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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-20-20 Following Hurricane Maria, FEMA did not maximize the use of advance contracts to address identified capability deficiencies and needs in Puerto Rico.  Specifically, we identified 49 of 241 new contracts issued in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria for the same goods or services covered by existing advance contracts.  We attributed FEMA’s limited use of advance contracts to its lack of a strategy and documented planning process for ensuring maximum use of advance contracts. Further, FEMA did not maintain contract files in accordance with Federal acquisition regulations and departmental or its own policy.  This occurred because FEMA’s Office of the Chief Procurement Officer did not have controls in place to ensure contract personnel follow Federal regulations and departmental or its own internal policy.  As a result, FEMA’s ability to hold contractors accountable for deliverables is hindered if contract files are not easily located. We made four recommendations to help FEMA improve its strategy for advance contracts, its process for identifying capability needs and gaps, and its contract file management practices. FEMA concurred with all four recommendations and described corrective actions it plans to take.

>FEMA’s Advance Contract Strategy for Disasters in Puerto Rico 		2020
OIG-20-18 The U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support.  Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service’s protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive.  We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled.  Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs.  We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs.  We made no recommendations. 

>United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort 		2020
OIG-20-16 DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components.  We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities.  We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices.  DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.

>DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 		2020
OIG-20-17 Colorado’s Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (Colorado) did not effectively oversee its subrecipient, Frasier Meadows, to ensure it was aware of and followed Federal procurement regulations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines.  In addition, FEMA should have ensured Colorado delivered assistance to Frasier Meadows consistent with the FEMA-State Agreement and the State Administrative Plan.  We recommended the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VIII, disallow $5.57 million for contracts and direct Colorado to work with Frasier Meadows officials to ensure they implement their updated Federal procurement policies and procedures in the event of a future disaster.  FEMA officials agreed with both recommendations.  Prior to final issuance of this report, FEMA took action to resolve and close both recommendations.  No further action is required.

>FEMA Should Recover $5.57 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Frasier Meadows Manor, Inc., Boulder, Colorado 		2020
OIG-20-15 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not balance its Manufactured Housing Unit (MHU) program costs with disaster-related housing needs.  In response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, FEMA overestimated the number of MHUs it needed by nearly 2,600, which amounted to purchase, transportation, and storage costs of at least $152 million.  The agency also overestimated the number of tank and pump systems (TPS) it needed to operate the fire sprinklers, by nearly 2,400, which amounted to purchase and transportation costs of approximately $29 million.  Following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA focused on providing prompt assistance and did not emphasize financial accountability and recordkeeping.  Had FEMA better managed and overseen the MHU program, it could have put an estimated $182 million to better use to assist survivors from Hurricane Harvey or other disasters.  We made four recommendations that will help FEMA better manage its MHU program.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey 		2020
OIG-20-14-VR We determined that the Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management’s technical assistance and monitoring of the City of Evans’ (City) procurement and project-related activities are effective and that FEMA’s corrective actions met the intent of our recommendation 2.  We also determined that the City awarded contracts according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  If Colorado’s technical assistance and monitoring continue, FEMA should have reasonable assurance the City will spend the remaining $7.17 million in grant funds for eligible disaster work according to Federal regulations.

>Verification Review of the City of Evans, Colorado - OIG Audit Report (OIG-16-78-D) 		2020
OIG-20-11 Weld County, Colorado did not always follow Federal procurement standards in awarding contracts for disaster work.  As a result of our review, we identified and discussed with FEMA various areas where it should review and adjust for cost reasonableness the funding amounts that a project and program management contractor charged related to Weld County.  FEMA agreed to review the costs for reasonableness, unless if FEMA disallowed all of the costs for procurement violations.  We subsequently reviewed FEMA’s cost analysis documentation for Weld County project closeouts related to this disaster.  We found that FEMA appropriately reduced final project amounts due to improper procurements and cost reasonableness concerns, including unreasonable contractor hourly rates.  Consequently, made no recommendations. 

>Review of Weld County, Colorado FEMA Grant Award Disaster No. 4145-DR-CO, Applicant No. 123-99123-00 		2020
OIG-20-13 Through its Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can successfully identify aliens charged with or convicted of crimes.  However, because ICE relies on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies, it sometimes faces challenges apprehending aliens in uncooperative jurisdictions.  ICE’s inability to detain aliens identified through CAP contributes to increased risk those aliens will commit more crimes.  Furthermore, having to arrest “at-large” aliens may put officer, detainee, and public safety at risk and strains ICE’s staffing resources.  We made four recommendations to ICE focused on improving CAP.  ICE concurred with all four recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings. 

