Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity Incident during a 2019 Biometric Pilot
September 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Mark Morgan  
Acting Commissioner  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection  

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
Inspector General  

SUBJECT: Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity Incident during a 2019 Biometric Pilot  

Attached for your action is our final report, Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity Incident during a 2019 Biometric Pilot. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains three recommendations to help CBP address the data vulnerabilities and mitigate the risk of similar future incidents. CBP concurred with all three recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider all three recommendations open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may review the recommendations for closure. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sondra McCauley, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

Attachment
September 21, 2020

Why We Did This Review

In May 2019, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) subcontractor discovered it had been the victim of a cyber attack. Subsequently, CBP data, including traveler images from CBP’s facial recognition pilot, appeared on the dark web. We conducted this review to determine whether CBP ensured adequate protection of biometric data during the 2019 pilot.

What We Found

CBP did not adequately safeguard sensitive data on an unencrypted device used during its facial recognition technology pilot (known as the Vehicle Face System). A subcontractor working on this effort, Perceptics, LLC, transferred copies of CBP’s biometric data, such as traveler images, to its own company network. The subcontractor obtained access to this data between August 2018 and January 2019 without CBP’s authorization or knowledge. Later in 2019, the Department of Homeland Security experienced a major privacy incident, as the subcontractor’s network was subjected to a malicious cyber attack.

DHS requires subcontractors to protect personally identifiable information (PII) from identity theft or misuse. However, in this case, Perceptics staff directly violated DHS security and privacy protocols when they downloaded CBP’s sensitive PII from an unencrypted device and stored it on their own network. Given Perceptics’ ability to take possession of CBP-owned sensitive data, CBP’s information security practices during the pilot were inadequate to prevent the subcontractor’s actions.

This data breach compromised approximately 184,000 traveler images from CBP’s facial recognition pilot; at least 19 of the images were posted to the dark web. This incident may damage the public’s trust in the Government’s ability to safeguard biometric data and may result in travelers’ reluctance to permit DHS to capture and use their biometrics at U.S. ports of entry.

What We Recommend

We are making three recommendations to aid CBP with addressing the vulnerabilities that caused the 2019 data breach, and mitigating the risk of similar future incidents through implementation of IT security controls and best practices recommendations.

For Further Information:

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

CBP Response

CBP concurred with all three recommendations.
Background

The Department of Homeland Security has primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders from illegal activity and promoting lawful travel and trade. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States while facilitating lawful international travel and trade. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is CBP’s largest unit and is responsible for border security at United States ports of entry. To carry out this mission, CBP personnel must be able to accurately confirm the identities of arriving travelers and determine whether they pose risks to the United States. For example, OFO personnel collect biometric information, such as facial images, to verify in-scope\(^1\) travelers’ entry to and exit from the United States. Collecting biometric data also enables CBP personnel to better document arrival and departure information on individuals arriving at United States ports of entry.

DHS Components Rely on Biometric Data for Border Protection

The DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management maintains the Automated Biometric Identification System, which contains the biometric data repository of more than 250 million people and can process more than 300,000 biometric transactions per day. It is the largest biometric repository in the Federal Government, and DHS shares this repository with the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. At least five major DHS components use biometric technologies to enforce Federal laws, support DHS and component strategic goals, and to further mission operations. These components include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United States Secret Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and CBP.

CBP Biometric Entry-Exit Program

CBP is congressionally mandated to deploy a biometric entry/exit system to record arrivals and departures to and from the United States.\(^2\) Congress used the FY 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-114) to provide CBP with up to $1 billion in funding over a 10-year period to develop a Biometric Entry-

\(^1\) Based on CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program Concept of Operations, in-scope travelers include all travelers, U.S. and non-U.S. citizens, between the ages of 14 and 79.

Exit solution. CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program Management Office, within OFO, is responsible for this effort. A long-term goal of the program is to biometrically verify the identity of all travelers exiting the United States and ensure that each traveler has physically departed the country at air, land, and sea departure locations. The program also addresses longstanding congressional mandates that the Department build an automated entry and exit control system, and follow a 2017 Executive Order to expedite its implementation.

To date, CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program Office has focused primarily on air departures, starting with a pilot program at nine airports across the country in 2017. According to component documentation, the facial recognition technology piloted at these airports has enabled CBP to simplify and expedite the entry-exit process for participating travelers. CBP’s biometric capability relies on a cloud-based facial recognition technology system known as the Traveler Verification Service (TVS). The service provides real-time matching of passenger photos against photos previously captured by CBP, other DHS components, or the Department of State to verify the identity of the traveler across the international border. As of April 2019, CBP had processed 19,829 flights and 2.8 million travelers across 19 airports through its biometric program.

