FINAL REPORT

Summary of Previously Issued Recommendations and Other Insights to Improve Operational Conditions at the Southwest Border
January 9, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: Troy A. Miller  
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director  
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

The Honorable Ur M. Jaddou  
Director  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Summary of Previously Issued Recommendations and Other Insights to Improve Operational Conditions at the Southwest Border

Attached for your action is our final report, Summary of Previously Issued Recommendations and Other Insights to Improve Operational Conditions at the Southwest Border. We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office. The report contains no recommendations.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriations responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kristen Bernard, Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.

Attachment
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
Summary of Previously Issued Recommendations
and Other Insights to Improve Operational Conditions
at the Southwest Border

January 9, 2024

Why We Did This Review

The number of migrant encounters along the Southwest border dramatically increased during FYs 2018 through 2022, growing from more than 500,000 in FY 2018 to more than 2.3 million in FY 2022.

We conducted this review to summarize our prior work on the Southwest border and identify related common issues.

What We Found

During fiscal years 2018 through 2022, we issued 61 reports and 178 recommendations for improving conditions at the Southwest border. As of August 17, 2023, 144 recommendations were closed, 31 recommendations were resolved and open, and 3 recommendations remained unresolved.

Based on our recommendation analysis, we identified 10 program management deficiency categories associated with the 178 recommendations, with the top five categories accounting for 143 (80 percent) of the recommendations as follows:

- Compliance with Requirements 52 recommendations
- Program Guidance 44 recommendations
- Strategic Planning 20 recommendations
- Evaluation of Resources 15 recommendations
- Collaboration 12 recommendations

The results of our recommendation analysis may be indicative of similar program management deficiencies affecting other Southwest border programs and operations due to the number of times the recommendations were associated with the same program deficiency from our 61 prior reports.

Additionally, we interviewed Department of Homeland Security component officials to obtain their perspectives on current Southwest border operations. Officials described difficulties in staffing and resources, workloads, system capabilities and integration, and policies and procedures, which correspond to categories we identified from our prior work. DHS should learn from these common deficiencies identified in our analysis and from other insights in this summary report to better address conditions at the Southwest border.

DHS Response

Even though this report contains no recommendations, DHS provided a management response, which is included in its entirety in Appendix B.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or email us at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov.
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Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>U.S. Border Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>U.S. Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR</td>
<td>Notice of Findings and Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFO</td>
<td>Office of Field Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBNDS</td>
<td>ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBCC</td>
<td>Southwest Border Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEDS</td>
<td>CBP National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Background

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; securing the Nation against potential threats; and enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws. In previous years, hundreds of thousands of migrants attempted to enter the United States, legally and illegally, through the border with Mexico (Southwest border). The number of migrant encounters along the Southwest border dramatically increased between fiscal years 2018 and 2022, growing from more than 500,000 to more than 2.3 million.¹ See Figure 1 for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encounters at the Southwest border. During this same time, the Federal Government invested approximately $67 billion² in support of DHS’ mission at the Southwest border.

Figure 1. FYs 2018 – 2023 Year-to-Date CBP Encounters at the Southwest Border³

Source: Prepared by DHS Office of Inspector General using CBP encounter data from CBP website

¹ Encounters are tracked by the number of “apprehensions” and “inadmissibles.” Apprehensions refers to physical control or temporary detainment of a person not lawfully in the United States by U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), which may or may not result in an arrest. Inadmissibles refers to individuals who are encountered by Office of Field Operations (OFO) at ports of entry seeking lawful admission into the United States but are determined to be inadmissible; individuals presenting themselves to seek humanitarian protection under our laws; and individuals who withdraw an application for admission and return to their countries of origin within a short timeframe.


³ FY 2023 data is year to date as of June 7, 2023.
Within DHS, CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are the primary components responsible for enforcing immigration laws and securing U.S. borders. The Southwest border accounts for about one-third of the country’s approximately 6,000 miles of border. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) supports the border mission by interviewing migrants who claim asylum based on credible fear. Table 1 shows DHS component roles and responsibilities at the Southwest border.

Table 1. DHS Component Roles and Responsibilities at the Southwest Border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Subcomponent</th>
<th>Responsibilities at the Border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Border Patrol</td>
<td>Agents apprehend individuals illegally crossing the border between ports of entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFO</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Officers inspect and examine people and goods entering and leaving the country at ports of entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Enforcement and Removal Operations</td>
<td>Deportation officers manage long-term custody of noncitizens in detention facilities nationwide, and they deport individuals who are illegally in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>Agents investigate, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist, transnational, and other criminal organizations exploiting the customs and immigration laws of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations</td>
<td>Asylum officers conduct credible fear screenings of noncitizens referred to USCIS and make determinations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS OIG analysis of DHS component roles and responsibilities at the Southwest border

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 61 reports, which included 18 audits, 23 inspections and reviews, and 20 unannounced inspections related to the Southwest border, with 178 recommendations to DHS, CBP, and ICE. The 61 reports included in our review focus on specific Southwest border programs and operations and unannounced inspections of CBP and ICE detention facilities at the Southwest border. DHS OIG is congressionally mandated to conduct unannounced inspections of CBP and ICE detention facilities to evaluate compliance with

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4 Table 1 does not include all CBP, ICE, and USCIS subcomponents’ roles and responsibilities.
applicable detention standards. CBP’s holding facilities are required to comply with National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS), which specify how detainees should be treated in CBP custody. Each ICE detention facility must comply with one of several national detention standards, such as the Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS). The recommendations in the 61 reports aim to address deficiencies identified during our audits and inspections.

