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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED)

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August 13, 2020
OIG-20-59



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

August 13, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: Randolph D. Alles
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under
Secretary for Management

Alysa D. Erichs
Acting Executive Associate Director
Homeland Security Investigations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

JOSEPH V
CUFFARI

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CUFFARI
Date: 2020.08.05 14:00:47
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SUBJECT: *HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism
Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be
Improved - ~~For Official Use Only//Law Enforcement
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Attached for your action is our final report, *HSI Effectively Contributes to the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be
Improved - ~~For Official Use Only//Law Enforcement Sensitive~~*. We
incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains five recommendations aimed at improving counterterrorism
efforts and information sharing. Your office concurred with two
recommendations, and did not concur with three recommendations. Based on
information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider
recommendations 1 and 3 resolved and open. Once your office has fully
implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to
us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The
memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-
upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts.

We consider recommendations 2, 4, and 5 unresolved and open. As prescribed
by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, *Follow-Up and
Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations*, within
90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a
written response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement,
(2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each
recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other
supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of
the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the
recommendations will be considered unresolved and open.

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Please send your response or closure request to
OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the *Inspector General Act*, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version of the report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sondra McCauley, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, or Don Bumgardner, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved

August 13, 2020

Why We Did This Audit

A top priority of DHS is to protect America from terrorism. However, the FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in combatting terrorism and maintaining operational oversight of the JTTF. As such, ICE's HSI has allied with the FBI's JTTF to carry out the counterterrorism mission. We conducted this audit to determine if ICE HSI is effectively contributing to the FBI's JTTF.

What We Recommend

We made five recommendations to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing.

For Further Information:

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

What We Found

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing. Specifically, HSI's investigative expertise and ability to enforce its unique customs, criminal, and immigration law enforcement authorities successfully contribute to JTTF efforts.

However, existing agreements and guidance for HSI's participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated. This occurred because Department of Homeland Security headquarters and HSI have not prioritized updating the documents. Up-to-date guidance would help establish a framework for agents to perform their assigned duties more effectively to support mission priorities.

Additionally, an existing DHS agreement with the Department of State restricts HSI JTTF agents from sharing passport information with the FBI or other law enforcement partners outside of DHS without prior approval. The agreement was enacted without considering the JTTF's unique interagency data sharing needs and does not adequately support the investigative activities of the JTTF. Further, Transportation Security Administration policy delays HSI JTTF agents' access to Secure Flight data. HSI agents on the JTTF work around the clock to protect the American public from terrorist attacks. Any delays or restrictions obtaining critical information could have detrimental consequences, such as loss of life.

Department Response

DHS concurred with two recommendations and did not concur with three. We have included a copy of DHS' management comments in their entirety in appendix A.




Background

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) plays an important role in combatting terrorism through its participation in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in combatting terrorism and maintaining operational oversight of the JTTF. Prior to the formation of ICE, the Department of Justice (DOJ) established agreements with its legacy components, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and U.S. Customs Service (Customs), to govern participation in the JTTF.

In October 2001, Customs began conducting terrorism financing investigations under Operation Green Quest. Subsequently, the FBI established the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) in 2002 to also focus on terrorism financing cases. See Figure 1 for a timeline of events impacting terrorism investigations.

Figure 1. Events Impacting Terrorism Investigations



Source: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of ICE and FBI data

Because of duplicate efforts between Operation Green Quest and the FBI’s TFOS investigations, the Department of Homeland Security¹ and DOJ

¹ DHS was established in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As a component of DHS, ICE was formed in March 2003, transferring and consolidating some of the functions and agents from legacy INS and Customs into ICE.



negotiated a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in May 2003² to address overlapping functions in conducting terrorism financing investigations. The MOA dismantled Operation Green Quest and consolidated terrorism financing investigations in the JTTF. The MOA specifically requires deconfliction of HSI's money laundering and financial crime leads through the FBI TFOS to determine if there is a nexus to terrorism. If the FBI declines the case, HSI retains the investigation. Otherwise, the investigation is assigned to the JTTF where HSI agents may potentially be tasked to lead or assist. Even in situations where HSI is the lead case agent, the FBI maintains operational control of all cases.

Terrorist Threats to the Homeland

In 2011, DHS launched the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), replacing the Homeland Security Advisory System. The purpose of NTAS is to issue timely and detailed information, in the form of Bulletins and Alerts, to inform the American Public of terrorist threats. The January 18, 2019 NTAS Bulletin emphasizes that "We continue to face one of the most challenging threat environments since 9/11, as foreign terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to inspire, enable, or direct individuals already here in the homeland to commit terrorist acts.

Homegrown terror suspects increasingly rely on technology, such as end-to-end encrypted social media applications, to avoid detection." See appendix B for the complete January 18, 2019 NTAS Bulletin.

"The United States is engaged in a generational fight against terrorists who seek to attack the American people, our country, and our way of life. An informed, vigilant and engaged public remains one of our greatest assets to identify potential terrorists and prevent attacks." – NTAS January 18, 2019

Since 9/11, the DOJ OIG has reported³ that homegrown violent extremists have carried out over 20 attacks in the United States. These attacks include:

- April 15, 2013 - Boston Marathon Bombings
- June 12, 2016 – Orlando Pulse Night Club Mass Shooting
- August 3, 2019 – El Paso Wal-Mart Mass Shooting

See appendix C for additional terrorist events.

² MOA between the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Terrorist Financing Investigations, dated May 13, 2003. This MOA establishes the FBI as the lead agency on terrorism and terrorist financing investigations and emphasized information sharing and coordination with HSI.