**CBP Use of Facial Recognition Technology at Land Border Crossings**

CBP is currently expanding its TVS to provide the same biometric matching capability for individuals departing the country by land. In 2018, CBP began a pilot effort known as the Vehicle Face System (VFS) at the Anzalduas, Texas (TX) Port of Entry. Among other goals, CBP intended for this VFS project to test the ability to capture volunteer passenger facial images for biometric matches “at speed” (under 20 mph) at the border for both entry and exit (inbound and outbound) vehicle lanes, while also testing CBP’s use of TVS to biometrically match captured images against a gallery of recent

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5 Within the Federal Government, the cloud is often used to refer to a technology solution provided by a vendor outside the Government. Cloud-based solutions allow for significant cost effectiveness and can be quickly deployed, among other benefits.
6 TVS biometrically confirms traveler departure by using facial recognition technology. Through TVS, CBP uses cloud-based information to create a gallery of photos on travelers on a particular flight. The photos come from Government holdings, such as U.S. passport and visa photos, photos in IDENT, etc. A photo captured by TVS is matched via algorithm against the gallery to biometrically confirm a traveler’s identity. Based on the information returned by TVS, CBP personnel will perform any needed enforcement actions.
travelers. Figure 1 shows the transfer of vehicle occupant images to the VFS database. During this process (starting top right), the vehicle occupant facial images are captured on contractor-owned cameras and sent to a Lane Security Controller. These images are then sent to a VFS database, which stores the Lane Security Controller facial images packages for analysis and subsequent processing. CBP’s network houses the VFS and stores additional information relative to the images. The post-analysis includes evaluation of facial images for photo quality and biometric matching accuracy. Through this evaluation, CBP refines its approach to biometric matching.

**Figure 1. Data Transfer from Image Capture to VFS Database**

CBP employed contractors to support the VFS capability pilot at the Anzalduas, TX Port of Entry. CBP selected Unisys Corporation to design, develop, and install a biometric entry-exit solution that would verify and confirm the arrival and departures of passengers. In turn, Unisys Corporation hired Perceptics, LLC, as a subcontractor to install its proprietary facial image capture solution

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7 In this graphic, CBP abbreviates the following terms for readability: Lane Security Controller (LSC), License Plate Reader (LPR), Vehicle Primary Application and Integration Services (VPAIS), Vehicle Primary Client (VPC), Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), and Land Border Integration (LBI).

8 Perceptics performed technical work at air, land, and sea ports of entry on behalf of CBP.
and provide support for associated equipment. CBP relied on the images captured from Perceptics’ facial image solution for testing and analysis throughout the pilot. The information captured by the pilot was intended to inform ongoing expansion of biometric verification for visitors entering and exiting the country by vehicle.\(^9\) Prior to the start of the VFS pilot, Perceptics had already worked for CBP as a subcontractor providing License Plate Reader technology at multiple U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints.\(^10\) At the time of our review in October 2019, CBP was continuing to test solutions across various modes of transportation, including air entry and exit programs and seaport pilots. Given the sensitive nature of biometric data and increased reliance on biometric technologies, it was critical that CBP and its partners manage and safeguard biometric data in compliance with DHS policies.

**Protections for Biometric Data**

DHS considers biometric information such as facial images to be sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII).\(^11\) The Department classifies certain forms of information as SPII because if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, it could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual.\(^12\) In 2017, the DHS Privacy Office issued a policy\(^13\) to classify biometric information as SPII and require DHS employees, contractors, interns, and consultants to protect personally identifiable information (PII) to prevent identity theft or other adverse consequences, such as privacy incidents, compromise, or misuse of data. According to the policy, all DHS staff and contractors must complete annual training, including a mandatory online course on protecting personal information. The policy also prohibits DHS employees from using any non-Government-issued removable media (e.g., Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives), connecting such devices to DHS equipment or networks, or storing sensitive information on them.

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\(^9\) The images were not used to verify identities or create border crossing records.  
\(^10\) CBP uses license plate reader technology to assist in detecting, identifying, apprehending, and removing individuals illegally entering the United States at and between ports of entry or otherwise violating U.S. law. When a vehicle enters a primary inspection lane at a port of entry or a Border Patrol Checkpoint, license plate readers capture vehicle license plate images. The license plate numbers are used to conduct searches of law enforcement information linked to that license plate.  
\(^11\) SPII includes, but is not limited to, social security numbers, passport numbers, and financial account numbers. SPII is more protected than other identifying information, such as names and addresses.  
\(^13\) *Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII, Privacy Policy Directive 047-01-007, Revision 3, December 2017*
To protect and manage SPII, DHS has established detailed system security and privacy protocols, known as the *DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook*.\(^\text{14}\) The 4300A Handbook provides controls and best practices for personnel to mitigate the risk of theft, loss, and mismanagement of biometric information, as well as other system security information and protocols. It also contains a compilation of guidance for implementing:

- **Management Controls**, which focus on managing system information security controls and system risk;
- **Operational Controls** to improve the security of particular systems;
- **Technical Controls** that provide automated protection from unauthorized access or misuse, facilitate detection of security violations, and support security requirements for applications and data; and
- **Privacy Controls** to protect and ensure the proper handling of PII.

We previously reported on CBP’s efforts to develop and implement biometric capabilities, including facial recognition technology, to track individuals at ports of entry.\(^\text{15}\) Our prior audit determined that biometric data collection improved DHS’ ability to verify foreign visitor departures at U.S. airports. Since our prior audit work, CBP continued to expand the Biometric Entry-Exit program, including pilots at land ports of entry. We conducted this review to determine whether CBP ensured adequate protection of biometric data during a 2019 pilot.

**Results of Review**

CBP did not adequately safeguard sensitive data on an unencrypted device used during its facial recognition technology pilot (known as the Vehicle Face System). A subcontractor working on this effort, Perceptics, LLC, transferred copies of CBP’s biometric data, such as traveler images, to its own company network. The subcontractor obtained access to this data between August 2018 and January 2019 without CBP’s authorization or knowledge. Later in 2019, DHS experienced a major privacy incident, as the subcontractor’s network was subjected to a malicious cyber attack.