We conducted this review to summarize the results of our prior work on the Southwest border and identify related common issues.

**Results of Review**

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 61 reports and 178 recommendations for improving conditions at the Southwest border. As of August 17, 2023, 144 recommendations were closed, 31 recommendations were resolved and open, and 3 recommendations remained unresolved.\(^5\)

Based on our recommendation analysis, we identified 10 program management deficiency categories associated with the 178 recommendations, with the top five categories accounting for 143 (80 percent) of the recommendations as follows:

- Compliance with Requirements: 52 recommendations
- Program Guidance: 44 recommendations
- Strategic Planning: 20 recommendations
- Evaluation of Resources: 15 recommendations
- Collaboration: 12 recommendations

The results of our recommendation analysis may be indicative of similar program management deficiencies affecting other Southwest border programs and operations due to the number of times the recommendations were associated with the same program deficiency from our 61 prior reports.

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\(^5\) According to DHS OIG Directive Number OIG-PTS-2, July 1, 2010, titled *Determining a Recommendation’s Status*, a recommendation is considered Open when agreed-upon corrective action has not been implemented. Open recommendations may be unresolved or resolved. A recommendation is considered Unresolved and Open when a management decision has not been received by OIG, or, if received, OIG has determined that the action does not meet the recommendation requirements. A recommendation is considered Resolved and Open when a management decision has been received and OIG determines that the action meets the recommendation requirements. A recommendation is Closed if (1) a resolved management decision has been implemented; (2) the Resolution Official makes the decision not to implement the recommendation; or (3) OIG closes the recommendation at its own discretion.
Additionally, we interviewed DHS component officials to obtain their perspectives on current Southwest border operations. Officials described difficulties in staffing and resources, workloads, system capabilities and integration, and policies and procedures, which correspond to the categories we identified from our prior work.

DHS should learn from these common deficiencies identified in our analysis and from other insights in this summary report to better address conditions at the Southwest border.

Analysis of Prior Recommendations Highlights Program Management Deficiencies

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 61 reports related to the Southwest border, with 178 recommendations to DHS, CBP, and ICE. See Appendix C for the complete list of DHS OIG reports. As of August 17, 2023, 144 of the 178 recommendations are closed (81 percent), 31 recommendations are resolved and open (17 percent), and 3 recommendations are unresolved and open (2 percent).

We conducted an analysis of these 178 recommendations and determined they could be grouped into 10 program management deficiency categories. We ranked the categories based on the total number of recommendations assigned to each. The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Recommendations Grouped into 10 Program Management Deficiency Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Program Management Deficiency</th>
<th>No. of Recs</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Compliance with Requirements</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Program Guidance</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation of Resources</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Program Monitoring</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>System Interoperability</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maintenance of Records</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS OIG results of analysis from prior recommendations
Top Five Categories Account for 80 percent of Total Recommendations

Compliance with Requirements

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 19 reports containing 52 recommendations pertaining to this category. Compliance with requirements ensures that DHS and its components are consistently conducting program activities according to program objectives and within the governing laws, regulations, and standards to achieve the Department’s mission at the Southwest border.

Our recommendations were intended to ensure DHS and its components complied with Federal and DHS requirements. For example:

- In OIG 22-57, El Paso Sector Border Patrol Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Consistent Compliance with TEDS Standards, we reported CBP did not meet TEDS standards; specifically, we identified inconsistency with implementation of standards related to segregating juveniles from unrelated adults or legal guardians and the provision of interpretation services to detained individuals. We recommended CBP develop and implement quality assurance and quality control tools to ensure the provision of interpretation services, particularly during the medical screening process. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on July 24, 2023.

- In OIG 21-18, CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs (REDACTED), we reported that CBP approved waivers without ensuring that ICE denied requests to store drug amounts exceeding established thresholds or that requests included an Assistant Attorney General appeal as required in CBP’s Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook. We recommend CBP ensure that requests to store drug amounts exceeding established thresholds are automatically denied. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on July 1, 2021.

- In OIG 21-12, ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, we reported that administrative segregation was being used as a long-term solution for detainees in protective custody and overly restricted detainees by not offering privileges similar to those offered to detainees in general housing units. We recommended ICE direct the San Diego Enforcement and Removal Operations Office responsible for the facility to ensure that detainees in administrative segregation are provided outdoor recreation and access to privileges similar to those offered to detainees in the general population in compliance with 2011 PBNDS requirements. ICE’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on May 4, 2021.
• In OIG 21-12, *ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility*, we reported the living conditions at the facility not only violated ICE detention standards, but in some instances, could pose health and safety risks to detainees. We recommended ICE direct the San Diego Enforcement and Removal Operations Office responsible for the facility to review the facility’s conditions we identified as deficient to ensure corrective action in compliance with 2011 PBNDS requirements. ICE’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on May 4, 2021.

