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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-18-79 In December 2014, OIG previously reported on the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.2 Our report disclosed CBP had not developed performance measures needed to accurately assess program effectiveness and make informed decisions. CBP also did not recognize all UAS operating costs and, as such, the Congress and public may be unaware of the amount of resources invested in the program. This audit determined that CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for surveillance information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Without a privacy assessment, CBP could not determine whether ISR Systems contained data requiring safeguards per privacy laws, regulations, and DHS policy. CBP’s failure to implement adequate security controls according to Federal and DHS policy could result in potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ISR Systems and its operations.

>CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems 		2018
OIG-18-76 We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased.

>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers 		2018
OIG-18-68 Although CBP had controls over its polygraph examination process, a key control over its review and approval process was not always operating as intended. Specifically, the polygraph quality control program may not have always conducted independent and objective reviews (blind reviews) of polygraph examination results, as required. We also determined that 96 percent of the complaints we reviewed were unfounded or ambiguous. Nevertheless, CBP did not have a formal complaint review process, which led to inconsistent and subjective reviews. This approach risks not finding or properly addressing issues contained in the complaints.

>Most Complaints about CBP's Polygraph Program Are Ambiguous or Unfounded 		2018
OIG-18-47 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. This Performance Summary Report contains the performance measures aligned to drug control decision units as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular: Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The drug control decision units are as follows: (1) Salaries and Expenses, (2) Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement and (3) Border Security Fence, Infrastructure and Technology.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2018
OIG-18-48 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. There are six program offices within CBP that are tasked with drug-control responsibilities: the United States Border Patrol (USBP), the Offices of Field Operations (OFO), Information and Technology (OIT), Training and Development (OTD), Acquisition (OA), and Air and Marine (AMO)).

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2018
OIG-18-37 Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image.

>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-18-19 Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017 (Redacted) 2018
OIG-18-18 CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption.

>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509 		2018
OIG-17-115-MA We conducted unannounced inspections of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) immigration holding facilities to determine if conditions are adequate, the quality of care provided is reasonable, and standards outlined in CBP’s National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search are being met.  During these inspections, we identified physical security issues that pose a potential threat to Border Patrol agents, assets, and operations at Border Patrol stations.  We also identified security issues related to cameras and access at other Border Patrol stations.  As a result, we are recommending that CBP promptly address the physical security issues, ensure cameras are operable, and facility access is secure.

>Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-17-114 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country.  The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats.  Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks.  IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry.  Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases.  Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders.  CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints.  We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges.  We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations.

>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations 		2017
OIG-17-103-MA We determined that two DHS Components – CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details and staffed them without clear legal authority. We made two recommendations to the DHS secretary to direct CBP and ICE to (1) discontinue security details pending a legal review by the DHS General Counsel and (2) develop directive regarding the scope and circumstances  when a security detail is permitted for DHS component heads including the requirements for departmental level authorization; pending the results of the legal review.

>Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns (OIG-17-103-MA) 		2017
OIG-17-99-MA We found that CBP administered polygraph examinations to unsuitable applicants who provided disqualifying information during the pre-test interview.  This occurred because CBP’s process is not sufficient to prevent unsuitable applicants from continuing the polygraph examination.  We made two recommendations to CBP to improve its screening by establishing an in-person pre-security interview process, requiring examiners to use the on-call adjudication process, and discontinue testing of unsuitable applicants.  CBP concurred with both recommendations and agreed that conducting the in-person pre-security interview prior to the polygraph examination is a best practice.  CBP has implemented one of the recommendations and has initiated a pilot program for a new polygraph format.

>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants (OIG-17-99-MA) 		2017
OIG-17-90 KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year (FY) 2016 consolidated financial statements.  The resulting management letter discusses 12 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in a number of processes, including deobligation of undelivered orders, review of Federal Employee Compensation Act claims, and the seized and forfeited property inventory.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements, dated January 18, 2017, included in CBP’s FY 2016 Performance and Accountability Report.

>Management Letter for U.S Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-70-SR We determined that FEMA did not implement our recommendations and suspended improvements on existing information technology systems.  We recommended that FEMA include an enterprise solution in its Grants Management Modernization platform for tracking applicant compliance with the Public Assistance Program insurance requirements that are a condition of receiving a disaster assistance grant.  We made five recommendations and FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations.

>Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border 		2017
OIG-17-60 We determined that CBP has made improvements to and continues to develop, its ethics and integrity training for officers and agents.  The agency tracks training completion using various methods and evaluation tools to measure and assess training effectiveness.  As a result, CBP has created, expanded, and redesigned training courses to promote ethics and integrity at the Advanced Training Center, the academies, and in the field.  However, CBP has not effectively communicated or conducted follow up with the field on its overall integrity strategy.  As a result, CBP cannot fully accomplish this important strategy.  We recommended CBP create a repository for the field offices to maintain and share unique field-developed training, highlight the importance of CBP’s integrity strategy throughout the agency and follow up with field staff to ensure it is effectively communicated.  We made two recommendations and CBP concurred with our recommendations, and prior to issuance of the final report took action to close recommendation 2.

>CBP Continues to Improve its Ethics and Integrity Training, but Further Improvements are Needed 		2017
OIG-17-55 KPMG, LLP determined that CBP made improvements by designing and implementing certain account management, audit logging, and configuration management controls.  However, KPMG continued to identify financial system functionality and general information technology control deficiencies related to access controls and configuration management for CBP’s core financial, feeder, and General Support Systems environments.  The deficiencies collectively limited CBP’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that CBP, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to CBP’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-39 We determined that CBP likely did not act in direct response to the Sandia report, but it has instituted many border security programs and operations that align with the report’s recommendations. However, our review and analysis of these reports also highlighted some continuing challenges to CBP in its efforts to secure the southwest border. In particular, CBP does not measure the effectiveness of its programs and operations well; therefore, it continues to invest in programs and act without the benefit of the feedback needed to help ensure it uses resources wisely and improves border security.  CBP also faces program management challenges in planning, resource allocation, infrastructure and technology acquisition, and overall efficiency.  Finally, coordination and communication with both internal and external stakeholders could be improved.  This final report does not contain recommendations.

>CBP’s Border Security Efforts – An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of Entry 		2017
OIG-17-28 CBP’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.  Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2016 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular.  KPMG did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2017
OIG-17-36 KPMG, LLC expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s FY 2016 consolidated financial statements.  However, KPMG identified five significant deficiencies in internal control, three of which KPMG considers material weaknesses in the areas of information technology controls and financial systems functionality; financial reporting; and refunds and drawbacks of duties, taxes, and fees. The two other significant deficiencies in internal control are related to entity-level controls and custodial revenue - entry process.  KPMG made 18 recommendations to improve these areas.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2017
OIG-17-29 CBP’s management prepared the Table of FY 2016 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP’s Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013.  CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the underlying assumptions used to calculate Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2016 Drug Control Obligations.  As a result, KPMG was unable to complete its review procedures over those assumptions.  Except as noted above, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2017
OIG-16-123 In response to a request from Senator Tom Coburn, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Professional Responsibility’s (OPR) actions to determine whether its collection, storage, and sharing of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) violated the Privacy Act of 1974 or Department policies. We also sought to determine whether CBP OPR’s policies and training for protecting sensitive PII are adequate.

>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices 		2016
OIG-12-84 Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver Eligibility 2012
OIG-16-90 KPMG LLP, under contract with the DHS Office of Inspector General, audited the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal year (FY) 2015. The resulting management letter contains 16 observations related to internal controls and other operational matters for management’s consideration. KPMG LLP noted internal control deficiencies and the need for improvement in several processes including control over settlement assets; the trade compliance measurement review process; review of Federal Employee Compensation Act Claims; controls in the seized and forfeited property inventory process; and reviews over the Performance and Accountability Report. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements, dated March 21, 2016.These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>Management Letter for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-68 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2015 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 		2016
OIG-16-75 U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Internal Affairs (IA) has oversight authority for all aspects of CBP operations, personnel, and facilities to ensure compliance with all CBP-wide programs and policies relating to corruption, misconduct, or mismanagement. From October 1, 2010, through March 12, 2015, CBP received 11,367 allegations of misconduct by its employees. IA investigated 6,524 of those allegations, of which 819 were classified as criminal.

>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing 		2016
OIG-16-51 We conducted this review to determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) regulations. The DHS PREA regulations set standards for CBP to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault. The regulations also require CBP to complete audits of holding facilities that “house detainees overnight” by July 2018. Since DHS issued its PREA regulations, CBP has taken measures, including issuing its zero-tolerance policy and designating a full-time Prevention of Sexual Assault Coordinator, to ensure its offices, stakeholders, and managers are aware of CBP’s roles and responsibilities. However, CBP’s implementation actions lack adequate planning, a budget, a component-wide policy to coordinate the efforts of all offices and personnel, and criteria to determine which facilities should be defined as overnight facilities and therefore subject to audits. Further, at the time of our review, CBP had not determined the feasibility of securing a joint PREA audit contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These problems may hinder CBP’s implementation of the DHS PREA regulations and ultimately, its ability to meet PREA’s goal to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault.