DHS requires subcontractors to protect PII from identity theft or misuse. However, in this case, Perceptics staff directly violated DHS security and privacy protocols when they downloaded CBP’s sensitive PII from an unencrypted device and stored it on their own network. Given Perceptics’ ability to take possession of CBP-owned sensitive data, CBP’s information


\(^{15}\) *Progress Made, But CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Nationwide* (OIG-18-80), September 21, 2018
security practices during the pilot were inadequate to prevent the subcontractor's actions.

This data breach compromised approximately 184,000 traveler images from CBP's facial recognition pilot; at least 19 of the images were posted to the dark web. This incident may damage the public's trust in the Government's ability to safeguard biometric data and may result in travelers' reluctance to permit DHS to capture and use their biometrics at U.S. ports of entry.

**Violation of DHS Security and Privacy Policies Resulted in the Breach of CBP’s Biometric Data**

A CBP subcontractor providing facial recognition technology for the VFS pilot transferred copies of biometric data, such as traveler images, to its own company network. This subcontractor, Perceptics, obtained access to this data without CBP’s authorization or knowledge. Perceptics’ staff directly violated at least three DHS security and privacy protocols when they downloaded CBP SPII data for their own use. CBP’s IT security controls were inadequate to prevent these actions, which put traveler data at risk. The subcontractor's network was later the subject of a malicious cyber attack that compromised approximately 184,000 traveler images from CBP’s facial recognition pilot. After removing duplicate images, CBP reduced its estimate to 100,000 individual images, of which they discovered 19 were posted to the Dark Web. This incident may ultimately result in damage to the public’s trust in Government biometric programs.

**Unauthorized Access and Improper Storage Made Pilot Data Vulnerable to Exploitation**

Perceptics gained unauthorized access to CBP’s data through a computer system connected to cameras located at the test site in Anzalduas, TX. The computer system contained images of vehicle drivers and passengers collected during the pilot. Perceptics gained the access to CBP’s data by submitting work order tickets through the CBP information technology (IT) help desk. Perceptics did so on at least three occasions — August 31, 2018; November 2, 2018; and January 31, 2019 — to provide maintenance on cameras and other related equipment. Once the tickets were approved by CBP and Unisys, Perceptics personnel performed the requested system maintenance work at the pilot site, but also used the access to download images from the system.16

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16 Perceptics requested and was approved by Unisys to perform the following work: adjusting the ground loop sensitivity, replacing camera lenses, and switching cameras to monochrome at CBP’s request.
None of the tickets authorized Perceptics to access or download images from the equipment.

According to documentation from Unisys and CBP, Perceptics subsequently admitted to Unisys that it had downloaded approximately 184,000\textsuperscript{17} traveler images from the equipment in conjunction with the work order tickets. Perceptics personnel accomplished this using an unencrypted USB hard drive that was eventually transported back to their corporate office in Knoxville, Tennessee. This download set-up is depicted in figure 2. From there, subcontractor personnel uploaded CBP’s images to a Perceptics server. According to documentation from a Unisys investigation, Perceptics downloaded images to improve performance.\textsuperscript{18} CBP did not know of or authorize the subcontractor’s removal of data and its subsequent storage on the subcontractor’s network.

![Figure 2. Perceptics’ Data Transfer Set-Up Using an Unencrypted Hard Drive](image)

*Source: CBP data as provided to DHS OIG*

**Subcontractor Network Subsequently Hacked by an Outside Threat**

Perceptics’ corporate network was subjected to a ransomware attack\textsuperscript{19} at some point prior to May 13, 2019. The attack compromised thousands of driver and passenger images.

\textsuperscript{17} We were unable to independently validate the exact number of images on the graphics processing unit during the time data was taken by Perceptics.

\textsuperscript{18} After learning about Perceptics’ actions, the prime contracting company, Unisys Corporation, led an investigation, starting in May 2019.

\textsuperscript{19} A ransomware is a type of malicious software that infects a computer and restricts user access to it until a ransom is paid to unlock it.
passenger images that CBP captured during the VFS pilot. CBP determined that more than 184,000 traveler facial image files, as well as 105,000 license plate images from prior pilot work, were stored on the subcontractor’s network at the time of the ransomware attack. In addition, the hacker stole an array of contractual documents, program management documents, emails, system configurations, schematics, and implementation documentation related to CBP license plate reader programs.

CBP first learned of the data breach on May 24, 2019, and took prompt action to notify the Department and mitigate risks from the incident. On June 3, 2019, DHS officially declared the event a “Major Cybersecurity Incident” based on the potential impact to the Department’s reputation and demonstrable harm to public confidence. As required by DHS Privacy Incident Handling Guidance, CBP notified Congress within 7 days and immediately stood up a DHS Breach Response team. The team coordinated a number of incident response and mitigation activities between May 24, 2019, and October 8, 2019, to eliminate the source of the breach, which included:

- removing from service all equipment involved in the breach;
- canceling Perceptics’ employee access to CBP information systems and data; and
- requiring its prime contractor, Unisys, terminate its contract with Perceptics.

