This interim report responds to Section 5275 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, which directed our offices — the Offices of Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of State (State) — to conduct a joint review “of efforts to support and process evacuees from Afghanistan and the Afghanistan special immigrant visa program,” in coordination with the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DoD) and other appropriate Inspectors General. Section 5275 requires that the review include an assessment of the systems, staffing, policies, and programs used to: (1) screen and vet the evacuees; (2) admit and process the evacuees at U.S. ports of entry; (3) temporarily house the evacuees prior to resettlement; and (4) account for the total number of individuals evacuated from Afghanistan in 2021 with support of the U.S. Government.

To address the requirements of Section 5275, we coordinated with the Inspectors General from DoD, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA). This interim report provides a compilation of OIGs’ work related to Section 5275 requirements.
Background

On August 29, 2021, President Biden issued the Memorandum on the Designation of the Department of Homeland Security as Lead Federal Department for Facilitating the Entry of Vulnerable Afghans into the United States. That memorandum directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead the coordination of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), the Federal Government’s effort to resettle Afghans evacuated from Afghanistan in the United States after the fall of the Afghan government in August 2021. The implementation of OAW involved numerous governmental agencies, including DHS, State, DoD, DOJ, HHS, SSA, and entities in the IC.

On October 27, 2021, DHS OIG established the OIG Afghanistan Project Coordination Group (Coordination Group), to coordinate and facilitate oversight of OAW. Participating OIGs include DHS, State, DoD, DOJ, IC, SSA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.1 The Coordination Group works to share information, avoid duplicative efforts, identify potential gaps, and promote comprehensive oversight of OAW’s programs and activities.

Interim Findings

The cumulative efforts of the OIGs in the Coordination Group have yielded significant findings and recommendations concerning many aspects of OAW, and the work continues. To date, the OIGs have issued 39 reports and have 10 ongoing projects regarding the implementation of OAW. Summarized below are the issued reports and ongoing projects responsive to the Section 5275 requirements.

Evacuee Screening and Vetting

OIGs issued three reports related to screening and vetting evacuees:

1. DHS OIG: DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (OIG-22-64) [Redacted]
3. DoD OIG: Evaluation of DoD Support to Other Agencies’ Requests for Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan (DoDIG-2023-088)

OIGs also have four ongoing projects related to screening and vetting evacuees:


1 HHS OIG was an original member but ended its participation August 2, 2022.
2. DOJ OIG: *Audit of the FBI’s Participation in Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome* (101-06-23-002), ECD: Spring 2024
4. IC OIG: *Special Review of Intelligence Community Support to Screening and Vetting of Persons from Afghanistan* (INS-2022-003), ECD: Summer 2023

These reports and projects address the following Section 5275 requirements:

Section 5275(b)(1)(A) requires “an assessment of whether personnel conducting such screening and vetting were appropriately authorized and provided with training, including training in the detection of fraudulent personal identification documents.”

State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06 is addressing this requirement.

Section 5275(b)(1)(B) requires “an analysis of the degree to which such screening and vetting deviated from United States law, regulations, policy, and best practices relating to the screening and vetting of parolees, refugees, and applicants for United States visas that have been in use at any time since January 1, 2016, particularly for individuals from countries containing any active terrorist organizations.”

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-64 addressed this requirement by comparing the screening and vetting processes for Afghan evacuees to the screening and vetting process in place for two other pathways of entry into the United States: the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Screening and vetting for parole of Operation Allies Refuge/OAW Afghan evacuees included biometric and biographic screening overseas at “lily pad” locations as well as the vetting of flight manifests. The Afghan SIV screening and vetting included background checks and biographic checks by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); screening by State or DoD; as well as State’s review of the SIV applications, an interview with each applicant, internal checks, and coordination of interagency security checks. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program included USCIS’ review of biographic checks and conducting biometric checks as well as interviewing applicants for eligibility. All three pathways required inspection of travelers by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. points of entry.

