DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department’s Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism
MEMORANDUM FOR:  David Richardson  
Assistant Secretary  
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office  
FROM:  
Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
Inspector General  
SUBJECT:  
DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department’s Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism  

For your action is our final report, DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department’s Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains three recommendations to improve oversight, policy initiatives, and coordination of the Department’s efforts to protect the Nation’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems. Your office concurred with all three recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider all three recommendations open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and the disposition of any monetary amounts.

Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sondra McCauley, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

Attachment
July 16, 2020

Why We Did This Audit

We conducted this audit to determine whether DHS’ CWMD Office implemented a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts to defend food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events in the United States as required by SAFA.

What We Recommend

We made three recommendations to DHS’ CWMD Office to improve oversight, policy initiatives, and coordination of the Department’s efforts to protect the Nation’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

What We Found

The Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (SAFA) requires that DHS’ Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) carry out a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts to defend the country’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events. According to SAFA, the program should provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, and coordinate with DHS components and Federal agencies. However, CWMD has not yet carried out a program to meet SAFA’s requirements.

This occurred because CWMD believes it does not have clearly defined authority from the Secretary to carry out the requirements of SAFA. In addition, since its establishment in December 2017, CWMD has not prioritized SAFA requirements but instead has focused its resources on other mission areas. As a result, CWMD has limited awareness of DHS’ ongoing efforts and cannot ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the Nation’s food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.

CWMD Response

CWMD concurred with all three recommendations and provided corrective action plans to address the recommendations. However, CWMD noted that since our audit fieldwork, it has undergone a change in senior leadership that reprioritized the critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA. Specifically, CWMD reconstituted a formal Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense program, which is now staffed with personnel supported by a budget. CWMD is also rebuilding and strengthening relationships with internal DHS components and interagency and external stakeholders.
Background

The United States’ food, agriculture, and veterinary systems are vulnerable to threats of terrorism and other events that pose a high risk to homeland security such as natural and unintentional introduction of diseases, pests, or poisons. For example, evidence suggests terrorists have considered targeting people by adding toxic chemicals and pathogens\(^1\) directly to the food supply. To illustrate, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military found a list of pathogens in an Afghanistan cave that Al-Qaeda planned to use as potential biological weapons to target humans and the food supply.

*Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection* designated food and agriculture as one of the Nation’s critical infrastructure sectors, so vital to the United States that its incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health, or safety. Within the Department of Homeland Security, six components help protect the Nation’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Science and Technology Directorate, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD), and Office of Intelligence and Analysis. For example, CBP protects the United States from the threat of invasive plant pests and foreign animal diseases through an approach designed to prevent prohibited agricultural items from entering the country. FEMA conducts interagency exercises to respond to disasters, including large-scale agricultural or food incidents. In addition, among other activities, CISA manages a web-based platform for information sharing related to food, agriculture, and veterinary efforts.

In 2017, the President signed into law the *Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act*\(^2\) (SAFA) requiring the Assistant Secretary for DHS’ Office of Health Affairs (OHA) to implement a program to carry out the Department’s efforts to defend food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other events that pose a high risk to homeland security. SAFA specifically required the program to provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, and coordinate with DHS components and Federal agencies that help support this mission. OHA’s Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Branch, which was led by three veterinary medical officers and epidemiologists, became responsible for coordinating the Department’s activities and fulfilling the requirements of SAFA. In December 2017, the Department moved all components with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions, including relevant portions of OHA, under

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1 A pathogen is a specific causative agent (such as a bacterium or virus) of disease.

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the newly established CWMD. The mission of CWMD is to enable operational partners to prevent attacks against the United States from weapons of mass destruction and promote readiness for chemical, biological, nuclear, and health security threats.

Following the establishment of CWMD, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum delegating the Assistant Secretary of CWMD responsibility for fulfilling SAFA’s requirements. We conducted this audit to determine whether CWMD implemented a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts to defend the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events\(^3\) in the United States as required by SAFA.

**Results of Audit**

**CWMD Has Not Carried Out a Program to Coordinate the Department’s Efforts to Defend the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism**

SAFA requires CWMD to carry out a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts to defend the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other events that pose a high risk to homeland security. SAFA specifies that the program, at a minimum, should:

1. provide oversight and management of the Department’s responsibilities pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) (see appendix B);\(^4\)
2. provide oversight and integration of the Department’s activities related to veterinary public health, food defense, and agricultural security;
3. lead the Department’s policy initiatives related to food, animal, and agricultural incidents, and the impact of such incidents on animal and public health;
4. lead the Department’s policy initiatives related to overall domestic preparedness for and collective response to agricultural terrorism;
5. coordinate with other Department components, including CBP, as appropriate, on activities related to food and agriculture security and screening procedures for domestic and imported products; and
6. coordinate with appropriate Federal departments and agencies.