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges 		2020
OIG-20-12 Aransas County’s procurement policies and procedures are not adequate to meet minimum Federal procurement regulations or address key procurement elements despite guidance and contacts with the Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Division of Emergency Management (Texas).  We recommended the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VI, require Texas to continue providing additional technical assistance and monitoring to the County, and provide to DHS OIG documentation supporting FEMA’s actions to that end.  FEMA officials agreed with both recommendations.  Prior to final issuance of this report, FEMA took action to resolve and close both recommendations.  No further action is required. 

>Aransas County, Texas, Needs Continued Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant 		2020
OIG-20-10 As required under the Grants Oversight and New Efficiency (GONE) Act of 2016, Public Law 114-117, we conducted a risk assessment of FEMA’s grant closeout process to determine whether a full audit is warranted in the future.  We identified risks in three overarching areas:  Unreliable Systems of Record, Lack of Integration in Grant Closeout Policies and Guidance, and Delays in Grant Closeout and Deobligation of Funds.  As a result, we may conduct a full audit of FEMA’s grant closeout process at a future date.  DHS and FEMA concurred with our risk assessment results.  We made no recommendations to FEMA.

>Risk Assessment of FEMA's Grant Closeout Process 		2020
OIG-20-09 DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

>DHS Confirmed It Has Applied Lessons Learned in the Latest Financial System Modernization Effort 		2020
OIG-20-08 We verified that Refugio County, Texas awarded contracts that complied with Federal procurement regulations and FEMA guidelines.  We determined that the County initially did not have written procurement policies to comply with all Federal procurement regulations.  Instead, for purchases and contracting, County officials said they followed Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 262.  In response to our audit, the County adopted written procurement procedures to comply with Federal requirements.  The report contains no recommendations.  FEMA did not submit a formal response to our draft report, but informally replied that it did not identify any issues requiring further action by FEMA.

>Refugio County, Texas, Has Implemented Adequate Procurement Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant 		2020
OIG-20-07 Between 2011 and 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed an average of $896 million in drawback claims annually; however, a lack of internal controls could affect the validity and accuracy of the drawback claims amount.  This occurred, in part, because CBP did not address internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  The Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting identified reoccurring CBP internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  CBP has outlined plans to correct these deficiencies by implementing an updated data processing system and revising legislative procedures.  Without correcting these repeated control deficiencies, CBP cannot determine drawback claims’ validity and accuracy.  These corrective actions are ongoing; therefore, we could not verify during our audit whether CBP remedied the identified internal control deficiencies. Our report contains no recommendations.  

>Lack of Internal Controls Could Affect the Validity of CBP’s Drawback Claims 		2020
OIG-20-06 DHS did not have the Information Technology (IT) system functionality needed to track separated migrant families during the execution of Zero Tolerance.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) adopted various ad hoc methods to record and track family separations, but this practice introduced widespread errors.  These conditions persisted because CBP did not address known IT deficiencies before the Zero Tolerance Policy was implemented in May 2018.  DHS also did not provide adequate guidance to personnel responsible for executing the policy.  Because of the IT deficiencies, we could not confirm the total number of families DHS separated during the Zero Tolerance period.  DHS estimated Border Patrol agents separated 3,014 children from their families while the policy was in place.  DHS also estimated it completed 2,155 reunifications, although this effort continued on for seven months beyond the July 2018 deadline for reunifying children with their parents.  However, we conducted a review of DHS data during the Zero Tolerance period and identified 136 children with potential family relationships that were not accurately recorded by CBP.  In a broader analysis of DHS data between the dates of October 1, 2017 to February 14, 2019, we identified an additional 1,233 children with potential family relationships not accurately recorded by CBP.  Without a reliable accounting of all family relationships, we could not validate the total number of separations, or the completion of reunifications.  Although DHS spent thousands of hours and more than $1 million in overtime costs, it did not achieve the original goal of deterring “Catch-and-Release” through the Zero Tolerance Policy.  Moreover, the surge in apprehended families during this time period resulted in children being held in CBP facilities beyond the 72-hour legal limit.  The Department concurred with all five report recommendations.

>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families 		2020
OIG-20-05 From fiscal years 2015 through 2018, in the midst of a growing opioid epidemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Secret Service appropriately disciplined employees whose drug test results indicated illegal opioid use, based on their employee standards of conduct and tables of offenses and penalties.  Additionally, during the same time period, components have either implemented or are taking steps to evaluate whether employees using prescription opioids can effectively conduct their duties.  For example, components have established policies prohibiting the use of prescription opioids that may impact an employee’s ability to work, in addition to requiring employees to report such prescription opioid use.  They have also implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to evaluate the fitness for duty of employees using prescription opioids.  These policies establish consistent standards components can use to ensure they are allowing employees to use legally-prescribed opioids, while also ensuring their workforce is capable of effectively performing their duties.  We made two recommendations to improve components’ oversight of illegal and prescription opioid use by employees.  CBP and Secret Service concurred with the recommendations, which are both resolved and open.