CBP initiated an investigation of Perceptics in May 2019. As part of the investigation, CBP learned Perceptics had previously obtained more than 105,000 license plate images from prior pilots. These images were originally obtained through a CBP-authorized process aimed at improving the License Plate Reader program. Perceptics used that authorized process to acquire

20 Perceptics received a ransom note via an email from a hacker by the name of “Boris Bullet Dodger” demanding 20 bitcoin within 72 hours. The ransom note stated that, without the bitcoin, stolen data would be uploaded to the dark web. Perceptics did not pay the ransom and the hacker uploaded more than 9,000 unique files to the dark web.
21 CBP officially reported this incident to the Department on May 24, 2019. CBP informed several DHS offices or individuals including the Chief Information Security Officer, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Enterprise Security Operations Center.
22 Following the incident, CBP Privacy conducted an assessment of the likelihood of substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual based on the disclosure of these images using the Office of Management and Budget breach notification guidance and determined the information taken was of low risk. DHS’ Acting Chief Privacy Officer provided this assessment to Congress.
23 CBP notified Congress of the major privacy incident on June 8, 2019.
24 The Breach Response Team included DHS’ Undersecretary for Management, Chief Information Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, and Chief Security Officer, as well as representatives from DHS Privacy, Partnership and Engagement, General Counsel, Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and other relevant CBP offices.
images during both a 2008–2010 contract and a 2016 tactical pilot. However, the images were stored on Perceptics’ servers for longer than the permitted 1 year.

CBP temporarily suspended Perceptics from participation in future Government contracts, subcontracts, grants, loans, and other Federal assistance programs in June 2019. However, the suspension was lifted on September 26, 2019, leaving Perceptics eligible to participate as a contractor in Federal procurement processes. As a part of lifting the suspension, CBP and Perceptics entered into an agreement in an effort to correct the risks identified in CBP’s investigation of the data breach. At the conclusion of our fieldwork, Perceptics was no longer working with CBP as either a prime contractor or subcontractor.

Perceptics Violated DHS Requirements for Safeguarding PII

DHS maintains a number of requirements for contractor employee access to sensitive information. These requirements include passing a background investigation and contractor training concerning the protection and disclosure of sensitive information. Unisys records show that Perceptics employees did complete all required training courses, including: IT Security Awareness and Rules of Behavior Training, CBP Privacy at DHS: Protecting Personal Information, CBP Annual Integrity Awareness Training, and Privileged User Access Training. Additionally, all relevant clauses including DHS Special Clauses and Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation clauses properly flowed through the contract language from CBP to Unisys, and from Unisys to Perceptics.

However, Perceptics failed to adhere to DHS requirements for protection of privacy, including the need to protect sensitive information on the Department’s IT systems from loss, misuse, modification, or unauthorized access. Perceptics also violated DHS rules related to the collection, storage, use, and disposal of SPII by using an unencrypted hard drive to access and download biometric images. The three DHS security and privacy requirements that Perceptics violated are outlined in table 1.

25 Under federal law, suspension is an action that is taken in the public interest for the Government’s protection and not for purposes of punishment. These actions were taken in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Subpart 9.4 (et seq.).
26 The agreement, known as an Administrative Compliance Agreement or ACA, is an agreement between the Government and the contractor as an alternative to suspension or debarment, and typically requires a contractor to accept responsibility for its conduct. An ACA also typically requires a code of ethics, oversight, compliance, and employee training. A contractor’s failure to comply with an ACA is cause for debarment.
27 DHS’ Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII
28 DHS’ 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook
Table 1. DHS Security and Privacy Requirements Violated by Perceptics

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Adherence to signed Rules of Behavior:</strong></td>
<td>At least one staff member violated the signed rules of behavior by</td>
<td>DHS’ Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII and the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contract staff with access to DHS computer systems are required to take</td>
<td>downloading CBP’s SPII and transferring that data to the company’s network.</td>
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<td>training on security guidance and sign Rules of Behavior agreements.</td>
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<td>These agreements are meant to inform users of their responsibilities and</td>
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<td>hold users accountable for their actions while accessing or using DHS</td>
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<td>systems, including the need to protect sensitive information from loss,</td>
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<td>misuse, modification, or unauthorized access.</td>
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<td>2. <strong>Protection of sensitive information by limiting disclosures to official use only:</strong></td>
<td>A member of the subcontract staff used an unencrypted USB to access and</td>
<td>DHS Special Clause - Safeguarding of Sensitive Information (MAR 2015) and DHS’ Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPII may only be accessed, viewed, saved, stored, or hosted on DHS-approved,</td>
<td>download CBP’s SPII.</td>
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<td>encrypted portable electronic devices, such as laptops, tablets, and</td>
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<td>smartphones, as well as encrypted Government-issued hard drives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Reporting:</strong> All known or suspected sensitive information incidents</td>
<td>CBP found out about the breach from a news article approximately 7 days</td>
<td>Unisys and CBP Contract, DHS’ Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII, and DHS Special Clause - Safeguarding of Sensitive Information (MAR 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shall be reported to the Headquarters or Component Security Operations</td>
<td>after Perceptics notified Unisys.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center within one hour of discovery in accordance with 4300A Sensitive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems Handbook Incident Response and Reporting requirements.</td>
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</table>

Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data

First, we determined that Perceptics’ staff with network access did complete necessary training and signed Rules of Behavior agreements. However, at least

29 The Clause explains that the Contractor shall not use or redistribute any sensitive information processed, stored, and/or transmitted by the Contractor except as specified in the contract.

30 Section 1.19, Sub-section (F) of the Unisys and CBP Contract, addresses DHS Special Clause - Safeguarding of Sensitive Information (MAR 2015). Contract wording states: All known or suspected sensitive information incidents shall be reported to the Headquarters or Component Security Operations Center within one hour of discovery in accordance with 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook Incident Response and Reporting requirements.