³ *Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Identify Homegrown Violent Extremists through Counterterrorism Assessments, March 2020.*



Prior Related Audits

DHS OIG collaborated with DOJ OIG to issue a report in 2007⁴ that examined coordination between the FBI and HSI on terrorism financing investigations, as required by the 2003 MOA. The audit found that terrorism financing cases transferred from HSI to the FBI were suitably investigated and HSI agents' expertise and experience were fully employed to assist the investigations. No recommendations were made to modify the 2003 MOA at the time. However, the report identified shortcomings in HSI and FBI implementation and management of the MOA that led to problems in cooperation and coordination. DHS OIG made four recommendations to overcome the issues.

In 2017, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, DOJ, and DHS examined counterterrorism information sharing among federal, state, and local entities.⁵ Although the report concluded that partners in the counterterrorism environment are committed to sharing terrorism information, it identified areas for improvement to enhance information exchange. For example, federal, state and local partners involved in counterterrorism need to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

Additionally, a joint review issued in 2019 by the DOJ and DHS OIGs examined cooperation between the FBI and HSI at the Southwest border.⁶ The report included five recommendations to improve cooperation. These recommendations included “developing written, agency-specific deconfliction guidelines; increasing awareness among FBI and HSI agents of each agency’s mission, statutory authorities, and criminal investigative priorities; instituting an interagency MOU for investigative interactions; and resolving unclear jurisdictional areas.”

⁴ *Coordination between FBI and ICE on Investigations of Terrorist Financing* (OIG-07-55, July 2007).

⁵ *Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information* (OIG-17-49, March 2017).

⁶ *A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations* (OIG-19-57, July 2019).



Results of Audit

HSI Provides Significant Contributions to the JTTF

U.S. Code Titles 8, 18, and 19 are the primary sources authorizing HSI agents to investigate criminal activity and immigration violations for:

- financial crimes, money laundering, and bulk cash smuggling;
- commercial fraud and intellectual property theft;
- narcotics and weapons smuggling and trafficking; and
- immigration, document, and benefit fraud.

ICE HSI is effectively contributing to the FBI's JTTF counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing. HSI special agents strengthen the JTTF's ability to identify and address threats to ensure the safety and security of Americans. Specifically, HSI agents' investigative expertise and ability to enforce broad and unique customs, criminal, and immigration law enforcement authorities have resulted in successful outcomes, as presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. FY 2015 - 2019 HSI Performance Metrics for JTTF Cases



Source: DHS OIG analysis of HSI data


[REDACTED] See appendix D for the process and requirements for HSI agents assigned to the JTTF. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] See Figure 3 [REDACTED]

Figure 3. [REDACTED]



According to HSI officials, existing JTTF staffing allocations were based on available resources for competing mission priorities. In October 2019, HSI conducted an internal assessment of its JTTF staffing and concluded that an additional 97 positions nationwide would provide adequate coverage of HSI's JTTF operational responsibilities. [REDACTED]

DHS Agreements and Component Guidance Do Not Reflect the Operational Needs of HSI Agents Assigned to the JTTF

DHS Management Directive 0450.1, "Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)," dated January 24, 2003, requires that every DHS MOU and MOA comply with specific requirements. The management directive requires basic information, such as clear identification of the parties, authorities, points of contact, modification provisions, and termination information for every agreement with DHS to ensure the agreements are current and accurate. However, we determined existing JTTF agreements are outdated and do not comply with these requirements. Figure 4 highlights




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issues related to the outdated JTTF agreements and HSI guidance, which are discussed in more detail below.

Figure 4. Outdated JTTF Agreements and HSI Guidance



Source: DHS OIG analysis of JTTF agreements and related HSI guidance

1999 and 2000 MOUs Governing HSI's Participation in the JTTF

The FBI established agreements⁸ with INS and Customs in 1999 and 2000 (no longer in existence) that govern HSI's current participation in the JTTF. Because the MOUs were executed over 20 years ago and prior to DHS' existence, the agreements do not identify termination procedures and points of contact information, and do not conform to guidelines in DHS Management

⁸ MOU between INS and the FBI, dated June 18, 1999, and MOU between Customs and the FBI, dated January 6, 2000.



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Department of Homeland Security

Directive 0450.1. Additionally, we found no evidence to support whether DHS Office of General Counsel reviewed and approved both MOUs, which is also required by DHS Management Directive 0450.1. Since instituting the original agreements, HSI has not prioritized developing a new agreement for its continued participation in the JTTF. As a result, HSI does not have up-to-date, documented arrangements governing its participation in the JTTF, outlining its authorities, roles and responsibilities, skill sets, and access to systems within the JTTF.

Because our audit focused only on HSI, it may be necessary for other DHS JTTF participants to also review and update their existing agreements, or establish new agreements with the FBI. Without current agreements dictating operational responsibilities within the JTTF, DHS risks duplication of effort and diminished effectiveness. Furthermore, terms of the MOUs may not be enforceable or contain provisions not approved by the Department.

2003 MOA Between DOJ and DHS Concerning Terrorism Financing Investigations

DHS headquarters and HSI have not taken action to ensure the 2003 MOA between DHS and DOJ aligns with current operational needs and conforms to DHS Management Directive 0450.1. The 2003 MOA does not contain a statement of authorities, modification provisions, updated points of contact, and termination information as the management directive requires. Additionally, similar to the 1999 and 2000 MOUs, we found no evidence to support whether DHS Office of General Counsel reviewed and approved the MOA. Further, deconfliction procedures described in the 2003 MOA reference the TFOS that no longer exists, rendering the procedures irrelevant and inconsistent with HSI's current operational practices.