>CBP, ICE, TSA, and Secret Service Have Taken Steps to Address Illegal and Prescription Opioid Use 		2020
OIG-20-04 Except for identified questioned costs, reported DHS Purchase and Travel Card transactions for FY 2017 were appropriate and complied with relevant laws and regulations.  The auditor, CohnReznick LLP, identified 17 control deficiencies within DHS Purchase and Travel Card Programs related to maintenance of purchase documentation, application of required procurement policies, price reasonableness determinations, price quotes/competitive bids, required sourcing, tax exemptions, and split purchases.  The DHS Travel Card Program deficiencies related to maintenance of travel documentation, allowability of transactions per regulations, credit balance refunds, the prudent traveler standard, and improper use of a travel card.  The auditor identified $43,508 in questioned costs for FY 2017 and made 12 recommendations.  When implemented, these recommendations should ensure that Purchase and Travel Card transactions are appropriate and comply with relevant laws and regulations.  The Office of the Chief Financial Officer concurred with six recommendations and non-concurred with six recommendations. 

>Audit of DHS Fiscal Year 2017 Purchase and Travel Card Programs 		2020
OIG-20-03 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with DHS OIG, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ FY 2019 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion over the Department’s financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2019.  However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas and other significant deficiencies in three areas.  Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG also reported two instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations.  DHS concurred with all of the recommendations.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2020
OIG-20-02 Based on our recent and prior audits, inspections, special reviews, and investigations, we consider the most serious management and performance challenges currently facing DHS to be: (1) Managing Programs and Operations Effectively and Efficiently during times of Changes in Leadership, Vacancies, Hiring Difficulties; (2) Coordinating Efforts to Address the Sharp Increase in Migrants Seeking to Enter the United States through our Southern Border; (3) Ensuring Cybersecurity in an Age When Confidentiality, Integrity, and the Availability of Information Technology Are Essential to Mission Operations; (4) Ensuring Proper Financial Planning, Payments, and Internal Controls; and (5) Improving FEMA’s Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts.  Addressing and overcoming these challenges requires firm leadership; targeted resources; and a commitment to mastering management fundamentals, data collection and dissemination, cost-benefit/risk analysis, and performance measurement. 

>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the DHS 		2020
OIG-20-01 At the time of our onsite work in July 2017, Box Elder County had not awarded any contracts under this grant. Therefore, we could not determine whether the County had complied with Federal procurement regulations. However, in reviewing Box Elder County’s written procurement policies and procedures we noted the County did not include procedures to ensure opportunities for small and minority businesses, women’s business enterprises, and labor surplus area firms to bid for federally funded work.  In addition, Box Elder County’s procurement policies did not require federally mandated provisions be incorporated in all contracts funded by Federal grants.  In response to our review, Box Elder County revised its procurement policies and procedures to include these Federal procurement requirements.  Consequently, we made no recommendations.

>Review of Box Elder County, Utah's Procurement Policies and Procedures for Disaster No. 4311-DR-UT, Grant No. 003-99003-00 		2020
OIG-19-67 Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics 2019
OIG-19-66 FEMA did not take sufficient actions to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of transportation assistance funds for vehicles considered damaged or destroyed by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in FY 2017.  These weakness occurred because FEMA does not require that agencies collect and retain documentation used to establish applicant eligibility; consider pre-disaster vehicle market value when determining award amounts; provide guidance to state, territorial and tribal governments on how to set transportation assistance thresholds; and conduct post-payment reviews to ensure funds are spent appropriately.  We made three recommendations that, when implemented, will help FEMA ensure it is spending Federal funds for transportation assistance properly.  FEMA concurred with one recommendation and non-concurred with two recommendations.

>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds 		2019
OIG-19-63 Richland County did not always properly account for and expend Federal funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  FEMA did not hold North Dakota accountable for fulfilling its grant management responsibilities, and North Dakota did not adequately manage the FEMA grant by monitoring the County to ensure it complied with applicable regulations and guidelines.  The County failed to follow all Federal procurement regulations when awarding about $1.9 million in disaster-related contracts.  We recommended that FEMA disallow $1,146,921 in ineligible contract costs and direct North Dakota to work with the County to verify that the County complies with all Federal grant requirements and establishes effective accounting systems.  FEMA concurred with our three recommendations for improving County compliance in managing future Federal grants. 

