved and had not taken a girl to his room.

During the bus ride and flight, people said they thought the situation would "blow over" and there was not much talking on the bus ride; however, on the flight, [REDACTED] involved [REDACTED] incident with prostitutes, were upset and making comments like "[REDACTED]". [REDACTED] was the main person talking in this manner and was "the most pissed off." [REDACTED] had never met [REDACTED] and had never seen many of the other people on the bus/flight. [REDACTED] recognized [REDACTED] because [REDACTED], but he did not know him. [REDACTED] appeared very nervous. [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] had more contact with management and had received a call from [REDACTED] who yelled at him about the incident after [REDACTED] heard rumors that a lot of prostitutes had been hired.

The flight consisted of two layovers in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. While on the layovers, everyone checked their emails during which emails were received ordering them to report to USSS Headquarters on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, to meet with USSS RES. [REDACTED] received an email from [REDACTED] instructing him to report at [REDACTED].

On [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] reported to USSS RES where he was interviewed and provided a written statement, [REDACTED] a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] was told he was being placed on administrative leave. His USSS property (i.e. credentials, uniforms, pins) was retrieved and he was instructed to go to his duty station and collect his personal property. Several days went by without hearing back from the USSS, so [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to speak with [REDACTED]. On his way to the [REDACTED] on April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] received a telephone call from a USSS Inspector instructing him to report to

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USSS Inspections as soon as possible. [REDACTED] informed the Inspector that [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] arrived [REDACTED], he was immediately passed off to USSS RES.

During this meeting with USSS RES, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He suspected this was a result of [REDACTED] in Cartagena.

He was given a form to sign to choose which option he would take [REDACTED]. No one ever explained to him exactly why [REDACTED] and he did not know who made the decision or their basis. During that meeting [REDACTED] overheard people talking about him and stating "[REDACTED]..." [REDACTED] had approximately [REDACTED] of time with the USSS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was also told, after making several telephone calls and being referred to the USSS Legal Division, that his security clearance was suspended. [REDACTED] reportedly received a print-out of why his clearance was being suspended [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] did not receive any documentation.

After [REDACTED] was told he would be leaving the USSS, he spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told him [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he did not witness any other USSS employees with girls and/or prostitutes and had no knowledge of anyone paying prostitutes. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] paid the girls they were with. [REDACTED] stated he heard stories of people getting prostitutes while on international trips and suspected it was common in countries where prostitution was prevalent, such as Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Brazil. [REDACTED] believed being with prostitutes was tolerated by USSS supervisors, as long as you did not get caught. He further stated that USSS supervisors also participate by getting prostitutes themselves. [REDACTED] could not provide specific examples, but said "Everybody doesn't know everything, but people know. Senior people know."

[REDACTED] had never reported allegations of misconduct or illegal activities to DHS OIG. He did not know what DHS OIG was or that he could report misconduct to them.<sup>14</sup>

### Employee # 10- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED] Prior to the interview, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

<sup>14</sup> (Exhibits # 87, 126, 365, 366)

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██████████ entered on duty (EOD) with the USSS on ██████████, as a ██████████ ██████████ was currently ██████████ the outcome of the investigation. Additionally, ██████████ security clearance had been suspended.

██████████ most recent assignment with the USSS was to ██████████ served as a member on one of the teams during his assignment in Cartagena in April 2012, where his chain of command for this assignment consisted of his team leader, ██████████, and ██████████ ██████████

Due to being prematurely sent home as a result of the incident in Cartagena, ██████████ never had an opportunity to work while the President of the United States was in Cartagena. While ██████████ was in Cartagena, he ██████████ arrived in Cartagena on ██████████ and was flown back to the United States (U.S.) on ██████████ in advance of the visit. [Agent's Note: ██████████ could not recall the exact calendar dates of his trip to Cartagena.]

██████████ stayed at the Hotel Caribe in Cartagena. Once ██████████ had returned to the U.S., he was interviewed by USSS RES in relation to the incident in Cartagena. Upon conclusion of RES' interview, ██████████ was placed on administrative leave and escorted out of the building. ██████████ had to return his access cards/keys and was placed on a "Do Not Admit" status. ██████████ did not have an opportunity to submit a travel voucher.

While in Cartagena, ██████████ went to several retail establishments that sold alcohol and/or food, including nightclubs, restaurants and bars. On ██████████ at approximately ██████████ and his other members began having drinks at a restaurant called ██████████, which was located ██████████. Approximately an hour and a half later, ██████████ and maybe six or eight team members walked to a nearby ██████████ restaurant where they had dinner and wine. Afterwards, they left and met up with other members down the street, which some may have possibly been the same individuals that attended the first restaurant (██████████) earlier in the evening. Certain members of ██████████ group broke away at times, but reunited as the evening progressed. Subsequently, ██████████ attended several other bars with team members, to include ██████████ ██████████

██████████ met a female foreign national named ██████████ Last Name Unknown (LNU) at a nightclub called ██████████ [sic]. ██████████ was dressed conservatively and he did not believe she was a prostitute. The members of his (██████████) party were all present when he met ██████████ which at this point, he was considerably intoxicated. Throughout the entire evening, ██████████ ██████████. ██████████ asked ██████████ if she was "working" upon which she replied, "No." [Agent's Note: ██████████ meant prostitution when he asked ██████████ if she was "working".]

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\_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ . After spending approximately \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ then left with \_\_\_\_\_ and proceeded to his hotel \_\_\_\_\_ where they arrived at approximately \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ said that upon arrival at his hotel, he noticed \_\_\_\_\_, each accompanied by a female acquaintance, were also arriving to the hotel at the same time. Everyone was then escorted into the hotel by a security guard and guided to the front desk where they had to sign-in their female visitors and pay a fee. The females presented identification, and \_\_\_\_\_ advised the front desk to add his visitor's fee for \_\_\_\_\_ onto his bill. \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ that \_\_\_\_\_ then proceeded to \_\_\_\_\_ room while \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ accompanied by their visitors, went their separate ways. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_

Once the beer had been delivered, it was consumed in \_\_\_\_\_ room. \_\_\_\_\_ subsequently had to utilize the bathroom. Once he finished and exited the bathroom, \_\_\_\_\_ entered the bathroom where he believed she may have taken a shower because he heard the water running. Following \_\_\_\_\_ exiting the bathroom, \_\_\_\_\_ received a phone call from what sounded to \_\_\_\_\_ as a female voice on the other end. Once \_\_\_\_\_ ended the call, she advised him that it was \_\_\_\_\_ and she had to leave. \_\_\_\_\_ asked \_\_\_\_\_ for money to pay for a cab. \_\_\_\_\_ pulled some pesos out of his pants pocket, which he believed to be equivalent to about \$10 to \$20 USD and gave it to \_\_\_\_\_ was familiar with the currency and gave some back to him after looking through it and removing a few bills. \_\_\_\_\_ claimed that the money she took would be enough for a cab. \_\_\_\_\_ was not sure exactly how much money \_\_\_\_\_ took, but he believed it could not have been much since he had already spent much of his money on food and drinks. \_\_\_\_\_ believed he may have been missing some money that he placed in a drawer underneath the television in his hotel room. \_\_\_\_\_ did not accuse anyone of taking the money, but it was possible that hotel staff or \_\_\_\_\_ may have done so. \_\_\_\_\_ did not exchange any contact information with \_\_\_\_\_ left the room by herself and presumably stopped by the front desk to check out on her way out, which was probably sometime either prior to or around \_\_\_\_\_ later walked down the street and got a bite to eat \_\_\_\_\_.