>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations 		2016
OIG-16-54 In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, CBP’s financial position as of September 30, 2015. The report identifies four significant deficiencies in internal control, two of which are considered material weaknesses. The material weaknesses are in drawback of duties, taxes, and fees and information technology. The two other significant deficiencies were in internal control in the entry process and entity-level controls.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2016
OIG-16-37 To sustain border security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has established permanent facilities in forward or remote locations, called Forward Operating Bases. We determined whether Forward Operating Bases provide adequate living conditions, security, and safety for employees. Of the seven Forward Operating Bases we inspected along the southwest border, six have adequate living conditions. One Forward Operating Base has security issues, safety and health concerns, and inadequate living conditions. At the other six Forward Operating Bases, we identified security issues, such as inoperable security cameras, as well as an ongoing challenge to provide safe drinking water. In addition, we determined that CBP is not performing all required Forward Operating Base inspections or adequately documenting maintenance and repairs. Without regular inspections and timely maintenance and repairs, CBP cannot ensure it will continue to provide adequate security, safety, and living conditions for its personnel working at these remote facilities.

>Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-34 The mission of CBP’s Special Operations Group (SOG) is to train, organize, equip, resource, and deploy tactical and emergency response personnel worldwide to protect America. Based in El Paso, Texas, SOG plans, coordinates, and executes national, regional, and international level operations. We reviewed the SOG program to determine its cost and effectiveness. We determined that CBP does not have formal performance measures for its SOG program and does not track SOG’s total program cost. The incomplete records of SOG and other components of CBP that support SOG limited the determination of the SOG program’s total cost. SOG program efficiency and effectiveness cannot be accurately determined without total program costs or formal performance measures. As a result, CBP may be missing opportunities to improve effectiveness and identify potential cost savings in the SOG program.

>CBP's Special Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness are Unknown 		2016
OIG-16-25 In June 2015, we received a hotline complaint that “due to repair cost,” CBP’s contractor in the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector was transporting some detainees in non-air-conditioned vehicles. The complainant also alleged the contractor did not maintain some vehicles adequately and would hide “defective” vehicles from inspection. In August 2015, we conducted unannounced spot inspections of CBP’s contractor’s vehicles in the Tucson sector. The contractor did not hide vehicles from inspection. Through our inspections, we determined the contractor’s vehicles could reach reasonable temperatures or were operating at reasonable temperatures; we also determined that CBP and its contractor had addressed previously known problems with inadequate vehicle air conditioning. Finally, we reviewed the contractor’s maintenance program and determined the contractor has adequate policies, procedures, and processes to maintain detainee transport vehicles, and the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector has sufficient oversight of the contractor’s program.

>Response to Allegations that a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Contractor Transport Detainees in Non-Air-Conditioned Vehicles (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-27 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Detailed Accounting Submission. CBP’s management prepared the Table of FY 2015 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). CBP management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the underlying assumptions used to calculate the total obligations reported in the Table for all Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Function assumptions. As a result, KPMG was unable to complete their review procedures over those assumptions. Except as noted above, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused them to believe that the FY 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria set forth in the Circular.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2016
OIG-16-26 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year 2015 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. CBP’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2015 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2015 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2016
OIG-15-137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed the Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI)—an index of relevant data in existing systems—to augment Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) ability to gather and develop information about persons, events, and cargo of interest. We performed this audit to determine the status of AFI implementation and whether effective controls have been applied to protect the sensitive information processed and stored by the system. CBP has made significant progress in implementing AFI. CBP fully deployed AFI on schedule and within budget, and has taken measures to secure the sensitive information the system processes and stores from unauthorized access. In addition, CBP developed a privacy impact assessment to ensure that privacy considerations for operating AFI were addressed throughout system deployment. Since deployment, system users have provided positive feedback to the component about AFI’s functionality and usefulness. Despite these positive steps, we identified deficiencies that the component must address to further secure the system.