HSI Internal Memoranda and Investigative Handbook

HSI's supplemental memoranda⁹ and investigative handbook¹⁰ include outdated deconfliction procedures stemming from the 2003 MOA requirements. HSI has not prioritized updating applicable internal memoranda and the investigative handbook, which remain outdated and do not address operational changes. HSI JTTF officials agreed that the field would benefit from up-to-date

⁹ HSI memoranda, Interim Guidance for Reporting Green Quest Cases, dated June 25, 2003; Procedures Pertaining to MOA on Terrorist-Finance Investigations, dated August 7, 2003; Use of Joint Vetting Unit to Coordinate Terrorist Financing Investigations, dated August 24, 2007; and OIG Report #07-55: Coordination between the FBI and ICE on Investigations of Terrorist Financing, dated September 10, 2007.

¹⁰ National Security Investigations Handbook, dated April 26, 2013, provides guidance for HSI special agents conducting national security investigations to ensure operational consistency.



guidance and stated, “ICE/HSI should issue clear, comprehensive, updated guidance with respect to all aspects of JTTF investigations, which can impact any of ICE’s numerous programmatic areas and authorities.” Up-to-date guidance also helps establish a framework for agents to perform assigned duties more effectively in support of mission priorities.

Current Agreement and Policy Restrict Sharing and Access to Critical Investigative Information in the JTTF

The National Security Strategy, dated December 2017, encourages the Federal Government to reduce barriers to information sharing. According to the DHS Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy, dated January 2013, DHS should coordinate with other Federal agencies and update agreements to improve the timeliness and quality of information sharing. DHS Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing, dated February 2007, promotes a department-wide information-sharing environment, free of unnecessary limitations and constraints, with emphasis on sharing information related to potential terrorism activity. Furthermore, the U.S. Government Accountability Office emphasizes the importance of continued efforts to improve the information sharing environment in light of “the constant evolution of terrorist threats and changing technology.”¹¹

Despite these guidelines, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF. For example, although DHS and some FBI agents have access to passport information through separate agreements with the Department of State (State),¹² HSI JTTF agents are prohibited from sharing that information with FBI agents or other law enforcement partners outside of DHS without prior approval from State.¹³ The agreements with State also include provisions

¹¹ In February 2017, Government Accountability Office removed Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland from its high risk list, but emphasized “while this progress is commendable, it does not mean the government has eliminated all risk associated with sharing terrorism-related information. It remains imperative that the Program Manager and key departments and agencies continue their efforts to advance and sustain the Information Sharing Environment.”

¹² MOA between State and DHS Regarding the Sharing of VISA and Passport Records and Immigration and Naturalization and Citizenship Records, signed November 18, 2008 and MOU between State, Bureau of Consular Affairs and DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington Field Office for Access to certain Passport Services' Databases, signed August 26, 2009.

¹³ Because passport records are subject to the *Privacy Act of 1974*, State requires prior approval for dissemination to third parties/agencies unless there is an agreement or arrangement authorizing such sharing.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

that may result in termination or suspension of access to passport information for unauthorized sharing. Although these agreements address privacy concerns, the provisions were enacted based on the specified needs of each agency which did not consider the information sharing needs of a JTTF environment. Consequently, critical information exchange may be delayed, and the restrictions may promote a belief among HSI agents and JTTF partners that passport information should not be shared, resulting in information silos.

"We are no longer allowed to share U.S. Passport information or photos with any agency on the JTTF. We are now required to fill out a permission form - or in an emergency contact a Department of State phone number and speak to a member of their legal department. This could be detrimental during a terrorist attack or imminent threat."
- **HSI JTTF Agent**

Additionally, HSI JTTF agents do not have immediate access to Secure Flight data.¹⁴ In accordance with Transportation Security Administration (TSA) policy,¹⁵ HSI JTTF agents must submit formal written requests that are subject to a multi-layered approval process. This process requires approval from TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, the Privacy Officer, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Assistant Administrator, and potentially the TSA Administrator, unless the request pertains to an individual on a watchlist or there is an established written arrangement with TSA. Currently, no arrangement is in place between TSA and the JTTF, similar to other counterterrorism groups such as the National Targeting Center. Although TSA may expedite the process for exigent circumstances, HSI JTTF agents may still experience delays in obtaining critical investigative leads. While we focused our review only on HSI's JTTF partnership, other DHS component policies may also result in delays and restrictions in information sharing that are crucial to JTTF investigations.

"It is critical to the security of our Nation that we share information in an environment that is free of unnecessary limitations or constraints." - **DHS Information Sharing Memo 2008**

¹⁴ Secure Flight data consists of passenger data and screening results. Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight program supports the Federal Government's counterterrorism efforts by performing risk based screening of passengers in addition to matching carrier-provided traveler information to watchlists, such as No Fly and Terrorism Screening database to identify threats to transportation or national security.

¹⁵ TSA Management Directive No. 1300.4, Request for Secure Flight Data.



Conclusion

HSI plays an important role in combatting terrorism through its support of the FBI's JTTF. HSI JTTF agents collectively work around the clock to protect the American public from terrorist attacks. It is imperative that all DHS agreements governing its participation in FBI's JTTF provide clear and current guidance to assist agents in effectively performing assigned duties and strengthening the Department's counterterrorism efforts.

Further, the FBI created the JTTF to establish an environment where federal, state, and local partners can immediately share information during an evolving terrorism event or threat. Information sharing is a crucial aspect of a JTTF environment, allowing multi-agency partners to leverage the assets of each contributor to reach the JTTF's full potential. In balance with privacy protection, the Department must ensure that timely sharing of terrorism-related information is a top priority to deter or prevent terrorist events. Any delays or restrictions of information could have detrimental consequences, such as the loss of life.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Management, coordinate with DHS JTTF contributors to:

- ensure agreements governing participation in the JTTF are binding;
- evaluate whether new agreements or terms governing JTTF participation are required; and
- develop guidance defining each DHS JTTF contributors' authorities, roles and responsibilities, skill sets, and access to systems.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the HSI Executive Associate Director renegotiate and update the existing 2003 MOA with DOJ on terrorism financing investigations to ensure:

- all appropriate action to align guidance on handling of terrorism cases with current operations;
- essential requirements defined in DHS Management Directive 0450.1 are included; and
- a review and modification process is established to reflect future operational changes.