On \_\_\_\_\_ at around \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ awoke after he was telephonically contacted by a friend who advised him that one member of \_\_\_\_\_ had been arrested for soliciting prostitution. \_\_\_\_\_ also received a phone call from \_\_\_\_\_ who advised him of the same issue and that he had heard about misconduct allegations concerning USSS employees. \_\_\_\_\_ was told by \_\_\_\_\_ that employees were allegedly partying too much, canines were sleeping on beds, things had been broken, and the rooms were being trashed. They told \_\_\_\_\_ that the U.S. Embassy had been contacted and the hotel staff was not content with the misconduct. \_\_\_\_\_ did not advise

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██████████ and ██████████ of his activities with ██████████ because he did not think she was a prostitute. ██████████ told both ██████████ and ██████████ that he would look into the issues.

██████████ then spoke on the phone with ██████████ who was also unaware of the alleged incidences. ██████████ decided to track down ██████████ since he observed them bringing women to the hotel the previous night. ██████████ told ██████████ that the female he brought back to the hotel had propositioned him for sex in exchange for money, which he refused and made her leave his room. Thereafter, ██████████ spoke to ██████████ who advised that he (██████████) and his female visitor had ██████████ arriving in his room. ██████████ said they were ██████████ female visitor departed his room upon being asked to leave. After speaking with ██████████ became concerned and notified ██████████ about the situations involving the girls they had brought back to the hotel.

██████████ subsequently received an e-mail instructing him to meet with ██████████ who was on scene. At approximately ██████████ met with ██████████ and provided an oral account of the events that occurred while in Cartagena. Also present during that meeting with ██████████ were ██████████. The meeting occurred at the Hilton Hotel in Cartagena. ██████████ not supposed to bring women back to the hotel. ██████████ first time he had ever heard of such directive. ██████████ had never been instructed to not bring females back to his hotel room while employed with the USSS. ██████████ advised that when ██████████ since working for the USSS both in the U.S. and abroad.

██████████ stated he was flown back to the U.S. ██████████ due to the incident. ██████████ submitted to ██████████ polygraph by USSS polygraphers, FNU ██████████ and FNU ██████████ believed this was unprecedented. ██████████ was advised that ██████████.

██████████ stated he did not witness any USSS or government employees hire prostitutes during the Cartagena trip. ██████████ stated he had never paid for sexual favors while employed with the USSS or engaged in illegal activity; however, ██████████ provided the OIG with additional information pertaining to incidents similar to Cartagena.

██████████ stated the USSS Security Clearance Division held a meeting on ██████████, 2012, at WFO, and advised that you do not have to report a one night stand with a foreign national. It had never been an issue in the past and ██████████ believed it was only an OPSEC violation if you had a relationship that could subject a government employee to coercion or blackmail. A consensual relationship (sex with

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a female) had never been an issue prior to the Cartagena incident. [REDACTED] declined to provide DHS OIG with a written statement.<sup>15</sup>

### Employee # 11- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and was being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] with the USSS. As a result of an investigation by the USSS into the Cartagena incident, [REDACTED] resigned from the USSS effective [REDACTED] suspension of his top secret security clearance, which could have eventually led to his security clearance being revoked, or he could voluntarily resign. [REDACTED] felt he had no choice but to resign based on the way the USSS presented their findings against him.

Prior to the USSS, [REDACTED] started with the USSS [REDACTED]. After approximately [REDACTED] became a [REDACTED] which was under the USSS [REDACTED] stated that the [REDACTED] required [REDACTED] The schedules were released on a daily basis and the number of required [REDACTED] was based on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was assigned by the USSS to officially travel to Cartagena for the visit to [REDACTED] stated that he was scheduled by the USSS to arrive in Cartagena a few days early because the airport in Cartagena could only hold a certain number of airplanes at one time. [REDACTED] stated that there seemed to be a misperception in the media that several USSS employees arrived early for no particular reason. In most cases, [REDACTED] as the trip to Cartagena, but because of the logistical issues with the airport, equipment, and arriving dignitaries, he and [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] would have been assigned to multiple locations; not one specific location. [REDACTED] supervisory chain of command in Cartagena was [REDACTED]

<sup>15</sup> (Exhibit # 125, 365, 366)

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████████ arrived in Cartagena on April ██████ 2012, around ██████. and arrived at his hotel, the Hotel Caribe, around ██████. On this same evening, ██████ had dinner at a restaurant ██████ with ██████. He had no reportable contact with foreign nationals and returned to his hotel room alone.

While in Cartagena, ██████ spent the majority of his off-duty time with ██████ including ██████. ██████ did not socialize in Cartagena with any other USSS personnel outside of ██████. ██████ also did not socialize with any other DHS personnel, non-DHS employees or other U.S. government personnel.

Prior to discussing the events surrounding the allegations of prostitution in Cartagena, ██████ wanted to clarify background information about the Hotel Caribe and information that was provided to him in the briefing packet he received. ██████ admitted that he had ██████ prior to this trip.

████████ stated that to his knowledge, the Hotel Caribe had been completely rented out by U.S. personnel. In addition, he stated there were at least seventy-five to one-hundred police officers (non-U.S. citizens) that provided security around the Hotel Caribe. ██████ stated that there were also at least twenty-five uniformed hotel security officers patrolling the hotel premises at one time. ██████ also wanted to make clear that the Hotel Caribe did not have ██████ the nearby Hilton hotel where the President was going to stay while in Cartagena. The Hotel Caribe was a secure location, but he did not believe the hotel would have been considered secure by USSS standards.

████████ heard the staff at the Hotel Caribe had issues with USSS personnel prior to the incident involving the prostitutes. ██████ was not directly made aware of these complaints by hotel staff, but heard that the hotel staff had complaints about USSS employees throwing a football in and around the pool area, USSS employees bringing in their own coolers filled with beer instead of buying beer from the hotel bar, a USSS canine reportedly defecated on a bed, a USSS employee who damaged something in their room, and a USSS employee who vomited in a hallway. ██████ saw people with their own coolers, but did not know the contents or if the people that had it were USSS employees. ██████ did not know if these issues at the hotel were brought to the attention of USSS personnel or if USSS personnel were asked to stop any specific activities or actions that the hotel staff found offensive.