>Enhancements to Technical Controls Can Improve the Security of CBP's Analytical Framework for Intelligence 		2015
OIG-12-104 CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management Tracking System (Revised) 2012
OIG-15-95 Streamline is an initiative to criminally prosecute individuals who illegally enter the United States through defined geographic regions along the Southwest border. Although U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol measures Streamline’s effect on re-entry of illegal aliens, its metrics do not reflect an alien’s crossing history, re-entry, or re-apprehension over multiple years. As a result, Border Patrol is not fully and accurately measuring Streamline’s effect on deterring aliens from entering and re­entering the country illegally. Additionally, because Border Patrol does not distinguish Streamline costs from the costs of its other border enforcement consequences, Border Patrol is not able to differentiate Streamline-associated costs. Finally, according to ICE ERO, Streamline has increased the workload at some of its Southwest border field offices. However, ERO cannot be certain which aliens it removes as a result of Streamline and which removals result from other enforcement actions.

>Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing 		2015
OIG-15-91 The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the commercial trade system designed to automate border processing to enhance border security and foster our Nation's economic security. CBP spent approximately $3.2 billion on the development of the ACE program from fiscal year 2001 through July 2013, when it was restructured to a rapid deployment strategy called Agile. Currently, in large part due to the implementation of Agile, CBP is on track to meet its milestones for the deployment of ACE. However, CBP has not ensured the internal control environment has kept pace with the rapid deployment of the ACE program. Specifically, CBP has not conducted risk assessments to identify potential gaps in data reliability, and has not fully developed and implemented performance measures for the program.

>CBP is on Track to Meet ACE Milestones, but It Needs to Enhance Internal Controls 		2015
OIG-15-60 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls, entity level controls, and business process application controls. KPMG LLP determined that CBP took corrective action by designing and consistently implementing certain account management controls.

>Information Technology Management Letter For the FY 2014 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-15-81 KPMG LLP reviewed CBP’s internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains 20 observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s consideration.

>Management Letter for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit ( 		2015
OIG-15-76 The independent public accounting firm, KPMG LLP, has issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s fiscal year 2014 consolidated financial statements. In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of CBP as of September 30, 2014.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Financial Statements 		2015
OIG-15-64 U .S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Houston Seaport is the fifth largest port for arriving containers and the largest petrochemical complex in the Nation. CBP is responsible for identifying high-risk cargo shipments arriving at the port that pose a possible threat to national security. We conducted this review to determine whether the Houston Seaport complied with CBP's National Maritime Targeting Policy (NMTP) and Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS) Port Guidance. The Houston Seaport generally complied with the NMTP and CERTS Port Guidance. However, CBP could improve its documentation of waivers and exceptions to mandatory examinations of high-risk cargo. In addition, CBP could improve access controls for authorizing Port Director waivers within CERTS.

>CBP's Houston Seaport Generally Complied with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its Documentation of Waivers and Exceptions (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-15-53 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) program is vital to securing the Nation’s borders while facilitating efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP uses NII equipment to screen cargo and conveyances at our Nation’s land, sea, and air ports of entry. In fiscal year 2014, CBP awarded six contracts and one interagency agreement valued at approximately $90.4 million to perform preventive and corrective maintenance of NII equipment. We performed this audit to determine whether maintenance is being performed on CBP’s screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. CBP monitored NII operations using methods such as conducting daily meetings to discuss NII availability and reviewing field office submissions of utilization reports. However, CBP has not ensured that contractors perform preventive and corrective maintenance on its screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. This deficiency occurred because CBP has not verified that maintenance is performed in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, evaluated contractors’ performance, and assessed the reliability of maintenance data. Without a process to validate maintenance data and to evaluate and assess that NII equipment is being repaired and maintained in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, CBP’s NII equipment may not be repaired and maintained to retain full functionality and maximum useful life.