31 Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation Class Deviation 15-01, Attachment 1: Safeguarding of Sensitive Information (MAR 2015), Section C requires contractors to follow all current versions of Government policies and guidance, which includes DHS 4300A.
one staff member directly violated the signed agreement by downloading CBP SPII data and transferring it to the company’s own network.

Second, the data used for the CBP pilot was not appropriately protected in line with DHS security requirements for protecting sensitive privacy information. An open USB port allowed Perceptics’ staff to use an unencrypted hard drive to gain access and download unencrypted biometric images (as previously shown in figure 2). Even though the subcontractor provided the equipment, CBP is ultimately responsible for securing its technology.32

Third, Perceptics and Unisys both defied contractual obligations and DHS’ privacy and security requirements for immediately reporting privacy incidents. Unisys chose not to inform CBP immediately of the data breach. CBP found out about the data breach from a news article approximately 1 week after Perceptics notified Unisys.

Figure 3 provides a timeline for the ransomware attack, including the contractor’s delay in officially notifying CBP.

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**Figure 3. Timeline for the Ransomware Attack**

**May 17, 2019**
- Perceptics notifies prime contractor
- Unisys that it was investigating a ransomware attack
- Unisys does not inform CBP.

**May 24, 2019**
- CBP discovers article in The Register and contacts Unisys for information on the breach. CBP is notified that Perceptics is trying to determine impact.
- Perceptics first mentions that CBP images could be at risk.

**May 31, 2019**
- Unisys confirms to CBP the possibility that PII data was exposed via an Initial Privacy Incident Report.

**May 13, 2019**
- Perceptics receives ransom note via email from “Boris Bullet Dodger” demanding 20 bitcoin within 72 hours.
- Perceptics notifies the FBI of the ransomware attack, but does not inform CBP.

**May 23, 2019**
- Unisys verbally notifies CBP of a ransomware investigation that had yet to identify whether CBP data was impacted.

**May 28, 2019**
- CBP receives contractual notification (late) from Unisys of potential data breach.

*Source: OIG-generated based on DHS data*

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32 DHS 4300A, *Sensitive Systems Handbook*
CBP Did Not Adequately Fulfill Its Responsibilities for IT Security

Although sufficient IT security controls are a requirement for all DHS programs, CBP did not fully ensure protection of SPII during this technology pilot. According to the DHS 4300A Handbook, components are responsible for ensuring that contractors adhere to DHS information security standards and guidelines. The DHS 4300A Handbook also requires that CBP secure its systems and technology. Additionally, DHS’ Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII states that DHS components are accountable for reviewing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with Department guidelines and privacy protection requirements.

Perceptrics was able to make unauthorized use of CBP’s biometric data, in part because CBP did not implement all available IT security controls, including an acknowledged best practice. Additional IT security controls in place during the pilot could have prevented Perceptrics from violating contract clauses and using an unencrypted hard drive to access and download biometric images at the pilot site. Following the data breach, CBP’s Chief Information Security Officer acknowledged the equipment vulnerabilities at this pilot location in Anzalduas, TX. Accordingly, CBP took swift action to prevent unauthorized access to, or removal of, data. Specifically, CBP disabled all USB capabilities to help prohibit further unauthorized access to pilot data. Additionally, approximately 4 months after the breach, CBP staff said they performed all needed software updates to support encryption of equipment similar to that used for the pilot.

In response to the data breach, CBP took immediate steps to review possible IT vulnerabilities at other locations with ongoing biometric pilot efforts. For example, the CBP Chief Information Security Officer initiated a forensic security assessment in 2019 of all existing cameras and biometric technologies to ensure data was not being stored on any other endpoint devices. As of November 8, 2019, CBP had completed onsite evaluations at five locations: four major U.S. international airports participating in the Biometric Air-Exit program, and a testing facility in Sterling, Virginia. Three of the five locations received more rigorous examinations, which revealed that no traveler biometrics were stored on the devices. Another assessment entailed reviewing additional data protection and insider threat security controls that could be incorporated to prevent similar breaches from occurring in the future.

33 DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook
34 Biometric Air-Exit program onsite evaluations occurred at Washington Dulles International Airport, Chicago O’Hare International Airport, McCarran International Airport, and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.
35 CBP conducted a forensic analysis of the images and concluded that no traveler biometric data was found.
As a result, CBP identified potential security vulnerabilities at four airports conducting similar facial recognition pilots.

CBP ultimately made 10 mitigation recommendations and 3 policy recommendations based on these assessments to protect against unauthorized access to data from cameras and related equipment used for biometric confirmation. One key recommendation was to ensure implementation of USB device restrictions and to apply enhanced encryption methods. Appendix C contains more information on CBP’s mitigation and policy recommendations.

To help mitigate future data breaches, CBP also sent a memo requiring all IT contractors to sign statements guaranteeing compliance with contract terms related to IT and data security. The memo asked contractors to provide documents supporting compliance, and responses to a questionnaire entitled “Baseline Security Requirements for Securing Sensitive Data.” As of October 11, 2019, CBP was in the process of collecting the signed attestations and supporting documentation.

It should be noted that prior to the data breach, CBP conducted privacy assessments in accordance with DHS requirements. The Biometric Entry-Exit Program Office and the CBP Privacy Office worked together to create 56 privacy products during the program’s development. These evaluations examined privacy related aspects of program development and explained mitigation of privacy concerns. Some of the documentation produced from these privacy evaluations is also shared with the public on DHS’ website to provide transparency on what information each system would collect and how that data would be protected.

