Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2022
April 17, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR:   Eric Hysen  
                   Chief Information Officer  
                   Department of Homeland Security  

FROM:  Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
        Inspector General  

SUBJECT: Evaluation of DHS’ Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2022  

Attached for your action is our final report, Evaluation of DHS’ Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2022. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains one recommendation aimed at improving the Department’s information security program. The Department concurred with the recommendation. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider the recommendation open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendation, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendation. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 981-6000, or your staff may call Bruce Miller, Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at the same number.

Attachment
April 17, 2023

Why We Did This Evaluation

We reviewed the Department of Homeland Security’s information security program for compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requirements. We conducted our evaluation according to fiscal year 2022 reporting instructions. Our objective was to determine whether DHS’ information security program and practices were adequate and effective to protect the information and information systems that support DHS’ operations and assets for FY 2022.

What We Found

DHS’ information security program for FY 2022 was rated “effective,” according to this year’s reporting instructions. We based this rating on our evaluation of DHS’ compliance with the FISMA requirements on unclassified and National Security Systems, for which DHS improved its maturity level in three functions compared to FY 2021. DHS received “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Identify, Protect, Respond, and Recover functions, and a “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” in the Detect function.

Based on our evaluation and testing, we identified the following six deficiencies:

1. Systems were operating without an Authority to Operate and without Contingency Plan Testing.
2. Plans of Action and Milestones used to mitigate known information security weaknesses were past due or not updated.
3. Security configuration settings were not implemented for all systems tested.
4. Some components had identity and access weaknesses.
5. An unsupported version of a Windows operating system was running on a component workstation.
6. Some components did not promptly apply security patches to mitigate critical and high-risk security vulnerabilities on selected systems tested.

What We Recommend

We made one recommendation to DHS to address the deficiencies we identified.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

DHS Response

DHS concurred with the recommendation. We included a copy of DHS’ comments in Appendix B.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Authority to Operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISA</td>
<td>Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISO</td>
<td>Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISMA</td>
<td><em>Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVA</td>
<td>High Value Asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Institute of Standards and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security System</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCIO</td>
<td>Office of the Chief Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIV</td>
<td>Personal Identity Verification</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA&amp;M</td>
<td>Plan of Action and Milestones</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCRM</td>
<td>Supply Chain Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Special Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services</td>
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Background

Recognizing the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA).\(^1\) Information security means protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction.\(^2\) FISMA provides a framework for ensuring effective security controls are in place to protect the information resources that support Federal operations and assets.\(^3\)

FISMA focuses on program management, implementation, and evaluation of the security of unclassified and National Security Systems (NSS).\(^4\) Specifically, FISMA requires Federal agencies to develop, document, and implement agency-wide information security programs.\(^5\) Each program should protect the data and information systems supporting the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or source.\(^6\) According to FISMA, agencies are responsible for conducting annual evaluations of information programs and systems under their purview. Each agency’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), in coordination with senior agency officials, is required to report annually to the agency head on the effectiveness of the agency’s information security program, including progress on remedial actions.\(^7\)

The Department of Homeland Security has various missions, such as preventing terrorism, ensuring disaster resilience, managing U.S. borders, administering immigration laws, and securing cyberspace. To accomplish its broad array of complex missions, DHS employs approximately 240,000 personnel, all of whom rely on information technology (IT) to perform their duties. It is critical that DHS provide a high level of cybersecurity\(^8\) for the information and information systems supporting day-to-day operations.

The DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) bears primary responsibility for protecting information and ensuring compliance with FISMA. The DHS CISO heads the Information Security Office and manages the Department’s information security program for its unclassified systems, its national security

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1 44 United States Code § 3551 et.seq.
2 Id. at § 3552(b)(3).
3 Id. at § 3551(1).
4 DHS defines NSS as systems that collect, generate, process, store, display, transmit, or receive Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, and Top-Secret information.
5 Id. at § 3554(b).
6 Id. at § 3554(a)(1), (2) and 3554(b).
7 Id. at § 3554(a)(5).
8 Cybersecurity is the process of protecting information by preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks.
systems classified as “Secret” and “Top Secret,” and systems operated by contractors on behalf of DHS. As part of the Department’s continuous monitoring strategy, DHS CISO maintains awareness of the Department’s information security program through: (1) Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, (2) Ongoing Authorization Program, and the (3) Network Operations Security Center.9

Foremost to all DHS components is adhering to the IT security requirements set forth in the Department’s security authorization process,10 which involves comprehensive testing and evaluation of security features of all information systems before becoming operational11 within the Department. This evaluation process results in an Authority to Operate (ATO) decision, whereby a senior official authorizes the operation of an information system based on an agreed-upon set of security controls. Per DHS guidelines,12 each component CISO is required to assess the effectiveness of controls implemented before authorizing the systems to operate, and periodically thereafter. According to applicable DHS,13 Office of Management and Budget (OMB),14 and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)15 policies, all systems must undergo the authorization process before they become operational. The DHS CISO relies on two enterprise management systems to keep track of security authorization status and administer the information security program. Enterprise management systems also provide a means to monitor plans of action and milestones for remediating information security weaknesses related to unclassified and Secret-level systems.