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\(^3\) Neither CWMD nor SAFA has defined high-consequence events. Based on HSPD-9, we believe examples of high-consequence events include major disasters and other emergencies.

\(^4\) In 2004, HSPD-9 – *Defense of United States Agriculture and Food* established a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
Despite these requirements, CWMD has not yet carried out a program to oversee and manage the Department’s efforts to defend the food and agriculture system, lead policy initiatives, or coordinate with DHS components or Federal agencies. We interviewed CWMD officials and requested documentation to determine any ongoing progress to fulfill SAFA’s requirements in lieu of having a program. CWMD officials could not provide adequate documentation and responded that the office is not actively monitoring or tracking the Department’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities.

CWMD also could not provide any published or draft policy initiatives as required by SAFA. Congress, through the Act, intended for the Department to lead internal policy initiatives to clarify roles and responsibilities throughout the Department and coordinate actions related to food, agriculture, and veterinary defense. However, since becoming an office, CWMD has not developed any policies or led any initiatives in this area. We asked three of the six DHS components — CBP, FEMA, and CISA — that help protect the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems to describe CWMD’s involvement in developing policy on related incidents and impact; and policy related to overall domestic preparedness and response. FEMA indicated it worked with CWMD on the 2018 National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex, which is an annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The annex highlights the unique attributes of a food, plant, or agricultural incident, including intentional acts of terrorism. CBP indicated it worked with CWMD on a draft policy related to food, agriculture, and veterinary defense, which was not finalized during our audit. Although we acknowledge CWMD’s work, we do not believe CWMD’s participation in these policies satisfies the intent of SAFA to lead policy initiatives.

Further, CWMD did not provide any evidence that it regularly coordinates with DHS components or Federal partners on food and agriculture security and screening procedures for domestic and imported products as SAFA requires. We determined CWMD’s coordination with three of the six components included in our audit was informal and ad hoc. For example, CISA officials reported they regularly attend interagency meetings of the Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council and the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council. These councils consist of Federal departments and state, local, and tribal governments that coordinate agricultural security, food defense strategies, and related activities. They also provide an avenue to communicate across government and the private sector on food, agriculture, and defense efforts. However, CWMD does not routinely attend these meetings or coordinate with CISA on information obtained and presented during these meetings. In addition, Federal partners, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration
said that since the establishment of CWMD, their contact with CWMD has been limited or non-existent.

These issues occurred because, although the Secretary of Homeland Security delegated responsibility to CWMD to coordinate DHS’ efforts pursuant to SAFA, CWMD believes it does not have clearly defined authority from the Secretary to carry it out. According to the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of CWMD, CWMD does not have the authority to direct or influence resources and priorities of the other components. This official further stated CWMD has no authority over other DHS components because each component operates under its own chain of command.

In addition, CWMD has not made food, agriculture, and veterinary defense a priority within its organization. Since becoming an office in December 2017, CWMD has not devoted the staff necessary to oversee the Department’s food, agriculture, and veterinary defense efforts. When we initiated our audit, two Veterinary Medical Officers worked in CWMD’s Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Resilience Joint Program Activity full time. CWMD later informed us the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Resilience Joint Program Activity no longer existed due to limited personnel and the mission would be addressed as a capability across CWMD. CWMD provided documentation that as of August 2019 showed the majority of employees, including the once full-time Veterinary Medical Officer, only spend about 1 percent of their time on the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense mission.

In its first year, CWMD focused its resources on other priorities and mission areas instead of food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense. According to CWMD’s Acting Secretary, the office spent that year conducting more than 150 deployments of surge capabilities to support law enforcement and public safety officials with radiological and nuclear detection, participating in exercises and training events to help local jurisdictions prepare for a biological attack, and procuring more than 11,400 portable radiation detection systems for DHS operational partners. Although these activities are important they should not negate the need for CWMD to meet the requirements of SAFA in order to address the potential risks related to food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense. CWMD recognizes it needs to apply additional resources such as personnel and budget to fulfill SAFA requirements. Without dedicated staff to support SAFA implementation and associated coordination activities CWMD has limited awareness of the Department’s ongoing efforts and cannot

5 One of the two Veterinary Medical Officers was on long-term leave during our audit. In addition, CWMD had one Veterinary Medical Officer vacancy approved for hire.
6 On August 9, 2019, CWMD reassigned the Veterinary Medical Officer, along with two other employees who joined the mission later in our audit because food, agriculture, and veterinary defense would not be a separate program or program office, but would be addressed as a capability across CWMD.
ensure DHS is adequately prepared to respond to a potential terrorist attack against the food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.