████████ continued that on ██████ April ██████ 2012, ██████ went to ██████ to make sure ██████ and ██████. After ██████ was briefed by ██████ at the Hilton Hotel and was given welcome packets prepared by the Regional Security Officer (RSO) with the U.S. Embassy/Department of State. The USSS advance team (████████) distributed the packets

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and mission assignments. [REDACTED] stated that no one from the U.S. Embassy spoke to them or briefed them about issues in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] further stated that he did not know that prostitution was legal in Cartagena and there was no information in the packet he received that warned or advised them about prostitution or criminal activity in the area. [REDACTED] stated that there was a bullet point on the individual protective measures form in the packet that stated to not give your hotel room number to strangers. [REDACTED] stated this was one of the items the USSS used against him administratively once he admitted that he had brought a female foreign national back to his hotel room. [Agent's Note: [REDACTED] provided a copy of the measures form.]

After the briefing, [REDACTED] and other [REDACTED] went back to [REDACTED] the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED] and several team members [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] decided to meet around [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall the name of this first location and further stated that no foreign national contacts were made other than wait staff. In addition, not all of the [REDACTED] were present because [REDACTED]. This first group included [REDACTED]. They sat around for a while, had a few drinks (alcoholic beverages) and waited for other team members to arrive before departing for [REDACTED] located in [REDACTED]. The group ate dinner and, at approximately [REDACTED] they left the [REDACTED] and went to a third location.

At the third location, identified as [REDACTED] (name unknown), most [REDACTED] had arrived and joined the initial group, who included [REDACTED]. They left this location and proceeded to a fourth location, which was a bar (name unknown) in [REDACTED]. On the way to the bar, the group split up for a brief time but eventually met up with team members already inside of the bar. The group [REDACTED] was sitting at a table with females that appeared to be foreign nationals. [REDACTED] approached the female [REDACTED] and introduced himself, but not as a USSS employee. [REDACTED] did not recall the name of the female, but assumed she was a local resident/foreign national. [REDACTED] and the female sat together had a few drinks, talked and danced. The female inquired about leaving the bar with [REDACTED] and told him that he would need to pay [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had exchanged money in the USSS control room prior to leaving that evening, so he was able to pay in pesos. [REDACTED] could not recall the exchange rate, but thought he paid [REDACTED] around three million pesos or approximately \$140 in U.S. currency for the girl to leave with him. [REDACTED] understood that he was paying for her to leave with him and eventually go back to his hotel room. There was no discussion at this time about sexual intercourse or any sexual services she would provide.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] left the fourth location and, as best he could recall, he ([REDACTED]) that had a female with him. [REDACTED] went to a fifth location, also a

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bar with female foreign nationals, had a few drinks and left. [REDACTED] stated at this point he was dancing and not paying much attention to what the other members in the group were doing.

When they left the fifth bar, [REDACTED] the female and a few others [REDACTED] back to the hotel. Prior to getting to the hotel, the group stopped at another bar, which would be location number six for [REDACTED]. Several members from the team had left as [REDACTED] stated they "lost several from the group." There were also several foreign national females at this location. [REDACTED] left this bar, which was [REDACTED] the Hotel Caribe, with the female he picked up.

[REDACTED] did not specifically recall any [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ask about his female companion during the evening or any of the details about payments for the female. [REDACTED] did not recall any [REDACTED] [REDACTED] identifying themselves to the female foreign nationals as USSS personnel and did not have any outward identification that would have identified them as USSS personnel. [REDACTED] stated that he did not tell his female companion anything about the USSS or that he was employed with the USSS.

When [REDACTED] arrived at the Hotel Caribe he was stopped by a person at the front desk and was told he needed to sign in any guests. [REDACTED] recalled signing a form, but was not sure what kind of form or what the form stated. [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] at this time. [REDACTED] was also advised that he needed to pay for an additional guest. [REDACTED] showed OIG a receipt from the Hotel Caribe that had a charge for an additional guest for 95,000 pesos. This charge appeared as an incidental charge and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that the charge for the extra guest was billed to him as an incidental charge [REDACTED] and he did not seek reimbursement from the USSS for this charge. [Agent's Note: OIG requested a copy of the hotel receipt, but [REDACTED] stated that it had [REDACTED] information on the receipt and did not want to provide a copy at this time.] [REDACTED] advised that he did not file a voucher for reimbursement of any incidental expenses he occurred in Cartagena.

After signing the hotel form and paying the fee to check the female into his room, [REDACTED] and his female companion went to his room. [REDACTED] estimated that he had at least [REDACTED] alcoholic beverages by this time and was drunk, but not incapacitated. When they got to his room [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; however, according to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that outside of Cartagena, he had never paid for sexual services while employed with the USSS.

The following morning, [REDACTED] April [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] was awakened [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED]

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██████████ said he was not aware of ██████████. ██████████ walked the female down to the lobby and she proceeded to the front desk. ██████████ did not walk to the front desk with her but assumed she needed to sign out and retrieve her identification. ██████████ provided the OIG with a copy of the Hotel Caribe policies that were located in his room that addressed visitors.

██████████ checked his electronic mail messages (e-mail) on his government issued Blackberry cellular telephone and looked up and noticed the female was no longer at the front desk. A hotel security guard pointed towards where she exited and ██████████ went towards that direction and eventually met up with her at an entrance other than the main entrance. The female told ██████████ she needed more money. ██████████ paid her approximately three million pesos, or what he estimated to be \$140 – \$150 U.S. Dollars. ██████████ walked her to a taxi and attempted to ██████████. ██████████ estimated she left around ██████████ on ██████████. ██████████ has had no further contact with her since that time.

██████████ went back to his room to start getting ready for work. He met with ██████████ in the ██████████. They walked together to ██████████ where they were scheduled to meet with ██████████. At ██████████ they ██████████ and went to ██████████. Shortly after meeting up with ██████████, they began to hear rumors that were spreading about a member of the USSS ██████████ that was involved in an incident with a prostitute in which local police were called. The information was disseminated to ██████████ by ██████████. ██████████ heard that the ██████████ member in question was ██████████.

After ██████████ decided to ██████████. While ██████████ and others started hearing that the U.S. Ambassador wanted to throw twenty-two U.S. personnel out of Colombia because of incidents involving prostitutes. ██████████ said the USSS wanted to “remove their own” instead of having the U.S. Ambassador remove them from the country. ██████████ understood that the twenty-two individuals involved included USSS personnel and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) personnel.

That afternoon, ██████████ received an email from ██████████ Miami Field Office, related to conduct in Cartagena. Later that afternoon, ██████████ received an e-mail from USSS logistics that he (██████████) needed to report to a hotel room ██████████ of the Hilton for a meeting. After appearing and waiting to be called in, he received e-mail containing travel plans for him to return to the U.S. on ██████████ prior to the arrival of the President. ██████████ were present and ██████████. There were no discussions about the events of the previous night, but they were all wondering what the meetings were about.