**FISMA Reporting Instructions**

FISMA requires each agency Inspector General (IG) to perform an annual independent evaluation to determine the effectiveness of the agency’s information security program and practices. The *FY 2022 Core Inspector General Metrics Implementation Analysis and Guidelines*16 (Fiscal Year 2022

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10 NIST defines a security authorization as a management decision by a senior organizational official authorizing operation of an information system and explicitly accepting the risk to agency operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on implementation of an agreed-upon set of security controls.
11 According to DHS policy, an information system must be granted an Authority to Operate.
15 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Revision 5, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, September 2020.
16 The *FY 2022 Core Inspector General Metrics Implementation Analysis and Guidelines* was based on coordinated discussions between representatives from OMB, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Federal Civilian Executive Branch CISOs and their staff, and the Intelligence Community.
FISMA Reporting Metrics) provide reporting requirements for addressing key areas identified during independent evaluations of agency information security programs. IGs are required to assess the effectiveness of information security programs on a maturity model spectrum, in which the foundational levels ensure that agencies develop sound policies and procedures, while the advanced levels capture the extent to which agencies institutionalize policies and procedures. Within the maturity model context, agencies should perform risk assessments to identify the optimal maturity levels that achieve cost-effective security, based on mission, risks faced, risk appetites, and risk tolerance. NIST provides agencies with a common structure to identify and manage cybersecurity risks across the enterprise, in alignment with five functions from its Cybersecurity Framework.17

Table 1. NIST Cybersecurity Functions and FY 2022 FISMA Domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cybersecurity Functions</th>
<th>FISMA Domains</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the organizational understanding to manage</td>
<td>Supply Chain Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to</td>
<td>Identity and Access Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ensure delivery of critical services.</td>
<td>Data Protection and Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>Security Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement the appropriate activities to</td>
<td>Information Security Continuous Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>Incident Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action regarding a detected cybersecurity event.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>Contingency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement the appropriate activities to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintain plans for resilience and to restore any</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>capabilities or services that were impaired due to a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cybersecurity event.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: NIST Cybersecurity Framework and FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics

According to the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics, each Office of Inspector General evaluates its agency’s information security program using selected metrics from the FY 2021 IG metrics18 for their applicability to critical efforts emanating from Executive Order 1402819 and OMB M-22-0520 and cited in the reporting instructions for the five cybersecurity functions listed in Table 1. The questions are derived from the maturity models outlined within the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Based on its evaluation, OIG assigns each

19 Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, issued May 12, 2021.
20 OMB Memorandum 22-05, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, December 6, 2021.
cybersecurity function a maturity level of 1 through 5, as shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Maturity Level Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 – Ad-hoc</td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies are not formalized; activities are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 – Defined</td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies are formalized and documented, but not consistently implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 – Consistently Implemented</td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies are consistently implemented, but quantitative and qualitative effectiveness measures are lacking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4 – Managed and Measurable</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative measures on the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and strategies are collected across the organization and used to assess them and make necessary changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies are fully institutionalized, repeatable, self-generating, consistently implemented, and regularly updated based on changing threats and technology landscape and business/mission needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: FY 2021 FISMA Reporting Metrics*\(^{21}\)

Per the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics, when an information security program is rated at “Level 4, Managed and Measurable,” the program is operating at an effective level of security.

**Scope of Our FISMA Evaluation**

This report summarizes the results of our evaluation of the Department’s information security program based on the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics. We performed our fieldwork at DHS Headquarters (HQ), DHS Office of the CISO, and at three selected DHS components. To determine whether DHS components effectively manage and secure their information systems, we reviewed the Department’s monthly FISMA Scorecards for unclassified systems and NSS. As part of discretionary audits conducted over the past year, we conducted technical testing to assess configuration management practices on eight selected systems at two components (referred to as “Component E” and “Component J”). Two of the eight systems assessed were designated as High Value Assets (HVA).\(^{22}\) We responded to the core questions cited in the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics based on our evaluation of DHS’ compliance with applicable FISMA requirements.

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\(^{21}\) The FY 2022 maturity levels were based on the FY 2021 FISMA Reporting Metrics.

\(^{22}\) An HVA is information or an information system so critical to the Department that the loss or corruption of this information or loss of access to the system would have serious impact to the organization’s ability to perform its mission or conduct business.
To determine the effectiveness of components’ implementation of their information security programs, our independent contractor performed work at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The contractor evaluated each component based on the maturity model approach outlined in the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics and NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework. We have incorporated the contractor’s work in this report.

**Results of Evaluation**

DHS’ information security program for FY 2022 was rated as “effective,” according to this year’s reporting instructions. We based this rating on our evaluation of DHS’ compliance with the FISMA requirements on unclassified and National Security Systems, for which DHS improved its maturity level in three functions as compared to FY 2021. DHS received “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Identify, Protect, Respond, and Recover functions, and a “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” in the Detect function.

Based on our evaluation and testing, we identified the following six deficiencies:

1. Systems were operating without an ATO or Contingency Plan Testing.
2. Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M) used to mitigate known information security weaknesses were past due or not updated.
3. Security configuration settings were not implemented for all systems tested.
4. Selected components had identity and access weaknesses.
5. An unsupported version of a Windows operating system was running on a component workstation.
6. Some components did not promptly apply security patches to mitigate critical and high-risk security vulnerabilities on selected systems tested.