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Department of Homeland Security

Recommendation 3: We recommend the HSI Executive Associate Director revise existing guidance including the 2003 and 2007 terrorism financing internal memoranda and its National Security Investigations Handbook to reflect changes implemented by departmental or interagency agreements.

Recommendation 4: We recommend the Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Management, coordinate with DOJ and State to develop an agreement that facilitates the direct sharing of passport information within the JTTF environment through State's formal MOU process.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the Under Secretary of Management coordinate with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to ensure:

- ICE and TSA develop an agreement for TSA to directly process Secure Flight data requested for use by JTTF or HSI JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions, and
- DHS JTTF contributors mitigate data restrictions or delays pertaining to law enforcement and intelligence investigations.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

DHS management provided written comments to address the recommendations provided in a draft of this report. Appendix A contains DHS management comments in their entirety. We also received technical comments on the draft report and revised the report as appropriate.

DHS Management's General Comments and OIG Response

In its general comments, DHS management stated our report incorrectly concludes partnering agreements and policy hinder JTTF operations. We contend the information presented in our report is accurate and fairly presents the results of our review. Following is our response to DHS' specific assertions.

DHS Management Comment: The draft report incorrectly concludes existing partnering agreements and policy hinder JTTF operations. As departmental program officials and subject matter experts discussed with the audit team on multiple occasions, JTTF agents are currently able to obtain needed information without undue delay. The current information sharing environment has no negative operational or programmatic impacts on the JTTF, which functions efficiently and effectively. The OIG's conclusion that JTTF operations are negatively impacted is not supported in the draft report.



OIG Response: We disagree with DHS' statement that our conclusions are incorrect and not supported. We detailed in our report how existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF.

Specifically, we reported that, although DHS and some FBI agents have access to passport information through separate agreements with State, HSI JTTF agents are prohibited from sharing that information with FBI agents or other law enforcement partners outside of DHS without prior approval from State. Based on HSI JTTF senior leadership's technical comment, there appears to be a misunderstanding regarding State requirements for sharing passport information. For example, HSI JTTF senior leadership stated, "While the dissemination of Department of State (DOS) information needs to be approved through the DOS, as a JTTF partner, we can share information we have access to with other members of the JTTF on JTTF investigations. The only time approval from the DOS is needed is if the information will be disseminated (different than shared) and the original documentation will be used for official or court purposes." This clearly contradicts the provisions of the DHS MOA with State requiring approval from State prior to sharing passport information outside of DHS.

Additionally, we reported HSI JTTF agents' requests for Secure Flight data are not processed directly by TSA. According to TSA's policy, HSI JTTF agents must submit formal written requests that are subject to approval from TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, the Privacy Officer, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Assistant Administrator, and potentially the TSA Administrator, unless the requests pertain to individuals on a watchlist or there is an established written arrangement with TSA.

The Department should strive for immediate passport and Secure Flight information sharing for HSI JTTF agents. As described in the 9/11 Commission Report, "Agencies uphold a 'need-to-know' culture of information protection rather than promoting a 'need-to-share' culture of integration." Going forward, DHS should take a proactive stance on sharing information to minimize delays experienced by DHS personnel in accomplishing their mission of protecting the American public.



DHS Management Response to Recommendations and OIG Analysis

DHS concurred with recommendations 1 and 3 but did not concur with recommendations 2, 4, and 5. A summary of DHS' responses and our analysis follows.

DHS Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. The DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY) will coordinate with DHS JTTF contributors to collect and review existing agreements governing participation in the JTTF. The PLCY Office of Counter Terrorism and Threat Prevention (CTP) will lead the development and issuance of guidance that defines the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of each DHS JTTF contributor when updating the agreements. Upon CTP establishing the guidance, each DHS JTTF contributor will update its individual JTTF agreements to reflect its unique law enforcement expertise and authorities, as appropriate. The estimated completion date is June 30, 2021.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation after we verify:

- PLCY CTP has issued guidance for DHS JTTF contributors to define the authorities, roles and responsibilities; and
- DHS contributors have established or updated existing agreements reflecting their scope of involvement and authorities on the JTTF.

DHS Response to Recommendation 2: Non-concur. Although the “MOA Between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the DHS Concerning Terrorist Financing Investigations,” dated May 13, 2003, does not currently reflect organizational and operational changes within both HSI and the FBI since its enactment, activities and subsequent guidance are required to be fluid and allow for adjustment to the ever-changing environment in which our law enforcement agencies operate. As a result, HSI and the FBI have adapted to the various organizational changes within their agencies in the terror finance mission space. In keeping with the intended premise and spirit of the MOA between DHS and DOJ on terror finance, HSI continues to fully deconflict possible terrorism financial investigations with the FBI. While the MOA delineated a process and entities that no longer exist, using the FBI Terrorism Finance Operations Section and the Joint Vetting Unit, the process used currently is operationally effective and efficient for both agencies in its execution and still aligns with the MOA's intended purpose.

On top of the deconfliction process with the FBI on terror finance cases, pursuant to ICE Memorandum entitled, “Capabilities and Mandatory Use of ICE Special Operations Unit,” dated September 1, 2009, as well as subsequent



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

yearly guidance to HSI field offices, it is mandatory for all HSI field offices to forward all communication data identified in any criminal investigation targeting narcotics smuggling, narcotics related money laundering, and terrorist related activity to the Special Operations Unit (SOU) for deconfliction and coordination purposes.

Senior ICE leadership does not believe renegotiating and updating the 2003 MOA would represent a prudent expenditure of increasingly scarce and limited resources given that the current deconfliction procedures in place are aligned with the purpose of the MOA between DHS and DOJ, and only the names of the organizational programmatic areas have changed, with no impact to the effectiveness of operational deconfliction.

