

This section reports on each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct by a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This report is provided in accordance with the requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.

We Investigated...

Three USCIS managers (GS-15s) alleged to have improperly directed their subordinate employees to approve the beneficiaries of petitioners who gained Lawful Permanent Resident status via suspected fraudulent means. These allegations were partially substantiated. The managers did advise their subordinates to approve the beneficiaries for status; however, they did so because the Service Center, where the managers and subordinate employees worked, did not possess legal authority to conduct interviews or investigations of the petitioners or beneficiaries. In addition, the Service Center did not have the authority to re-investigate the status initially granted or to rescind the immigration status of Lawful Permanent Resident petitioners. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A senior DHS employee (ST-00) for allegedly disclosing sensitive information by leaving sensitive DHS material onboard a commercial airliner. We determined that the official did not safeguard sensitive but unclassified DHS information by inadvertently leaving the materials on a commercial airliner. We reviewed the documents and assessed that disclosure of their contents would not cause permanent harm to the continuing operations of the relevant program. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A DHS OIG manager (GS-15) for allegedly filing a false police report; potentially committing insurance fraud; engaging in official travel abuse; engaging in time and attendance abuse; obtaining personal loans from romantic partners that were not repaid; using illegal steroids; and making false statements to TSA regarding being armed while flying on commercial aircraft. We determined that the manager did not file a false police report or commit insurance fraud. We found evidence that the manager provided misleading information during a civil lawsuit, but no criminal referrals were warranted because the statute of limitations had expired. We found that the manager failed to report personal loans on yearly financial disclosure reports as required. We did not find evidence that the manager used or received illegal steroids. We found evidence that the manager made false statements to TSA by falsely claiming to be flying armed. We referred the alleged false statements to TSA to the U.S. Attorney's Office, but the matter was declined for prosecution. The manager is no longer employed by DHS OIG.

An Office of Health Affairs manager (SES) for allegedly sexually harassing a DHS contractor, bullying DHS contractors, and exhibiting irrational behavior. We found evidence that the manager inappropriately tasked DHS contractors, made sexually suggestive comments to a contractor, touched a contractor inappropriately, and took multiple photographs of the contractor without permission. We found evidence that the manager failed to report outside employment in the medical marijuana industry to DHS security. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A former Secret Service manager (SES) for alleged purchase and procurement improprieties. We found that these allegations were unsubstantiated. We also received allegations that a second Secret Service manager (GS-15) had stolen computer equipment from evidence. We found that the Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility had already investigated the allegations regarding the second manager and found that the manager failed to follow Secret Service procedures regarding the inventory and disposal of evidence, misused seized property, and provided inaccurate information to the Secret Service when questioned regarding the matter. The manager was subjected to disciplinary action. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A CBP manager (SES) for allegedly improperly influencing and manipulating the selection and promotion process for two senior management positions. We determined that the manager was improperly involved in this personnel process, which occurred while the manager was temporarily detailed to another assignment. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.