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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-22-42 Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative 2022
OIG-22-74 FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations 2022
OIG-22-06 DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts 2022
OIG-22-41 DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-73 More than $2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities 2022
OIG-22-09 DHS' Implementation of OIG Recommendations Related to Drug Interdiction 2022
OIG-22-39 CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-72 A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Response and Relief 2022
OIG-22-08 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ fiscal year 2021 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on the financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2021.  However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas and other significant deficiencies in four areas.  Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting.  KPMG also reported noncompliance with two laws and regulations.  KPMG made 19 recommendations to improve the Department’s internal control over financial reporting.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2022
OIG-22-29 I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-70 ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations 2022
OIG-22-05 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2022
OIG-22-40 Violations of ICE Detention Standards at South Texas ICE Processing Center 2022
OIG-22-69 FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program 2022
OIG-21-14 Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning 2021
OIG-21-45 DHS issued notices to appear (NTA), to MPP participants that were mostly accurate and in accordance with laws and regulations.  However, some NTAs were completed inaccurately.  Specifically, of our sample of 106 NTAs from February 2019 through April 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) served 20 that did not meet legal sufficiency standards or contained inaccurate information.  However, CBP agents and officers documented proactively issuing 105 of 106 NTAs in our sample in person before returning migrants to Mexico.  If CBP serves a legally insufficient NTA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cannot prosecute its removal case if a migrant fails to appear for the initial hearing.  Serving NTAs by mail to migrants in Mexico could result in migrants missing their hearings or the Government’s cases being dismissed or challenged.  We recommended that CBP’s Executive Director of the Office of Field Operations’ Admissibility and Passenger Programs and the Deputy Chief of Border Patrol’s Law Enforcement Operations Directorate develop procedures for quality control and supervisory review of NTAs for MPP enrollees to better ensure that officers and agents fill out the NTAs accurately and completely.  We made one recommendation to improve the accuracy and completeness of NTAs issued to MPP participants.  CBP non-concurred with the recommendation due to it being overcome by events when the program was terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security on June 1, 2021.  We administratively closed the recommendation.

>CBP Generally Provided Accurate Notices to Appear to Migrant Protection Protocols Enrollees, but Could Improve Procedures to Reduce Future Errors 		2021
OIG-21-13 CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage 2021
OIG-21-47 CBP did not always protect MPC apps from cybersecurity threats.  This occurred because app version updates were not always scanned for vulnerabilities and CBP did not always identify vulnerabilities detected in scans.  CBP also did not complete seven required security and privacy compliance reviews of MPC apps because it did not establish a schedule for the reviews or track and centrally store review documentation.  In addition, CBP did not obtain the information needed for the reviews, had competing priorities, and did not ensure app developers created a process for a required internal audit.  Finally, CBP did not implement Department server configuration requirements for its MPC servers.  We made eight recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the security of CBP’s MPC program.  CBP concurred with all eight recommendations.

>CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation 		2021
OIG-21-12 ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility 2021
OIG-21-44 Specifically, in reviewing 16 contract files, we found files that did not have relevant Federal tax information, were missing information on the contractor’s past performance evaluations, and contained incomplete and inconsistent documentation.  We attribute these deficiencies to FEMA not providing guidance on procedures for implementing Federal regulations to contracting personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security removing guidance from its acquisition manual that is used by component personnel.  As a result of inadequate guidance, FEMA personnel awarded contracts without making fully informed determinations as to whether prospective contractors could meet contract demands.  If contractors cannot meet demands, FEMA may have to cancel contracts it has awarded, which has happened in the past and continues.  In fact, between March and May 2020, FEMA awarded and canceled at least 22 contracts, valued at $184 million, for crucial supplies in response to the national COVID-19 pandemic.  By awarding contracts without ensuring prospective contractors can meet contract demands, FEMA will continue wasting taxpayer dollars and future critical disaster and pandemic assistance will continue to be delayed.  We made one recommendation that, when implemented, should help strengthen FEMA’s responsibility determination process.  The Department concurred with our recommendation. 

