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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-23-05 DHS Did Not Consistently Comply with National Instant Criminal Background Check System Requirements 2023
OIG-22-62 DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks 2022
OIG-22-60 (U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021 2022
OIG-22-58 DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns 2022
OIG-22-54 DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome 2022
OIG-22-53 DHS Has Controls to Safeguard Watchlist Data. 2022
OIG-22-50 The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve its Open Source Intelligence Reporting Process 2022
OIG-22-49 DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism 2022
OIG-22-42 Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative 2022
OIG-22-41 DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-30 S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects 2022
OIG-22-29 I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-19-24 Prompted by the suspicious cyber activities on election systems in 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson designated the election infrastructure as a subsector to one of the Nation’s existing critical sectors. Our audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department’s efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation’s election infrastructure. DHS has taken some steps to mitigate risks to the Nation’s election infrastructure; however, improved planning, more staff, and clearer guidance could better facilitate the Department’s coordination with state and local officials. Specifically, despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, or established metrics to measure progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and insufficient guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS’ ability to accomplish such planning.

>Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure 		2019
OIG-19-19 DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs 2019
OIG-19-15 National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Chief of Staff requested a review to determine whether Federal Protective Service (FPS) inspectors’ positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors’ excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Specifically, 11 of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This kind of extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States. Furthermore, FPS’ increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for fiscal year 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk. The inspectors were able to accumulate the extensive overtime because of poor internal controls, such as management not monitoring the use of overtime.

>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively 		2019
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019
OIG-18-89-UNSUM We conducted our review of the Science and Technology’s (S&T) insider threat program between January 2017 and June 2017.  S&T is the primary research arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Its mission is to strengthen the Nation’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative solutions to support DHS mission operations.  Specifically, Congress created S&T in 2003 to conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of the Department.  S&T oversees laboratories where scientists perform mission-critical research on chemical and biological threats, radiological and nuclear detection, animal diseases, transportation security, and explosives trace identification.  S&T employees, contractors, and business partners—especially those with special or elevated privileges—can potentially use their inside knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to mission-critical systems and operations.  We made nine recommendations that, if implemented, should strengthen S&T’s management of insider threat risks.  The Department concurred with all of the recommendations.

>(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain 		2018
OIG-18-65 Between January 2016 and April 2017, DHS OIG received dozens of allegations regarding a variety of issues at the FLETC facility in Glynco, Georgia. Following extensive investigation, DHS OIG determined that many of the allegations could not be substantiated. However, with respect to certain other allegations, DHS OIG’s findings indicate that some of FLETC’s senior managers, including former Director Connie Patrick, failed to exercise the judgment, stewardship, and leadership expected of DHS senior officials. This report focuses on two specific allegations that exemplify the broader issues uncovered by DHS OIG’s investigation. Many of the allegations DHS OIG received regarding FLETC related to the official travel of the former FLETC Director, Connie Patrick. Patrick served as the Director of FLETC from 2002 until her retirement in June 2017. During this time, she frequently traveled domestically and internationally on FLETC-related business. DHS OIG conducted an extensive review of Patrick’s travel for the period January 15, 2014 through June 23, 2016 to identify any instances of impropriety. In addition to multiple complaints about Patrick’s alleged noncompliance with federal, DHS, and FLETC travel rules and regulations, DHS OIG received complaints alleging that Patrick pressured FLETC managers to hire her husband, John Patrick (JP), for a term position within the FLETC Law Enforcement Leadership Institute (LELI). DHS OIG’s investigation determined that JP was hired to a term position with LELI on January 3, 2010 and completed the term on September 11, 2011 — all during Patrick’s tenure as Director of FLETC

>Special Report - Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials 		2018
OIG-18-51 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010.  The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today.

>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-18-37 Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image.