• In OIG 21-02, *CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry*, we reported that, without prior public notice, CBP stopped processing most undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers, at seven Class A ports of entry and redirected them to other port locations. We recommended CBP resume processing undocumented aliens at these ports of entry or formally redesignate the ports to exclude undocumented aliens. At report issuance, CBP did not concur with this recommendation. However, in August 2022, CBP provided an updated corrective action plan, which was accepted by DHS OIG. This recommendation was resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.8

CBP and ICE implemented corrective actions that enabled us to close 44 of the 52 recommendations. Additionally, seven recommendations were resolved and open, and one recommendation was unresolved and open as of August 17, 2023.9

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6 CBP refers to individuals who are not in possession of documents allowing them entry into the United States — e.g., a travel visa — as undocumented aliens.

7 These ports are classified as Class A ports under Title 8, Section 100.4 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Class A ports are designated for all aliens. CBP has authority to change a port’s classification. When changing a port’s classification in the past, CBP has published a final rule in the Federal Register.

8 CBP did not concur with the recommendation when the report was issued on October 27, 2020. However, CBP provided an update on August 9, 2022, indicating it was gathering and analyzing data to determine what action should be taken considering potential regulatory changes to Title 42. DHS OIG approved CBP’s action plan and changed the recommendation’s status to resolved and open on October 26, 2022. The target completion date for corrective action was May 31, 2023. Title 42 COVID-19 authority expired on May 11, 2023.

9 In addition to the unresolved recommendation discussed in footnote 8 above, ICE did not concur with the recommendation in OIG-22-31, Management Alert – Immediate Removal of All Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility, for ICE to remove all detainees from the facility until it ensured adequate staffing and appropriate living conditions. ICE responded that it complied with staffing level requirements and that it had made all necessary repairs. However, DHS OIG did not receive any documentation to support the statements made in ICE’s response. The status of this recommendation remains unresolved and open.
Program Guidance

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 24 reports containing 44 recommendations pertaining to this category. Program guidance ensures that DHS conducts its critical functions consistently and reliably in order to execute its Southwest border mission effectively and efficiently.

Our recommendations were intended to help DHS develop, revise, or update guidance, policies, and procedures. For example:

- In OIG 22-80, *Del Rio Area Struggled with Prolonged Detention, Consistent Compliance with CBP’s TEDS Standards, and Data Integrity*, we reported during an inspection of a CBP Border Patrol facility that we observed the use of a bar-coded wristband system to track the handling, retention, retrieval, and return of detainee personal property along with the use of supplemental procedures to clarify the handling and secure storage of personal property. We considered this to be a best practice and recommended CBP assess whether the Eagle Pass soft-sided facility’s supplemental guidance on the management of detainee property could be developed and implemented sector-wide, and to implement where operationally feasible. This recommendation was resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

- In OIG 22-71, *U.S. Border Patrol Screened Migrants at the Southwest Border but Could Strengthen Processes*, we reported that CBP did not issue a formal policy detailing how to expedite the processing of migrants as apprehension numbers continued to rise. We recommended CBP develop and implement a comprehensive policy to use different pathways for expedited processing during times of increased apprehension activity. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on February 17, 2023.

- In OIG 22-57, *El Paso Sector Border Patrol Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Consistent Compliance with TEDS Standards*, we reported that Border Patrol agents utilized the Ysleta OFO ports of entry for expelling migrants subject to immediate Title 42 authorities. Even though this practice created operational efficiencies, formal documentation or guidance could have defined roles and responsibilities, as well as aided in the coordination and documentation of migrants. We recommended CBP clarify and document existing procedures to formalize Border Patrol’s use of OFO facilities. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on February 21, 2023.

- In OIG 19-67, *Limitations of CBP OFO’s Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics*, we reported that CBP had not issued guidance on standard use of small-scale chemical screening devices to detect illicit narcotics. We recommended CBP develop a formal strategy to deploy and use small-scale chemical screening devices and
keep them updated. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on September 13, 2022.

- In OIG 18-76, Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers, we reported that CBP and ICE did not have specific guidance on reporting acts of resistance or attempted assaults on law enforcement officers. We issued two recommendations that CBP and ICE clarify guidance on the types of assaults that must be officially reported, as well as the steps in the reporting process. CBP and ICE’s actions were sufficient to close these recommendations on July 19, 2019, and September 4, 2018, respectively.

CBP and ICE implemented corrective actions that enabled us to close 37 of the 44 recommendations. The remaining seven recommendations were resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

**Strategic Planning**

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 13 reports containing 20 recommendations to strengthen strategic planning for Southwest border operations. Effective strategic planning positions DHS to better consider risks, resources, and alternative options for mission success.