>FEMA Must Strengthen Its Responsibility Determination Process 		2021
OIG-21-06 DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives 2021
OIG-21-43 FEMA has not prioritized compliance with the DMA 2000.  According to FEMA officials, the agency has instead focused on immediate needs of disaster operations and other high- profile initiatives necessary to carry out its mission.  As such, FEMA has not published regulations and related policies as required by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to reduce repetitive damages to facilities, including the Nation’s roads and bridges.  We made four recommendations to FEMA, including that FEMA should prioritize the DMA 2000 by addressing the unresolved implementation issues and publishing a regulation as required. 

>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges 		2021
OIG-21-11 TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-21-42 FEMA’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with the Texas General Land Office (TxGLO) was appropriate to ensure direct housing assistance program compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  However, FEMA initiated the IGSA without first developing the processes and controls TxGLO needed to administer the program.  As a result, FEMA and the State had to develop and finalize implementation guidelines after signing the IGSA, delaying TxGLO’s disaster response.  In addition, FEMA disaster personnel had to prepare the necessary guidance, toolkits, and training resources while simultaneously responding to Hurricane Harvey.  Also, FEMA used workarounds and TxGLO set up a separate system, creating additional operational challenges and inefficiencies.  We made three recommendations to improve future state administered direct housing assistance efforts.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

>FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls 		2021
OIG-21-70 CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-21-10 FEMA Should Disallow $12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy 2021
OIG-21-41 We determined that FEMA followed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance in its efforts to provide funding for reconstruction of the Vieques’ Community Health Center.  FEMA’s assessment of the funding needs for the project is complete and $39,569,695 (Federal share) was obligated on January 21, 2020 for a full facility replacement.  We did not make any recommendations but announced an audit to assess FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Alternative Procedures process for all permanent work projects.

>FEMA's Efforts to Provide Funds to Reconstruct the Vieques Community Health Center 		2021
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-21-40 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not adequately identify and track human trafficking crimes.  Specifically, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) did not accurately track dissemination and receipt of human trafficking tips, did not consistently take follow-up actions on tips, and did not maintain accurate data on human trafficking. These issues occurred because HSI did not have a cohesive approach for carrying out its responsibilities to combat human trafficking. We made one recommendation to improve ICE’s coordination and human trafficking efforts to assist victims. ICE concurred with our recommendation.

>ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims 		2021
OIG-21-73 FLETC implemented robust protocols to respond to and mitigate COVID-19 at its Glynco training facility.  Before reopening in June 2020, FLETC developed a formal plan to resume in-person training.  Through this plan, along with other policies and procedures, FLETC established protocols in accordance with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance and medical expertise.  DHS students and component officials we spoke with confirmed that these protocols were in place and told us that, overall, they were effective.  However, they also raised concerns related to students socializing inappropriately, and not following some requirements such as mask-wearing.  In instances such as these, FLETC was largely reliant on students’ home agencies to take action to reinforce compliance among their students with safety protocols, or to take disciplinary action, if necessary.  As a result of its measures, FLETC’s rate of positive COVID-19 tests was lower than that of its surrounding county.  We also found, however, that FLETC did not always follow its own protocols for housing assignments related to COVID-19.  For example, some students who were not positive for COVID-19 or were not quarantined for exposure to COVID-19 were still housed in the isolation dormitory.  Some of the students we spoke with who were incorrectly assigned to the isolation dormitory told us that they did not feel safe.  We made one recommendation to the FLETC Director to improve COVID-19 student-housing protocols.  FLETC concurred with the recommendation. 

>FLETC's Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at its Glynco Training Center 		2021
OIG-21-08 Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 2021
OIG-21-39 We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not manage the Recruitment and Hiring (R&H) contract in a fiscally responsible manner.  Specifically, TSA did not properly plan contract requirements prior to awarding the contract and did not develop accurate cost estimates for all contract modifications.  We recommended TSA establish a cross-functional requirements working group for planning and awarding the R&H re-compete efforts as well as other Personnel Futures Program contract requirements.  The working group should develop a holistic and forward-thinking acquisition strategy, as well as implement a comprehensive process for reviewing and determining requirements.  We also recommended TSA ensure Human Capital improves contract management activities including, but not limited to, requirements planning and realistic cost estimate development by obtaining additional expert resources or leveraging existing expertise.  We made two recommendations to improve TSA’s contract management.  TSA concurred with both recommendations.