**Data Breach Compromised Traveler Data and May Damage Public Trust**

The malicious ransomware attack on Perceptics’ network directly and adversely affected CBP, as well as the traveling public. CBP estimated that more than 184,000 traveler facial image files, as well as 105,000 license plate images were stored on the subcontractor’s network at the time of the ransomware attack. After removing duplicate images, CBP reduced its estimate to 100,000 individual images, of which they discovered 19 were posted to the dark web. As facial recognition technology advances, facial images, like those in this data breach, could be used in unauthorized ways to learn more information about travelers whose biometrics are captured by the Department.

Additionally, this data breach may damage the public’s trust in the Government’s use of biometric data. This data breach, and the subsequent ransomware attack on Perceptics, became the subject of international news coverage. Although the stolen images were not linked to other traveler PII, the
Washington Post\textsuperscript{36} and the New York Times\textsuperscript{37} both released articles on June 10, 2019, about the cyber attack. Both articles highlighted that sensitive information had been stolen and placed on the dark web. This concern could create reluctance among the public to permit DHS to use photos in the future.

Likewise, members of Congress flagged the data breach as a concern. In June of 2019, U.S. Senator Edward Markey called on DHS to halt its use of facial recognition technology after CBP confirmed the data breach had exposed images of travelers and their vehicles. Senator Markey stated the breach “raises serious concerns about the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to effectively safeguard the sensitive information it is collecting.” He also stated, “Malicious actors’ thirst for information about U.S. identities is unquenchable, and DHS must keep pace with emerging threats.”\textsuperscript{38}

Additionally, the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Representative Bennie Thompson, said, “We must ensure we are not expanding the use of biometrics at the expense of the privacy of the American public.”\textsuperscript{39}

Congressional caution about the Department’s plans to use biometrics predated this data breach. In December 2017 and May 2018, U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) called on DHS to halt the expansion of its biometric program until it had safeguards in place.\textsuperscript{40} Later, on June 22, 2018, Senator Lee and Senator Markey released a joint statement about biometrics, calling for DHS to complete the formal processes addressing privacy and security concerns before further expanding the Biometric Entry-Exit program.\textsuperscript{41}

**Conclusion**

It is vital that CBP protect against unauthorized access to data from cameras and related equipment used for biometric confirmation, especially when entrusting third parties to manage its SPII. These measures are particularly important as CBP is increasing its biometric data collection efforts at more and more ports of entry. The consequences of this data breach, including the damage to public perception, could pose a major threat to the Department’s use of biometrics going forward to detect and prevent illegal entry into the

\textsuperscript{36} U.S. Customs and Border Protection says photos of travelers were taken in a data breach, Washington Post, June 10, 2019
\textsuperscript{37} Border Agency’s Images of Travelers Stolen in Hack, New York Times, June 10, 2019
\textsuperscript{38} Ed Markey: Customs data breach ‘raises serious concerns’, Boston Herald, June 11, 2019
\textsuperscript{39} House Homeland Security Panel to hold hearings on DHS’s use of biometric information in wake of CBP breach, The Hill, June 10, 2019
\textsuperscript{40} Ed Markey: Customs data breach ‘raises serious concerns’, Boston Herald, June 11, 2019
\textsuperscript{41} Senators Markey and Lee Release Statement on Facial Recognition Technology Use at Airports, www.markey.senate.gov, June 22, 2018

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-20-71
United States, grant proper immigration benefits, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, and enforce Federal laws.

**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend CBP’s Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Information and Technology implement all mitigation and policy recommendations to resolve the 2019 data breach identified in CBP’s Security Threat Assessments, including implementing USB device restrictions and applying enhanced encryption methods.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations coordinate with the CBP Office of Information and Technology to ensure that all additional security controls are implemented on relevant devices at all existing Biometric Entry-Exit program pilot locations.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations establish a plan for the Biometric Entry-Exit Program to routinely assess third-party equipment supporting biometric data collection to ensure partners’ compliance with Department security and privacy standards.

**OIG Analysis of CBP Comments**

CBP provided formal written comments in response to a draft of this report. We have included a copy of CBP’s response in its entirety in appendix B. We also received technical comments from CBP and revised the report where appropriate. CBP concurred with all three of our recommendations and provided updates on the work it has completed in those areas since the conclusion of our fieldwork.

In its response, CBP documented its commitment to protecting sensitive information, including personally identifiable information stored on information systems. CBP also outlined standard protection measures and contractor requirements meant to protect data collected by the Department. Although CBP maintains that it did what was required to protect the data associated with its VFS pilot, the data was still removed without authorization. Our recommendations are aimed at ensuring CBP’s data is no longer vulnerable in order to limit the chances of future data breaches. A summary of CBP’s response to our recommendations and our analysis follows.
Further, CBP asserts that our draft report stated Perceptics admitted to violating security policies in transferring the photos to its corporate servers. We would like to clarify that even though our report notes that Perceptics admitted to the prime contractor that it had downloaded traveler images in conjunction with work order tickets, our report does not state that Perceptics admitted to violating security policies.

A summary of CBP’s response to our recommendations and our analysis follows.

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend CBP’s Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Information and Technology implement all mitigation and policy recommendations to resolve the 2019 data breach identified in CBP’s Security Threat Assessments, including implementing USB device restrictions and applying enhanced encryption methods.

**Management Comments**

CBP concurred and stated that between August 2019 and January 2020, CBP completed work on the short- and long-term mitigation and policy recommendations that CBP previously identified following the 2019 data breach. This work included implementing device restrictions, security enhancements, such as encryption, and penetration testing. CBP’s Office of Information and Technology established periodic testing to help ensure external storage device access is restricted. CBP requested that this recommendation be considered resolved and closed, as implemented.