Our recommendations were intended to help DHS develop strategies, plans, and objectives to achieve various goals and missions. For example:

- In OIG 22-68, U.S. Border Patrol Faces Challenges Administering Post-Apprehension Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors, we reported that CBP appeared unprepared to meet increased processing burdens when a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention order was terminated.10 A CBP official stated that there were no contingency plans for when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention order expired. We recommended CBP develop and implement contingency plans for increased apprehensions and processing. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on October 13, 2022.

- In OIG 19-67, Limitations of CBP OFO’s Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics, we reported that CBP did not have a policy for ensuring the chemical screening devices at U.S. ports of entry had the most up-to-date spectral database library and operating system. We recommended CBP develop and implement a plan for the

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10 On March 20, 2020, under Title 42 authority and in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued an order temporarily prohibiting the introduction of certain persons from foreign countries traveling from Canada or Mexico, regardless of their country of origin. On August 2, 2021, a subsequent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention order extended the prohibition of entry under Title 42. Title 42 COVID-19 authority expired on May 11, 2023.
long-term development of a centralized spectral database for the chemical screening devices. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on February 23, 2021.

- In OIG-18-77, Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE’s Expanding 287(g) Program,\(^\text{11}\) we reported that according to ICE field program managers, ICE’s 287(g) program reporting structure was confusing and made management and oversight of participating law enforcement agencies more difficult. We recommended ICE develop a reporting structure for the 287(g) program that clearly defined the reporting structure for field program managers. ICE’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on April 1, 2020.

CBP and ICE implemented corrective actions that enabled us to close 18 of the 20 recommendations. Additionally, one recommendation was resolved and open, and one recommendation was unresolved and open as of August 17, 2023.\(^\text{12}\)

**Evaluation of Resources**

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 14 reports containing 15 recommendations pertaining to this category. Evaluating its resources will ensure that DHS and its components make appropriate and necessary adjustments to achieve the Department’s mission at the Southwest border.

Our recommendations were intended to ensure DHS and its components evaluated resources, such as staffing, equipment, and facilities, as environments and priorities changed. For example:

- In OIG 21-02, CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry, we reported that two ports of entry had stopped using available detention space, even though undocumented aliens were waiting in queue management lines. We recommended CBP evaluate whether it could more efficiently use available holding spaces to process undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on October 26, 2022.

- In OIG 19-67, Limitations of CBP OFO’s Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics, we reported that CBP purchased small-scale chemical screenings

\(^{11}\) Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act authorizes ICE to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement entities, permitting designated officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions.

\(^{12}\) DHS did not concur with Recommendation 1 in OIG-20-52 and explained that the CBP Wall Acquisition Program appropriately conducted an Alternatives Analysis in accordance with DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and other related guidance. According to DHS, this program will be dispositioned. DHS will provide documentation to support this action when completed.
devices that could not identify fentanyl at purity levels of 10 percent or less. We recommended CBP conduct a comprehensive analysis on the ability of any chemical screening device to identify the presence of fentanyl and other narcotics at lower purity levels in field environments, perform reproducibility test runs, and obtain a third-party verification of the results. CBP’s actions were sufficient to close this recommendation on September 22, 2020.

- In OIG 19-23, Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents, we reported that neither CBP nor Border Patrol had completed or submitted a workforce staffing model, as required by Congress. We recommended DHS ensure CBP and Border Patrol expedite development and implementation of a workforce staffing model for Border Patrol to better inform staffing and resource deployment decisions. This recommendation was unresolved and open as of August 17, 2023, as CBP has revised the estimated completion date eight times during the last 4 years.13

CBP and ICE Implemented corrective actions that enabled us to close 11 of the 15 recommendations. Additionally, three recommendations were resolved and open, and one recommendation was unresolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

Collaboration

During FYs 2018 through 2022, we issued 8 reports containing 12 recommendations pertaining to this category. Collaboration allows DHS components and other government agencies to freely and transparently share information, ideas, and skills that support decisions and activities to achieve the Department’s mission at the Southwest border.

Our recommendations were intended to facilitate coordination and collaboration between DHS and its components as well as with external agencies. For example:

- In OIG 22-66, DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border, we reported that DHS and external agencies often relied on relationship-based communication and past practices. Not all agents and officers at the Southwest border locations were aware of existing memorandums of agreement, which require meetings and coordination between components and agencies. We issued two recommendations for CBP and ICE to evaluate adherence to current immigration policies and memorandums of agreement for internal and external collaboration and working groups and to update them as needed. Both recommendations were resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

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13 On May 6, 2022, CBP Border Patrol Submitted to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the Patrol Border Group sub-model of the CBP Border Patrol Staffing Model. Before it can be submitted to Congress, it has to be cleared by OMB. CBP is waiting for feedback from OMB.
• In OIG 20-06, *DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families*, we reported that before DHS implemented a Zero Tolerance policy, it did not establish a plan for how CBP, ICE, and the Department of Health and Human Services would successfully reunify separated family members. We recommended DHS coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services to outline roles and responsibilities and create and distribute standard operating procedures for migrant family reunification. This recommendation was resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

• In OIG 19-57, *A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations*, DHS OIG and the Department of Justice OIG reported cooperation failures that negatively affected investigations and operations. We issued five recommendations to improve cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations along the Southwest border. ICE’s actions, in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were sufficient to close all five recommendations between June 23, 2020, and January 17, 2023.

