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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-18-60 At the time of our audit, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the City of Waterloo, Iowa (City), sustained approximately $1.9 million in damages from severe storms and flooding from September 21 through October 3, 2016. The City did not provide all requested information and explanations necessary to perform our review; therefore, we were unable to assess whether the City’s policies, procedures, and business practices were adequate to account for FEMA Public Assistance grant funds properly. The City’s failure to cooperate with a Federal audit put approximately $1.9 million dollars in potential FEMA grant funding at risk of being deobligated or not funded.

>The City of Waterloo, Iowa Jeopardizes $1.9 Million in Estimated FEMA Grant Funding 		2018
OIG-10-85  

>The Coast Guard's Boat Crew Communications System Is Unreliable 		2010
OIG-10-89  

>The Coast Guard's Maritime Safety and Security Team Program  		2010
OIG-08-03 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Management of State Homeland Security Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004 2008
OIG-11-109  

>The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009 		2011
OIG-14-05 Our audit was conducted in accordance with applicable Government Auditing Standards, 2011 revision. The audit was a performance audit, as defined by Chapter 2 of the Standards, and included a review and report on program activities with a compliance element. Although the audit report comments on costs claimed by the CNMI, we did not perform a financial audit, the purpose of which would be to render an opinion on CNMI’s financial statements, or the funds claimed in the Financial Status Reports submitted to the Department of Homeland Security.

>The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands’ Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2009 Through 2011 (Revised) (PDF, 34 pages - 1.36 MB) Spotlight 		2014
OIG-06-45 The Commonwealth of Virginia's Management of State Homeland Security Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 2006
OIG-13-10 The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the Commonwealth of Virginia distributed and spent State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative grant funds (1) effectively and efficiently and (2) in compliance with applicable Federal laws and regulations. We also addressed the extent to which grant funds enhanced the Commonwealth’s ability to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters. The audit included a review of $90 million in State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative grants awarded to the Commonwealth during fiscal years 2008 through 2010.

>The Commonwealth of Virginia’s Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2008 Through 2010 		2013
OIG-17-113-D We determined that while the Commission has a system in place to account for funds on a project-by-project basis and generally expended Public Assistance grant funds according to FEMA guidelines, the Commission needs additional assistance in developing long-term solutions for repetitive damages to county roads and managing its $5.4 million FEMA grant. We found that the Commission did not receive adequate guidance from FEMA and Alabama concerning Hazard Mitigation funding for long-term solutions to repetitive damages to roads; thus, potentially costing FEMA millions of dollars in the future; and project formulation, causing improperly written project scopes.  Additionally, the Commission did not have proper procurement procedures to ensure that small businesses, minority-owned firms, and women’s business enterprises have an opportunity to bid on Federal contracts; and adequate procedures to ensure proper documentation is collected to support $24,000 in costs. The report contains five recommendations to the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, to provide the Commission with additional guidance to properly manage its $5.4 million and save millions in the future.  FEMA agreed with all recommendations.

>The Covington County Commission Needs Additional Assistance in Managing a $5.4 Million FEMA Grant 		2017
OIG-07-33 The Department of Homeland Security's Role in Food Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection 2007
OIG-09-65  

>The DHS Personnel Security Process 		2009
OIG-11-67  

>The DHS Privacy Office Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 		2011
OIG-08-29 The DHS Process for Nominating Individuals to the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist 2008
OIG-22-78 The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority 2022
OIG-14-137 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Visa Security Program is intended to prevent terrorists, criminals, and other ineligible applicants from receiving visas. DHS assigns special agents with expertise in immigration law and counterterrorism to U.S. diplomatic posts overseas to perform visa security activities . We reviewed the program’s effectiveness in preventing ineligible applicants from receiving U.S. visas; DHS’ annual reporting to Congress on the program’s expansion; and the efforts to expand the program to additional overseas posts, including the potential impact of a new initiative, the Pre ‐ Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence OperationsTeam.