OIG Analysis: We agree that the FBI and HSI have adapted its operational deconfliction procedures over time. However, the 2003 MOA does not reflect these changes and the agreement does not conform to the requirements identified in DHS Management Directive 0450.1. Specifically, the agreement is missing required basic information and evidence demonstrating that the Office of General Counsel conducted the required legal review and approval prior to the Department official signing the agreement.

Additionally, throughout the course of our audit, HSI officials agreed that the 2003 MOA is outdated and needs to be updated. HSI officials also informed our team they were in the process of drafting a new agreement with the FBI which would collectively address counterintelligence and their engagement on the JTTF. Until HSI takes the appropriate action on the 2003 MOA and provides documentation as appropriate, we consider this recommendation unresolved and open.

DHS Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. HSI's National Security Investigations Division, National Security Unit is coordinating the drafting of an updated handbook (which will now be titled the Counterterrorism Investigations Handbook) through all required parties for clearance and review. The draft handbook will specifically highlight the changes that occurred within the FBI, including the removal of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section and the Joint Vetting Unit. This handbook will comply with the 2003 MOA with DOJ to include standard operating procedures and the current deconfliction process that has evolved over time. The new handbook will supersede all relevant outdated HSI directives and memoranda. The estimated completion date is August 30, 2021.

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation after HSI



provides the updated Counterterrorism Investigations Handbook and we verify it has been updated accordingly.

DHS Response to Recommendation 4: Non-concur. DHS stated the existing access to passport information has no negative operational or programmatic impacts on the JTTF. The disclosure of passport information is outside the scope of DHS responsibility or authority. Any JTTF personnel seeking more access to passport information than they can obtain within their responsibility and authority directly negotiate that access with the Department of State. HSI agents assigned to the JTTFs are not the appropriate authorities for determining when to disclose passport information, as HSI agents assigned to JTTFs must follow the rules and process of the agencies responsible for non-HSI data to which they have access. Not doing so would be a violation of longstanding practice and properly scoped interagency agreements. Consequently, DHS defers to the determinations made by the Department of State regarding when it is appropriate to disclose this data.

OIG Analysis: DHS asserted that disclosure of passport information is outside its scope of responsibility or authority. However, as stewards with the mission of protecting the Homeland, the Department needs to develop a proactive, not a reactive, stance to sharing information. DHS also stated that HSI JTTF agents are not the appropriate authorities for determining disclosure of passport information as they must follow the processes of the agency that originated the data. DHS deferred to State for determinations on disclosing passport data. However, according to State, it facilitates critical record and information access by approving data sharing agreements for U.S. passport records based on the needs identified by the external agency requestor and consistent with established laws, rules, and policies on information sharing. Additionally, State pointed out, “As outlined in all of State’s MOUs, external agencies can initiate modifications to their agreements when new needs and unique circumstances arise.”

DHS’ passport sharing agreement with State was enacted without considering the JTTF’s unique interagency data sharing needs and does not adequately support the investigative activities of the JTTF. The FBI created the JTTF to establish an environment for immediate information sharing amongst multi-agency partners, leveraging the assets of each contributor to reach the JTTF’s full potential. Given this, we strongly recommend DHS take the lead to coordinate with DOJ and State on developing an agreement that facilitates the direct sharing of passport information within the JTTF environment through State’s formal MOU process. We consider this recommendation unresolved and open until DHS provides evidence that it coordinated with State and DOJ to update the passport sharing agreement.



DHS Response to Recommendation 5: Non-concur. TSA currently has a process with ICE for requesting information, including Secure Flight data for use by JTTF or HSI JTTF agents to investigate terrorism activities or perform task force specific missions. Although the OIG's draft report suggests that this process may pose delays in TSA providing this information to ICE, this concern is not substantiated by the data TSA provided to the OIG, and the OIG also provided no evidence that this is a problem. TSA records show that a significant majority of requests are addressed within 30 minutes. For any exigent circumstances, TSA's process allows for information to be provided immediately. Without a potential operational or programmatic benefit, DHS is unwilling to dedicate limited resources to developing the recommended agreement.

OIG Analysis: Although TSA has a process in place for HSI JTTF agents to request Secure Flight data in support of terrorism investigations, potential delays still exist as there is no arrangement in place between TSA and the JTTF to directly process these requests. TSA currently has arrangements with other counterterrorism groups, such as the National Targeting Center and the Terrorist Screening Center. The current process inherently creates lead time because TSA policy requires HSI JTTF agents submit formal written requests that are subject to approvals unless the requests pertain to an individual on a watchlist.

Although DHS management comments cite a 30-minute turnaround time for Secure Flight data requests, TSA did not provide evidence supporting this timeframe. Further, TSA's official response obtained during field work stated: "TSA will usually return results between 1-12 hours; the timing may vary based upon the time needed for review by counsel, privacy, and Secure Flight leadership to ensure compliance with MD 1300.4. For exigent circumstances, the approval process is expedited and returned ASAP, including after normal working hours; Secure Flight operations has 24/7 contact information for the reviewing offices." The statement that requests can be expedited implies there is a delay in obtaining this information.

Based on this information, we strongly encourage TSA to develop an agreement for directly processing Secure Flight data requested by JTTF or HSI JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions. We consider this recommendation unresolved and open until DHS provides evidence that this agreement has been established and DHS JTTF contributors have mitigated data restrictions or delays pertaining to JTTF investigations.



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Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*.

The objective of this review was to determine if ICE HSI was effectively contributing to the JTTF. To achieve our objective, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed:

- public law, department and component directives, policies, and guidance;
- agreements governing JTTF participation;
- ICE’s Investigative Case Management system information;
- HSI’s performance metrics and risk assessments;
- TSA policy and related information on Secure Flight;
- DOJ’s agreements, memoranda, and other JTTF related information; and
- State’s information sharing agreements and other related information.