CBP and ICE implemented corrective actions that enabled us to close 9 of the 12 recommendations. The remaining three recommendations were resolved and open as of August 17, 2023.

**Remaining Five Categories Account for 20 Percent of Recommendations**

The remaining 20 percent of recommendations fall into the bottom five categories and have less than 10 recommendations associated with each program management deficiency, as shown in Table 2. Table 3 depicts these bottom five program deficiency categories and the related impact to DHS and its components.
Table 3. Remaining Five Program Management Deficiency Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Deficiency Category</th>
<th>DHS and Components’ Impacted Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Monitoring</td>
<td>Conduct program reviews to identify areas for improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Provide, improve, and increase frequency of trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Identify and address system errors to improve data collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Interoperability</td>
<td>Improve systems integration for systems to connect to each other and share information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of Records</td>
<td>Maintain complete and accurate documentation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DHS OIG analysis of recommendations from prior reports

A total of 35 recommendations were assigned to these five categories. As of August 17, 2023, 25 recommendations were closed and 10 were open and resolved.

In summary, our recommendation analysis may be indicative of similar program management deficiencies affecting other Southwest border programs and operations due to the number of times the recommendations were associated with the same program deficiency from our 61 prior reports. Although we do not make a recommendation in this report, DHS should continue to monitor the program deficiencies to ensure Southwest border programs and operations support successful mission execution.

Issues Affecting Current Southwest Border Operations

We met with Southwest border officials and personnel from CBP, ICE, and USCIS to obtain their perspectives on current Southwest border operations. As of February 2023, the components experienced four primary issues — staffing and resources, workloads, system capabilities and integration, and policies and procedures. Table 4 shows a summary of the issues each component faces.
Table 4. Current Southwest Border Issues by Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Staffing and Resources</th>
<th>Workloads</th>
<th>System Capabilities and Integration</th>
<th>Policies and Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIS</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- No data

Source: DHS OIG analysis based on interviews with CBP, ICE, and USCIS officials

Staffing and Resources

According to CBP, ICE, and USCIS officials, staffing continues to be an issue for current Southwest border operations. To combat this issue, components are using contractors and other partners and agencies, and they are reallocating resources from their primary missions to details along the Southwest border.

Components attributed staffing shortages to unfilled positions. One official stated his component “could not hire fast enough.” The number of Border Patrol encounters14 along the Southwest border dramatically increased during the 5-year period of our review, growing from almost 400,000 in FY 2018 to almost 1.7 million in FY 2021, and to more than 2.2 million in FY 2022. Based on year-to-date data as of June 7, 2023, encounters are on track to increase for a third consecutive year with significant migrant crossings. During this period of unprecedented growth, the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to the Southwest border remained consistent, as shown in Figure 2.

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14 Since March 2020, CBP has separately reported both apprehensions under Title 8 and expulsions under Title 42, referring to them jointly as encounters. DHS further clarified that actions taken under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Title 42 public health order, which ended on May 11, 2023, are considered encounters and expulsions. Title 8 actions are considered apprehensions under immigration authorities set forth in Title 8 of the United States Code.
Workloads

CBP, ICE, and USCIS officials identified workloads as an issue. Workloads are closely aligned with staffing and are influenced by migrant volume. According to USCIS officials, their workload challenges are primarily volume driven. They explained that the credible fear asylum screening caseload was unpredictable because they were unable to control the referrals. Further, these officials stated that USCIS does not have resources fully dedicated to conducting credible fear screenings; when USCIS receives a credible fear referral, it must draw resources from other primary missions.

System Capabilities and Integration

CBP and USCIS officials indicated that system capabilities and integration were an issue. According to a CBP official, the component’s technology was outdated and could not handle current needs. They also stated that technology in remote locations near the Southwest border did not have normal infrastructure available, such as internet access.

Further, USCIS officials stated that during detainees’ credible fear screenings, they experienced logistical challenges, such as lack of phones, software, computer access, and other technology

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15 Border Patrol encounters are recorded by FY, and staffing is based on CBP information for pay period 3 for each calendar year.
connectivity issues. Lack of phones posed a serious issue due to a majority of credible fear screenings being conducted over the phone.

According to USCIS officials, USCIS coordinates with CBP and ICE by using their systems to help obtain information for processing. All three components use different systems. Challenges exist when trying to access all parts of CBP and ICE’s systems. A USCIS official stated that the integration of these systems is mostly being done at ICE facilities near the Southwest border, but it would be beneficial if they expanded it to all ICE facilities to help process cases more efficiently.

Policies and Procedures

CBP officials stated that communicating current and revised policies and procedures to the field was an ongoing issue. CBP OFO created the Southwest Border Operation Cell to help communicate policies to OFO personnel in the field. An ICE official mentioned similar challenges, noting that lawful pathways, alternatives to detention, and pandemic response requirements are guidance that was frequently changed.