**DHS Improved the Effectiveness of Its Information Security Program**

DHS improved its maturity level in three functions as compared with FY 2021, with a maturity rating of “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions. We summarized a comparison of FY 2021 and FY 2022 ratings in Table 3.
The following is a complete discussion of all progress and deficiencies we identified in each cybersecurity function as part of this evaluation.

1. Identify: The “Identify” function requires developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risks to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in this function. DHS can further improve this area by focusing on centralized risk management practices. For example, DHS did not provide an enterprise-wide (portfolio) view of cybersecurity risk management activities for all systems across the Department. Further, DHS did not provide documentation to support that it had integrated cybersecurity risk management information into its Enterprise Risk Management process, including DHS’ agency-wide risk assessment, as discussed in OMB Circular A-123, the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Green Book, and NIST Special Publications (SP) 800-37 and 800-39.

We also identified component systems that were operating with expired ATOs. Without valid ATOs, DHS cannot be assured effective controls are in place to protect sensitive information stored and processed by these systems. We also identified deficiencies in security weakness remediation, as several components did not effectively manage the POA&M process as required by DHS. POA&M is a tool to correct information security weaknesses found during any review done by, for, or on behalf of the agency, such as audits or vulnerability assessments. A POA&M identifies tasks that need to be accomplished and details the resources required to accomplish elements of the plan, any milestones for meeting tasks, and scheduled completion dates for milestones.²⁴

Risk Management

Managing risk is a complex, multifaceted activity that requires involvement of the entire organization. A key component of risk management is the security authorization package (also referred to as an ATO package) that documents the results of the security assessment. The ATO process provides the authorizing official with information needed to make a risk-based decision whether to authorize operation of the information system.\(^\text{25}\) Per DHS guidance,\(^\text{26}\) components are required to use enterprise management systems\(^\text{27}\) that incorporate NIST security controls when performing security assessments of their systems. Based on OMB and NIST guidance,\(^\text{28}\) system ATOs are typically granted for a specific period, in accordance with terms and conditions established by the authorizing official. DHS allows its components to enroll in an ongoing authorization program established by NIST.

We determined that 5 of 11 DHS components did not meet the required authorization target for high-value assets. DHS maintains a target goal of ensuring ATOs for 100 percent of its 149 high-value systems assets. The ATO target goal is 95 percent for its 449 other operational systems. In our review of DHS’ May 2022 FISMA Scorecard for unclassified systems, we found that five components did not meet the required authorization target of 100 percent for high-value assets, as shown in Figure 1.

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\(^{25}\) A Federal information system is an information system used or operated by an executive agency, a contractor of an executive agency, or another organization on behalf of an executive agency.


\(^{27}\) Enterprise management systems enable centralized storage and tracking of all documentation required for the authorization package of each system.

In addition, according to DHS’ May 2022 FISMA Scorecard, there were 40 other systems from 6 of 11 DHS components that did not meet the security authorization target of 95 percent, as shown in Figure 2.

To determine the components’ compliance with DHS’ NSS security authorization target, we examined the Department’s May 2022 NSS FISMA
Cybersecurity Scorecard. We found that all DHS General Support System/Major Applications met DHS’ NSS ATO target of 90 percent.

Our analysis of May 31, 2022, data from DHS’ unclassified enterprise management system revealed that DHS and its components have made progress reducing the number of systems operating without ATOs to 23, compared to 56 of 600 (62 percent reduction) in FY 2021. Table 4 outlines the number of unclassified systems operating without ATOs at selected components from FYs 2020 to 2022.

Table 4. Number of Unclassified Systems Operating without ATOs at Selected Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component D</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component E</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component H</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component J</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS OIG-compiled data from Evaluation of DHS’ Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020, OIG-21-72, September 30, 2021, and analysis of data from DHS’ unclassified enterprise management system as of May 31, 2022

In our FISMA FY 2021 report, OIG-22-55, dated August 1, 2022, we recommended DHS revise its (1) DHS 4300A Policy, (2) Handbook, and (3) Ongoing Authorization Methodology to incorporate applicable changes from NIST SPs, including SP 800-37, Revision 2, 29 and SP 800-53, Revision 5, and SP 800-137A, to maintain consistency between the documents. In July 2022, we reported to OMB that DHS had not yet updated this guidance to reflect the new and revised controls. However, the Department updated its 4300A Policy, Handbook, and Ongoing Authorization Methodology after our submission, in September 2022. As a result of the Department incorporating the applicable controls from various NIST SPs into its revised policies, it satisfied the intent of one of the prior recommendations.

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29 NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2, was issued December 18, 2018, in which NIST added a new “Prepare” step.
Weakness Remediation

OMB and DHS require using POA&Ms to track and plan the resolution of information security weaknesses.\(^{30}\) We found several components did not effectively manage the POA&M process as required by DHS. For example, components did not resolve all POA&Ms within 12 months or consistently include estimates for resources needed to mitigate identified weaknesses as required.