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entered the room and was joined by an unknown and a supervisor who was also unknown. asked about the e-mail he received prior to the start of the meeting containing travel orders back to the U.S. said the did not believe was being truthful with him. admitted that he was not entirely truthful when questioned by and the others about his activities in Cartagena. He had admitted to having a guest in his room, but not to any payments or sexual intercourse. stated that after he received the e-mail about being sent home he figured the USSS had already made their decision and would not give him a chance.

After the meeting with returned to his hotel room and prepared to leave. He did not receive an email rescinding the travel order that said (according to On and several others were flown back to the U.S. and arrived in Washington, D.C. or was instructed to report to USSS headquarters to meet with the USSS RES on at

At USSS headquarters, met with two SAs from the USSS RES and was instructed to type a statement in regards to his involvement in the incident in Cartagena. recalled some type of warnings being read to him prior to providing the statement, but he could not recall the exact type of warnings given. stated that it was on this date, April 2012, that he had to turn in property issued to him by the USSS. provided a copy of the memorandum placing him on administrative leave. The memorandum was dated April 2012, with an effective date of April 2012, and was signed by USSS.

stated that he was later called back to be administered polygraph was told the polygraph was going to be a "national security" polygraph and he would only be asked questions in regards to national security. voluntarily took the polygraph which he described as being about and was told that.

The polygraph examiners then asked was advised that was also asked to because of an allegation that was involved during the incident. stated that he felt the media was controlling the USSS and what the USSS did to its employees in regard to the Cartagena incident. provided a copy of that he signed, which was dated 2012.

also provided a copy of a memorandum to that detailed the notice of suspension of top secret security clearance dated 2012, and a copy of a USSS memorandum dated

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[REDACTED], 2012, with a subject of "Notice of Determination – [REDACTED]" addressed to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] stated that this memorandum referenced the individual protective measure form provided in the welcome packet he received and specifically referenced foreign intelligence services and not giving your room number to strangers. [REDACTED] stated that not only did he have to sign in with her, but as he previously stated, the hotel had police officers and hotel security and he did not believe that what he did reached the levels as quoted from the warnings in the packet. In addition, [REDACTED] stated that the USSS took [REDACTED] out of context. [REDACTED] but stated that it was in regard to [REDACTED]. The e-mail stated in part, "[REDACTED]" and [REDACTED] stated that the USSS took it completely out of context. [REDACTED] stated that USSS employees [REDACTED] and (First Name Unknown) [REDACTED] might have [REDACTED].

The memorandum also referenced [REDACTED] statement that was made to the USSS RES regarding his self-admitted alcohol consumption and taking the female foreign national to his hotel room. The polygraph was also noted in the memorandum and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] provided a copy of a USSS memorandum dated [REDACTED] 2012, entitled Proposed [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] from USSS [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] was presented with an offer to resign from the USSS. [REDACTED] stated that he was going through a very stressful time [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] he was [REDACTED] and was [REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED] all that was happening and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that it was presented to him that he could either resign or be placed on administrative leave pending an investigation in which he could lose his top secret clearance. [REDACTED] also stated that all of this could have been avoided if the pre-advance teams, advance teams, and Department of State had advised and made clear the propensity for prostitution in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] felt as if he had no choice but to resign in lieu of losing his top secret security clearance and provided DHS OIG with his letter of resignation dated [REDACTED], which would be effective [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also provided a copy of a Standard Form 50 (SF 50) Request for Personnel Action that documented the resignation.

[REDACTED] stated that because of the media coverage and embarrassment to the agency, he was punished more severely than required based on his purported actions. [REDACTED] stated that there was a great deal of disparity and treatment within the USSS between [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that there were people within the USSS that committed actual crimes and were still employed by the USSS. [REDACTED] admitted he may have [REDACTED] but his actions in Cartagena were not a violation of law in Cartagena and he should not have lost his job as a result. Again he stated the whole situation could have been alleviated if the advance and pre-

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advance teams had done their jobs properly and made proper advisements about the area and prostitution in the area.

██████████ stated that the incident in Cartagena was not typical within the USSS; however he believed that if the local police and media were not involved, the USSS would have handled it in-house.

██████████ believes there is a level of acceptance balanced with a level of professionalism. He could not say that this type of behavior never happened, happened during every foreign trip, or if this was the only time this type of behavior occurred. ██████████ refused to provide a written statement.<sup>16</sup>

### Employee # 12- ██████████

The OIG made attempts to conduct a voluntary interview with ██████████ ██████████ USSS, Washington, D.C. ██████████ was later personally contacted and his attorney was advised that the DOJ had approved Kalkines warnings and that ██████████ was compelled to appear for an interview with the OIG. ██████████ failed to comply and never appeared for an interview.<sup>17</sup>

### Employee # 13- ██████████

The OIG interviewed ██████████, USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, ██████████ was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. Additionally, ██████████ was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [Agent's Note: ██████████ ██████████ administer Kalkines warnings to ██████████ in order to compel him to speak to the OIG. ██████████ provided copies of his resignation letter and SF-50 showing a resignation date effective on ██████████, therefore Kalkines would not be applicable. ██████████ agreed to proceed with the interview voluntarily.] ██████████ provided the following information in substance:

██████████ started with the USSS on ██████████, and was assigned to ██████████. He started with ██████████, and was assigned as ██████████ in Cartagena, Colombia, in preparation for the President's visit. ██████████ arrived in Cartagena, Colombia, on April ██████████ 2012, in order to ██████████. He was also tasked with ██████████. His supervisor in Cartagena was ██████████, USSS ██████████.

██████████ stated that he was in Cartagena approximately ██████████ for the Presidential visit and stayed at the Hilton hotel in Cartagena, Colombia. He did not have any classified paperwork in his hotel

<sup>16</sup> (Exhibits # 122C, 365, 366)

<sup>17</sup> (Exhibits # 177, 177A, 365, 366)

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room; all of the classified paperwork and his laptop were [REDACTED]. He spent his off-duty time with [REDACTED] (later identified by OIG as [REDACTED]), USSS, because they both worked similar shifts. Several days before the President's visit to Cartagena, Colombia, he went [REDACTED]. He was at the bar drinking and met a foreign national and "things got out of hand." [REDACTED] stated that he was at the bar drinking [REDACTED] and a female named [REDACTED] came up to him and they started talking and dancing. She asked him, "if he wanted to leave with her," and he agreed. [REDACTED] declined to answer what "leaving together" implied, but advised he did not pay a fee to leave with the female from the bar and stated that the females that were at the bar seemed like "regular girls."

They both returned to the Hilton Hotel and he signed her in at the hotel lobby and she provided her identification card at the hotel lobby. He had to pay a guest fee to the hotel but did not recall the exact figure. He gave her a fictitious name and told her he was there on vacation. When asked whether he paid the female any money, or the details of what occurred when they left the bar together, he declined to answer.

