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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-14-131 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures our Nation’s borders and facilitates lawful international trade and travel while enforcing Federal laws and regulations. To accomplish its mission, CBP often stations officers and agents in remote areas of the country without adequate housing options. In 2008, CBP identified a need for employee housing along the southwest border, particularly in Arizona and Texas, given the remoteness and limited housing market. CBP began planning the construction of employee housing in Ajo, Arizona, in 2008 and completed construction in late 2012. We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP followed good business practices in planning and managing employee housing in Ajo, Arizona.

>CBP Did Not Effectively Plan and Manage Employee Housing in Ajo, Arizona (Revised) ( 		2014
OIG-24-01 CBP Did Not Fully Implement the Requirements of the Synthetic Opioid Exposure Prevention and Training Act 2024
OIG-19-11 CBP has a statutory responsibility to collect revenue owed to the U.S. Government that arises from the importation of goods into the United States. Although in fiscal year 2017 CBP collected $40 billion in duties, taxes, and fees, more than $4.3 billion in its allowance for doubtful account for cumulative duties, taxes, and fees remained delinquent and uncollectible — some dating back almost 40 years This outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase without completing the viability analysis worksheets to enable the timely pursuit or termination of delinquent debt, and the ability to monitor and properly track debt collection and write-offs.

>CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers 		2019
OIG-20-75 CBP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Strategy for Meeting Its LS-NII Needs 2020
OIG-21-27 We determined that U.S Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) mail inspection processes and physical security at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport International Mail Facility (IMF) are ineffective, showing limited progress since our prior audit.  CBP inspected approximately [REDACTED] percent of the 1.3 million pieces of mail it received during our June 2019 site visit.  CBP also did not timely inspect and process mail from high-risk countries, creating unmanageable backlogs. These deficiencies were largely because of inadequate resources and guidance.  Consequently, more than [REDACTED] pieces of mail were sent out for delivery without physical inspection.  We made eight recommendations aimed at improving international mail processes at JFK International Airport.  CBP concurred with six, but non-concurred with two of the recommendations. 

>CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility (Redacted) 		2021
OIG-10-54  

>CBP Faces Challenges in Achieving Its Goals for Small Business Participation in Secure Border Initiative Network 		2010
OIG-23-27 CBP Facilities in Vermont and New York Generally Met TEDS Standards, but Details to the Southwest Border Affected Morale, Recruitment, and Operations 2023
OIG-21-45 DHS issued notices to appear (NTA), to MPP participants that were mostly accurate and in accordance with laws and regulations.  However, some NTAs were completed inaccurately.  Specifically, of our sample of 106 NTAs from February 2019 through April 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) served 20 that did not meet legal sufficiency standards or contained inaccurate information.  However, CBP agents and officers documented proactively issuing 105 of 106 NTAs in our sample in person before returning migrants to Mexico.  If CBP serves a legally insufficient NTA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cannot prosecute its removal case if a migrant fails to appear for the initial hearing.  Serving NTAs by mail to migrants in Mexico could result in migrants missing their hearings or the Government’s cases being dismissed or challenged.  We recommended that CBP’s Executive Director of the Office of Field Operations’ Admissibility and Passenger Programs and the Deputy Chief of Border Patrol’s Law Enforcement Operations Directorate develop procedures for quality control and supervisory review of NTAs for MPP enrollees to better ensure that officers and agents fill out the NTAs accurately and completely.  We made one recommendation to improve the accuracy and completeness of NTAs issued to MPP participants.  CBP non-concurred with the recommendation due to it being overcome by events when the program was terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security on June 1, 2021.  We administratively closed the recommendation.

>CBP Generally Provided Accurate Notices to Appear to Migrant Protection Protocols Enrollees, but Could Improve Procedures to Reduce Future Errors 		2021
OIG-21-21 We determined that, in response to Executive Order 13767, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented new tools and technologies that have enhanced Border Patrol’s surveillance capabilities and efficiency along the southwest border.  We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s border technology, enhance situational awareness of the southwest border, and address potential IT security vulnerabilities.  CBP concurred with all three recommendations.

>CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain 		2021
OIG-20-52 U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not demonstrated the acquisition capabilities needed to effectively execute the Analyze/Select Phase of the Wall Acquisition Program.  Specifically, CBP did not conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to assess and select the most effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions to obtain operational control of the southern border as directed, but instead relied on prior, outdated border solutions to identify materiel alternatives for meeting its mission requirement.  CBP did not use a sound, well-documented methodology to identify and prioritize investments in areas along the border that would best benefit from physical barriers.  Additionally, the Department did not complete the required plan to execute the strategy to obtain and maintain control of the southern border, as required by its Comprehensive Southern Border Security Study and Strategy.  Without an Analysis of Alternatives, a documented and reliable prioritization process, or a plan, the likelihood that CBP will be able to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the southern border with mission-effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions is diminished.  We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s ongoing investments for obtaining operational control of the southern border.  DHS concurred with recommendation 2 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 3. 

>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border 		2020
OIG-18-79 In December 2014, OIG previously reported on the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.2 Our report disclosed CBP had not developed performance measures needed to accurately assess program effectiveness and make informed decisions. CBP also did not recognize all UAS operating costs and, as such, the Congress and public may be unaware of the amount of resources invested in the program. This audit determined that CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for surveillance information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Without a privacy assessment, CBP could not determine whether ISR Systems contained data requiring safeguards per privacy laws, regulations, and DHS policy. CBP’s failure to implement adequate security controls according to Federal and DHS policy could result in potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ISR Systems and its operations.

>CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems 		2018
OIG-21-47 CBP did not always protect MPC apps from cybersecurity threats.  This occurred because app version updates were not always scanned for vulnerabilities and CBP did not always identify vulnerabilities detected in scans.  CBP also did not complete seven required security and privacy compliance reviews of MPC apps because it did not establish a schedule for the reviews or track and centrally store review documentation.  In addition, CBP did not obtain the information needed for the reviews, had competing priorities, and did not ensure app developers created a process for a required internal audit.  Finally, CBP did not implement Department server configuration requirements for its MPC servers.  We made eight recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the security of CBP’s MPC program.  CBP concurred with all eight recommendations.

>CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation 		2021
OIG-21-02 In 2018, senior DHS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) leaders issued public statements urging undocumented aliens seeking asylum to enter the United States legally at ports of entry, while also directing ports of entry to focus on other priority missions and institute practices to limit the number of undocumented aliens processed at ports of entry.  CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) personnel at 24 Southwest Border ports of entry implemented a practice known as queue management, where an officer manned a “limit line” position at or near the U.S.-Mexico border to control the number of undocumented aliens entering the port.  We identified that seven of these ports stopped processing virtually all undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers, by redirecting them to other ports located miles away.  This redirection contravenes CBP’s longstanding practice to process all aliens at a “Class A” port of entry or reclassify the port of entry.  Additionally, CBP officers at four ports returned undocumented aliens to Mexico despite a legal requirement to process asylum claims of aliens that are physically present in the United States.  We made three recommendations aimed at bringing CBP’s practices in line with Federal law and regulations and promoting efficient processing of undocumented aliens.  CBP concurred with two of the recommendations and did not concur with one.  CBP defended its decision to redirect undocumented aliens at seven ports citing the availability of operational capacity and resources and the need to maintain a discretionary balance between mission requirements at each port.

>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry 		2021
OIG-23-43 CBP Implemented Effective Technical Controls to Secure a Selected Tier 1 High Value Asset System 2023
OIG-12-95  

>CBP Information Technology Management: Strengths and Challenges (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-15-91 The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the commercial trade system designed to automate border processing to enhance border security and foster our Nation's economic security. CBP spent approximately $3.2 billion on the development of the ACE program from fiscal year 2001 through July 2013, when it was restructured to a rapid deployment strategy called Agile. Currently, in large part due to the implementation of Agile, CBP is on track to meet its milestones for the deployment of ACE. However, CBP has not ensured the internal control environment has kept pace with the rapid deployment of the ACE program. Specifically, CBP has not conducted risk assessments to identify potential gaps in data reliability, and has not fully developed and implemented performance measures for the program.