2 Please direct related questions to the IC IG’s Legislative Counsel at (571) 204-8050.
3 Operation Allies Refuge was a U.S. military operation to airlift certain at-risk Afghan civilians—including Afghan U.S. embassy employees, and other prospective SIV applicants and their immediate family members—from Afghanistan.
4 Lily pads — located in Bahrain, Germany, Kuwait, Italy, Qatar, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates — were used to temporarily shelter people evacuated from Afghanistan.
Additionally, DHS OIG’s project 22-067-ISP-DHS, State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06, and IC IG’s project INS-2022-003 are addressing this requirement.

Section 5275(b)(1)(C) requires “an identification of any risk to the national security of the United States posed by any such deviations [as analyzed pursuant to Section 5275(b)(1)(B)].”

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-64 addressed this requirement and found that CBP allowed some evacuees who were not fully vetted to travel from overseas or enter the United States with derogatory information. The report identified at least two individuals paroled into the country who posed a risk to national security. This occurred because DHS had no contingency plan to support similar emergency situations and no standardized screening and vetting policies to support OAW. DHS OIG recommended DHS develop a contingency plan to account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals during unprecedented events when limited biographic data is available.

In DoD OIG’s report DODIG-2022-065, the DoD OIG determined that not all available DoD data in the DoD Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) database was used when vetting Afghan evacuees entering the United States. This occurred because the DHS’ biometric information system data does not include all biometric data located in the DoD ABIS database and because the DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) has agreements with foreign partners that prohibit the sharing of some ABIS data outside of the DoD. At the time of the evaluation, NGIC identified as many as 50 Afghan evacuees in the United States who could pose potential security concerns based on the DoD data.

In DoD OIG’s report DODIG-2023-088, the DoD OIG determined that the NGIC analysts conducted biometric assessments of all watch list encounters and biographic analysis of over 84,000 Afghan evacuee records, and sent out rapid notifications to a wide distribution list to identify evacuees who may pose a threat to national security. However, NGIC did not consistently follow the Biometrically Enabled Watch List (BEWL) Guide and NGIC standard operating procedures when deciding to retain or remove some Afghan evacuees from the BEWL. As a result, NGIC might have removed from the BEWL some Afghan identities that should have been retained on the list. DHS used the BEWL as at least one consideration for its screening and vetting analysis of whether Afghan evacuees should be allowed to travel onward and apply for parole into the United States.

Additionally, State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06, IC IG’s project INS-2022-003, and DOJ OIG’s 101-06-23-002 are addressing this requirement.
Section 5275(b)(1)(D) requires “an analysis of the processes used for evacuees traveling without personal identification records, including the creation or provision of any new identification records to such evacuees.”

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-64 partially addressed this requirement. The report found CBP relied upon incomplete, inaccurate, or missing biographic data to vet evacuees. This occurred because: (1) CBP did not have a list of evacuees without sufficient identification documents; (2) CBP had no contingency plan for U.S. ports of entry to verify an evacuee’s identity; and (3) DHS did not have formal screening and vetting policies to support OAW. During the initial months of OAW, DHS officials said screening and vetting requirements were decided on an ad hoc basis. As a result, DHS and CBP cannot be sure they properly screened, vetted, and inspected all evacuees. DHS OIG recommended CBP identify evacuees in the United States, provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed identification, and ensure recurrent vetting processes occur for paroled evacuees throughout the duration of the parole period. DHS OIG also recommended DHS develop a contingency plan to support similar situations that would account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals during unprecedented events when limited biographic data is available. The report did not discuss the creation or provision of any new identification records to such evacuees.

Additionally, State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06 is addressing this requirement in the context of an assessment of State systems, staffing, policies, and programs used to vet Afghan SIV holders and participants in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. This review will specifically examine how State vets SIV applicants and other evacuees who have been relocated to Doha, Qatar, and lack necessary identification records, including any steps to create or provide new identification records to such evacuees.

Section 5275(b)(1)(E) requires “an analysis of the degree to which such screening and vetting process [as identified in Section 5275(b)(1)(D)] was capable of detecting — (i) instances of human trafficking and domestic abuse; (ii) evacuees who are unaccompanied minors; and (iii) evacuees with a spouse who is a minor.”

State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06 is addressing this requirement.