>The DHS Visa Security Program 		2014
OIG-12-24  

>The Effects of USCIS Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers 		2012
OIG-17-104 TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-53), required us to review the Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS’) policies and procedures for identifying misuse of Government resources, as well as the administration of FAMS’ code of conduct or integrity policies with respect to instances of misconduct. We incorporated this requirement into our ongoing department-wide audit of conduct and discipline, which seeks to determine whether DHS and its components have sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. We determined that FAMS has sufficient policies and procedures to establish expectations for appropriate conduct, identify misuse of government resources, and address misconduct allegations. The report contains no recommendations.

>The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing Misconduct 		2017
OIG-04-49 The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Individual and Family Grant Program Management at the World Trade Center Disaster, September 2004 2004
OIG-12-92  

>The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Requirements for Reporting Homeland Security Grant Program Achievements 		2012
OIG-19-15 National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Chief of Staff requested a review to determine whether Federal Protective Service (FPS) inspectors’ positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors’ excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Specifically, 11 of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This kind of extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States. Furthermore, FPS’ increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for fiscal year 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk. The inspectors were able to accumulate the extensive overtime because of poor internal controls, such as management not monitoring the use of overtime.

>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively 		2019
OIG-16-02 FPS is not managing its fleet effectively. FPS did not properly justify that its current fleet is necessary to carry out its operational mission. Specifically, FPS did not justify the need for: more vehicles than officers; administrative vehicles; larger sport utility vehicles; home-to-work miles in one region; and discretionary equipment added to vehicles. Additionally, FPS overpaid for law enforcement equipment packages, did not have standard operating procedures for fleet management, a sound vehicle allocation methodology, or accurate fleet data to make effective management decisions. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) fleet managers did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure FPS complied with all Federal and departmental guidance. As a result, FPS cannot ensure it is operating the most cost-efficient fleet and potentially missed opportunities to save more than $2.5 million in fiscal year 2014.

>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively ( 		2016
OIG-15-123-D The County received a $14 million grant for damages from Hurricane Isaac, an August 2012 disaster. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the County may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements. At the time of our audit, the Jackson County, Mississippi, Board of Supervisors (County) had not established accounting procedures to account for disaster costs on a project-by-project basis, as Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines require. As a result, we had to rely on direct assistance from County officials to identify project costs and related supporting documentation. Additionally, although most of the County’s contracts complied with Federal procurement standards, the County improperly procured an architectural and engineering (A/E) contract totaling $1.3 million for dredging navigation channels. Inadequate competition increased the likelihood of fraud, waste, and abuse of Federal funds and resulted in at least $353,154 of unreasonable costs. Further, in soliciting bids for the A/E contract, the County did not provide opportunities for disadvantaged firms, such as small and minority firms, to bid on federally funded work as Congress intended. Lastly, the contract included a clause making payment contingent upon FEMA funding, which Federal cost principles do not allow.

>The Jackson County, Mississippi, Board of Supervisors Would Benefit from Technical Assistance in Managing Its $14 Million FEMA Grant Award 		2015
OIG-15-134-D The Knoxville Utilities Board received a Public Assistance award of $2.7 million from the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, a FEMA grantee, for damages resulting from severe storms and tornadoes in April 2011. We audited projects totaling $2.5 million. For the projects we reviewed, the Utility properly accounting for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements.

>The Knoxville Utilities Board Effectively Managed FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded for Damages from Tornadoes and Severe Storms in April 2011 		2015
OIG-15-133-D The Knoxville Utilities Board received a Public Assistance award of $5.2 million from the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, a FEMA grantee, for damages resulting from severe storms and tornadoes in June 2011. We audited projects totaling $4.3 million. For the projects we reviewed, the Utility properly accounting for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements.

>The Knoxville Utilities Board Effectively Managed FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded for Damages from Tornadoes and Severe Storms in June 2011 		2015
OIG-22-33 The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve Its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices 2022
OIG-16-104-D The Louisiana Office of Community Development (OCD) received $702.9 million in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funds for hazard mitigation grant program (HMGP) work on 9,588 properties under Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We received allegations that the timeliness of OCD payments was placing financial hardship on program contractors. Therefore, our objective was to determine whether OCD processed payments to contractors in a timely manner and according to Federal regulations, FEMA guidelines, and State laws. We did not verify the validity of costs claimed or completion of work.