**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office coordinate with the DHS Secretary to reinforce the office’s authority to implement a coordinated program in accordance with the Public Law 115-43, *Securing our Agriculture and Food Act*.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office reprioritize the food, agriculture, and veterinary defense mission within the Department to ensure adherence to requirements of Public Law 115-43, *Securing our Agriculture and Food Act*.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office conduct a capability assessment to identify needs and gaps in DHS’ food, agriculture, and veterinary defense mission. The assessment should identify the necessary resources (staffing and budget) needed to fulfill requirements of Public Law 115-43, *Securing our Agriculture and Food Act*, including Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 responsibilities. Based on the results of the assessment, the Assistant Secretary should develop an implementation plan for execution.

**Management Comments and OIG Analysis**

CWMD concurred with all three recommendations and provided corrective action plans to address the recommendations. CWMD noted that since our audit fieldwork, it has undergone a change in senior leadership that reprioritized the critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA. CWMD has subsequently reconstituted a formal Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense program, which is now staffed with personnel supported by a budget. CWMD is also rebuilding and strengthening relationships with internal DHS components and interagency and external stakeholders. Appendix A contains a copy of the CWMD’s management comments in their entirety. We also received technical comments from CWMD and revised the report where appropriate. A summary of CWMD’s responses and our analysis follows.

**CWMD Response to Recommendation 1:** Concur. CWMD’s current senior leadership agrees that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s DHS Delegation 25000, Delegation to the Assistant Secretary for The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, dated May 21, 2018, and the CWMD Act of 2018,
clearly delineate CWMD’s responsibility for fulfilling SAFA’s requirements. Therefore, CWMD believes coordination with the Secretary to clarify CWMD’s authority in this regard is not needed. CWMD requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

**OIG Analysis:** We agree that the DHS Delegation 25000 and the CWMD Act of 2018 clearly delineate CWMD’s responsibility for fulfilling SAFA requirements. CWMD’s acknowledgment of the authority and actions taken to reprioritize the critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA satisfies the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation resolved and open until CWMD provides support for the corrective actions taken.

**CWMD Response to Recommendation 2:** Concur. CWMD has re-established the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense program to rebuild and prioritize CWMD’s role in the DHS food and agriculture mission space and reprioritize engagement with DHS components. CWMD plans to announce reconstitution of Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense and will work with the Science and Technology Directorate to develop a research and development (R&D) Strategic Plan to reprioritize and better align food and agriculture defense R&D across the Department. CWMD estimates a completion date of September 30, 2020.

**OIG Analysis:** CWMD’s actions satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until CWMD provides support for the corrective actions taken.

**CWMD Response to Recommendation 3:** Concur. The Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Division is developing an initial vision, mission, and roadmap to guide implementation efforts over the next year. The roadmap will include an external Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense mission needs and capability gaps assessment. CWMD estimates a completion date of May 31, 2021.

**OIG Analysis:** CWMD’s actions satisfy the intent of this recommendation. We consider this recommendation resolved, but it will remain open until CWMD provides support for the corrective actions taken.
Objective, Scope, and Methodology


We performed this audit to determine whether CWMD implemented a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts related to defending the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high consequence events within the United States as required by SAFA.

To answer our audit objective, we performed the following activities:

- Reviewed applicable Federal laws, regulations, and DHS’ policies regarding the security and defense of the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems.
- Reviewed prior OIG and external reports to identify challenges in DHS’ food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense mission.
- Obtained an understanding of CWMD’s internal controls significant to determining whether it complied with the SAFA.
- Interviewed and distributed questionnaires to representatives of CWMD and the Office of Chief Human Capital Officer to obtain an understanding of their roles and responsibilities in coordinating the Department’s efforts related to food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense in accordance with SAFA. In addition, we distributed data collection instruments to selected officials to obtain information on the status of each HSPD-9 responsibility and short-term food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities.
- Interviewed or distributed questionnaires to CBP, FEMA, CISA, and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center to obtain an understanding of their food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities and coordination with CWMD.
- Interviewed or distributed questionnaires to Federal partners such as USDA and U.S. Food and Drug Administration to obtain an understanding of their coordination with CWMD.
- Interviewed a representative of the former Minority Counsel to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee who helped draft the companion bill to SAFA, to obtain an understanding of the intent of SAFA.
- Interviewed officials from Kansas State University and the University of Minnesota’s Food Protection and Defense Institute to obtain an understanding of the intent of SAFA.