Our analysis of 8,344 open unclassified POA&Ms from DHS’ enterprise management system as of May 31, 2022, showed that 2,350 were past due; 823 were overdue by more than a year, including 229 POA&Ms created for HVAs; and 29 were overdue by more than 3 years. Of the 2,350 past due unclassified POA&Ms, 396 had weakness remediation costs estimated at less than $50,\(^{31}\) as shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3. Review of 8,344 Open Unclassified POA&MS**

Based on our review of the May 2022 NSS FISMA Cybersecurity Scorecard, we found that DHS HQ did not meet DHS’ NSS weakness remediation metrics for

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\(^{31}\) To ensure sufficient resources are available to mitigate known information security weaknesses, DHS requires that components include a nominal weakness remediation cost of $50 when the cost cannot be estimated due to the complexity of tasks or other unknown factors.
POA&Ms. This has been a consistent finding in our FISMA reporting since 2003.

Without valid ATOs and aggregated POA&M information, DHS cannot be assured that effective controls are in place to protect sensitive information stored and processed by these systems.

According to FY 2022 reporting metrics, our independent contractor rated components’ Identify Risk Management domain “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” for ICE, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for CISA and USCIS.

Supply Chain Risk Management

The Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) domain focuses on the maturity of agency SCRM strategies, policies and procedures, plans, and processes to ensure that products, system components, systems, and services of external providers are consistent with the organization’s cybersecurity and SCRM requirements. This domain aligns with SCRM criteria in NIST SP 800-53, Rev.5, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. The Department’s management has developed draft SCRM policies and procedures to ensure products, system components, systems, and services of external providers are consistent with applicable cybersecurity supply chain requirements. However, because the Department has not approved these draft policies and procedures, the actions taken thus far do not effectively address the maturity level indicators as discussed in the reporting metrics.

According to FY 2022 reporting metrics, our independent contractor rated components’ Supply Chain Risk Management Domain “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” for USCIS, “Level 4 – Management and Measurable” for CISA, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for ICE.

2. Protect: The “Protect” function entails developing and implementing the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services based on four FISMA domains: (1) Configuration Management, (2) Identity and Access Management, (3) Data Protection and Privacy, and (4) Security Training.

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Protect function. For example, DHS employs automation to resolve found issues and address configuration changes. However, DHS has not addressed its identified knowledge, skills, and abilities gaps. In addition, the results from our August 2022 audit on cyber attack protections32 revealed that some components did not (1) ensure all users completed required cybersecurity

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awareness training; (2) consistently educate users about the risks of malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks; and (3) conduct at least one phishing exercise in the period sampled. Based on technical testing results, DHS had not implemented security configuration settings for all systems tested; one component was running an unsupported version of a Windows operating system on a workstation; and some components did not apply security patches timely to mitigate critical and high-risk security vulnerabilities on selected systems tested.

Configuration Management

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Configuration Management domain. As part of DHS OIG audits and technical testing conducted during the year, DHS OIG performed security assessments on six systems, including one HVA at two components (Component E and Component J). Our testing confirmed that both components had implemented a vulnerability patch management program. However, the components did not ensure all known security patch and software updates were remediated timely. In addition, we found an unsupported version of Windows operating system on a workstation at Component J.

We also identified misconfigured security settings on selected workstations, domain controllers, servers, and mobile devices that may expose DHS data to unnecessary security risks at the components tested. DHS requires components document any deviation in implementing the control settings through waivers or risk-acceptance. When factoring in all available waivers through a risk acceptance memo, along with our assessment results, components should arrive at 100% compliance. However, we determined that:


Further, our security assessment revealed critical and high-risk Common Vulnerability Scoring System vulnerabilities were not remediated timely on the eight systems tested, including two HVAs at Components E and J. Specifically:

- At Component E, we assessed 2 systems, including 1 HVA, and identified 8 critical and 30 high risk unique/individual weaknesses on 527 workstations, domain controllers, and servers tested. Further, at
Component E, we identified 1 unique critical vulnerability, occurring 32 times, that is listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.\footnote{CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01 – Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, issued November 3, 2021, establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the Federal enterprise and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate any such vulnerabilities included in the catalog.} We also assessed two mobile applications and identified two critical and seven high risk unique/individual weaknesses.

- At Component J, we assessed 4 systems, including 1 HVA, and identified 14 critical and 201 high risk unique/individual weaknesses on 780 workstations, domain controllers, and servers tested.

When security patches are not applied in a timely fashion, components could be subject to potential exploitation. Personnel within Components E and J stated that the components are taking corrective actions to remediate the security vulnerabilities identified during our other discretionary audits conducted this year.

Our independent contractor rated components’ Configuration Management Domain “Level 1 – Ad-hoc” for CISA, “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” for ICE, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for USCIS.

Identity and Access Management

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Identity and Access Management domain. Identity and access management is critical to ensuring only authorized users can log onto DHS systems. DHS has taken a decentralized approach to identity and access management, leaving its components individually responsible for issuing Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards (access cards) for computer and building access, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12.\footnote{Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, dated August 27, 2004, requires Federal agencies to begin using a standard form of identification to gain physical and logical access to federally controlled facilities and information systems.} DHS requires all privileged and unprivileged employees and contractors to use PIV cards to log onto DHS systems.