DHS established the Southwest Border Coordination Center (SBCC) in February 2022 to coordinate planning, operations, engagement, and interagency support for the Southwest border. According to CBP and ICE officials we interviewed, SBCC has no authority to direct change, and it depends on component management to implement changes. An ICE official questioned SBCC’s effectiveness, partly due to this perceived lack of authority. The ICE official further stated that adding SBCC to the existing Southwest border structure may have created confusion about partners’ roles and responsibilities.

In summary, DHS officials we interviewed cited current issues at the Southwest border that are similar to common deficiencies featured in our analysis of recommendations. We consider all four of the primary issues DHS component officials identified as high-risk due to their potential consequences, such as:

- negative effects on other DHS mission areas resulting from moving resources to the Southwest border;
- additional burdens on staff and increases in workloads resulting from inadequate technology solutions, reliance on obsolete systems, and use of systems that do not adequately support the mission needs; and
- inefficiencies and ineffectiveness due to program deficiencies that impact staffing, workloads, and DHS’ ability to meet its primary missions.
Conclusion

Our analysis of DHS OIG reports issued during FYs 2018 through 2022 related to the Southwest border identified 10 program management deficiencies, with the top five categories accounting for 80 percent of the recommendations. This may be indicative of similar program management deficiencies affecting other Southwest border programs and operations due to the number of times the recommendations were associated with the same program deficiency. Additionally, DHS officials we interviewed cited current issues at the Southwest border that are similar to the issues featured in our analysis of recommendations. Although we do not make a recommendation in this report, DHS should learn from these common deficiencies identified from our prior work and from other insights in this summary report to better address conditions at the Southwest border.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

DHS provided management comments on a draft of this report. We included the comments in their entirety in Appendix B. We also received technical comments from DHS on the draft report, and we revised the report as appropriate. A summary of the DHS response and our analysis follows.

DHS Response: DHS expressed concerns that the report does not fully recognize the extent of initiatives DHS has recently implemented to address common deficiencies in Southwest border program management. For example:

- DHS claimed SBCC created more efficient processes, particularly regarding balancing where resources are located versus where they are needed. Based on SBCC’s results, agency leadership recommended integrating SBCC functions and coordinating processes into a more permanent effort.

- DHS stated it has taken measures since May 2021 to address and prevent the prolonged detention of individuals at the Southwest border through:
  - integration of digital processing;
  - use of electronic A-files;
  - coordination with partner agencies and governments; and
  - leveraging virtual processing to improve processing operations and reduce time in custody.

- DHS stated CBP bases staffing level requests on internal models. Like all Government agencies, CBP and ICE request staffing through the Federal budget process, and staffing levels are based on funding for positions through appropriations and/or user fees.
- DHS stated USCIS added four language interpreter services contracts on May 1, 2023, and another contract on July 8, 2023, for a total of five language interpreter services contracts to further support credible fear screenings related to the Southwest border workload.

Finally, DHS noted differences between the draft report and information discussed during the Notice of Findings and Recommendations (NFR) meeting held on July 18, 2023. DHS found the information discussed to be more useful than a traditional capping report of previously published work. It also noted that the number of reports and recommendations increased substantially from the NFR meeting to the draft report and indicated that DHS OIG did not communicate this change before delivering the draft report. DHS encouraged frequent and open communication between program officials and audit and inspection teams, including discussions on revisions in findings and messaging.

**OIG Analysis:** In our November 2022 entrance conference, we explained that our scope included a review of prior DHS OIG reports relevant to the Southwest border issued from FYs 2018 through 2022. Further, we explained that our objective was to summarize those prior reports and recommendations on DHS’ Southwest border operations and programs and identify similar issues and trends. As such, we believe the recommendation analysis identifies useful information that may aid DHS’ efforts to ensure efficient and effective operations at the Southwest border. The report provides information regarding issues and trends categorized by 10 common program management deficiencies across DHS’ programs. This includes complying with requirements, sufficient guidance, planning, and evaluating results and resource efficiencies. If these elements are not operating as intended, DHS programs will not achieve optimal results.

We acknowledge that the contents of the September 2023 draft report differed from information discussed at the July 2023 NFR meeting. We explained during the NFR meeting that the results presented were preliminary and subject to change before the issuance of the report. Subsequent to the NFR meeting, we decided to include unannounced inspection reports issued by our Office of Inspections and Evaluations. We re-examined the recommendations associated with the unannounced inspections and concluded that they appropriately aligned with the categories used in the recommendation analysis and should therefore be included.

In its response, DHS stated it had implemented numerous recent initiatives to address the findings and recommendations included in the original reports. We cannot verify DHS’ assertions because these efforts were not included in the original scope of work summarized. However, we acknowledge in the report all recommendations that have been closed.

We share DHS’ desire for frequent and open communication between program officials and audit and inspection teams. We received DHS’ technical comments on October 27, 2023 and held an exit conference on November 1, 2023. The discussion in the exit conference focused on the
technical comments. Although DHS did note the differences between the information discussed in the NFR meeting and the draft report, it did not share any of the initiatives it highlighted in its management response.
Appendix A: 
Objective, Scope, and Methodology


The objective of this review was to summarize our prior work on the Southwest border and identify related common issues. Our scope was DHS OIG reports issued during FYs 2018 through 2022 that were related to the Southwest border.