We conducted interviews with officials from ICE’s Office of Budget and Program Performance, and from various HSI divisions and units as follows:

- Strategic Planning and Analysis Requirements Unit
- Budget Formulation and Reporting Unit
- National Security Investigations Division
- Illicit Finance and Proceeds to Crime Unit
- Special Operations Unit
- National Targeting Center - Investigations
- Office of Intelligence
- Joint Vetting Unit
- Domestic Operations

Additionally, we interviewed HSI agents and supervisors assigned to the JTTF field offices in Boston, Chicago, Miami, New York, and Houston. We also conducted interviews with officials from State and DOJ.

Although this was not a joint audit, both State and DOJ provided us information during the course of our audit. State and DOJ also provided feedback on draft report content pertinent to their respective department. We updated the draft report, addressing each Department’s comments as appropriate. In addition, we redacted the report as needed for any sensitivity concerns based on input from each department.



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Department of Homeland Security

We reviewed and verified the HSI JTTF resources and the investigative case information, including performance data (i.e. arrests, indictments, etc., reported under performance metrics) and supporting system reports. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable to support our conclusions. We did not validate HSI's internal staffing assessment to evaluate the adequacy of the allocations determined by HSI since we received this information after the completion of our fieldwork.

We did not validate the JTTF staffing data received from the FBI. The FBI's JTTF information is mainly classified, which prevented us from reporting on some items in explicit details. For example, we were unable to present the breakdown of all contributors to the JTTF as this information is classified. However, the FBI was able to provide unclassified information at a summary level for reporting purposes.

We conducted this performance audit between April 2019 and March 2020 pursuant to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives.

The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Shelley Howes, Director; Bradley Mosher, Audit Manager; Hope Wright, Auditor-In-Charge; Michael Brunelle, Program Analyst; Jacklyn Pham, Auditor; Deborah Mouton-Miller, Communications Analyst; and Brandon Landry, Independent Referencer.



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**Appendix A
DHS Comments to the Draft Report**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528



**Homeland
Security**

July 6, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Jim H. Crumacker, CIA, CFE
Director
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: “HSI Effectively
Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But
Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved”
(Project No. 19-049-AUD-ICE)

JIM H
CRUMPACKER
Digitally signed by
JIM H CRUMPACKER
Date: 2020.07.06
13:49:46 -04'00'

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

DHS is pleased to note OIG’s recognition that U.S. Immigration and Custom’s (ICE’s) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) effectively contributes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing. We also appreciate that the OIG acknowledges the success of this partnership. ICE’s HSI is committed to strengthening the JTTF’s capability by utilizing HSI’s investigative expertise and its unique customs and immigration law enforcement authorities to protect the safety and security of the American people.

Senior DHS leadership is concerned; however, that the draft report incorrectly concludes existing partnering agreements and policy hinder JTTF operations. As Departmental program officials and subject matter experts discussed with the audit team on multiple occasions, JTTF agents are currently able to obtain needed information without undue delay. The current information sharing environment has no negative operational or programmatic impacts on the JTTF, which functions efficiently and effectively. The OIG’s conclusion that JTTF operations are negatively impacted is not supported in the draft report.

The draft report contained five recommendations. DHS concurs with two (Recommendations 1 and 3), and non-concurs with three (Recommendations 2, 4, and 5).



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Department of Homeland Security

Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. ICE previously submitted consolidated Departmental technical comments under a separate cover for OIG's consideration.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future.

Attachment

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**Attachment: Management Response to Recommendations
Contained in Project No. 19-049-AUD-ICE**

OIG recommended that the:

Recommendation 1: Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans [PLCY], in consultation with the Under Secretary for Management, coordinate with DHS JTTF contributors to:

- ensure agreements governing participation in the JTTF are binding;
- evaluate whether new agreements or terms governing JTTF participation are required; and
- develop guidance defining each DHS JTTF contributors' authorities, roles and responsibilities, skill sets, and access to systems.

Response: Concur. The DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY), will coordinate with DHS JTTF contributors to collect and review existing agreements governing participation in the JTTF. Specifically, the PLCY Office of Counter Terrorism and Threat Prevention (CTP) and others, as appropriate, will oversee an evaluation to determine whether the agreements are binding, and whether new agreements or terms are required. Furthermore, CTP will lead the development and issuance of guidance that defines the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of each DHS JTTF contributors when updating the agreements. Upon completion of each of these corrective actions, CTP will also provide a copy of the updated guidance to the OIG.

Following completion of the guidance to define the roles and responsibilities of each DHS JTTF contributor, the Department's eight operational Components, such as ICE, will update individual JTTF agreements to reflect their unique law enforcement expertise and authorities, as appropriate. PLCY believes that operational Components are best able to efficiently update JTTF agreements and ensure that they will optimize their JTTF participation, as appropriate. DHS Management Directive 0450.1, "Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)," dated January 24, 2003, governs these agreements and provides guidance to Components about coordinating the drafting and approval of such agreements. PLCY will assist the operational Components in this process to ensure the consistency of JTTF agreement updates, as well to ensure that coordination and clearance are consistent with DHS's internal review process.

Estimated Completion Date (ECD): June 30, 2021.

Recommendation 2: HSI Executive Associate Director renegotiate and update the existing 2003 MOA with DOJ on terrorism financing investigations to ensure:

- all appropriate action to align guidance on handling of terrorism cases with current operations;



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

- essential requirements defined in DHS Management Directive 0450.1 are included; and
- a review and modification process is established to reflect future operational changes.