Our audit of Component E revealed it does not consistently enforce multifactor authentication. Component E requires non-privileged and privileged user accounts to use multifactor authentication with PIV cards for workstations via Microsoft’s Active Directory Group Policy Object.\footnote{Active Directory keeps track of users, computers, and groups. Active Directory uses Group Policy Objects to enforce security and to limit access to protected resources.} However, Component E does not enforce multifactor authentication with PIV cards for servers. Instead,
Component E has allowed its privileged user accounts to authenticate with a username and strong password in accordance with applicable policy. Further, we identified 259 of 44,585 total users who were allowed to reset the password for a powerful, privileged account, which Windows used to encrypt access tickets at Component E. Component E personnel agreed that account permissions should be reviewed. As of June 2022, Component E stated it had already disabled some of the identified accounts and removed unnecessary permissions from others.

As part of our technical testing, we accessed Component J implementation of Microsoft’s Active Directory and determined that multifactor authentication via PIV was enforced for its non-privileged users. For privileged accounts, Component J has implemented strong authentication mechanisms. However, Component J allowed 61 of 38,102 total users to reset the password for a powerful, privileged account, which Windows used to encrypt access tickets. Component J personnel stated that two Active Directory security groups were inheriting password change permissions they were not intended to have. To mitigate this weakness, Component J personnel stated they would break these permission inheritances and correct the problem during their next update.

Our independent contractor rated components’ Identity and Access Management domain at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” for CISA, ICE, and USCIS.

Data Protection and Privacy

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 2 – Defined” in the Data Protection and Privacy domain. DHS has not defined policies and procedures to mitigate against Domain Name System infrastructure tampering. The Department has not fully encrypted personally identifiable information and other sensitive data. As part of DHS’ efforts to meet Executive Order 14028’s full encryption requirement, program officials reported in March 2022 that DHS had only applied encryption on 86 percent of DHS’ systems for data at rest and 96 percent for data in transit. Under Executive Order 14028, Federal agencies were required to meet the President’s 180-day target for full encryption by November 8, 2021.

Our independent contractor rated components’ Data Protection and Privacy domain at “Level 1 – Ad-hoc” for CISA, “Level 2 – Defined” for ICE, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for USCIS.

Security Training Program

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” in the Security Training domain. Educating employees about acceptable practices
and rules of behavior is critical for an effective information security program. DHS has a security training program that DHS HQ, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, and the components manage collaboratively. Specifically, the Department uses a Performance and Learning Management System to track employee completion of training, including security awareness courses. Components are required to ensure all employees and contractors receive annual IT security awareness training, as well as specialized training for employees with significant responsibilities.

DHS has not resolved its identified knowledge, skills, and abilities gaps of its cyber workforce. As a result, the Department cannot ensure its employees possess the knowledge and skills necessary to perform job functions, or that qualified personnel are hired to fill cybersecurity-related positions.

In addition, the results from our August 2022 audit on cyber attack protections\(^{36}\) revealed that some components did not (1) ensure all users completed required cybersecurity awareness training; (2) consistently educate users about the risks of malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks; or (3) conduct at least one phishing exercise in the period sampled.

Although the Department has made overall progress in the “Protect” function, DHS components can further safeguard the Department’s information systems and sensitive data by:

- implementing all configuration settings;
- improving identity and access weaknesses at selected components;
- replacing unsupported operating systems;
- implementing security patches timely; and
- resolving identified gaps outlined in its cyber workforce.

According to FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics, our independent contractor rated components’ Security Training domain at “Level 1 – Ad-hoc” for CISA, “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” for USCIS, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for ICE.

3. **Detect:** The “Detect” function entails developing and implementing appropriate activities, including ongoing systems authorization and continuous monitoring, to identify any irregular system activity.

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Information Security Continuous Monitoring

We determined that DHS was operating at “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” in this function. The Department updated its 4300A Policy, Handbook, and Ongoing Authorization Methodology after our FY 2022 submission to OMB, as referenced earlier in this report. As a result of the Department incorporating the applicable controls from various NIST SPs into its revised policies, it satisfied the intent of one of the prior recommendations.

As of May 2022, eight components were enrolled in the Department’s ongoing authorization program. The Department had decreased the number of systems enrolled in the program by 2 percent from FY 2021 to FY 2022, as shown in Figure 4. According to a DHS official, the decrease in system enrollment was due to components decommissioning systems previously in the Ongoing Authorization Program.

![Figure 4. DHS Systems Enrolled in the Ongoing Authorization Program from FY 2020 to FY 2022](source: DHS OIG-compiled based on DHS Office of the CISO data)

Our independent contractor rated components’ Detect function at “Level 1 – Ad-hoc” for CISA and “Level 4 - Managed and Measurable” for ICE and USCIS.

4. **Respond:** The “Respond” function entails developing and implementing appropriate responses to detected cybersecurity events.
Incident Response

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in this function. However, our August 2022 audit on cyber attack protections37 revealed that DHS can better protect its sensitive data from potential malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks by revising its policies and procedures to incorporate applicable new controls, in accordance with OMB policy. DHS can also ensure its users receive the required security awareness training to mitigate the risk.

Our independent contractor rated components’ Respond function at “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” for CISA, “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” for ICE, and “Level 5 – Optimized” for USCIS.