**OIG Analysis**

We appreciate CBP’s efforts thus far to implement all mitigation and policy recommendations outlined in its 2019 Security Threat Assessments. Although we consider these actions positive steps toward addressing this recommendation, we suggest CBP continue its work to address these efforts until all mitigation and policy recommendations are fully implemented. We look forward to receiving status updates, along with documentary evidence, as these controls are implemented. This recommendation remains open and resolved.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations coordinate with the CBP Office of Information and Technology to ensure that all additional security controls are implemented on relevant devices at all existing Biometric Entry-Exit program pilot locations.
Management Comments

CBP concurred and stated that OFO and CBP’s Office of Information and Technology have worked together to develop a plan to routinely assess third party equipment supporting biometric data collection. These assessments are aimed at ensuring third party compliance with the Department’s security and privacy standards. The assessments may include interviews, security scans, and penetration tests. CBP requested that this recommendation be considered resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis

We agree that a formal assessment plan is needed to ensure third parties are not able to take advantage of Department data in the same manner again. Until CBP addresses whether or how additional security controls are to be implemented across relevant devices at all existing Biometric Entry-Exit locations including land, air, and sea initiatives, this recommendation will remain open and resolved.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations establish a plan for the Biometric Entry-Exit Program to routinely assess third-party equipment supporting biometric data collection to ensure partners’ compliance with Department security and privacy standards.

Management Comments

CBP concurred with the recommendation. As stated in the response to recommendation 2, OFO and CBP’s Office of Information and Technology developed a plan for routine assessments of third-party equipment, including interviews and security scans. CBP requested that this recommendation be considered resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG Analysis

We appreciate the work OFO and CBP’s Office of Information and Technology put into the assessment plan. Creating the plan is a step toward better securing Department data. Although CBP provided DHS OIG with a plan, the plan did not appear to support the Biometric Entry-Exit Program specifically. Until we receive supporting documentation outlining plans to address potential vulnerabilities with equipment used to support the Biometric Entry-Exit Program, this recommendation will remain open and resolved.
Appendix A

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. We conducted this review to determine whether CBP ensured adequate protection of biometric data during its 2019 pilot.

To conduct this review, we researched and used Federal, departmental, and agency criteria related to Federal IT security requirements. We obtained and reviewed published reports and other relevant documents, testimonial transcripts, and media articles related to the Department’s management and use of biometric data. Additionally, we reviewed Government Accountability Office and DHS OIG reports to identify previous findings and recommendations related to DHS’ use of biometrics.

We held more than 20 meetings and teleconferences with more than 100 individuals including DHS personnel and external stakeholders to learn about the Department’s use and protection of biometric data, as well as the specific biometric breach at Anzalduas, TX. At DHS Headquarters, we interviewed representatives from the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Privacy Office, the Office of the Chief Technology Officer, the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, and the Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans.

At CBP headquarters, we interviewed officials from the Office of Field Operations, the Office of the Chief Information Security Officer, the Office of Information Technology, the Privacy Office, and Procurement Personnel. We met with subject matter experts at the Office of Biometric Identity Management and the TSA. Finally, we met with external stakeholders from Delta Airlines and NEC Corporation.

In August 2019, we visited Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia, to observe CBP, TSA, and airline-run biometric pilot activities, and to speak with staff about program successes and challenges. During this visit, we observed operations of CBP’s Biometric Exit Program and its Global Entry facial recognition pilot, TSA’s biometric identification verification pilot, and Delta Airlines’ biometrics initiatives.

We requested and reviewed more than 250 documents and files from the Department. We did not compile or review classified documents to conduct this review. We also did not meet with or request information directly from the...
contracting organizations, Unisys and Perceptics, LLC, mentioned in this report.

We conducted this review between July and October 2019 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our objectives.
Appendix B
CBP Comments to the Draft Report

August 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Henry A. Moak, Jr.
Senior Component Accountable Official
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report:
“Review of CBP’s Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot”
(Project No. 19-061-AUD-CBP, OBIM, S&T, TSA, DHS)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

CBP is committed to protecting all sensitive information in its possession, including mitigating to the extent possible the risk of data breaches from information systems containing personally identifiable information (PII). As OIG’s draft report acknowledges, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requires subcontractors to protect PII from identity theft or misuse. However, Perceptics, a subcontractor working on the Vehicle Face System pilot demonstration in Anzalduas, Texas, directly violated DHS security and privacy protocols. Perceptics staff, in violation of DHS security policies, transferred copies of facial images collected during the demonstration to Perceptics’ servers, which subsequently experienced a malicious cyber-attack. Prior to this data breach, and as stated in the OIG’s draft report, CBP had worked with Perceptics for more than 25 years without any security or privacy incidents. Nevertheless, upon confirming the breach, CBP took swift action to terminate its relationship with Perceptics to prevent future incidents.

Senior CBP leadership disagrees with the OIG’s draft report conclusion that CBP did not adequately safeguard this data. CBP recognizes the sensitive nature of the data needed to fulfill its mission obligations and takes seriously requirements related to the: 1) definitions of, 2) access to, and 3) storage requirements for protected data. These requirements are outlined in contractual clauses with the prime contractor. They are also
required to be present in subcontracting agreements between the prime contractor and subcontractors. In addition, CBP’s contractual clauses require individual employees of both prime contractors and subcontractors to safeguard data, and to take annual training.