Admitting and Processing Evacuees at U.S. Ports of Entry

OIGs issued one report related to admitting and processing evacuees at U.S. ports of entry:

1. DHS OIG: DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (OIG-22-64) [Redacted]

This report addresses the following Section 5275 requirement:
Section 5275(b)(2) requires “an assessment of the systems, staffing, policies, and programs used ... to admit and process such evacuees at United States ports of entry.”

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-64 found that CBP admitted or paroled evacuees who were not fully vetted into the United States. Additionally, some information used to vet evacuees through U.S. Government databases, such as name, date of birth, identification number, and travel document data, was inaccurate, incomplete, or missing. The report explained the challenges posed by incomplete or inaccurate information occurred because DHS did not have a contingency plan for how to verify the identities of evacuees who did not have reliable identification records. CBP’s use of incomplete or inaccurate data would not have yielded positive matches from intelligence databases if the individuals had derogatory records under a different name or date of birth. DHS OIG recommended CBP identify the evacuees in the country and recurrently vet the evacuees for the duration of their parole.

Temporarily Housing Evacuees Prior to Resettlement

OIGs issued 15 reports related to the temporary housing of evacuees prior to resettlement:

1. DHS OIG: *DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome* (OIG-22-54)
2. DHS OIG: *The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority* (OIG-22-78)
3. DHS OIG: *The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases* (OIG-22-79)

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5 The term “admission” refers to “the lawful entry of [a foreign national] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A). In contrast, parole is the authority that the Secretary of Homeland Security may exercise to grant foreign nationals, who may be inadmissible or otherwise ineligible for admission, entry to the United States and permission to remain temporarily “only on a case-by-case-basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit....” INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).


These reports address the following requirement of Section 5275:

Section 5275(b)(3) requires “an assessment of the systems, staffing, policies, and programs used ... to temporarily house such evacuees prior to resettlement.”

DHS established a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to coordinate the resettlement effort, including providing Afghan evacuees with temporary housing at eight U.S. military installations designated as “safe havens.” DHS OIG issued three reports related to DHS’ efforts to temporarily house evacuees prior to resettlement.

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-54 evaluated DHS’ efforts to recruit, deploy, and manage the DHS employees detailed to or volunteering at safe havens. This report found DHS did not direct components to commit all necessary staff to detail opportunities at safe havens and did not receive funding for employee travel and overtime expenses until a December 3, 2021 continuing resolution.6 In addition, DHS recruited employee volunteers through the DHS Volunteer Force, but DHS could not reimburse components for the costs of travel and overtime, making some components reluctant to fund the volunteer deployments. As a result, DHS was unable to fill all the positions at safe havens, and the DHS employee shortage affected the safe havens’ ability to provide certain services to Afghan guests.

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DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-78 evaluated DHS’ administration of the UCG, the UCG’s coordination of Federal agencies’ OAW activities, and the UCG’s general oversight of the resettlement process. This report found two significant vulnerabilities that affected the UCG’s coordination of the resettlement process: (1) the absence of direct funding for most DHS OAW activities during the beginning of the operation, and (2) the absence of clear and direct authority for UCG leadership. DHS OIG determined that, as a result of those vulnerabilities, the UCG had trouble recruiting staff to support OAW and encountered problems procuring needed supplies and equipment.

DHS OIG’s report OIG-22-79 evaluated the UCG’s efforts to track Afghan evacuees who independently departed safe havens and inform them about their parole conditions. This report found that the UCG struggled to track Afghan evacuees who independently departed safe havens and had difficulties documenting when independent departures occurred. Further, DHS OIG determined that some Afghan evacuees did not receive counseling on their parole conditions, such as required vaccinations, before departing the safe havens.

DHS OIG made six recommendations across these three reports for DHS to develop new strategies, clarify and adjust policies and procedures for efficiency and effectiveness, and develop new training to address the identified issues. The recommendations from the three reports should help DHS improve its oversight of Government-wide coordination efforts during future crises.