>TSA Needs to Improve Its Oversight for Human Capital Contracts 		2021
OIG-21-72 In May 2020, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management formally documented the Department’s risk acceptance to allow the Coast Guard to meet FISMA requirements according to Department of Defense, rather than DHS’ reporting requirements.  The Deputy Under Secretary for Management’s decision adversely affected our ability to evaluate the Department’s enterprise-wide information program under this year’s OIG reporting metrics.  Nonetheless, when evaluating the overall effectiveness of DHS’ information security program for FY 2020 FISMA, our rating does not include the Coast Guard.  DHS’ information security program earned a maturity rating of “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in three of five functions.  DHS can further improve the effectiveness of its information security program by ensuring components execute all its policies and procedures.  We made four recommendations in our report, with one to the DHS Chief Information Officer, one to the S&T Chief Information Officer, one to the Secret Service Chief Information Officer, and one to the FEMA Chief Information Officer.  The Department concurred with all four recommendations.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020 		2021
OIG-21-07 Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 2021
OIG-21-38 We determined DHS had not yet strengthened its cybersecurity posture by implementing a Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program.  DHS spent more than $180 million between 2013 and 2020 to design and deploy a department-wide continuous monitoring solution but faced setbacks.  DHS initially planned to deploy its internal CDM solution by 2017 using a “One DHS” approach that restricted components to a standard set of common tools.  We attributed DHS’ limited progress to an unsuccessful initial implementation strategy, significant changes to its deployment approach, and continuing issues with component data collection and integration.  As of March 2020, DHS had developed a key element of the program, its internal CDM dashboard.  However, the dashboard contained less than half of the required asset management data.  As a result, the Department cannot leverage intended benefits of the dashboard to manage, prioritize, and respond to cyber risks in real time.  Finally, we identified vulnerabilities on CDM servers and databases.  This occurred because DHS did not clearly define patch management responsibilities and had not yet implemented required configuration settings.  Consequently, databases and servers could be vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, and the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data could be at risk.  We made three recommendations for DHS to update its program plan, address vulnerabilities, and define patch management responsibilities

>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program 		2021
OIG-21-71 FEMA does not always appropriately report and investigate employee allegations of sexual harassment and workplace sexual misconduct.  For FYs 2012 to 2018, we identified 305 allegations from FEMA employees potentially related to sexual harassment and sexual misconduct such as sexual assault, unwelcome sexual advances, and inappropriate sexual comments.  However, we were unable to determine whether FEMA properly handled 153 of these allegations, because it could not provide complete investigative and disciplinary files.  For allegations that had complete files available, at times we were unable to determine whether FEMA conducted an investigation.  Finally, we found FEMA did not document whether it investigated some sexual harassment EEO complaints as potential employee misconduct.  We attribute the inconsistent investigations and incomplete files to inadequate policies, processes, and training. These shortcomings may fuel employee perceptions that FEMA is not addressing sexual harassment and sexual misconduct and is not supportive of employees reporting that type of behavior.  We made five recommendations to improve FEMA’s handling of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations including establishing a comprehensive case management system; developing and implementing formal processes and procedures to appropriately address all harassment allegations; providing investigative training; and ensuring allegations are appropriately referred to DHS OIG.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct 		2021
OIG-21-04 Modernization has improved the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) ability to timely process policies and claims data, enhanced reporting capabilities, and provided more reliable address validation. Despite these improvements, the transition to PIVOT did not resolve longstanding data reliability issues, as FIMA migrated the vast majority of its historical legacy data, including errors, into the PIVOT system. FIMA also deployed PIVOT without adequate controls to prevent potentially erroneous transactions from being recorded in the system. We made three recommendations to improve the quality of data in the modernized NFIP system and educate stakeholders on data quality issues that exist in historical NFIP data. FEMA concurred with all three recommendations.