>FEMA Should Disallow $1.1 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Richland County, North Dakota 		2019
OIG-19-64 In two of the four areas – training and collaboration – Washington’s Emergency Management Division (EMD) and FEMA complied with applicable policies, procedures, and regulations.  In the third functional area – project execution, monitoring and oversight – we did not identify any significant deficiencies.  We found, however, EMD lacked position-specific guidance for all personnel with programmatic responsibilities.  In the last functional area – project and grant closeout – neither EMD nor its subrecipients submitted timely project closeout requests.  In addition, FEMA did not enforce compliance with its own guidance for processing closeouts.  We recommended FEMA ensure EMD complies with its State Administrative Plan by issuing and regularly updating desk manuals.  In addition, we recommended FEMA coordinate with EMD to initiate closeout on behalf of subrecipients for all open, large projects whose period of performance end dates exceed the 90-day regulatory requirement, and submit closeout requests to FEMA for projects exceeding the 180-day requirement.  We made five recommendations to strengthen EMD’s internal controls to improve its oversight of FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program.  FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations.

>The State of Washington's Oversight of FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program for Fiscal Years 2015-2017 Was Generally Effective 		2019
OIG-19-61 FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for $306 Million in Public Assistance Funds 2019
OIG-19-62 DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning 2019
OIG-19-60 DHS’ information security program was effective for fiscal year 2018 because the Department earned the targeted maturity rating, “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions, as compared to last year’s lower overall rating, “Consistently Implemented” (Level 3). We attributed DHS’ progress to improvements in information security risk, configuration management practices, continuous monitoring, and more effective security training. By addressing the remaining deficiencies, DHS can further improve its security program ensuring its systems adequately protect the critical and sensitive data they store and process.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018 		2019
OIG-19-59 We determined that despite requirements of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) did not effectively coordinate and integrate department-wide research and development (R&D) activities.  In August 2015, S&T established Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) as the central mechanism to identify, track, and coordinate department-wide priority R&D efforts.  However, S&T did not follow its IPT process as intended.  Specifically, not all components submitted all information on capability gaps to the IPTs; S&T did not effectively gather, track, and manage data on the Department’s R&D gaps and activities; and S&T did not adequately monitor the IPT process to ensure it was effective.  As a result, S&T may not be able to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an accurate profile of the Department’s R&D activities or justify funding needs for a wide range of missions, including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers.  We made three recommendations to improve S&T’s coordination of R&D activities across DHS.  S&T concurred with our recommendations.

>S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS 		2019
OIG-19-58 FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations 2019
OIG-19-57 A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations 2019
OIG-19-56 The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) methods for classifying its Office of Inspection (OOI) criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. TSA’s criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The FY 2017 timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met the 50 percent requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. This occurred because OOI officials lacked oversight and accountability for the timesheet submission, review, and approval processes. Further, criminal investigators and their supervisors did not always complete and approve certification forms as required to verify eligibility for premium pay. In some instances, incorrect timesheet calculations inflated the annual average of unscheduled duty hours criminal investigators worked to be eligible for premium pay. OOI management did not develop and implement guidance to review these key calculations annually. Without better oversight and valid timesheet data, TSA cannot ensure it is accurately classifying criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA also may be wasting agency funds on criminal investigators ineligible to receive premium pay. We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its OOI criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA concurred with all of our recommendations.

>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement 		2019
OIG-19-54 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not properly oversee the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (Louisiana or State) to ensure it complied with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  Louisiana and the Office of Community Development (OCD), in turn, did not always properly account for and expend Federal grant funds.  Specifically, Louisiana did not provide adequate documentation to support costs, as required by Federal regulations, and FEMA is not requiring the State to provide mandatory documentation to close out the $706.6 million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) grant.  Louisiana also has not provided FEMA with required documentation showing that homeowners paid $79.7 million in promissory notes for state-funded mitigation work on their homes.  Finally, Louisiana drew down funds exceeding project obligations by $50.4 million due to a lack of FEMA controls.  These issues arose primarily because FEMA did not ensure Louisiana exercised proper oversight of the HMGP grant and the State did not comply with Federal regulations.  As a result, Federal funds are at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.  We provided five recommendations to FEMA to postpone project closeout until Louisiana provides adequate documentation that supports $706.6 million in costs and that FEMA ensures compliance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  FEMA’s responses were sufficient to close all but one recommendation, which we consider open and unresolved.  