Response: Non-concur. While the “MOA Between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the DHS Concerning Terrorist Financing Investigations,” dated May 13, 2003, does not currently reflect organizational and operational changes within both HSI and the FBI since its enactment, activities and subsequent guidance are required to be fluid and allow for adjustment to the everchanging environment in which our law enforcement agencies operate. As a result, HSI and the FBI have adapted to the various organizational changes within their agencies in the terror finance mission space. In keeping with the intended premise and spirit of the MOA between DHS and DOJ on terror finance, HSI continues to fully deconflict possible terrorism financial investigations with the FBI. While the MOA delineated a process and entities that no longer exist, using the FBI Terrorism Finance Operations Section and the Joint Vetted Unit, the process used currently is operationally effective and efficient for both agencies in its execution and still aligns with the MOA’s intended purpose.

On top of the deconfliction process with the FBI on terror finance cases, pursuant to ICE Memorandum entitled, “Capabilities and Mandatory Use of ICE Special Operations Unit,” dated September 1, 2009, as well as subsequent yearly guidance to HSI field offices, it is mandatory for all HSI field offices to forward all communication data identified in any criminal investigation targeting narcotics smuggling, narcotics related money laundering, and terrorist related activity to the Special Operations Unit (SOU) for deconfliction and coordination purposes.

As background, the SOU is HSI’s financial, narcotics, and special operations component operating within the Special Operations Division (SOD). SOD is a multi-agency coordination center consisting of representatives from a significant number of agencies, including HSI, the FBI, various other DOJ agencies and many more.

SOU also performs a valuable deconfliction service by identifying and coordinating investigative commonalities between HSI and other domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies on transnational criminal organizations (including terrorist organizations) who strive to disguise their illicit proceeds.

Senior ICE leadership does not believe renegotiating and updating the 2003 MOA would represent a prudent expenditure of increasingly scarce and limited resources given that the current deconfliction procedures in place are aligned with the purpose of the MOA between DHS and DOJ, and only the names of the organizational programmatic areas have changed, having no impact to the effectiveness of operational deconfliction.

We request the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

Recommendation 3: HSI Executive Associate Director revise existing guidance including the 2003 and 2007 terrorism financing internal memoranda and its National Security Investigations Handbook to reflect changes implemented by departmental or interagency agreements.

Response: Concur. The existing internal memoranda and guidance provided to HSI employees in 2003 and 2007, including multiple internal memoranda, should be updated.

Regarding the National Security Investigations Handbook, dated April 26, 2013, HSI National Security Investigations Division National Security Unit (NSU) coordinated over the past year with HSI field agents and supervisors assigned to the JTTFs nationwide, as well as with ICE's Office of the Principal Legal Advisor to update this handbook. NSU is coordinating the drafting of an updated handbook (which will now be titled the Counterterrorism Investigations Handbook) through all required parties for clearance and review. The draft handbook will specifically highlight the changes that occurred within the FBI, including the removal of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section and the Joint Vetted Unit. This handbook will comply with the 2003 MOA with DOJ to include standard operating procedures and the current deconfliction process that has evolved over time. The new handbook will supersede all relevant outdated HSI directives and memoranda.

ECD: August 30, 2021.

Recommendation 4: Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in consultation with the Under Secretary for Management, coordinate with DOJ and State to develop an agreement that facilitates the direct sharing of passport information within the JTTF environment.

Response: Non-concur. DHS is committed to operational collaboration while combatting terrorism and the existing access to passport information has no negative operational or programmatic impacts on the JTTF. The disclosure of passport information is outside the scope of DHS responsibility or authority. Any JTTF personnel seeking more access to passport information than they can obtain within their responsibility and authority directly negotiate that access with the Department of State. HSI agents assigned to the JTTFs are not the appropriate authorities for determining when to disclose passport information, as HSI Agents assigned to JTTFs must follow the rules and process of the agencies responsible for non-HSI data to which they have access. Not doing so would be a violation of longstanding practice and properly scoped interagency agreements. Consequently, DHS defers to the determinations made by the Department of State regarding when it is appropriate to disclose this data.

We request the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 5: Under Secretary for Management coordinate with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to ensure:



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Department of Homeland Security

- ICE and TSA develop an agreement for TSA to directly process Secure Flight data requested for use by JTTF or HSI JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions, and
- DHS JTTF contributors mitigate data restrictions or delays pertaining to law enforcement and intelligence investigations.

Response: Non-concur. TSA currently has a process with ICE for information requests, including Secure Flight data requested for use by JTTF or HSI JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions. Although the OIG's draft report suggests that this process may create delays with providing this information to ICE, this concern is not substantiated with the data TSA provided to the OIG and the OIG has provided no evidence that this is a problem. TSA records show that a significant majority of requests are addressed within 30 minutes of request. For any exigent circumstances, TSA's process allows that information to be provided *immediately*. Without a potential operational or programmatic benefit, DHS is unwilling to dedicate limited resources to developing the recommended agreement.

We request the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.



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Appendix B

NTAS Bulletin, dated January 18, 2019



National Terrorism Advisory System

Bulletin

www.dhs.gov/advisories

January 18, 2019 2:00PM EST

NOTE: Posting of the extension delayed due to the lapse in federal funding

SUMMARY OF TERRORISM THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Since 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has used this Bulletin to highlight the continuing terror threat to the U.S. Homeland. The United States is engaged in a generational fight against terrorists who seek to attack the American people, our country, and our way of life. An informed, vigilant and engaged public remains one of our greatest assets to identify potential terrorists and prevent attacks.