The draft report identifies, in hindsight, only a single action that CBP could have handled better: the universal serial bus (USB) port attached to the device during the demonstration in Anzaldus was not disabled. However, the device was in a secure locked enclosure with very limited access to only a few staff involved with the project. To access the data, Perceptics submitted at least three separate work tickets indicating required site visits for operational maintenance. None of the work tickets required the downloading or removal of facial images. As such, CBP had no reason to believe that Perceptics would remove the data in violation of the terms of their contract and government-provided training. The contract employees involved had all cleared background investigations and successfully completed mandatory initial and annual training requirements, including: 1) “CBP Annual Security Awareness and Rules of Behavior,” and 2) “Privacy at DHS: Protecting Personal Information” training. In addition, they had signed the associated “Rules of Behavior.” It is also important to note that neither the CBP nor DHS privacy offices concluded that the data should be considered Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information because there was no way to connect the facial images to corresponding biographic data.

According to the OIG’s draft report, Perceptics admitted to violating security policies in transferring the photos to their corporate servers. These were the deliberate actions of Perceptics employees, again in violation of contract requirements and the security-related training previously completed. In short, the main issue of the incident was a subcontractor who disregarded the terms of their contract and normal ethical business principles. In response, CBP effectively weighed available options, consulted with appropriate officials, and took tangible actions to protect our operational interests.

The draft report contained three recommendations, with which CBP concurs. Attached find our detailed response to each recommendation. CBP previously submitted technical comments under a separate cover for OIG’s consideration.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Attachment

OIG recommended that the Assistant Commissioner for Office of Information and Technology:

**Recommendation 1:** Implement all mitigation and policy recommendations to resolve the 2019 data breach identified in CBP’s Security Threat Assessments, including implementing USB device restrictions and applying enhanced encryption methods.

**Response:** Concur. During the period of August 2019 through January 2020, the CBP Office of Information Technology (OIT) completed the short-term mitigation, long-term mitigation and policy recommendations identified in the CBP’s Security Threat Assessments to resolve the 2019 data breach. OIT actions included:

1. In August 2019, USB device restrictions were applied to all Land Border Integration (LBI) devices in the field;
2. In September 2019, a tool used to provide security files for audit purposes “Splunk” was implemented for the Lane Security Controller Systems (LSC);
3. In October 2019, an additional security tool that helps to log user actions Digital Guardian, was added to all LBI devices;
4. In September 2019, all LBI device hard drives were encrypted The Win 10 project
5. In October 2019, USB restrictions enforcing AES-256 encryption on all data transferred to removable media have been implemented on all CBP desktops and laptops;
6. In January 2020, a Security Test & Evaluation was conducted to include a penetration test on the Unisys Contractor Test Lane Facility Extranet and Industrial Control System.

In addition, OIT established periodic testing, as needed, for non-traditional Internet of Things-type systems to ensure the use of external storage devices is disabled, where possible.

CBP request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

OIG recommended that the Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations:

**Recommendation 2:** Coordinate with the CBP Office of Information and Technology to ensure that all additional security controls are implemented on relevant devices at all existing Biometric Entry-Exit program pilot locations.
Response: Concur. In April 2020, CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO), in collaboration with OIT, developed a plan to routinely assess third-party equipment supporting biometric data collection to ensure partners’ compliance with Department security and privacy standards. These assessments, to ensure implementation of the appropriate security and privacy controls on relevant devices in support of the Biometric Entry-Exit Program will include security interviews with partner IT departments, security scans of biometric processing systems, and penetration tests of those systems. CBP OFO previously provided the OIG a copy of its “Assessment Test Plan and Rules of Engagement,” under a separate cover.

CBP request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.

Recommendation 3: Establish a plan for the Biometric Entry-Exit Program to routinely assess third-party equipment supporting biometric data collection to ensure partners’ compliance with Department security and privacy standards.

Response: Concur. In April 2020, CBP’s OFO, in collaboration with OIT, developed a plan to routinely assess third-party equipment supporting biometric data collection to ensure partners’ compliance with Department security and privacy standards. These assessments to ensure implementation of the appropriate security and privacy controls on relevant devices in support of the Biometric Entry-Exit Program will include security interviews with partner IT departments, security scans of biometric processing systems, and penetration tests of those systems. CBP OFO previously provided the OIG a copy of its “Assessment Test Plan and Rules of Engagement,” under a separate cover.

CBP request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed, as implemented.
## Mitigation Recommendations

### Short-term Efforts

- Request documentation from Unisys evidencing that images are not being stored locally.
- Replace HTTP with HTTPS to ensure data is protected during network transmission, and in accordance to FIPS 140-2.
- Install and configure Symantec Endpoint Protection on all applicable devices.
- Install Tanium agent on all applicable devices.
- Install Splunk Forwarder on all applicable devices.

### Long-term Efforts

- Implement USB restrictions to ensure USB devices are blocked (excluding Human Interface Devices).
- Document the provisioning and decommissioning processes for all devices.
- Conduct a full live penetration test in the production environment after business hours.

### Policy Recommendations

- Ensure that any time a new application is set for deployment inside CBP, the Information System Security Officer for that department collaborates with the Cyber Security Division to confirm that the necessary controls and procedures are met before deployment.
Policy Recommendations (continued)

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<td>• Identify Security Needs.</td>
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Develop an implementation checklist.

*Source*: Compiled from CBP-provided information
Appendix D
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