>CBP is on Track to Meet ACE Milestones, but It Needs to Enhance Internal Controls 		2015
OIG-20-55 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not comprehensively plan and conduct its covert testing, use test results to address vulnerability, or widely share lessons learned.  CBP’s two covert testing groups do not use risk assessments or intelligence to plan and conduct covert tests at ports of entry and U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints, do not plan coordinated tests, and do not design system-wide tests.  This occurred because CBP has not provided adequate guidance on risk- and intelligence-based test planning, directed the groups to coordinate, given them the required authority, or established performance goals and measures for covert testing.  Following testing, CBP does not widely share covert test results, consistently make recommendations, or ensure corrective actions are taken.  Results are not widely shared because CBP has not defined roles and responsibilities for such sharing.  Covert testing groups do not make recommendations or ensure corrective actions are implemented due to insufficient authority and policies directing these actions.  Finally, CBP does not effectively manage covert testing groups to ensure data reliability, completeness, and compliance with security requirements due to leadership changes and limited staff.  Without comprehensive planning, incorporating lessons learned from test results, and program management accountability, CBP cannot ensure it addresses vulnerabilities, which may be exploited and threaten national security.  We recommended CBP develop policies and procedures for conducting covert testing and assign roles and responsibilities for oversight of covert testing groups.  We made seven recommendations that will strengthen its covert testing program.  CBP concurred with all seven recommendations.

>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - (REDACTED) 		2020
OIG-21-18 CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-16-75 U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Internal Affairs (IA) has oversight authority for all aspects of CBP operations, personnel, and facilities to ensure compliance with all CBP-wide programs and policies relating to corruption, misconduct, or mismanagement. From October 1, 2010, through March 12, 2015, CBP received 11,367 allegations of misconduct by its employees. IA investigated 6,524 of those allegations, of which 819 were classified as criminal.

>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing 		2016
OIG-22-34 CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise 2022
OIG-16-51 We conducted this review to determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) regulations. The DHS PREA regulations set standards for CBP to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault. The regulations also require CBP to complete audits of holding facilities that “house detainees overnight” by July 2018. Since DHS issued its PREA regulations, CBP has taken measures, including issuing its zero-tolerance policy and designating a full-time Prevention of Sexual Assault Coordinator, to ensure its offices, stakeholders, and managers are aware of CBP’s roles and responsibilities. However, CBP’s implementation actions lack adequate planning, a budget, a component-wide policy to coordinate the efforts of all offices and personnel, and criteria to determine which facilities should be defined as overnight facilities and therefore subject to audits. Further, at the time of our review, CBP had not determined the feasibility of securing a joint PREA audit contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These problems may hinder CBP’s implementation of the DHS PREA regulations and ultimately, its ability to meet PREA’s goal to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault.

>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations 		2016
OIG-23-54 CBP Needs to Improve Its Video and Audio Coverage at Land Ports of Entry 2023
OIG-09-105  

>CBP Needs to Improve the Monitoring of the Cash Collection Process 		2009
OIG-21-19 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) training approach and execution do not fully support the canine teams’ mission to detect smuggling of illegal narcotics, agriculture products, and humans at and between ports of entry.  In total, we made four recommendations that, if implemented, should help CBP improve oversight of its Canine Program, formalize and implement a realignment plan for the training academy, provide proper training capabilities, and update and standardize program guidance.  CBP concurred with all our recommendations. 

>CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance (REDACTED) 		2021
OIG-21-48 CBP needs better oversight and policy to adequately safeguard migrants experiencing medical emergencies or illnesses along the southwest border.  According to CBP’s policies, once an individual is in custody, CBP agents and officers are required to conduct health interviews, and “regular and frequent” “welfare checks” to identify individuals who may be experiencing serious medical conditions.  However, CBP could not always demonstrate staff conducted required medical screenings or consistent welfare checks for all 98 individuals whose medical cases we reviewed.  This occurred because CBP did not provide sufficient oversight and clear policies and procedures, or ensure officers and agents were adequately trained to implement medical support policies.  As a result, CBP may not identify individuals experiencing medical emergencies or provide appropriate care in a timely manner.  CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations, which when implemented, should improve medical attention and procedures for migrants at the southwest border. 

>CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention 		2021
OIG-22-27 CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships 2022
OIG-23-39 CBP Outbound Inspections Disrupt Transnational Criminal Organization Illicit Operations (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-23-31 CBP Released a Migrant on a Terrorist Watchlist, and ICE Faced Information Sharing Challenges Planning and Conducting the Arrest (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-21-34 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol headquarters officials were only aware of a few of the 83 CBP employees’ cases of social media misconduct.  CBP and Border Patrol senior officials only responded to one of those cases, upon direction from DHS.  In contrast, the senior Office of Field Operations (OFO) headquarters leader issued guidance to remind OFO employees of acceptable use of social media.  With regard to the posts media outlets published in July 2019, we found no evidence that senior CBP headquarters or field leaders were aware of them until they were made public by the media.  We also found some senior leaders questioned the legality or the application of CBP policies, which may undermine CBP’s ability to enforce the policies.  We made two recommendations to help reduce the incidence of social media misconduct.  First, we recommended the Commissioner ensures CBP uniformly applies social media misconduct policies, and establishes social media training for new recruits and annual refresher training for all employees.  CBP concurred with all recommendations.

>CBP Senior Leaders' Handling of Social Media Misconduct 		2021
OIG-20-35 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field operations (OFO) personnel at ports of entry had separated 60 asylum-seeking families between May 6 and July 9, 2018, despite CBP’s claim that it had separated only 7 such families.  More than half of those separations were based solely on the asylum-seeking parents’ prior non-violent immigration violations, which appeared to be inconsistent with official DHS public messaging.  After a June 27, 2018 court ruling, CBP issued specific guidance, and the ports separated fewer families in the prior months.  Despite the new guidance, we continue to have concerns about DHS’ ability to accurately identify and address all family separations due to data reliability issues.  In late June 2018, CBP modified its system for tracking aliens at the ports of entry to capture family separation data consistently, but it could not provide a reliable number of families separated before June 2018.  We made one recommendation that will help CBP’s data collection.  CBP concurred with our recommendation.

>CBP Separated More Asylum-Seeking Families at Ports of Entry Than Reported and For Reasons Other Than Those Outlined in Public Statements 		2020
OIG-19-02 CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector 2019
OIG-21-62 CBP officials had legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on American journalists, attorneys, and others suspected of organizing or being associated with the migrant caravan.  However, many CBP officials were unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and, therefore, may have inadvertently placed lookouts on these Americans, which did not fully comport with the policy.  Additionally, CBP officials did not remove lookouts promptly once they were no longer necessary and, as a result, subjected some of these U.S. citizens to repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections.  During the same time period, a CBP official requested that Mexico deny entry to caravan associates, including 14 Americans.  Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on these U.S. citizens, CBP had no genuine basis for requesting Mexico to deny entry to these individuals.  On several other occasions throughout Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also improperly shared the names and sensitive information of U.S. citizens with Mexico.  We made six recommendations that will improve CBP’s controls on placing and removing lookouts and sharing Americans’ sensitive information with foreign countries.  CBP concurred with all six recommendations.

>CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan 		2021
OIG-13-114 Following April 2012 media reports regarding the death of an undocumented immigrant while in the custody of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in May 2010, Senator Robert Menendez and 15 members of Congress requested that we review the use of force within CBP. We reviewed allegations of the use of excessive force by CBP employees and determined what reforms CBP has implemented. We also examined what effect adding more agents and officers to the workforce has had on training and professionalism. Allegations of employee misconduct that are entered into Department of Homeland Security (DHS) case management systems are assigned one of several case allegation types; however, there is no primary use of force designation. As a result, we were unable to identify the total number of excessive force allegations and investigations involving CBP employees.

>CBP Use of Force Training and Actions To Address Use of Force Incidents (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-10-01 CBP's Ability to Detect Biological and Chemical Threats in Maritime Cargo Containers 2010
OIG-20-34 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States.  This occurred because neither CBP nor TSA developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately.  We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program.  CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations. 

>CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States 		2020
OIG-21-13 CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage 2021
OIG-09-91  

>CBP's Construction of Border Patrol Facilities and Aquisition of Vehicles 		2009
OIG-11-57  

>CBP's Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 		2011
OIG-20-79 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) cannot ensure its Entry Reconciliation Program reporting is accurate or complies with requirements.  Specifically, CBP did not always validate importers’ self-reported final values of imports when it assessed duties and fees because it did not require importers to substantiate self-reported merchandise values with source documentation.  In addition, CBP did not always follow its policies when conducting reviews of reconciliation entries because its Standard Operating Procedures had been implemented differently across all ports of entry.  Finally, CBP missed opportunities to collect additional revenue when it did not assess monetary liquidated damages for importers that filed reconciliation entries late or not at all.  This occurred because CBP’s controls were insufficient to ensure the ports properly assess liquidated damages for importers who file reconciliations late or not at all.  CBP’s actions compromised the integrity of the Entry Reconciliation Program and, as such, may have put approximately $751 million of revenue, in the form of reconciliation refunds, at risk.  We made four recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of the program.  CBP concurred with three of our four recommendations. 