To answer our objective, we manually reviewed all DHS OIG reports issued during this period to identify those related to the Southwest border. We selected audits, reviews, and inspections based on an initial review of report titles and highlights pages to identify an association with Southwest or southern border. We reviewed the reports’ objectives and scopes to determine whether the reports were related to Southwest border operations or programs. We further reviewed the Objective, Scope, and Methodology section of each report to confirm if site visits included locations at the Southwest border. We identified 61 reports, which included 18 audits, 23 inspections and reviews, and 20 unannounced inspections related to the Southwest border, with 178 recommendations to DHS, CBP, and ICE.

We gathered recommendation data for each report we reviewed from the Project Tracking System — the DHS OIG system of record for all projects and reports. We included recommendations resolved and open, unresolved and open, and implemented and closed. We did not include recommendations administratively closed and closed-not implemented because they would not have had any impact on the conditions at the Southwest border. These recommendations were not implemented due to a variety of reasons, such as being overcome by events. For example, the relevant executive order was rescinded, the pertinent contract was terminated, or the applicable program was eliminated.

We organized recommendations into categories by manually reviewing each recommendation to identify the underlying program deficiency that the recommendation aimed to correct. We identified 10 program deficiency categories and ranked the categories based on the number of recommendations assigned to each category.

We conducted interviews to discuss current challenges along the Southwest border with officials and personnel from:

- ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations and Homeland Security Investigations;
• USCIS — Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate and Office of Policy and Strategy; and
• DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans to understand the challenges DHS faces along the Southwest border.

We also interviewed officials and personnel from SBCC to gain an understanding of SBCC and its role and responsibilities along the Southwest border.

We reviewed Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service reports related to the Southwest border. To assess the reliability of Project Tracking System–generated data, we traced a sample of recommendations in the reports we reviewed back to the relevant report language to determine if information was entered into the system correctly.

We conducted this review between November 2022 and August 2023 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401-424, and according to Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

**DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information**

During this review, DHS provided timely responses to our requests for information and did not delay or deny access to information we requested.
December 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

FROM: Jim H. Crumpancker, CIA, CFE
Director
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office

SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: “Summary of Previously Issued Recommendations and Other Insights to Improve Operational Conditions at the Southwest Border” (Project No. 23-006-AUD-CBP, ICE, USCIS)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) appreciates the work of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.

DHS leadership is pleased to note the OIG’s recognition that the Department has closed 80 percent (143 of 178) of Southwest Border (SWB)-related recommendations issued by the OIG in 61 reports from fiscal years (FY) 2018 through 2022, as of August 17, 2023. Leadership, however, is concerned that this draft report includes stale information and does not fully recognize the extent of initiatives DHS has implemented to address what the OIG characterizes as “common deficiencies” in SWB program management. Current and complete information is needed to provide “cold readers” of the report a clearer understanding of the present state of DHS operations at the SWB.

For example, DHS has developed a more unified and robust approach to respond to migrant surges, starting with the formation of the Southwest Border Coordination Center (SBCC) in February 2022. The SBCC, which was staffed and managed by several DHS Components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel, was established to coordinate the whole of DHS resources along the SWB. Accordingly, the SBCC created more efficient processes, particularly with regard to balancing where resources are located versus where they are needed and moving those resources to address gaps and reduce pressure on local staffing. In recognition that this coordination must continue long beyond a singular incident, event, or planning effort, the
SBCC and agency leadership recommended taking the lessons learned by the SBCC and integrating its functions and coordinating processes into a more permanent effort, the Southwest Border Executive Council. Going forward, DHS will continue to support cross-Component working groups with field and headquarters representatives, consistent with DHS’s overall border strategy and future DHS migration resource and response plans, which build on the lessons learned from the SBCC and provides resources and proven approaches, including the cross-Component working group structure described above, to ensure a whole-of-government response to managing the SWB. DHS remains committed to maintaining employee morale and resiliency, as well as the safety and well-being of our workforce and those individuals in our custody.

DHS has also taken numerous steps to address issues previously identified by CBP, ICE, and USCIS personnel as challenges in the SWB environment that the OIG considers to be “high risk” due to their potential consequences. For example, with regard to system capabilities and integration, as well as collaboration, DHS has taken measures since May 2021 to address and prevent the prolonged detention of individuals at the SWB who are in its custody, through:

(1) integration of digital processing;
(2) use of electronic A-files;
(3) coordination with partner agencies and governments, such as through the DHS Movement Coordination Cell; and
(4) leveraging virtual processing to improve processing operations and reduce time in custody.