5. Recover: The “Recover” function entails developing and implementing plans for resiliency and restoration of any capabilities or services impaired due to outages or other disruptions from a cybersecurity event.

Contingency Planning

We determined DHS was operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in this function. DHS defined its policies, procedures, and strategies for information contingency planning, but did not fully test these plans. For example, as of May 2022, DHS had not tested 17 unclassified systems contingency plans.

DHS has a department-wide business continuity program to restore essential business functions and resume normal operations in response to emergency events. As part of this program, DHS implemented a Reconstitution Requirements Functions Worksheet to collect information about components’ key business requirements and capabilities needed to recover from attack or disaster. DHS used this information to develop a Reconstitution Plan outlining macro-level procedures for all DHS senior leadership, staff, and components to follow to resume normal operations as quickly as possible in the event of an emergency. The procedures may involve both manual and automated processing at alternate locations, as appropriate.

DHS components are responsible for developing and periodically testing such contingency plans outlining backup and disaster recovery procedures for the respective information systems.38 However, as of May 31, 2022, we identified the following deficiencies:

• Our review of the May 2022 NSS FISMA Cybersecurity Scorecard showed that DHS HQ did not meet DHS’ NSS compliance target for contingency plan testing.

• More specifically, ICE, the Management Directorate, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Transportation Security Administration,39 and USCIS had not tested contingency plans for 17 of 600 unclassified systems, based on our analysis data from DHS’ enterprise management system.

A well-documented and tested contingency plan can ensure the recovery of critical network operations. Untested plans may create a false sense of security and an inability to recover operations timely.

According to FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics, our independent contractor rated components’ “Recover” function at “Level 2 – Defined” for USCIS and “Level 3 – Consistently Implemented” for CISA and ICE.

**Summary of Selected Components’ Implementation of Information Security Programs**

Our independent contractor rated component information security programs effective for ICE and USCIS, as each achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” or higher in three of the five functions. CISA’s overall information security program was rated not effective because it only achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” or higher in one of five functions. Table 5 summarizes the implementation of information security programs by CISA, ICE, and USCIS.

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39 After the issuance of our draft report Transportation Security Agency informed DHS OIG the system was decommissioned in September 2022.
Table 5. Summary Status of CISA, ICE, and USCIS Information Security Programs for FY 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>CISA</th>
<th>ICE</th>
<th>USCIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
<td>Level 1 – Ad-hoc</td>
<td>Level 4 – Managed and Measurable</td>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>Level 1 – Ad-hoc</td>
<td>Level 4 – Managed and Measurable</td>
<td>Level 4 – Managed and Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond</td>
<td>Level 3 – Consistently Implemented</td>
<td>Level 4 – Managed and Measurable</td>
<td>Level 5 – Optimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>Level 3 – Consistently Implemented</td>
<td>Level 3 – Consistently Implemented</td>
<td>Level 2 – Defined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall Rating: Ineffective | Effective | Effective

Source: DHS OIG contractor-compiled summary status information

Since 2019, our independent contractor has performed fieldwork at 12 selected components and rated 5 components’ information security programs as “ineffective” because the components achieved below “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in three of five functions, in accordance with the FY 2022 FISMA Reporting Metrics.

**Recommendation**

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend the DHS Chief Information Officer enforce the requirements for components to obtain Authority to Operate their systems, promptly use sufficient resources to create and monitor Plans of Action and Milestones to mitigate known information security weaknesses, and ensure contingency plans are tested.

**Management Comments and OIG Analysis**

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of the Departmental Government Accountability Office-OIG Liaison Office (Director), who expressed the Department’s appreciation for OIG’s work planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. We reviewed the Department’s comments, as well as the technical comments previously submitted under separate cover, and updated the report as appropriate.
Response to Report Recommendation:

The Department concurred with the recommendation. Following is a summary of DHS’ response to the recommendation and the OIG’s analysis.

DHS Comments to Recommendation: Concur. The Department provided the corrective actions to address deficiencies identified.

Deficiency 1: Systems were operating without an Authority to Operate.

In FY 2022, DHS CISO worked through the DHS CISO Council on a weekly basis to address compliance and security matters facing the Department, such as system authorizations, compliance with Executive Order 14028, and Zero Trust architecture development. As a result, the percentage of systems operating with a current ATO and updated contingency plans rose from 78 percent of the Department population in the first quarter of FY 2022 to 97 percent in the fourth quarter of FY 2022.

Throughout FY 2022, DHS CISO established the Department’s standards for Ongoing Authorization. The DHS CISO Council approved this program on January 26, 2023. The Department expects the new standards for Ongoing Authorization will be published by the end of March 2023 as Attachment BB, DHS Ongoing Authorization Program, of DHS Policy Directive 4300A, Information Technology System Security Program, Sensitive Systems. This program provides all DHS FISMA reportable system owners the opportunity to streamline their compliance activities to avoid the scheduling factors that sometimes complicate system ATO renewal. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.

Deficiency 2: POA&Ms used to mitigate known information security weaknesses were past due or not updated.