>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a $706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes 		2019
OIG-19-55 FEMA has instituted several effective mechanisms to demonstrate the importance of fraud prevention in its disaster assistance programs, but it needs to do more.  In line with our 2011 audit report recommendations, FEMA now uses standard system queries and additional business rules to flag potentially fraudulent disaster assistance applications.  However, FEMA must take additional, proactive steps to create and sustain a culture of fraud prevention and awareness.  This includes adequately staffing the Fraud and Internal Investigations Division, implementing an effective process to monitor and discourage staff noncompliance with required fraud training requirements, and establishing a clear and consistent process for reporting suspected fraud.  We made five recommendations for FEMA to demonstrate its commitment to fraud prevention in carrying out its disaster assistance programs.  FEMA concurred with all of our recommendations and has begun implementing corrective actions.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 		2019
OIG-19-53 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a critical role in the Nation’s efforts to interdict dangerous substances and prohibited items at U.S. ports of entry and keep these materials from harming the American public. An important part of CBP’s mission is preventing foreign countries from importing illegal drugs such as opioids into the U.S. CBP is experiencing a rise in seizures of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that upon exposure can kill in minutes.  CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) Fines Penalties and Forfeitures Division stores, manages, and disposes seized property, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl.  During our ongoing audit of CBP’s storage of seized drugs at permanent drug vaults we visited, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids.  Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure.  This occurred because CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure.  In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure.  As a result, CBP staff is at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure.  We made one recommendation to help CBP provide its components with guidance, knowledge, and tools to handle and reverse overdoses from fentanyl and other opioids.

>Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure 		2019
OIG-19-52 FEMA's Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC 2019
OIG-19-50 Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts 2019
OIG-19-51 Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley 2019
OIG-19-49 CBP’s controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. This occurred because CBP officers did not always comply with policies when reviewing Global Entry applications nor do CBP’s policies sufficiently help officers

determine an applicant’s level of risk. Additionally, during the airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. These weaknesses were due to officers not following policy, as well as CBP’s insufficient verification procedures. Unless CBP officers authenticate kiosk receipts, someone could use a fake receipt to enter the United States. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. In particular, CBP did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program effectively. CBP’s lack of adherence to its compliance program’s policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry by allowing potentially ineligible members to continue to participate.

>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation 		2019
OIG-19-48 DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline 2019
OIG-19-47 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities 2019
OIG-19-44 Audit of DHS' Issuance and Management of Other Transaction Agreements Involving Consortium Activities 2019
OIG-19-46 According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose  is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT).

>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center 		2019
OIG-19-45 Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions 2019
OIG-19-43 The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2019
OIG-19-42 DHS expanded the Insider Threat Program from monitoring user activity on its classified networks to monitoring cleared and non-cleared employees’ activity on unclassified networks. We initiated a project to determine Insider Threat Program progress in monitoring, detecting, and responding to malicious insider threats on unclassified DHS systems and networks. Before continuing its planned expansion of the Insider Threat Program, DHS needs to address several deficiencies that may hinder program effectiveness and efficiency. Although the expanded program was approved in January 2017, the Office of the Chief Security Officer has yet to revise, obtain approval for, and reissue required documentation.

>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program 		2019
OIG-19-41 Special Report: Review Regarding DHS OIG's Retraction of Thirteen Reports Evaluating FEMA's Initial Response to Disasters 2019
OIG-19-39 This report presents the results of KPMG LLP’s (KPMG) work conducted to address the performance audit objectives relative to the Audit of Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending. KPMG performed the work during the period of September 18, 2017 to August 30, 2018, and our scope period for testing was October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017. KPMG LLP (KPMG) found that DHS management has policies and procedures over conference spending and reporting, improvements are needed. KMPG made seven recommendations to improve conference spending reporting.

>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending 		2019
OIG-19-40 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions 2019
OIG-19-38 FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC 2019
OIG-19-37 This interim report is part of an ongoing audit to determine the extent FEMA is meeting disaster survivors’ transitional shelter needs after the California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. We determined that FEMA does not require disaster survivors to notify the agency when they vacate hotels participating in the TSA program, thus allowing the hotels to continue to bill FEMA for unoccupied rooms. Because FEMA is unaware when disaster survivors vacate the hotels, the agency does not know the magnitude of unnecessary hotel charges. Consequently, FEMA could not account for associated TSA payments it may have paid since August 2017, related to the 2017 hurricane season and California wildfires.

>Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program 		2019
OIG-19-36 Williams, Adley and Company - DC, LLP completed an audit of Missouri’s management of State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants awarded during fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Williams Adley concluded that Missouri’s State Administrative Agency generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations. Although Williams Adley did not identify any duplicate benefits received by the state, it did identify instances in which the state did not fully comply with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) FYs 2012–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance.

>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015 		2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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