>CBP's Oversight of Its Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment Maintenance Contracts Needs Improvement 		2015
OIG-15-39 CBP did not effectively target and examine rail shipments entering the United States from Mexico and Canada. Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPO) did not always target shipments using the mandatory Automated Targeting System (ATS) targeting criteria. CBPOs also did not always use the required radiation detection equipment to examine high-risk shipments. Finally, CBPOs did not always record the results of their rail cargo examinations in the Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS). CBPOs were unaware of the correct targeting criteria or inadvertently used inappropriate criteria. In addition, one port did not have the required radiation detection equipment for its rail team, and CBPOs at two other ports used Personal Radiation Detectors to examine shipments. Rail CBPOs also received insufficient training on the use of ATS and CERTS. Finally, Supervisory CBPOs did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure CBPOs followed CBP policy. As a result, CBP may have failed to target or properly examine rail shipments that were at an increased risk to contain contraband or dangerous materials. In addition, CBP has no assurance that decisions to release these high-risk shipments into U.S. commerce were appropriate.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Did Not Effectively Target and Examine Rail Shipments From Canada and Mexico 		2015
OIG-15-36 Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Internal Affairs (OSC File No. DI-14-0666) 2015
OIG-15-25 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Detailed Accounting Submission. CBP management prepared the Table of fiscal year 2014 Drug Control Obligations (Table) and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary (Circular), dated January 18, 2013. Some of the assumptions CBP used for computing obligations by decision units are based on surveys completed in prior years. While CBP management represented that the assumptions used continue to be valid for purposes of computing obligations presented in the Table, KPMG was unable to perform review procedures supporting that representation. Based on its review, except for matters noted above, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that the Detailed Accounting Submission for the year ended September 30, 2014, is not presented, in all material respects, in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2015
OIG-15-26 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year (FY) 2014 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. CBP management prepared the Performance Summary Report and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of ONDCP circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary (Circular), dated January 18, 2013. Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that the Performance Summary Report for the year ended September 30, 2014, is not presented, in all material respects, in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2015
OIG-15-20 We conducted this evaluation in response to a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees in the U.S. Border Patrol’s (USBP) El Centro Sector Headquarters in El Centro, California. The whistleblower alleged that Border Patrol agents detailed to the El Centro Sector Headquarters as CrossFit instructors claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. Border Patrol agents also serve as CrossFit instructors in seven other Border Patrol sector headquarters. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Employees must remain on duty not merely because it is desirable, but because of compelling reasons inherently related to continuance of their duties, and of such a nature that failure to carry on would constitute negligence. CrossFit is a fitness program that employs endurance and fast-switch strength movements as a form of physical conditioning. Eight USBP sectors include CrossFit classes in their physical fitness programs. Six of the eight sectors paid AUO to Border Patrol agents engaged as CrossFit instructors. AUO paid to Border Patrol agents for CrossFit instruction and related activities, such as gym maintenance and class preparation, was inconsistent with Federal AUO regulations. The hours of duty for CrossFit instruction and related activities could have been controlled administratively. In addition, CrossFit duties were not so compelling that failure to complete those duties would have constituted negligence. USBP discontinued AUO payments for CrossFit instruction and related activities in January 2014.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse by U.S. Border Patrol Agents Engaged as CrossFit Instructors 		2015
OIG-15-17 We conducted this audit to determine the effectiveness and cost of the Unmanned Aircraft System program, in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP) has invested significant funds. Although CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP cannot prove that the program is effective because it has not developed performance measures. The program has also not achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals, and we found little or no evidence CBP has met its program expectations. We estimate it costs $12,255 per flight hour to operate the program; CBP’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include all operating costs. By not recognizing all operating costs, CBP cannot accurately assess the program’s cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program expansion. In addition, Congress and the public may be unaware of all the resources committed to the program. As a result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has improved border security. The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better use by investing in alternatives.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations 		2015
OIG-15-13 In most instances, the CBP Miami Field Office complied with CBP policies and procedures. We found only minor deficiencies in CBP Miami Field Office operations for cargo targeting and seized asset management. For passenger screening, Miami International Airport leveraged an existing system to track passengers who have records for violations of laws or other significant events. Other Miami Field Office ports of entry could benefit from this “one-stop system” that would allow them to document, monitor, and report on targeting passengers in real time. The field office could improve the consistency of its recordkeeping for changes to the biometric watchlist. Also, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to improve its compliance with safeguards for using high security bolt seals during cargo screening. Lastly, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to update its policy and procedures for agriculture inspections so they align with current U.S. Department of Agriculture procedures.

>Inspection of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Miami Field Office Ports of Entry 		2015
OIG-15-11 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees at U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center–Cargo, in Herndon, Virginia and the National Targeting Center– Passenger, in Reston, Virginia. The whistleblower alleged that employees in both locations regularly claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. The National Targeting Center did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most of the tasks employees performed during AUO hours appear to have been administratively controllable.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center 		2014
OIG-15-07 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ysleta Border Patrol Station (Ysleta Station) in El Paso, Texas. The whistleblower alleged that supervisors and border patrol agents at the Ysleta Station claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. The whistleblower also alleged that supervisors at the Ysleta Station authorize AUO to compensate injured agents who are assigned administrative duties and are not working overtime hours. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Ysleta Station did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most activities that second-line supervisory border patrol agents performed during AUO hours and some activities that first-line supervisory agents and nonsupervisory agents performed appear to have been administratively controllable. We did not find evidence to substantiate that Ysleta Station agents who sustained work-related injuries were paid AUO improperly.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Border Patrol, Ysleta Station 		2015

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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