>The Office of Community Development Paid Most Contractors in a Timely Manner for Hazard Mitigation Work on Louisiana Homes 		2016
OIG-12-57  

>The Office of Financial Management’s Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-13-70 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>The Office of Financial Management’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-14-75 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>The Office of Financial Management’s Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
DS-16-04 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audited Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to King County, Seattle, Washington (County), July 27, 2004 2004
OIG-22-50 The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve its Open Source Intelligence Reporting Process 2022
OIG-18-25 The Omaha Tribe’s serious financial management weaknesses combined with inadequate and missing documentation resulted in unreliable financial records. As a result, we have little confidence that the transactions recorded in the accounting system actually occurred or that the tribe completed its FEMA-authorized projects. Therefore, we question $13.9 million as unsupported. Due to the unreliable financial information, we calculated the amount unsupported as the entire $16.9 million FEMA provided for both grants, less $2.8 million in unused Federal funding that FEMA should put to better use; $165,000 in unclaimed insurance coverage; and approximately $74,749 that we were able to verify as supported and eligible.

>The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska and Iowa Mismanaged $14 Million in FEMA Disaster Grants 		2018
OIG-10-63  

>The Performance of 287 (g) Agreements 		2010
OIG-11-119  

>The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2011 Update 		2011
OIG-12-130 The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2012 Follow-Up 2012
OIG-13-116 As of July 2013, ICE had 39 MOAs in 19 States, a reduction from the 64 MOAs in 24 States during fiscal year 2012. As of January 2013, all Task Force Officer Models have been discontinued. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) maintains day-to-day supervision of the 287(g) program. Within the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the 287(g) Inspections Unit assesses the effectiveness of ICE field offices in supervising and supporting 287(g) programs, as well as ICE and LEA compliance with program policies and MOA requirements. The results of 287(g) inspection reviews provide ICE management with information on the administration of the program by local ICE offices and LEAs.

>The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2013 Update 		2013
OIG-10-124  

>The Performance of 287(g) Agreements Report Update  ( 		2010
OIG-15-67-D As of February 2014, the Port Authority requested an estimated $213 million in Public Assistance funding for 2012 Hurricane Sandy damages. We conducted this audit early in the Public Assistance process to identify areas where the Port Authority may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal grant requirements. At the time of the grant award, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) did not have adequate accounting and procurement policies and procedures in place to ensure compliance with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant requirements. However, in late 2013, the Port Authority made changes to its accounting and procurement policies and procedures for FEMA-funded work. These changes should provide FEMA reasonable assurance that the Port Authority has the capability to account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal requirements.

>The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Recently Updated Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices Should Be Adequate to Effectively Manage FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds 		2015
OIG-12-21 The Preparedness Directorate’s Anti-Deficiency Act Violations for Fiscal Year 2006 Shared Service Administrative Assessments 2012
OIG-15-142-D The Puerto Rico Department of Housing received two Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant awards totaling $186.13 million to implement the New Secure Housing Program following Hurricane Georges in September 1998. In August 2012, the Puerto Rico Department of Housing submitted final expenditure claims totaling $184.34 million. FEMA requested that we audit these claims to facilitate closeout of the grants. The Puerto Rico Department of Housing did not always account for and expend FEMA grant funds awarded for the New Secure Housing Program according to Federal requirements. Of the $179.98 million of construction costs the Puerto Rico Department of Housing claimed, we found that $90.79 million was ineligible. The majority of these findings occurred because the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency, as the grantee, should have done a better job of managing the grants.

>The Puerto Rico Department of Housing Did Not Properly Administer $90.79 Million of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded for the New Secure Housing Program 		2015
OIG-14-121-D We audited Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Housing (FIPS Code 000-92151) following Hurricane Georges in September 1998. We conducted the audit at the request of FEMA Region II to facilitate FEMA's closeout of the grant. The Puerto Rico Department of Housing (Department) received a Hazard Mitigation Grant Program award of $165.3 million from the Puerto Rico Office of Management and Budget (Puerto Rico), a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grantee, to implement the New Secure Housing Program. The award provided 75 percent FEMA funding under the New Secure ousing Program and 100 percent under the Emergency Home Repairs Program.