>FIMA Made Progress Modernizing Its NFIP System, but Data Quality Needs Improvement 		2021
OIG-21-37 We determined that DHS needs to improve the collection and management of data across its multiple components to better serve and safeguard the public.  The data access, availability, accuracy, completeness, and relevance issues we identified presented numerous obstacles for DHS personnel who did not have essential information they needed for decision making or to effectively and efficiently carry out day-to-day mission operations.  Although DHS has improved its information security program and developed plans to improve quality and management of its data, follow through and continued improvement will be essential to address the internal control issues underlying the data deficiencies highlighted in the report.  We made no recommendations in the summary report.

>Persistent Data Issues Hinder DHS Mission, Programs, and Operations 		2021
OIG-21-63 Summary: OFO continues to experience challenges managing searches of electronic devices, similar to those identified in our first audit report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry, issued in December 2018.  Specifically, OFO did not properly document and conduct searches of electronic devices, fully assess the effectiveness of the electronic device search program, or adequately manage electronic device search equipment.  This occurred because, although it plans to do so, OFO has not yet fully implemented corrective actions for four of the five recommendations in our previous audit report, including establishing training for staff.  According to an OFO official, there have been delays in fully implementing the prior recommendations due to reviews of existing policy and a capabilities analysis report, and development of additional training.  In addition, OFO does not have adequate processes for auditing electronic device searches, does not track prosecutions and convictions resulting from referrals to other Federal agencies, and does not adequately monitor search equipment usage, functionality, and inventory.  Unless it corrects previously identified deficiencies and better manages searches and equipment, OFO will limit its ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.  We made five recommendations to improve CBP’s oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports of entry.  CBP concurred with all five recommendations.

>CBP Continues to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-21-36 We determined that before July 12, 2018, migrant parents did not consistently have the opportunity to reunify with their children before removal.  Although DHS and ICE have claimed that parents removed without their children chose to leave them behind, there was no policy or standard process requiring ICE officers to ascertain, document, or honor parents’ decisions regarding their children.  As a result, from the time the Government began increasing criminal prosecutions in July 2017, ICE removed at least 348 separated parents without documenting whether those parents wanted to leave their children in the United States.  In fact, ICE removed some parents without their children despite having evidence the parents wanted to bring their children back to their home country.  In addition, we found that some ICE records purportedly documenting migrant parents’ decisions to leave their children in the United States were significantly flawed.  We made two recommendation that will ensure ICE documents separated migrant parents’ decisions regarding their minor children upon removal from the United States, and develops a process to share information with Government officials to contact parents for whom ICE lacks documentation on reunification preferences.  ICE concurred with our recommendations.

>ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal 		2021
OIG-21-69 TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities.  These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems.  DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds.  However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance.  In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters.  DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system.  As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.  We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition.  DHS concurred with all three recommendations.  

>DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems 		2021
OIG-21-02 In 2018, senior DHS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) leaders issued public statements urging undocumented aliens seeking asylum to enter the United States legally at ports of entry, while also directing ports of entry to focus on other priority missions and institute practices to limit the number of undocumented aliens processed at ports of entry.  CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) personnel at 24 Southwest Border ports of entry implemented a practice known as queue management, where an officer manned a “limit line” position at or near the U.S.-Mexico border to control the number of undocumented aliens entering the port.  We identified that seven of these ports stopped processing virtually all undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers, by redirecting them to other ports located miles away.  This redirection contravenes CBP’s longstanding practice to process all aliens at a “Class A” port of entry or reclassify the port of entry.  Additionally, CBP officers at four ports returned undocumented aliens to Mexico despite a legal requirement to process asylum claims of aliens that are physically present in the United States.  We made three recommendations aimed at bringing CBP’s practices in line with Federal law and regulations and promoting efficient processing of undocumented aliens.  CBP concurred with two of the recommendations and did not concur with one.  CBP defended its decision to redirect undocumented aliens at seven ports citing the availability of operational capacity and resources and the need to maintain a discretionary balance between mission requirements at each port.