[REDACTED] stated that he tried to be discreet and never said anything to anybody for the remainder of the advance. He continued on with his duties for the trip and did not have additional contact with any other foreign nationals for the remainder of the trip. [REDACTED] stated that the first time he heard that USSS employees were involved in prostitution in Cartagena, Colombia, was when he heard that some of the Department of Defense (DOD) employees were causing a scene at the hotel with some girls. He was subsequently told that [REDACTED] members [REDACTED], were being sent home due their involvement with prostitutes. None of the employees spoke to him regarding their intentions to find prostitutes before the incident.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] factor in the loss of the [REDACTED] members to accommodate the loss of [REDACTED] stated the USSS jeopardized the mission because they sent [REDACTED] members home before their mission was complete. He felt that the DOD response to the incident was more appropriate because they kept the employees in country to complete the mission and then dealt with the disciplinary action after the mission was completed.

[REDACTED] stated that there were subsequent meetings with the advance team regarding the prostitution incident in Cartagena and the advance team was told to report any information they knew regarding prostitution and USSS employees. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] returned to the U.S.

Once in the U.S., he received an email from SOD Support stating that he needed to report to the USSS RES for a witness interview where he was interviewed by RES on [REDACTED], 2012. He stated that he was not issued any warnings prior to the interview by RES and was under the

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impression that it was a witness interview. He did not feel that the interview was voluntary and felt that he would be subject to administrative action if he did not participate in the interview. He stated that during the interview, the inspectors implied that they had knowledge of wrongdoing by [REDACTED]. He then told them about the incident with the female foreign national at the bar. [REDACTED] believed that the USSS found out about the female through the log sheet that he signed when he returned to the hotel with the female [REDACTED]. During the interview, USSS RES asked him to voluntarily submit to a national security/counterintelligence polygraph examination and gave him a written request to which he agreed. The polygraph was administered on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, and the polygraphers told him that [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was then called in to USSS Headquarters on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2012, and met [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall his name) were present. [REDACTED] was given two options during the meeting, sign a typed letter of resignation or face termination proceedings and revocation of his security clearance due to his "unauthorized contact with a foreign national" [REDACTED] signed the letter after his options were explained to him and his resignation was effective [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that he had approximately 15 minutes to decide whether he was going to resign or allow the USSS to take administrative action while his supervisors were staring at him.

[REDACTED] stated he did not feel that the USSS RES investigation was fair because of how quickly everything happened, he gave a statement on a [REDACTED] a polygraph on a [REDACTED] and signed a resignation letter on [REDACTED]. He also stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are still working for the USSS. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] and is currently [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] was unsure if this played a role in [REDACTED] employment status.

[REDACTED] stated he had witnessed the involvement on other foreign trips in [REDACTED]. He stated that he witnessed SAs from PPD drinking excessively and "hooking up" with "working girls" and "non working girls." [REDACTED] stated he had direct knowledge because USSS SAs [REDACTED] because he [REDACTED]. On another occasion, [REDACTED] returned to his assigned hotel from a club with a USSS supervisor in a taxi and the supervisor went to the front desk to advise them he (the supervisor) was expecting a young lady to come back to his room for the night.<sup>18</sup>

### Employee # 14 – [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which

<sup>18</sup> (Exhibits # 173C, 365, 366)

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he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, before questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] stated that he entered on duty with [REDACTED] the USSS on [REDACTED] and was currently assigned to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that in April 2012 [REDACTED] the assignment to Cartagena, Columbia. [REDACTED] stated that he was previously interviewed [REDACTED] regarding the prostitution incident. [REDACTED] interviewed in Cartagena by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] USSS, Miami, Florida, and [REDACTED], [REDACTED], USSS, Bogota, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated that he was notified by e-mail to meet with [REDACTED] in Cartagena. [REDACTED] stated that he did not know what the interview was about and was not provided with any written or oral warnings (Garrity or Kalkines) prior to the interview. [REDACTED] stated that he did not believe the interview was voluntary and thought he would have suffered negative consequences if he refused to answer questions.

[REDACTED] stated that when he returned from Cartagena he was interviewed by investigators from the USSS Inspections Division in Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he was issued a Non-Disclosure warning and provided with his rights. [REDACTED] was not sure if he was advised of Garrity rights. [REDACTED] stated that he knew this interview was voluntary and did not think he would suffer negative consequences if he had declined to be interviewed. [REDACTED] stated that he was not asked to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that in Cartagena he was assigned to [REDACTED]. Before the trip, [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] that were also going on the assignment. [REDACTED] stated that he did not e-mail anyone about the trip. [REDACTED] received e-mails containing logistical information such as travel dates, hotel reservations, etc. [REDACTED] stated that he did not receive or send any e-mails regarding after hours activities in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED] staying at El Caribe Hotel in Cartagena and that he did not go to any night clubs. While off-duty they went to a restaurant [REDACTED] from El Caribe Hotel and to [REDACTED], both restaurants served alcohol. [REDACTED] stated that they also went to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that he interacted with the employees of the establishments but did not socialize with any females or other Colombian nationals.

[REDACTED] stated that on [REDACTED] 2012, he was interviewed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and they asked if he knew what the interview was about. [REDACTED] said he did not and they informed him El Caribe complained about USSS personnel. They asked if [REDACTED] had anyone in his hotel room the night before and [REDACTED] said, "No." [REDACTED] stated that he was dismissed from the interview and not told anything else. The next day [REDACTED] received an e-mail addressed to him and eleven other USSS personnel informing them to check out of the hotel because they were being sent home.

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President's visit in April.<sup>22</sup> OIG did not interview or investigate the activities of any individuals not employed by DHS, to include the WHCA employee and the reported White House staff and/or advance member.

OIG made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records. However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter. Therefore, OIG had to rely on the FFN statements previously obtained by the USSS.<sup>23</sup>

During questioning, USSS employees reported they were aware of incidents similar to those that reportedly occurred in Cartagena and were asked whether they thought this incident was indicative of a broader organizational issue within the USSS. INV preliminarily identified reports that 123 believed it was an anomaly<sup>24</sup>, 5 said that the broader organizational issues played a role<sup>25</sup>, and 10 relayed knowledge of similar misconduct occurring on other occasions.<sup>26</sup> The remainder made no assertions of any opinion.