The DoD OIG reported that the DoD did not establish a comprehensive memorandum of agreement with the lead Federal agencies overseeing Operation Allies Refuge or OAW, and none of the individual DoD task forces at installations supporting OAW established a memorandum of agreement with State or DHS. In addition, the DoD OIG reported that, despite having minimal time to prepare for the Afghan evacuees, the DoD successfully provided housing, sustainment, medical care, and security for more than 34,900 Afghans traveling through two installations in Germany and more than 73,500 Afghan evacuees temporarily staying at eight U.S. installations. Finally, the DoD OIG identified eight lessons learned as ways to improve in the event a similar operation occurs in the future.

Accounting for the Total Number of Individuals Evacuated from Afghanistan in 2021 with U.S. Government Support

OIGs have one ongoing project related to accounting for the total number of individuals evacuated from Afghanistan:

1. State OIG: *Review of Continuing Afghan Screening, Vetting, and Relocation Efforts* (22AUD012.06), ECD: Winter 2024
This project is addressing the following Section 5275 requirements:

Section 5275(b)(4) requires DHS OIG and State OIG “to account for the total number of individuals evacuated from Afghanistan in 2021 with support of the United States Government, disaggregated by –

(A) country of origin;
(B) citizenship, only if different from country of origin;
(C) age;
(D) gender;
(E) the number of individuals who were holders of a special immigrant visa pursuant to the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note; Public Law 111–8) or section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note; Public Law 109–163) at the time of evacuation;
(F) the number of individuals who were applicants for a special immigrant visa pursuant to the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note; Public Law 111–8) or section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note; Public Law 109–163) at the time of evacuation;
(G) the number who were in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States at the time of evacuation; and
(H) familial relationship to individuals described in subparagraphs (E) through (G).”

State OIG’s project 22AUD012.06 will address these requirements while also assessing State’s continuing screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees and refugees.

This work builds on extensive prior and ongoing State OIG work on the Afghan SIV program and the Afghanistan evacuation, which includes information pertinent to the above areas of interest. In September 2022, State OIG issued its Information Report: Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program Metrics, AUD-MERO-22-38, that included statistics on SIV applications, approvals, and denials, as well as information on average SIV processing times at different stages in the process. In October 2022, State OIG issued its Compliance Follow Up Review of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program, AUD-MERO-23-01, identifying several deficiencies that contributed to Afghan SIV applicant processing times exceeding the 9-month goal set by Congress and may have delayed vulnerable Afghan allies from reaching safety in the United States. In June 2023, State OIG issued its information brief, Relocation and Resettlement Outcomes of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Holders, AUD-MERO-23-21, that reported on the number of SIV holders remaining in Afghanistan after the evacuation as well as the number of Afghans who became naturalized U.S. citizens. With respect to the evacuation, in May 2023, State OIG issued its classified Review of Emergency Action Planning Guiding the Evacuation and
Suspension of Operation at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, AUD-MERO-25-13, that included information on factors with a bearing on the number of individuals evacuated from Afghanistan in 2021 with the support of the U.S. Government and its partners. State OIG has plans to issue an unclassified product associated with this review.

Report Recommendations

OIGs continue to monitor their departments’ progress addressing 13 report recommendations related to requirements of Section 5275. In total, departments concurred with 11 recommendations and did not concur with two recommendations. Of these recommendations, three have been closed, and the others remain open. All 13 recommendations are summarized below.

DHS OIG Report OIG-22-54

Recommendation 1: Develop a framework for directing DHS components to deploy staff to support missions, including non-centrally funded, unplanned, or emergency operations, for which DHS resources are needed.

Status: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

Recommendation 2: Develop a volunteer deployment strategy that includes provisions for supporting volunteers, regardless of funding source.

Status: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

Recommendation 3: Develop and implement training for DHS employee volunteers to prepare for deployment, including but not limited to training on how to complete administrative paperwork and make travel arrangements.

Status: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is closed.

DHS OIG Report OIG-22-64

Recommendation 1:

a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United States and provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed identification — especially for those who did not have documentation; and

b. Ensure recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled evacuees are carried out for the duration of their parole period.

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7 To obtain a copy of this classified report, please contact ryan.d.holden@stateoig.gov.
8 A recommendation remains open until a department completes the agreed-upon corrective actions and the department’s OIG verifies the actions were completed.
9 A recommendation is resolved after a department submits a corrective action plan that addresses a report’s findings and recommendations and the department’s OIG accepts the plan.
\textit{Status}: DHS did not concur, and the recommendation is unresolved and open.