>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry 		2021
OIG-21-35 We determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees as required.  Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Protective Service inconsistently collected DNA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA.  DHS did not adequately oversee its law enforcement components to ensure they properly implemented DNA collection.  Based on our analysis, we project the DHS law enforcement components we audited did not collect DNA for about 212,646, or 88 percent, of the 241,753 arrestees from fiscal years 2018 and 2019.  Without all DHS arrestees’ DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches.  Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components.  We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements.  DHS concurred with all four of our recommend.

>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees 		2021
OIG-21-67 During our ongoing audit of DHS law enforcement virtual training, we learned that the Coast Guard uses functional firearms to conduct DVD-based simulation training.  We identified this issue in Coast Guard’s Commandant Instruction 3574.5C, 18 September 2014, Coast Guard Judgmental Use of Force Evaluation and observed a demonstration of this training at one Coast Guard location.  According to testimony or policy from four other DHS components that employ or train law enforcement personnel, the use of functional firearms during video-based simulation training is prohibited within their respective components.  By using functional firearms capable of firing ammunition, even if emptied of ammunition, in DVD-based simulation training, Coast Guard increased the risk of unintentional injury or death.  Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation and took immediate corrective actions to discontinue the use of functional firearms during DVD-based simulation training.  The recommendation is resolved and closed.

>Management Alert - The United States Coast Guard Discontinued the Use of Functional Firearms in DVD Simulation Training 		2021
OIG-21-03 We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) generally complied with ICE detention standards regarding communication, it did not meet the standards for detainee searches, food service, and record requirements for segregation and medical grievances.  We determined HCDC excessively strip searched ICE detainees when leaving their housing unit to attend activities within the facility, in violation of ICE detention standards and the facility’s own search policy.  In addition, HCDC failed to provide detainees with two hot meals per day, as required.  For those in segregation, HCDC did not document that detainees received three meals per day and daily medical visits.  Further, HCDC did not properly document the handling of detainee medical grievances.  We made two recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Baltimore ERO Field Office overseeing HCDC addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  ICE concurred with both recommendations and is implementing a corrective action plan to address the concerns we identified.

>ICE Needs to Address Concerns About Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center 		2021
OIG-21-34 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol headquarters officials were only aware of a few of the 83 CBP employees’ cases of social media misconduct.  CBP and Border Patrol senior officials only responded to one of those cases, upon direction from DHS.  In contrast, the senior Office of Field Operations (OFO) headquarters leader issued guidance to remind OFO employees of acceptable use of social media.  With regard to the posts media outlets published in July 2019, we found no evidence that senior CBP headquarters or field leaders were aware of them until they were made public by the media.  We also found some senior leaders questioned the legality or the application of CBP policies, which may undermine CBP’s ability to enforce the policies.  We made two recommendations to help reduce the incidence of social media misconduct.  First, we recommended the Commissioner ensures CBP uniformly applies social media misconduct policies, and establishes social media training for new recruits and annual refresher training for all employees.  CBP concurred with all recommendations.

>CBP Senior Leaders' Handling of Social Media Misconduct 		2021
OIG-21-68 TSA implemented 167 of the 251 (67 percent) requirements in both Acts, 55 of the 167 (33 percent) were not completed by the Acts’ established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining 84 requirements.  TSA was unable to complete 33 of these requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside of TSA's control. The shortfalls occurred because TSA did not: (1) designate a lead office to establish internal controls, conduct oversight, and provide quality assurance for implementing the legislatively mandated requirements; (2) develop formal policies and procedures to ensure consistency and accountability for implementing the requirements on time; or (3) plan or develop an effective system to maintain relevant supporting documentation for the Acts’ requirements to help ensure information accuracy, continuity, and record retrieval capability. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders.  Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems.  TSA provided a corrective action plan but did not concur with the recommendation.

>TSA Has Not Implemented All Requirements of the 9/11 Act and the TSA Modernization Act 		2021
OIG-21-01 DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure 2021
OIG-21-33 We determined DHS did not comply with Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)  in fiscal year 2020 because it did not achieve and report an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for 2 of 12 programs reported in its FY 2020 Agency Financial Report.  DHS complied with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public its FY 2020 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports.  We made two recommendations to DHS to follow Office of Management and Budget requirements and ensure the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues its remediation process to reduce improper payments.  DHS concurred with both recommendations. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2021

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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