The reports of broader organizational issues within the USSS were referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.<sup>27</sup>

### **Allegation 2: The DHS OIG received reports that the USSS RES did not provide any employee administrative warnings during the Cartagena interviews.**

The OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after USSS employees reported that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) did not provide USSS personnel with any employee rights advisements during the interviews conducted as part of their investigation of this incident. After consulting with the DOJ, OIG decided that the OIG would conduct an entirely new investigation to ensure that the information OIG obtained during our interviews was obtained

<sup>22</sup> (Exhibits # 20, 25, 123, 306, 314, 316, 317, 324, 340, 346, 352)

<sup>23</sup> (Exhibits # 3A, 315, 365)

<sup>24</sup> (Exhibits # 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 91, 94, 95, 99, 100, 107, 110, 115, 119, 127, 129, 130, 131, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 148, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161, 167, 169, 172, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 197, 199, 202, 203, 207, 209, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 228, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 261, 262, 320)

<sup>25</sup> (Exhibits # 49, 50, 65, 126, 127, 145, 168, 234, 257, 268, 292, 294, 295, 306, 322, 324, 326, 338, 343, 345, 345A, 347, 351, 353, 354, 356)

<sup>26</sup> (Exhibits # 4, 26, 62, 80, 84, 86, 122, 125, 126, 127, 145, 168, 173C, 198, 212, 234, 252, 264, 291, 322, 353, 364, 365)

<sup>27</sup> (Exhibit # 366)

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voluntarily and therefore useable in any potential criminal or administrative proceedings. OIG found that of the employees initially interviewed by USSS RES, 38 said they were provided with an administrative rights advisement,<sup>28</sup> 72 advised that they were provided with no rights advisement<sup>29</sup> and 48 had no recollection of receiving any warnings whatsoever.<sup>30</sup>

USSS employees OIG interviewed reported that they felt compelled to participate in the USSS RES interviews, citing concerns of punishment or reprimand if they failed to cooperate in the RES investigation.<sup>31</sup>

Two USSS RES Inspectors responsible for conducting the internal interviews also reported that administrative rights were not provided to employees.<sup>32</sup>

The reports of USSS policy regarding the use of administrative warnings for USSS employees was referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.<sup>33</sup>

### **Allegation 3: The DHS OIG received reports that U.S. Secret Service personnel failed to properly record foreign national contact reports.**

As part of our investigation, OIG reviewed the completed USSS foreign national contact reports and conducted interviews to determine whether the USSS personnel had complied with the mandatory reporting provisions of DCID 6/4 and PDD 12, as authorized by Executive Order 9397, 6 USC 341, 44 USC 3101, PDD 12 and DCID 6/4. Specifically, the OIG requested all foreign contact reports on file with the USSS since January 2008, to determine whether foreign contacts had been properly reported and documented as required, and to identify instances with foreign nationals similar to those of the Cartagena incident. Our review of these documents found that in the four years prior to this incident, 105 total reports were filed. Our review revealed that following the Cartagena incident and a subsequent reported USSS policy change, 423 new reported foreign national contacts were filed,

<sup>28</sup> (Exhibits # 39, 41, 42, 55, 64, 71, 73, 85, 86, 87, 95, 97, 98, 100, 107, 112, 114, 122C, 123, 124, 128, 129, 133, 139, 145, 146, 151, 174, 178, 184, 190, 199, 212, 221, 223, 234, 238, 240, 249, 360E)

<sup>29</sup> (Exhibits # 18, 19, 20, 26, 44, 49, 51, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 89, 91, 94, 96, 101, 103, 106, 108, 115, 116, 118A, 119, 123, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137, 138, 143, 150, 154, 172, 173C, 179, 182, 187, 188, 193, 195, 198, 203, 204, 205, 209, 214, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 233, 235, 236, 239, 241, 243, 244, 246, 247, 251, 273, 297, 312, 360E)

<sup>30</sup> (Exhibits # 38, 43, 47, 53, 54, 59, 61, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 80, 82, 84, 99, 110, 130, 132, 134, 140, 141, 148, 168, 169, 175, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201, 206, 208, 215, 216, 217, 228, 230, 232, 237, 242, 244, 248, 250, 360E)

<sup>31</sup> (Exhibit # 26, 65, 68, 74, 82, 85, 86, 94, 98, 107, 110, 112, 118A, 123, 126, 173C, 199, 220, 297, 312, 360E)

<sup>32</sup> (Exhibits # 297, 312, 363)

<sup>33</sup> (Exhibit # 366)

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the majority of which were retroactively filed subsequent to this incident, dating back to 1976. Of the 423, one report was filed for the Cartagena trip.<sup>34</sup>

The reports of prior USSS policy and new procedural changes regarding the reporting of foreign contacts were referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.<sup>35</sup>

### **Allegation 4: The DHS OIG reviewed the Cartagena incident for any potential disclosure of national security information and/or related threat to the President of the United States.**

During our interviews of USSS personnel, OIG received no reports of any potential loss or disclosure of national security information or any specified threat to the President directly related to the Cartagena prostitution incident. More specifically, our investigation developed no evidence to suggest that the actions of USSS personnel had potentially compromised the safety and security of the President or any sensitive information during this trip; however, OIG received reports of other alleged compromises of safety and security.<sup>36</sup> These additional allegations are currently under OIG review.

As part of our investigation, OIG identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; OIG could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. OIG queried the IC as to whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported, the other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.<sup>37</sup> Our interviews of USSS executive personnel and our review of relevant records confirmed that the USSS had knowledge that one FFN had derogatory information,<sup>38</sup> but were not aware of the second identified by the OIG.

[Agent's Note: Records from the Hilton Cartagena Hotel also showed names of two people OIG identified as the non-DHS employees associated with the White House, registered in two separate rooms. The names of the [REDACTED] females listed as visitors to these two rooms during the advance activities were queried through the IC, which did not reveal any derogatory information. OIG did not interview the two non-DHS employees or the FFN visitors regarding any disclosure issues.]

<sup>34</sup> (Exhibits # 122C, 152, 161A, 193, 261, 273, 279, 284, 285, 339, 360A, 360B, 365)

<sup>35</sup> (Exhibit # 366)

<sup>36</sup> (Exhibits # 257, 267, 285, 320A, 324, 348, 356, 365)

<sup>37</sup> (Exhibits # 335, 358, 358A, 365, 366)

<sup>38</sup> (Exhibits # 98A, 162, 277, 277A, 278, 278A, 283, 285, 289, 306, 310, 312, 313, 317, 323, 349, 350, 365, 366)

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The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] did not tell the prostitute why he was in Cartagena, nor did he tell her that he was a USSS SA. [REDACTED] stated did not release any classified or sensitive information to the prostitute and did not report any loss.<sup>39</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he did not disclose any sensitive or classified information to [REDACTED] LNU. [REDACTED] told investigators he had secured all sensitive or classified documents in the car plane and in the safe of his hotel room.<sup>40</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] pertained mainly to the [REDACTED] kept these documents in a safe in his hotel room when they were not in his possession. [REDACTED] disposed of these documents by placing them in a burn bag at the [REDACTED] No unauthorized persons had access to [REDACTED] paperwork.<sup>41</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he told his female companion that he was a tourist from the U.S., but did not tell her his occupation, nor did he ask her occupation. [REDACTED] stated the female companion did not ask any questions about the U.S. government, USSS, or anything about the U.S. other than the fact that she mentioned she would like to visit the U.S. at some point in her life. [REDACTED] stated he did not possess any classified information, any documentation regarding the Presidential visit to Cartagena, or a weapon in his room. [REDACTED] stated he did have [REDACTED] and his credentials locked in the safe in his room. [REDACTED] believed he may have had his personal travel documentation, such as plane tickets and receipts, in a bag in his room. [REDACTED] stated he was carrying his USSS blackberry, but it was locked with a password. He did not report anything missing.<sup>42</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated he had no Top Secret or classified information in his possession. He did not report anything missing.<sup>43</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] denied having any classified or sensitive information in his possession