>The Puerto Rico Department of Housing Generally Complied with FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Eligibility Requirements for Participants of the New Secure Housing Program – Hurricane Georges 		2014
OIG-16-43-D The Authority received an $8.04 million Public Assistance grant award from the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (Puerto Rico), a FEMA grantee, for damages resulting from Hurricane Irene in August 2011. Our audit objective was to determine whether the Authority accounted for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements. The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Puerto Rico, (Authority) generally accounted for and expended Public Assistance grant funds according to Federal regulations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines. However, the Authority did not comply with the Single Audit Act, which requires non-Federal entities that expend $500,000 or more in a year in Federal awards to obtain a single or program-specific audit for that year. Although the Authority did not take steps to ensure that it met the Single Audit Act requirements, Puerto Rico, as grantee, is responsible for ensuring that its subgrantee (the Authority) is aware of and complies with grant requirements. As a result of this deficiency, FEMA and Puerto Rico did not have an opportunity to review the Single Audit report that would have made them aware of any potential issues with the Authority’s administration of the FEMA grant.

>The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority Effectively Managed FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded for Hurricane Irene in August 2011 		2016
OIG-08-18 The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria (Redacted) 2008
OIG-10-80  

>The Responsibilities of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement  		2010
OIG-09-88  

>The Science and Technology Directorate's Processes for Funding Research and Development Programs 		2009
OIG-16-16 The Secret Service responded immediately to a November 2011 incident in which shots fired from an assault rifle hit the White House and participated in the ensuing investigation. However, the Secret Service did not conduct a formal after action review or a detailed analysis of its protective operations or investigative response, so it is not clear whether protective policies were followed. After the incident, the Secret Service spent at least $17 million to improve infrastructure around the White House and increase patrols; however, without a formal after action review and detailed analysis, the Secret Service cannot be certain these changes were necessary, would have minimized the potential threat, or improved the response to the incident.

>The Secret Service Did Not Identify Best Practices and Lessons Learned from the 2011 White House Shooting Incident 		2016
OIG-17-47 The Protective Mission Panel (PMP) made a number of recommendations in its December 2014 classified report.  The objective of this review was to determine whether the Secret Service has taken or plans to take action to implement the PMP’s classified recommendations, which primarily relate to security gaps and vulnerabilities at the White House Complex (WHC).  The Secret Service has clearly taken these recommendations seriously.  Using funding appropriated for PMP initiatives, the Secret Service began enhancing security and refreshing technology at the WHC.  Fully implementing many of the PMP’s classified recommendations will depend on staff increases, sustained funding, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department leadership to ensure actions continue even during times of increased protective mission demands and unexpected priorities.  We made no recommendations in this report.

>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Classified Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel 		2017
OIG-17-10 We determined that the U.S. Secret Service has clearly taken the Protective Mission Panel’s (PMP) recommendations seriously, which it has demonstrated by making a number of significant changes.  Specifically, it has improved communication within the workforce, better articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and committed to more training.  However, fully implementing many of the PMP’s recommendations will require long-term financial planning, further staff increases, consistent re-evaluation of the initiated actions’ effectiveness, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department of Homeland Security leadership.  We have made five recommendations.

>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel 		2017
OIG-15-41 The United States Coast Guard (USCG) operates the Biometrics at Sea System (BASS) to collect biometric data from interdicted aliens. The biometrics are sent to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) to identify potential persons of interest, including suspected terrorists. We audited BASS interface with IDENT, security roles and responsibilities, and change control management. We determined that USCG did not have a routine reconciliation process to ensure that all biometrics that it captured on the 23 cutters are maintained in IDENT. Not ensuring reconciliation between the total biometrics USCG submitted and the number stored in IDENT may impede future identification of suspected terrorists, aggravated felons, or other individuals of interest. USCG also allowed application programmers with unrestricted system access to share passwords. The control weakness may result in individuals making unauthorized changes to the system without detection. Further, we determined that the authorization for the transition from the 2-fingerprint to 10-fingerprint application system was not properly documented and security documentation had not been updated. Without a proper authorization process, USCG could not provide assurance that senior executives approved the change prior to implementation.

>The Security Posture of the United States Coast Guard's Biometrics At Sea System Needs Improvements 		2015
OIG-09-79 The Special Immigrant Nonminister Religious Worker Program 2009

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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