7 During the course of our audit, we interviewed several officials who worked for CWMD but were later reassigned or left the agency.
understanding of challenges within the Department related to HSPD-9 and food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense activities.

- Interviewed a representative of DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans to gain an understanding of its role in issuing and providing oversight of Delegation to the Assistant Secretary for CWMD Office - DHS Delegation 25000.8

- Reviewed DHS’ budget documentation to identify funds allocated for food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense.

- Interviewed representatives of DHS’ Science and Technology Directorate to gain an understanding of its historical funding for food, agriculture, and veterinary systems defense.

During the course of our audit, we identified instances where CWMD officials were vetting documents requested by the audit team. We also experienced significant delays in obtaining documents from CWMD. Once documents were provided, CWMD officials informed OIG that deliverables were either legacy OHA documents, draft/pre-decisional documents, or no longer operable. In most cases, CWMD could not provide OIG with reasonable evidence and adequate documents to support their compliance with SAFA. CWMD’s vetting of information and delays in cooperating with OIG is not in compliance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Department of Homeland Security Management Directive 0810.1.

We conducted this performance audit between August 2018 and September 2019 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives.

The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Robert Greene, Director; Shelley Howes, Director; Modupe Ogunduyile, Audit Manager; Katherine “Nikki” McCall, Auditor-in-Charge; Ebonyee Brincefield, Auditor; Peter Charboneau, Program Analyst; Sabrina Paul, Program Analyst; Mary Stevens, Auditor; Lindsey Koch, Communications Analyst; and Renee Gradin, Independent Reference Reviewer.

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8 Issued in May 2018, this document assigns responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of CWMD to fulfill SAFA’s requirements.

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Appendix A
CWMD Comments to the Draft Report

June 15, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Gary C. Rasicot
Acting Assistant Secretary

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: “DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department’s Efforts to Defend the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism” (Project No. 18-107-AUD-DHS)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

CWMD is pleased to note OIG’s positive recognition of CWMD’s efforts in our first year to protect America by deploying surge radiological and nuclear detection equipment to law enforcement, conducting training and exercises to prepare local jurisdictions for biological attacks, and procuring portable radiation detection systems for DHS operational partners. CWMD remains committed to enabling operational partners in the prevention of weapons of mass destruction use against the Homeland and promoting readiness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and health security threats.

As the draft report highlights, the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (SAFA) 1 requires that DHS (CWMD) carry out a program to coordinate the Department’s efforts to defend the country’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems against terrorism and other high-consequence events. Since the conclusion of the OIG’s fieldwork in September 2019 for this report, CWMD underwent a change in senior leadership that reprioritized the critical role CWMD plays in implementing SAFA. CWMD subsequently reconstituted a formal Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program which is now staffed with personnel supported by a budget and is rebuilding and strengthening relationships with internal DHS Components, interagency, and external

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stakeholders. FAV-D is also focused on short, medium, and longer-term efforts to bolster the effectiveness of implementation.

The draft report contained three recommendations, with which CWMD concurs. Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. CWMD previously submitted technical comments under a separate cover for OIG’s consideration.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future.

Attachment
Attachment: Management Response to Recommendations
       Contained in 18-107-AUD-DHS

OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary for CWMD:

**Recommendation 1:** Coordinate with the DHS Secretary to reinforce the office’s authority to implement a coordinated program in accordance with the Public Law 115-43, “Securing our Agriculture and Food Act” (SAFA).

**Response:** Concur. Current senior CWMD leadership agrees that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s memorandum, “Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Delegation 25000, dated May 21, 2018, and the CWMD Act of 2018, clearly delineate CWMD’s responsibility for fulfilling SAFA’s requirements. Therefore, coordination with the Secretary to clarify CWMD’s authority in this regard is not needed.

CWMD requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

**Recommendation 2:** Reprioritize the food, agriculture and veterinary defense mission within the Department to ensure adherence to requirements of Public Law 115-43, “Securing our Agriculture and Food Act.”

**Response:** Concur. Under new leadership in October 2019, CWMD re-established the FAV-D program under the Chief Medical Officer to rebuild and prioritize the CWMD role in the DHS food and agriculture mission space. CWMD assigned four federal employees to the new FAV-D Division, including two veterinarians. The FAV-D Division is currently developing an initial vision, mission, and roadmap to help guide implementation efforts over the course of the next year.

In establishing the FAV-D Division, CWMD has increased resources to implement FAV-D program requirements. For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, the FAV-D program budget increased 50 percent over FY 2019 funding, from $800,000 to $1.2 million. In addition, the FY 2021 FAV-D program budget request is $2.4 million.