In March 2022, DHS leveraged its Unified Cybersecurity Maturity Model framework to prioritize the overdue POA&M in the Management Directorate immediate prioritized remediation. According to the Department, the Unified Cybersecurity Maturity Model framework was key to identifying which overdue POA&Ms needed to be addressed immediately to improve the cybersecurity posture of the Management Directorate’s systems and successfully closed about 64 percent of the overdue POA&Ms. The Department is implementing this POA&M prioritizing method at other components. Additionally, DHS implemented this framework in FY 2023 as part of its monthly scorecard process to guide cybersecurity maturity improvements for the Department. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.

Deficiency 3: Security configuration settings were not implemented for all systems tested.
DHS has developed an annual *Information Security Performance Plan* based on OMB’s FISMA cybersecurity metrics, which includes new standards and associated scoring for compliance with Defense Information Security Agency *Secure Technical Implementation Guide*. This new standard has increased awareness and compliance with system configurations across all Department components and FISMA systems. The DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) expects this will improve security configuration settings compliance for all DHS FISMA systems throughout FY 2023. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 4: Selected components had identity and access weaknesses.**

OCIO continues to lead the adoption of Multifactor Authentication for 100 percent of Department’s FISMA systems. By the first quarter of FY 2023, the Department stood at 93 percent compliance. OCIO also initiated an overhaul of the entire Department’s standards for privileged account issuance and management. Since the beginning of FY 2023, OCIO has been updating an attachment to DHS 4300A to clearly reflect the minimum standards for the review, approval, and issuance of privileged accounts on any DHS FISMA system. This effort will standardize the process for the provisioning and deprovisioning of privileged accounts department-wide. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 5. An unsupported version of a Windows operating system was running on a component workstation.**

OCIO continues to work with the components to improve compliance with all *Information Security Performance Plan* metrics, one of which is using fully supported operating systems by upgrading to the current approved version of Windows. The Department tracks this metric in the DHS Monthly FISMA Scorecard using *Information Security Performance Plan*-defined metrics for prohibited operating systems. DHS will continue to work to upgrade all systems found to be using an unauthorized version of Windows. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 6. Some components did not promptly apply security patches to mitigate critical and high-risk security vulnerabilities on selected systems tested.**

OCIO prioritized the maturation of component patching capabilities in FYs 2022 and 2023. To date, the Department has increased its centralized patching capability to reach 88 percent of all DHS. OCIO has prioritized increasing the adoption of centralized patching capability so that it reaches 100 percent of DHS endpoints. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2023.
OIG Analysis of DHS Comments

DHS’ actions are responsive to the recommendation, which will remain open and resolved until DHS provides documentation showing that all planned corrective actions are completed.
Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology


The objective of our evaluation was to determine whether DHS’ information security program and practices were adequate and effective to protect the information and information systems that support DHS’ operations and assets for FY 2022. Our independent evaluation focused on assessing DHS’ information security program using requirements outlined in the FY 2022 Inspector General Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) Reporting Metrics. Specifically, we evaluated DHS’ information security program’s compliance with requirements outlined in five NIST Cybersecurity Functions.

We performed our fieldwork at the DHS Office of the CISO and at selected organizational components and offices: CISA, ICE, and USCIS. To conduct our evaluation, we interviewed relevant DHS HQ and component personnel, assessed DHS’ current operational environment, and determined compliance with FISMA requirements and other applicable information security policies, procedures, and standards. Specifically, we:

- reviewed the results from our FY 2019, FY 2020, and FY 2021 FISMA evaluations and used them as baselines for the FY 2022 evaluation;
- evaluated policies, procedures, and practices DHS implemented at the program and component levels;
- reviewed DHS’ POA&Ms and ongoing authorization procedures to determine whether security weaknesses were identified, tracked, and addressed;
- evaluated processes and the status of the department-wide information security program reported in DHS’ monthly information security scorecards regarding risk management, contractor systems, configuration management, identity and access management, security training, information security continuous monitoring, incident response, and contingency planning; and
- developed an independent assessment of DHS’ information security program.

We incorporated technical testing results from other projects, and we also included results from discretionary projects conducted during the same fiscal year. We reviewed information from DHS’ enterprise management systems to determine data reliability and accuracy. We found no discrepancies or errors.
in the data. OIG contractors performed fieldwork at CISA, ICE, and USCIS to support our evaluation.

We conducted this review between May 2022 and February 2023, under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. We did not evaluate OIG’s compliance with FISMA requirements during our review.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General
FROM: Jim H. Crumpacker, CFA, CFE
Director
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office
(Project No. 22-040-AUD-DHS)

March 23, 2023

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

The Department is pleased to note OIG’s positive recognition of compliance with security standards and the improvements in our maturity level in three functions as compared with Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, with a maturity rating of “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions. The Department remains committed to sustaining a strong Information Security Program that effectively protects data and information systems while supporting DHS’s mission of protecting the American people from threats to their security.

The draft report contained one recommendation with which the Department concurs. Enclosed find our detailed response to the recommendation. DHS previously submitted technical comments addressing several accuracy, contextual, and other issues under a separate cover for OIG’s consideration, as appropriate.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future.

Enclosure
Enclosure: Management Response to Recommendation
Contained in 22-040-AUD-DHS

OIG recommended that the DHS Chief Information Officer:

**Recommendation 1:** Enforce the requirements for components to obtain Authority to Operate their systems, promptly use sufficient resources to create and monitor Plans of Action and Milestones to mitigate known information security weaknesses, and ensure contingency plans are tested.