\textit{Recommendation 2}: Develop a comprehensive contingency plan to support similar emergency situations in the future and account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals during unprecedented events when limited biographic data is available. Specifically:

a. The plan should include, at a minimum, lessons learned from departmental after-action reports that can be incorporated into the plan for future events, lead roles and responsibilities, points of contact, established processes, and expected timeframes.

b. The policies and procedures should ensure accountability, standard practices, and quality assurance across DHS components involved in screening, vetting, and inspecting individuals in emergency situations.

\textit{Status}: DHS did not concur, and the recommendation is unresolved and open.

DHS OIG Report OIG-22-78

\textit{Recommendation 1}: In preparation for establishing a UCG, propose that Congress create a contingency fund to allow UCG officials to set up the internal organization, including funding, when directed funding is not available via disaster aid, Stafford Act funds, congressional appropriations, or other means.

\textit{Status}: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

\textit{Recommendation 2}: Develop and implement DHS-specific guidance on lines of authority for future UCGs formed for events requiring government-wide coordination.

\textit{Status}: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

DHS OIG Report OIG-22-79

\textit{Recommendation 1}: Ensure U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and USCIS:

a. identify Afghan evacuees who independently departed safe havens, were not on the Independent Departure Task Force’s list of evacuees to contact, and have not yet completed medical requirements; and

b. provide Afghan evacuees with counseling on their parole requirements.

\textit{Status}: DHS concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

DoD OIG Report DoDIG-2022-065

\textit{Recommendation 1}: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Director, Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency; and the Commander, NGIC, negotiate an
extension to the temporary sharing agreement of biometric information with the DHS beyond the expiration date of December 27, 2021, to allow NGIC personnel to complete their analytic review of Afghan evacuees for derogatory information.

**Status**: DoD concurred, and the recommendation is closed.

**Recommendation 2**: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders.

**Status**: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

**DoD OIG Report DODIG-2022-066**

**Recommendation 1**: The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish memorandums of agreement with the appropriate interagency partners to clarify roles and responsibilities and to define cost-sharing and reimbursement terms and conditions for OAW, in accordance with DoD Instruction 4000.19 and the Economy Act.

**Status**: The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy concurred, and the recommendation is closed.

**DoD OIG Report DODIG-2023-088**

**Recommendation 1**: The NGIC Commander:

a. revise and issue BEWL guidance and standard operating procedures to incorporate specific criteria for removal or retention of individuals with:
   i. criminal derogatory information of a nonviolent nature.
   ii. a failed Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System or polygraph examination, or a failed counterintelligence screening interview.
   iii. confirmed Tier 1 or Tier 2 connections to nefarious individuals.

b. submit the revised guidance and procedures through the applicable chain of command.

c. conduct a review of all Afghan evacuee identities removed from the BEWL during Operations Allies Refuge and OAW and, as required, update each identity with a detailed removal justification.

d. add back to the BEWL those Afghan evacuees whose removals are not properly justified.

e. disseminate updated notifications to the OAW notification distribution list for any Afghan evacuees added back to the BEWL.

f. correct the BEWL removal justifications within the Biometric Identity Intelligence Resource/Identity Intelligence Analytic Resource that cite Army
Regulation 381-10 criteria or a special standard for Afghan SIV applicants who have not been confirmed as U.S. persons.

Status: The NGIC Commander concurred with the recommendation and the recommendation is resolved and open.

Recommendation 2: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security:

a. revise or replace DoD Instruction O-3300.04 to reflect the transition of responsibilities from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security for the management, support, and requirements of the BEWL.
b. review and approve the NGICs “DoD BEWL Guidance” and related policies and procedures for nominating, removing, validating, and sharing BEWL entries with interagency partners.

Status: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security concurred, and the recommendation is resolved and open.

We will continue providing oversight of the Federal Government’s OAW efforts and issuing reports addressing the requirements of Section 5275. We appreciate your ongoing interest in our work and support of our independent oversight missions. Please do not hesitate to contact us directly if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

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