>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-18-31 During our August 2017 site visit to the FLETC Artesia Training Center, we identified a potential safety issue at a warehouse, Building 13. The Border Patrol Academy had been using the warehouse to train new hires on search and conveyance. In 2009, a vehicle from an adjacent driving course struck the warehouse. FLETC officials could not provide documentation to support that an engineering evaluation was conducted to determine whether the accident affected the integrity of the warehouse structure. Border Patrol Academy officials also expressed safety concerns about using the warehouse to train new hires.

>Management Alert - Safety Issue at FLETC Artesia Warehouse 		2018
OIG-18-20 We evaluated the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) privacy safeguards for protecting the personally identifiable information (PII) it collects and maintains. OHA has not implemented an effective organizational framework for safeguarding PII in accordance with Federal requirements. OHA appointed a Privacy Officer, but this official lacks adequate authority and resources to carry out the various required privacy management responsibilities. This official also has not received OHA senior leadership support to issue the policies and procedures needed for effective organization-wide privacy management. Further, there was no central tracking to ensure that all employees completed annual privacy training and to accurately report this information to the Department and Congress as required.

>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program 		2018
OIG-17-104 TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-53), required us to review the Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS’) policies and procedures for identifying misuse of Government resources, as well as the administration of FAMS’ code of conduct or integrity policies with respect to instances of misconduct. We incorporated this requirement into our ongoing department-wide audit of conduct and discipline, which seeks to determine whether DHS and its components have sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. We determined that FAMS has sufficient policies and procedures to establish expectations for appropriate conduct, identify misuse of government resources, and address misconduct allegations. The report contains no recommendations.

>The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing Misconduct 		2017
OIG-17-94 We determined that the Department failed to report 6 conferences in FY 2014 and 14 conferences in FY 2015 that were greater than $100,000 in its Annual Report to the Office of Inspector General and on the public website, as required by Federal regulations.  The total dollar value of these unreported conferences was $862,881 and $2,822,561 for FYs 2014 and 2015, respectively.  In addition, the Department did not always report actual conference costs timely or accurately.  We made five recommendations that would improve conference reporting and recordkeeping and ensure the accuracy and timeliness of conference submissions.  DHS concurred with all five of our recommendations and has implemented corrective actions, resulting in the resolution and closure of all the recommendations.

>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 Conference Spending 		2017
OIG-17-96 KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the Management Directorate’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses five observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  These issues were related to journal entry review; financial system reconciliations; ineffective obligation analysis; contract expense approval, improper invoice posting; and intra-governmental payment and collection expense approval.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>Management Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-92 KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses 14 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including revenue accrual, personnel actions, journal entry reviews, performance reviews, contract expense approvals, time keeping, and intra-governmental payment and collection expense approvals.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>National Protection and Programs Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-88 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP were related to access controls and configuration management of the Management Directorate’s core financial systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited the Management Directorate’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that the Management Directorate make improvements to DHS’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Management Directorate Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-91 We determined that DHS’ Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS) does not address the Department’s critical need for an integrated department-wide system.  As of October 2016, PALMS has not met DHS operational requirements for effective administration of employee learning and performance management activities.  In addition, the PALMS program office did not effectively implement the acquisition methodology selected for PALMS and did not monitor contractor performance.  Finally, between August 2013 and November 2016, the Department spent more than $5.7 million for unused and partially used subscriptions; incurred more than $11 million to extend contracts of existing learning management systems; and more than $813,000 for increased program management costs.  The Department also did not identify $72,902 in financial credits stemming from the contractor not meeting performance requirements.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) also reported in its February 2016 report, GAO-16-253, that the Department experienced programmatic and technical challenges that led to years-long schedule delays.  We made seven recommendations to address the challenges with the PALMS acquisition and to improve future acquisitions.  The Department concurred with all seven of our recommendations.

>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs 		2017
OIG-17-86 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the Office of Financial Management’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies and the need for improvement in several processes including financial disclosure reviews; designation of intra-governmental transactions as non-acquisition; reconciliation of unfilled customer order and undelivered order balances; and inadequate review of closing package notes.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2015 Agency Financial Report.

