This page contains summaries of our closed investigations completed since April 1, 2015, involving subjects in the Senior Executive Service and employees at the GS-15 grade level or above, in which the OIG found misconduct and no prosecution resulted.
|Affected Agency||Subject Grade||Date Closed||Summary|
|ICE-HSI||ES-00||05/21/2015||We investigated allegations that three supervisory (SES, GS-15, GS-14) U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) employees improperly disclosed classified information during an ongoing criminal investigation, failed to refer a felon re-entry case to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), and made a false statement in the case file regarding the USAO notification. The allegations were unsubstantiated. However, we found the GS-15 employee violated ICE policy related to investigatory procedures. We presented our investigative findings to the USAO, who declined to open a case for further review. We referred our findings to the Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, ICE.|
The OIG investigated a former Assistant Secretary for a post-government employment conflict of interest in violation of 18 USC 207(a)(1) by seeking to influence the Department in connection with a particular matter involving the same specific party with which he had been personally and substantially involved as Assistant Secretary.
The allegation was substantiated, but the USAO declined to prosecute. We referred our findings to the Associate General Counsel for Ethics, Ethics Division, Office of General Counsel.
The OIG investigated an ICE employee for engaging in a sexual relationship with a subordinate employee.
The allegation was substantiated. We referred our findings to the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, ICE.
We investigated allegations that two managerial Secret Service agents, Marc Connolly (SES) and George Ogilvie (GS-14), disrupted the scene of a suspicious package investigation at the White House on March 4, 2015.
We substantiated the allegations and referred our findings to the Director of the Secret Service for whatever action he deemed appropriate. A summary of our investigative findings is available on our website.
We investigated a senior HSI employee who used his government issued credit card for personal use and failed to return his government issued laptop computer upon separation from service.
The allegations were substantiated, and we referred our findings to the Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, ICE.
We investigated a senior Secret Service employee who had a potential conflict of interest when the employee became the final signing authority for a promotion of a subordinate employee with whom the employee had a financial interest.
The allegation was substantiated but the USAO declined to prosecute in lieu of administrative action. We referred our findings to the Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, Secret Service.
We investigated a senior Secret Service employee who was accused of indecent assault on a subordinate employee.
We were unable to determine whether an indecent assault occurred, but found that the senior employee engaged in inappropriate behavior with the subordinate employee and provided a material false statement to the OIG. The USAO declined criminal prosecution of the alleged assault. We referred our findings to the Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, Secret Service.