>CBP's Entry Reconciliation Program Puts Revenue at Risk 		2020
OIG-21-70 CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-19-49 CBP’s controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. This occurred because CBP officers did not always comply with policies when reviewing Global Entry applications nor do CBP’s policies sufficiently help officers

determine an applicant’s level of risk. Additionally, during the airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. These weaknesses were due to officers not following policy, as well as CBP’s insufficient verification procedures. Unless CBP officers authenticate kiosk receipts, someone could use a fake receipt to enter the United States. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. In particular, CBP did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program effectively. CBP’s lack of adherence to its compliance program’s policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry by allowing potentially ineligible members to continue to participate.

>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation 		2019
OIG-10-117  

>CBP's Handling of Unaccompanied Alien Children 		2010
OIG-15-64 U .S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Houston Seaport is the fifth largest port for arriving containers and the largest petrochemical complex in the Nation. CBP is responsible for identifying high-risk cargo shipments arriving at the port that pose a possible threat to national security. We conducted this review to determine whether the Houston Seaport complied with CBP's National Maritime Targeting Policy (NMTP) and Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS) Port Guidance. The Houston Seaport generally complied with the NMTP and CERTS Port Guidance. However, CBP could improve its documentation of waivers and exceptions to mandatory examinations of high-risk cargo. In addition, CBP could improve access controls for authorizing Port Director waivers within CERTS.

>CBP's Houston Seaport Generally Complied with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its Documentation of Waivers and Exceptions (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-18-83 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for inspecting all international mail arriving at U.S. airports, with limited exceptions. A major challenge for CBP is preventing imports of opioids and other illegal items mailed from overseas through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP's air mail inspection processes at JFK airport are effective and have adequate information technology (IT) security controls. CBP has ineffective processes and IT security controls to support air mail inspection operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), the largest of nine USPS facilities that receive and handle incoming international mail. Despite legislative requirements to systematically target and widely prevent illegal imports, CBP inspects only a limited number of the hundreds of thousands of pieces of incoming air mail each day, largely due to difficulty inventorying and locating targeted mail, as well as having inadequate guidance, equipment, and resources. These air mail inspection deficiencies hinder CBP's efforts to prevent prohibited items (particularly opioids) from entering the United States.

>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport 		2018
OIG-17-114 We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country.  The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats.  Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks.  IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry.  Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases.  Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders.  CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints.  We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges.  We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations.

>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations 		2017
OIG-12-25  

>CBP's Management Controls over Bonded Facilities 		2012
OIG-23-48 CBP's Management of International Mail Facilities Puts Officer Safety and Mission Requirements at Risk 2023
OIG-16-123 In response to a request from Senator Tom Coburn, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Professional Responsibility’s (OPR) actions to determine whether its collection, storage, and sharing of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) violated the Privacy Act of 1974 or Department policies. We also sought to determine whether CBP OPR’s policies and training for protecting sensitive PII are adequate.

>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices 		2016
OIG-15-53 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) program is vital to securing the Nation’s borders while facilitating efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP uses NII equipment to screen cargo and conveyances at our Nation’s land, sea, and air ports of entry. In fiscal year 2014, CBP awarded six contracts and one interagency agreement valued at approximately $90.4 million to perform preventive and corrective maintenance of NII equipment. We performed this audit to determine whether maintenance is being performed on CBP’s screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. CBP monitored NII operations using methods such as conducting daily meetings to discuss NII availability and reviewing field office submissions of utilization reports. However, CBP has not ensured that contractors perform preventive and corrective maintenance on its screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. This deficiency occurred because CBP has not verified that maintenance is performed in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, evaluated contractors’ performance, and assessed the reliability of maintenance data. Without a process to validate maintenance data and to evaluate and assess that NII equipment is being repaired and maintained in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, CBP’s NII equipment may not be repaired and maintained to retain full functionality and maximum useful life.

>CBP's Oversight of Its Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment Maintenance Contracts Needs Improvement 		2015
OIG-11-28  

>CBP's Oversight of the Permit to Transfer Process for Cargo Containers 		2011

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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