<sup>39</sup> (Exhibits # 123, 365, 366)

<sup>40</sup> (Exhibits # 26, 365, 366)

<sup>41</sup> (Exhibits # 82, 365, 366)

<sup>42</sup> (Exhibits # 86, 365, 366)

<sup>43</sup> (Exhibits # 124, 365, 366)

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that the FFN may have had access to or whether she accessed any of information. [REDACTED] also denied her having any access to weapons or law enforcement tools.<sup>44</sup>

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. While in Cartagena, [REDACTED] had no classified or sensitive paperwork. [REDACTED] stated he was not aware of any compromise of such material by anyone during the Cartagena operation. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any incident, to include Cartagena, in which the actions of USSS personnel compromised the safety and security of the President.<sup>45</sup>

The OIG submitted an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) request so that OIG could proceed with re-interviews of the FFNs and secure additional records to identify any other outstanding investigative leads; however, that request was declined. Therefore, OIG had to rely on the FFN statements previously obtained by the USSS.<sup>46</sup>

### Other Allegations Reported:

[REDACTED]

During our investigation, OIG received allegations that the USSS learned on April 19, 2012, that one FFN had derogatory information within the IC;<sup>47</sup> [REDACTED]. It was also reported that USSS officials had previously advised Congress that no White House personnel were involved in the Cartagena incident despite knowledge of their potential misconduct.

Reportedly, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. [A separate DHS OIG investigation has been initiated on this matter.]

<sup>44</sup> (Exhibits # 118A, 365, 366)

<sup>45</sup> (Exhibits # 119, 365, 366)

<sup>46</sup> (Exhibits # 3A, 315, 365)

<sup>47</sup> (Exhibits # 98A, 162, 277, 277A, 278, 278A, 283, 285, 289, 306, 310, 312, 313, 317, 323, 349, 349A, 350, 365)

<sup>48</sup> (Exhibits # 20, 25, 117A, 152, 306, 314, 316, 317, 324, 340, 346, 347, 352, 363, 365)

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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### **The DHS OIG received allegations of interference by USSS personnel with transparency during the Cartagena investigation.**

During our investigation of this matter, OIG received reports that USSS managers and executives advised their subordinates not to speak voluntarily with the OIG or proactively cooperate with the OIG investigation of this incident. Interviewees alleged that USSS legal counsel and others directed them not to participate in the interviews with the OIG.<sup>49</sup> Of the 32 employees who declined to participate in a voluntary interview and declined to answer our questions, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives, to include Deputy Assistant and Assistant Directors; and 22 were special agents or inspectors.<sup>50</sup>

One individual interviewed reported threats of retaliation for cooperating with the OIG and consenting to be interviewed,<sup>51</sup> and another reported that USSS information technology (IT) personnel had intercepted OIG email communications with USSS employees regarding their availability, or willingness, to be interviewed by the OIG.<sup>52</sup>

Additionally, OIG received reports that USSS officials continued to proceed with their investigative activities into the Cartagena incident, despite having been advised by the OIG on several occasions to cease their investigative activities, in order to enable the OIG to conduct an independent investigation.<sup>53</sup> [A separate DHS OIG investigation has been initiated on this matter.]

All reported information of broader organizational issues within the USSS was referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> (Exhibits # 260, 267, 359, 365)

<sup>50</sup> (Exhibits # 104, 144, 153, 163, 177, 258, 259, 260, 263, 280, 282, 301, 365)

<sup>51</sup> (Exhibit # 267)

<sup>52</sup> (Exhibit # 299)

<sup>53</sup> (Exhibits # 123, 162, 278A)

<sup>54</sup> (Exhibit # 366)

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# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

## EXHIBITS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1	Predicate Document – <u>Case Opening</u> , on May 23, 2012
2	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Records Request (Dept of State, DSS)</u> , on May 30, 2012
3	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – Meeting with DOJ Public Integrity</u> , on May 30, 2012
3A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – MLAT Request Rejection</u> , on July 27, 2012
4	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Complaint Referrals</u> , on May 31, 2012
5	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request - SATO Travel</u> , on June 1, 2012
6	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for USSS Records</u> , on June 3, 2012
7	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hotline Complaint ( [REDACTED] )</u> , on June 3, 2012
8	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hotline Complaint ( [REDACTED] )</u> , on June 3, 2012
9	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 1, 2012
10	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – National Finance Records</u> , on June 3, 2012
11	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED]</u> on June 6, 2012
12	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contacts – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED]</u> , on June 6, 2012
13	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED] (Attorney [REDACTED])</u> , on June 6, 2012
14	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012
15	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
16	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012
17	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
18	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012
19	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012
20	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012
21	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
22	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
23	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012
24	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Country Clearance Approvals</u> , on June 6, 2012

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

25	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Hotel Hilton Cartagena Records</u> , on June 6, 2012
26	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 25, 2012
27	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Trip Emails for Assigned Visit Support Personnel</u> , on June 7, 2012
28	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – DOD JAG Records</u> , on June 7, 2012
29	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Records Request from DSS</u> , on June 12, 2012
30	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Names</u> , on June 21, 2012
31	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012
32	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
33	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
34	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
35	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
36	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
37	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 18, 2012
38	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
39	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
40	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 18, 2012
41	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
42	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
43	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 20, 2012
44	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 20, 2012
45	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 20, 2012
46	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 26, 2012
47	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 26, 2012
48	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 27, 2012
49	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 2, 2012
50	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
51	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
52	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
53	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012
54	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 19, 2012

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54A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Case File Review</u> , on June 25, 2012
55	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
56	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
57	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
58	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
59	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
60	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
60A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Emails from USSS Attorney</u> – ██████████ ██████████ on July 11, 2012
61	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
62	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
63	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
64	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
65	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
66	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
67	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
68	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
69	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
70	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
71	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
72	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
73	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 18, 2012
74	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
75	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
76	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
77	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
78	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
79	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
80	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
81	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
82	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
83	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
84	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
85	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
86	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012

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87	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
88	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
89	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
90	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Referral to ██████████ Field Office</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
91	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
92	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012
93	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Emails</u> , on June 23, 2012
94	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
95	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
96	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
97	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
98	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
98A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
99	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
100	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
101	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
102	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
103	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
104	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
104A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
105	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
106	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
107	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
108	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
109	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
110	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
111	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
112	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
113	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
114	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012