**Response:** Concur. As this recommendation is intended to address six deficiencies identified by the OIG, the response below is aligned to those individual deficiencies.

**Deficiency 1:** Systems were operating without an Authority to Operate.

In FY 2022, the DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) worked through the DHS CISO Council on a weekly basis to address compliance and security matters facing the Department. These issues included system authorizations, compliance with Executive Order 14028 and Zero Trust architecture development. As a result of this Department leadership and Component partnership, the number of systems operating with a current Authority to Operate (ATO) and updated contingency plans went from 78 percent of the Department population in Quarter (Q) 1 of FY 2022 to 97 percent in Q4.

In addition to the focused effort to resolve expired authorizations to operate, throughout FY 2022, the DHS CISO established the Department’s standards for Ongoing Authorization (OA). The DHS CISO Council approved this program on January 26, 2023, and it will be published by the end of March 2023 as Attachment BB, “DHS Ongoing Authorization Program,” of DHS Policy Directive 4300A, “Information Technology System Security Program, Sensitive Systems.” This program provides all DHS Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) system owners the opportunity to streamline their compliance activities to avoid the scheduling factors that sometimes complicate system ATO renewal. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 2:** Plans of Action and Milestones used to mitigate known information security weaknesses were past due or not updated.

In March 2022, DHS leveraged its Unified Cybersecurity Maturity Model (UCMM) framework to prioritize the overdue Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) in the Management Directorate (MGMT) for immediate prioritized remediation. The UCMM framework was key in identifying which overdue POA&Ms needed to be addressed immediately to improve the cybersecurity posture of MGMT systems. This effort was a
success resulting in the closure of 64 percent of MGMT’s overdue POA&Ms. This method of prioritizing POA&Ms has continued with the recent UCMM analysis of overdue POA&Ms in other Components. This aids resource-constrained system teams in planning and prioritizing which POA&Ms to address first to increase the system’s cybersecurity maturity as measured by UCMM. Additionally, DHS implemented this framework in FY 2023 as part of its monthly scorecard process to guide cybersecurity maturity improvements for the Department. ECD: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 3:** Security configuration settings were not implemented for all systems tested.

DHS implements an annual Information Security Performance Plan (ISPP) that is based on the Office of Management and Budget’s FISMA cybersecurity metrics. The FY 2022 ISPP metrics introduced new standards and associated scoring for compliance with Defense Information Security Agency Secure Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) standards that now include category 2 and 3 (CAT 2 & 3), where in previous years only compliance with CAT 1 STIGs was evaluated. This new standard has increased awareness and compliance with system configurations across all Department Components and FISMA systems. The DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) expects this will result in a trend of continuous improvement of configuration settings compliance for all DHS FISMA systems throughout FY 2023. ECD: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 4:** Selected components had identity and access weaknesses.

While DHS was determined to be operating at “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in the Identity and Access Management domain, the OIG observed inconsistencies in Component Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enforcement standards where MFA was not enforced for access to servers or in some cases to authenticate to privileged accounts. Both issues are being address by ongoing Department improvements.

First, OCIO continues to lead the adoption of MFA for 100 percent of Department FISMA systems. This standard established by Executive Order 14028, “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity” requires all systems to institute MFA mechanisms. Since issuance of the order, DHS has worked with all Components to implement the necessary infrastructure and processes to support system-wide MFA compliance. By Q1 FY 2023, the Department stood at 93 percent compliance, which is a leading example of Executive Order compliance among Chief Financial Officer Act agencies.

Second, OCIO initiated an overhaul of the entire Department’s standards for privileged account issuance and management. Since Q1 FY 2023, OCIO has been developing an updated attachment to the DHS 4300A, which will clearly reflect the minimum standards for the review, approval, and issuance of privileged accounts on any DHS FISMA
system. Furthermore, this effort will standardize the process (independent of the underlying tool or tracking software) for the provisioning and deprovisioning of privileged accounts in MGMT for adoption by other Components. This will improve oversight as well as the generation of artifacts for annual independent audit events. ECD: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 5.** An unsupported version of a Windows operating system was running on a component workstation.

OCIO continues to work with Components to improve compliance with all ISPP metrics, one of which is using fully supported operating systems by upgrading to the current approved version of Windows. The Department tracks this metric in the DHS Monthly FISMA Scorecard using ISPP-defined metrics for prohibited operating systems (OS). DHS will continue to work to upgrade all systems found to be using an unauthorized version of Windows. ECD: September 30, 2023.

**Deficiency 6.** Some components did not promptly apply security patches to mitigate critical and high-risk security vulnerabilities on selected systems tested.

OCIO prioritized the maturation of Component patching capabilities in FYs 2022 and 2023. To date, the Department has increased its centralized patching capability to reach 88 percent of all DHS endpoints with seven out of eleven DHS Components using a centralized patch management process, enabling them to respond quickly to priority patching directives and emerging vulnerabilities that threaten the Component mission. OCIO has prioritized increasing the adoption of centralized patching capability so that it reaches 100 percent of DHS endpoints. ECD: September 30, 2023.
Appendix C
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Appendix D
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