FAV-D program staff have also reprioritized engagement with DHS Components and will work with Components to formalize the following:

- Establish joint research and development (R&D) requirements for food and agriculture defense:
Increase focus on the myriad threat vectors across the food and agriculture critical infrastructure;

- Develop a “Defense of Food, Agriculture and Water Implementation Plan” to complement NSC-led policy initiatives.
- Consider catastrophic reference scenarios impacting the food and agriculture sector;
- Enhance resilience across the food and agriculture critical infrastructure; and
- Conduct quarterly DHS Component discussions focused on FAV defense.

By August 30, 2020, CWMD plans to announce the reconstitution of FAV-D in a memorandum to relevant DHS Components and request their active collaboration and support for the successful implementation of SAFA.

It is also important to note that from September 2019 through January 2020, FAV-D led the Department through a National Security Council (NSC) interagency review of food and agriculture sector policies and continues to represent the Department on NSC food and agriculture policy initiatives.

In addition, FAV-D staff also regularly represent DHS in meetings of the Food and Agriculture Government Coordinating Council/Sector Coordinating Council and other relevant discussions across the United States government regarding interagency coordination on agricultural security, food defense strategies, and related activities. These interagency efforts include, for example: (1) CDC’s One Health Federal COVID-19 Coordination Group; (2) K-9 Detection; (3) FEMA’s working groups on COVID-19 response Food Security (Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6); and (4) USDA’s Interagency Food Supply Chain (ESF#11).

On April 8, 2020, CWMD also completed a historical analysis of FAV-D R&D funding, in collaboration with the Department’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). CWMD and S&T will develop an R&D Strategic Plan to reprioritize and better align food and agriculture defense R&D across the Department.


**Recommendation 3:** Conduct a capability assessment to identify needs and gaps in DHS’ food, agriculture, and veterinary defense mission. The assessment should identify the necessary resources (staffing and budget) needed to fulfill requirements of Public Law 115-43, “Securing our Agriculture and Food Act,” including Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 responsibilities. Based on the results of the assessment, develop an implementation plan for execution.

**Response:** Concur. The FAV-D Division is developing an initial FAV-D vision, mission, and roadmap to guide implementation efforts over the course of the next year.
The roadmap will include an external FAV-D mission needs and capability gaps assessment. FAV-D plans to issue a contract structured around three main tasks to complete the mission needs assessment:

1. **Systems analysis and support in the development of Food, Agriculture and Veterinary (FAV) national defense strategy** will inform a multiyear plan for engagement, capability development, and draft framework for FAV-D readiness.

2. **Implementation of FAV defense frameworks and strategy** will focus on: 1) building awareness across multiple internal, external, and international stakeholder communities; 2) enabling sharing of best practices; and 3) identifying areas for cooperation.

3. **Responsive analysis to support key FAV defense issues and needs**: FAV-D will conduct a rapid assessment of how connections, equipment, and infrastructure (e.g., ventilators, labs, etc.) within the veterinary sector could be or could have been leveraged to support COVID-19, with associated continuing operations for veterinary sector involvement across the broader response spectrum that play significant roles in natural disaster response. FAV-D will use the results from this analysis to identify key lessons learned from response efforts and applications to better inform the response to future pandemics and/or emerging infectious diseases affecting veterinary and human public health.

# Appendix B
## Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies under HSPD-9
### Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food

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<td>Biological threat awareness capacity</td>
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<td><strong>Vulnerability Assessments</strong></td>
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<td>Vulnerability assessments</td>
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<td>Mitigation strategies</td>
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<td>Federal, state, and local response capabilities</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Recovery systems</td>
<td><strong>USDA, HHS; DHS, EPA</strong></td>
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<td>National Veterinary Stockpile</td>
<td><strong>USDA; DHS, HHS, EPA</strong></td>
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<td>National Plant Disease Recovery System</td>
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<td><strong>Outreach and Professional Development</strong></td>
<td><strong>DHS; USDA, HHS, and Others</strong></td>
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<td>Information sharing and analysis mechanism</td>
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<td>Higher education programs for protection of the food supply</td>
<td><strong>USDA, HHS; DHS, ED</strong></td>
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<td>Specialized training in agriculture and food protection</td>
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<td><strong>Research and Development</strong></td>
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<td>Countermeasures</td>
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<td>Plan to provide agriculture biocontainment labs</td>
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<td>Centers of excellence</td>
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<td>Integrated budget plan for defense of food system</td>
<td><strong>USDA, HHS, DHS</strong></td>
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</table>

*Federal Agencies with primary responsibility, as listed in HSPD-9, are in bold, underlined text.

Source: HSPD-9
Appendix C
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Acting Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Office of the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

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