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115	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
116	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
117	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Record Request from Department of State</u> , on June 20, 2012
117A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review- Certified Official Passport Records</u> , on September 21, 2012.
118	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 18, 2012
118A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 26, 2012
119	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
119A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (TECS)</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
120	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
121	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of ██████████ Lead</u> , on June 21, 2012
121A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview: ██████████</u> , on July 17, 2012
121B	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – United States Air Force</u> , on July 17, 2012
121C	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 25, 2012
121D	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Forensic Threat Analysis Unit</u> , on July 26, 2012
121E	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Photograph of ██████████</u> , on July 27, 2012
122	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
122A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Attempted Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012
122B	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012
122C	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
123	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 25, 2012
124	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
125	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012
126	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012
127	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
128	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
129	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
130	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
131	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, June 21, 2012
132	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012

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133	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
134	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
135	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 24, 2012
136	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
137	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
138	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
139	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
140	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
141	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
142	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
143	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
144	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
145	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
146	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
147	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
148	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
149	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
150	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
151	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, June 21, 2012
152	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on August 2, 2012
152A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 20, 2012
153	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012
153A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
154	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012
155	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
156	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012
157	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012
158	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012
159	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012
160	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
161	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012
161A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information</u> – ██████████, on July 7, 2012

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

162	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 13, 2012
163	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 12, 2012
164	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012
165	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012
166	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 23, 2012
167	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
168	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 10, 2012
169	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
170	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 23, 2012
171	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
172	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED] on June 28, 2012
173	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
173A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (CLEAR/TECS)</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
173B	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Visit</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
173C	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on August 3, 2012
174	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
175	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
176	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
177	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
177A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Surveillance of</u> [REDACTED] on June 26, 2012
178	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
179	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012
180	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
181	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
182	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
183	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 20, 2012
184	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
185	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
186	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Lead Combined with #349</u> , on July 12, 2012
187	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
188	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

189	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
190	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
191	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
192	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
193	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
194	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
195	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
196	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
197	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
198	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
198A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS/TECS)</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
199	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
200	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 22, 2012
201	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
202	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
203	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED]h, on June 25, 2012
204	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
205	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED] on June 25, 2012
206	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
207	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
208	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
209	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
210	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
211	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED] on June 27, 2012
212	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
213	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
214	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
215	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
216	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
217	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
218	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
219	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
220	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26,

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	2012
221	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
222	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
223	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
224	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
225	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
226	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
227	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
228	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
229	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
230	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
231	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 20, 2012
232	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
233	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 18, 2012
234	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
235	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
236	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
237	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
238	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
239	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012
240	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
241	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
242	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
243	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
244	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
245	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
246	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
247	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012
248	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012
249	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012
250	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012
251	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012

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252	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012
253	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 23, 2012
254	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 23, 2012
255	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 23, 2012
256	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request – DCA</u> , June 18, 2012
257	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
258	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
259	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
260	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 11, 2012
261	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 11, 2012
262	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
263	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
264	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
265	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 11, 2012
266	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request - Collateral Request to FTA Unit</u> , on June 22, 2012
267	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 21, 2012
268	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
269	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 22, 2012
270	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012
271	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 23, 2012
272	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012
273	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 25, 2012
274	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012
275	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012
276	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012
277	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
277A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 9, 2012
278	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012
278A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 9, 2012
278B	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 16, 2012
279	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 10, 2012
280	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012
281	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 25, 2012

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282	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
283	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
284	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012
285	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012
286	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Trip Survey Packet for Trip #341-011-034-0163-12</u> , on June 22, 2012
287	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Summary/Closure – Lead 287</u> , on June 21, 2012
287A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt/Review of Information – Flying While Armed Logs</u> , on June 25, 2012
288	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
289	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012
290	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012
291	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
292	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
293	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012
294	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
295	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
296	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012
297	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
297A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS)</u> , on July 7, 2012
298	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
299	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
300	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
301	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012
302	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
303	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
304	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
305	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012
306	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
307	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 26, 2012
308	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 27, 2012
309	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – FNU</u> ██████████, on June 27, 2012
310	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012
311	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012

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311A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS) – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 9, 2012
312	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 11, 2012
313	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 11, 2012
314	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Summit of Americas Hotel List</u> , on June 14, 2012
315	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Colombian Female Foreign Nationals</u> , on June 26, 2012
316	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 12, 2012
317	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> on July 13, 2012
318	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 13, 2012
319	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 27, 2012
320	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 12, 2012
320A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012
321	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 9, 2012
322	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
323	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
324	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
325	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
326	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012
327	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 23, 2012
328	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Documents from DHS OIG, Office of Inspections</u> , on June 29, 2012
329	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Documents on July 12, 2012</u> , on July 12, 2012
329A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Travel Vouchers</u> , on July 18, 2012
330	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on July 3, 2012
331	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request (CITI bank)</u> , July 3, 2012
332	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request (Hilton)</u> , on July 3, 2012
333	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , July 3, 2012
334	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request - Request to USSS for Credit Card Records</u> , on July 6, 2012
335	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Request to [REDACTED] OIG</u> , on July 9, 2012
336	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012

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337	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
337A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
338	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████ Letter, on July 5, 2012
339	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Foreign Contact Reporting</u> , on June 20, 2012
340	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – White House Advance Staff Records from US Embassy, Bogota</u> , on July 6, 2012
341	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hilton Subpoena Served</u> , on July 10, 2012
342	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 29, 2012
343	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other</u> – ██████████ on June 29, 2012
344	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
345	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
345A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Records – Documents Received by CS</u> , on July 13, 2012
346	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
347	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012
348	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012
349	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████ ██████████ on July 12, 2012
349A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – ██████████, on July 13, 2012
350	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Congressional Briefing Packet</u> , on July 12, 2012
351	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012
352	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████ Emails Regarding Hilton Hotel Records, on July 12, 2012
353	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012
354	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Employee Separations from U.S. Secret Service</u> , on July 18, 2012
355	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of</u> ██████████ Lead (Lead 90), on June 19, 2012
356	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012
357	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Review of</u> ██████████ Statement, on July 19, 2012
358	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Intelligence Community (IC) Record</u> , on July 19, 2012 *** <b>CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT</b> ***

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## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

358A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Receipt – Intelligence Community (IC) Record</u> , on August 7, 2012 *** <b>CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT</b> ***
359	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 24, 2012
360	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of USSS Documents</u> , on July 25, 2012
360A	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Training Documents</u> , on July 27, 2012
360B	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – Employee Reporting Responsibilities</u> , on July 26, 2012
360C	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Records (USSS Documents)</u> , on July 30, 2012
360D	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Email Discs</u> , on August 21, 2012
360E	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Documents – RES</u> , on August 24, 2012
361	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – Hilton Worldwide</u> , on July 19, 2012
362	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on August 2, 2012
363	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on August 2, 2012
364	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Internal Allegations</u> , on August 21, 2012
365	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Congressional Questionnaire to USSS</u> , on August 21, 2012
366	Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – INV Summary for Referral to DHS OIG Inspections</u> , dated September 5, 2012

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