>Office of Financial Management's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-75 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls and configuration management of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) core financial systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited FLETC’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that FLETC, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Acting Chief Financial Officer (ACFO), make improvements to FLETC’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-85 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP were related to access controls and configuration management of Office of Financial Management (OFM) and Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) core financial and feeder systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited OFM’s and OCIO’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that OFM and OCIO make improvements to DHS’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Office of Financial Management and Office of the Chief Information Officer Components of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-82 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the S&T financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses three observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including journal entry review processes; procurement and financial management system reconciliations; and intra-governmental payment and collection expense review and approval.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>Science and Technology Directorate's' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-81 The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) main financial application is owned and operated by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  As a service provider, ICE provides support to S&T.  KPMG identified general information technology control deficiencies at ICE that could potentially impact S&T’s financial data, and as such, issued a finding.  The deficiencies collectively limited S&T’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommended that S&T, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s CIO and ACFO, make improvements to S&T’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Science and Technology Directorate Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-78 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls and configuration management for NPPD’s core financial and feeder systems. The deficiencies collectively limited NPPD’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We recommend that NPPD, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to NPPD’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program

>Information Technology Management Letter for the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-58-UNSUM Since our fiscal year 2015 evaluation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has continued to provide effective oversight of DHS’ department-wide intelligence system and implemented programs for ongoing monitoring of its security practices. In addition, I&A has relocated its intelligence system to a DHS data center to improve network resiliency and support. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has migrated its sites that process Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information to a Defense Intelligence Agency owned system. However, USCG must continue to work with the Defense Intelligence Agency to clearly define the oversight responsibilities for this external system that supports its intelligence operations. We identified deficiencies in DHS’ information security program and are making two recommendations to I&A and three recommendations to USCG. I&A concurred with its two recommendations, while USCG non-concurred with its three recommendations. We conducted this review between May and September 2016.

>(U) Annual Evaluation of DHS' INFOSEC Program (Intel Systems - DHS Intelligence and Analysis) for FY 2016 		2017
OIG-17-49 The Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a joint report on the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information.  The IGs’ review was conducted in response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The IGs found that federal, state, and local entities are committed to sharing counterterrorism information by undertaking programs and initiatives that have improved information sharing.  However, the IGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance the sharing of counterterrorism information.  The IGs made 23 recommendations to the components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, and DOJ to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and, ultimately, enhance the government’s ability to prevent terrorist attacks.  The components of ODNI, DHS, and DOJ agreed with all 23 recommendations.

>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information 		2017
OIG-17-02 We determined that overall; the Department cannot be assured that its preparedness plans can be executed effectively during a pandemic event.  As a result, the eight components we reviewed may not be fully prepared to continue mission essential functions during a pandemic event.  The Department concurred with all seven recommendations and has initiated corrective actions

>DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and Execution 		2017
OIG-16-93 We evaluated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ (I&A) safeguards for the sensitive privacy and intelligence information it collects and maintains. Our objective was to determine whether I&A ensures compliance with Federal laws, regulations, and policies. I&A has made progress in developing a culture of privacy. Specifically, I&A has centralized the oversight of privacy and civil liberties and has been working to ensure that it meets the requirements of pertinent legislation, regulations, directives, and guidance. I&A conducted specialized onboarding and advanced training that address safeguards for privacy and civil liberties in its intelligence processes. In addition, I&A designed intelligence oversight reviews to ensure that its employees observe the required safeguards. However, I&A has faced challenges because it did not place priority on institutionalizing other capabilities and processes to ensure timely and complete compliance with requirements regarding privacy and intelligence information.

>Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy 		2016
OIG-12-48 Department of Homeland Security's Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 2012
OIG-16-57 KPMG LLP, under contract with the DHS Office of Inspector General, audited the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) financial statements and internal control over financial reporting for fiscal year (FY) 2015. The management letter contains one observation related to internal controls and other operational matters for management’s consideration. KPMG LLP noted an internal control deficiency and the need for improvement in the undelivered order process. The deficiency is not considered significant and was not required to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 13, 2015, included in the DHS FY 2015 Agency Financial Report.

>Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-56 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2015. KPMG evaluated select general information technology controls (GITCs), entity level controls, and business process application controls at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). KPMG determined that FLETC took corrective action to address certain prior IT control deficiencies. For example, FLETC made improvements by designing and consistently implementing controls related to the separation and termination of contractors. However, KPMG continued to identify GITC deficiencies related to access controls and configuration management for FLETC’s core financial systems. The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited FLETC’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Federal Law Enforcement Center Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-18 In 2014, West African countries experienced the largest Ebola virus disease (Ebola) outbreak to date. As part of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) response to prevent the spread of Ebola in the United States, DHS instituted additional screening at U.S. ports of entry for passengers traveling from Ebola-affected countries. We conducted this audit to determine whether DHS has effectively implemented its enhanced screening measures to respond to an Ebola outbreak. Although the Department responded quickly to implement domestic Ebola screening with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), it did not ensure sufficient coordination, adequate training, and consistent screening of people arriving at U.S. ports of entry. Coordination between DHS, HHS, and other DHS components was not sufficient to ensure all passengers received full screening. Components did not ensure all personnel received adequate training on the screening process or the use of certain protective equipment. Component personnel also did not always follow established Ebola procedures and ensure all identified passengers completed required screening. As a result, some passengers with potential risk of Ebola exposure may have entered the United States without having their temperatures taken or otherwise cleared by health professionals, and the DHS workforce performing the response was not always appropriately protected.

>DHS' Ebola Response Needs Better Coordination, Training, and Execution 		2016
OIG-16-02 FPS is not managing its fleet effectively. FPS did not properly justify that its current fleet is necessary to carry out its operational mission. Specifically, FPS did not justify the need for: more vehicles than officers; administrative vehicles; larger sport utility vehicles; home-to-work miles in one region; and discretionary equipment added to vehicles. Additionally, FPS overpaid for law enforcement equipment packages, did not have standard operating procedures for fleet management, a sound vehicle allocation methodology, or accurate fleet data to make effective management decisions. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) fleet managers did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure FPS complied with all Federal and departmental guidance. As a result, FPS cannot ensure it is operating the most cost-efficient fleet and potentially missed opportunities to save more than $2.5 million in fiscal year 2014.

>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively ( 		2016
OIG-12-111 US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities (Redacted) 2012
OIG-15-108-IQO The Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight, Investigations Quality Assurance Division conducted an oversight review of the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Internal Affairs Division (IAD) from November 2014 to February 2015. The review covered IAD activity from October 1, 2011, to September 30, 2014 (fiscal years 2012 through 2014). We conducted this review as part of the planned periodic review of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component internal affairs offices by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) in keeping with the oversight responsibilities mandated by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Generally, we found that inquiries conducted and overseen by the Internal Affairs Division were thorough and complete. Our review, however, raised serious concerns about NPPD’s authority to conduct criminal investigations. Additionally, we found that criminal investigators assigned to IAD did not meet the minimum legal requirement of spending at least 50 percent of their time on criminal investigative activity to earn Law Enforcement Availability Pay. Lastly, we found particular issues with the written policies and the overall management of inquiries.

>Oversight Review of the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Internal Affairs Division 		2015
OIG-15-83 KPMG LLP reviewed the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ (FLETC) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains five observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations.

>Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-15-82 KPMG LLP reviewed the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Office of Operations Coordination’s (OPS) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains four observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations.

>Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Office of Operations Coordination's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-15-84 KPMG LLP reviewed the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains one observation related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations. KPMG LLP noted a deficiency and the need for improvement in certain DNDO processes. This deficiency did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2014, included in DHS’ fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report. This observation is intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-15-79 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls and business process application controls at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), and the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS). FLETC provides financial system hosting and support to I&A and OPS. KPMG LLP determined that FLETC, I&A, and OPS had made improvements in designing and consistently implementing controls related to reviewing audit logs and enforcing account security requirements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Component of the FY 2014 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2015

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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