DURATION

This Bulletin will expire on or before **July 18, 2019** at 1:00 PM EDT

ADDITIONAL DETAILS

- We continue to face one of the most challenging threat environments since 9/11, as foreign terrorist organizations exploit the internet to inspire, enable, or direct individuals already here in the homeland to commit terrorist acts. Homegrown terror suspects increasingly rely on technology, such as end-to-end encrypted social media applications, to avoid detection.
- Terrorist groups are urging recruits to adopt easy-to-use tools to target public places and events. Specific attack tactics have included the use of vehicle ramming, to include the use of rental vehicles, small arms, straight-edged blades or knives, homemade explosives, and poisons or toxins.
- Some terrorist groups overseas are using battlefield experiences to pursue new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and chemical agents that could be used outside the conflict zones. Many of these technologies are readily available. Additionally, terrorists continue to target commercial aviation and air cargo, including with concealed explosives.
- Violent extremist media encourages individuals worldwide to launch attacks using all means possible. Continued U.S. and partner successes in disrupting and defeating terrorists on the battlefield may encourage homegrown terrorists to carry out acts of violence in the homeland instead of attempting to travel overseas to fight or in retaliation for apparent losses.
- Additionally, foreign terrorist fighters who have acquired training and battle-tested terrorism experience may flee from terrorist-controlled territories with a desire to conduct attacks elsewhere, including the United States.

U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

- DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) continue to provide guidance to state, local, tribal and territorial partners related to the current threat environment. DHS continues to support the private sector to provide risk assessments and to coordinating security measures with business owners and operators. The public may continue to observe law enforcement and security activity in and around public places and events.
- DHS works closely with the FBI and other intelligence partners to detect and disrupt terror suspects, enhance screening and vetting measures to identify suspicious travelers and cargo, combating violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment in our communities, monitoring emerging threats, and engaging with foreign partners.
- More broadly, DHS remains committed to preventing violence and threats meant to intimidate or coerce specific populations on the basis of their religion, ethnicity or identity.
- DHS is enhancing its program to secure potential [soft targets and crowded places](#), including schools.

TYPES OF ADVISORIES

Bulletin
Describes current developments or general trends regarding threats or terrorism.

Elevated Alert
Warns of a credible terrorism threat against the United States.

Imminent Alert
Warns of a credible, specific and impending terrorism threat against the United States.

HOW YOU CAN HELP

- Report suspicious activity to local law enforcement who are best to offer specific details on terroristic indicators.
- Report suspicious activity or information about a threat, including online activity, to [fusion centers](#) and the [FBI's Field Offices](#) - part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.
- Learn [how to recognize signs of pre-operational planning](#) associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.

BE PREPARED

- Be prepared for security and plan ahead. Anticipate delays and restrictions on items around populated places and at public events.
- Be responsible for your personal safety. Know where emergency exits and security personnel are located. Carry emergency contact and special needs information with you.
- [Connect. Plan. Train.](#) and [Report](#) to prepare businesses & employees. Security tools/resources can be accessed through the DHS's [Hometown Security Campaign](#).

STAY INFORMED

- The U.S. Government will provide additional information about any emerging threat as additional information is identified. The public is encouraged to listen to local law enforcement and public safety officials.
- We urge Americans to continue to travel, attend public events, and freely associate with others but remain vigilant and aware of surroundings.
- The Department of State issues [international travel alerts and warnings](#).
- For additional information visit [Ready](#).

If You See Something, Say Something™. Report suspicious activity to local law enforcement or call 911.

The National Terrorism Advisory System provides information on homeland security issues and threats. It is distributed by the Department of Homeland Security. More information is available at: www.dhs.gov/advisories. To receive mobile updates: [www.twitter.com/dhs.gov](https://twitter.com/dhs.gov)

If You See Something Say Something™ used with permission of the NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Source: www.DHS.gov/advisories



Appendix C Significant Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil

Since 9/11, there have been over 20 terrorist attacks in the United States. Here's a snapshot of some of the significant events:

 <p>September 11, 2001 Nineteen al Qaeda members hijack four US passenger airliners. At the World Trade Center site 2,753 people are killed; 184 at the Pentagon; and 40 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. A total of 2,977 people are killed.</p>	 <p>April 15, 2013 Twin bomb blasts explode near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and wounding at least 264.</p>	 <p>July 16, 2015 A man opens fire on a military recruiting center and a Naval reserve facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee, killing four US Marines and a Navy sailor.</p>	 <p>December 2, 2015 A married couple open fire on a holiday party in San Bernardino, California, killing 14 people.</p>
 <p>August 3, 2019 A domestic terrorism case involving a mass shooting at a Wal-Mart store in El Paso, Texas kills twenty-two people.</p>	 <p>October 31, 2017 Eight people are killed and almost a dozen injured when a 29-year-old man in a rented vehicle drives down a busy bicycle path near the World Trade Center in New York.</p>	 <p>August 12, 2017 One person is killed and 19 are injured when a speeding car slams into a crowd of counter-protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia.</p>	 <p>June 12, 2016 An American-born man pledged allegiance to ISIS and kills 49 people and wounds others in a shooting spree in Orlando, the second-deadliest mass shooting in recent US history.</p>
 <p>December 6, 2019 A gunman opens fire on a Navy air station in Pensacola, Florida, killing three US sailors. Attorney General William Barr says the shooting was an act of terrorism motivated by "jihadist ideology."</p>	 <p>December 10, 2019 Two gunmen kills three people inside a kosher grocery store in Jersey City, New Jersey. The case is being investigated as domestic terrorism.</p>	 <p>CURRENT The United States continues to face an evolving threat environment where terrorists are increasingly relying on technology such as social media applications to avoid detection and utilizing any means possible to launch terrorist attacks.</p>	

Source: Events from 2001 to 2019 are from the CNN Article, *US Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts*, CNN Editorial Research. Updated Wednesday, January 15, 2020.¹⁶ Current information is from the NTAS Bulletin, dated January 18, 2019.

¹⁶ The original CNN article also includes incidents pre-9/11.



Appendix D

Process and Requirements for HSI Agents Assigned to the JTTF

HSI agents are first assigned to a field office and subsequently may be considered for opportunities to serve the JTTF full-time, part-time, or as liaisons. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]



Appendix E Report Distribution

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