Using electronic A-files significantly decreases processing and in-custody times for individual noncitizens and family units by reducing the number of paper A-files and forms. Specifically, using electronic A-numbers and A-files speeds the transfer of information and coordination within DHS and its Components, while increasing case acceptance and processing of asylum, credible fear, and immigration court cases. Use of electronic A-files also allows DHS employees with a need to know to retrieve entire case files on demand while eliminating hours of delays waiting for hard copy case files to be delivered via traditional mail and courier services. This results in quicker completion and adjudication of a higher volume of cases while providing relief to strained budgets, and therefore provides a time savings to the Department. Accordingly, this enhances efficiencies in numerous processes from apprehension to final adjudication.

Further, the Department has bolstered coordination with partner agencies through the creation and implementation of multi-Component initiatives such as Enhanced Expedited Removal, which allows CBP, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations and USCIS to perform all agency functions and responsibilities while the noncitizen is still in custody. This streamlines required DHS processes from several weeks to a matter of days and results in a greater number of individuals whose cases are adjudicated in shorter timeframes.
Previously, United States Border Patrol (USBP) sectors utilized Virtual Processing on a limited basis to assist with processing during sporadic surges in irregular migration. Since FY 2021, however, CBP components have employed virtual processing, nationwide, as a force multiplier that augments live processing along the SWB. For instance, CBP law enforcement personnel, along with DHS Volunteer Force and contractor personnel, are able to process casework remotely for in-custody family units and single adults. This manner of virtual processing increases case throughput, while decreasing time in custody. Further, Virtual Processing has enabled CBP to simultaneously process additional non-citizens on top of the casework prepared and completed by USBP Agents and CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) Officers at stations and ports of entry (POE) along the SWB.

With regard to staffing, resources, and workload, CBP uses internal models on which staffing level requests are based. Specifically, USBP’s staffing model is comprised of four separate sub-models, while CBP OFO currently uses a model as a first step in determining workload level at each of its POEs, to include sudden or unplanned needs, as appropriate. Like all government agencies, CBP and ICE request staffing through the federal budget process, and staffing levels are based on funding for positions through appropriations and/or user fees.

Specifically, USBP’s staffing model is comprised of four workforce sub-models that delineate personnel requirements for USBP. In developing the four sub-models, USBP incorporated statistically sound methodologies to ensure that the results were demonstrable and repeatable. As USBP regions can vary greatly due to the operational environment, types of threats, and levels of available resources, the USBP model accounts for the operational realities and uniqueness of the different USBP regions. USBP also continuously reviews the model to ensure that all significant variables that affect staffing requirements are considered, to include ever-changing threat levels and investments in other mission capabilities that augment personnel requirements. Currently, the USBP’s staffing model considers 37 key essential mission functions that are performed by USBP personnel.

Similarly, CBP OFO’s workload staffing model (WSM) serves as a decision support tool for OFO leadership and is the initial data-driven step in the process of quantifying workload at the POEs. OFO executive leadership uses the model results, along with other factors such as emerging threats and newly opening facilities, to determine the allocation of staffing across our ports of entry. This model is completely reviewed and updated each year with data from the previous FY. The activities covered in the model (currently approximately 100) are reviewed and evaluated each year to:

1. remove any activities that are no longer performed;
2. update processes to reflect current operating conditions; and
3. add new activities in response to changing conditions and emerging threats.
Further, the WSM is independently assessed, and the model routinely audited and reviewed by outside stakeholders such as DHS and the Office of Management and Budget. Accordingly, it is updated each year to reflect the changing activities and emerging threats in all environments, to include air, sea, and land. Throughout the year, CBP OFO uses the WSM to inform other modeling efforts that estimate the impact to throughput and enforcement of various scenarios to determine the best way to respond to sudden and unplanned needs. Currently, the WSM models approximately 100 activities that cover the entirety of a CBP OFO Officer’s duties from pre-primary, primary, and secondary, to seize processing.

In addition, USCIS added four language interpreter services contracts on May 1, 2023, and one interpreter services contract on July 8, 2023, for a total of five language interpreter services contracts to further support credible fear screenings related to the SWB workload. USCIS also continues to divert staff from other primary missions and to diligently hire and onboard staff to support credible fear screenings and other related humanitarian workloads. As part of this effort, USCIS prioritizes the expeditious screening of noncitizens for protection claims at the SWB, as these individuals are subject to immigration detention.

Lastly, DHS notes that the OIG’s draft report departs in several respects from the Notice of Findings and Recommendations (NFR), dated July 14, 2023, and discussed with Component and Headquarters officials on July 18, 2023. Specifically, the NFR:

- Anchored OIG’s analysis and identification of “common deficiencies” in SWB program management to U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government” (i.e., the “Green Book”) (GAO-14-704G, dated September 10, 2014), which DHS program officials, subject matter experts, and others thought was an appropriate source of authoritative criteria for the analysis. This included:
  (1) An Appendix B summarizing and associating the applicable 17 GAO internal control principles (Principles) with each program deficiency category OIG identified, and
  (2) Extensive narrative throughout the NFR discussing the Principles and how they related to each of the deficiencies OIG identified.

However, the draft report does not mention of the Green Book work accomplished in the report’s “Objective, Scope, and Methodology” appendix, nor any explanation of the apparent professional judgment used to conduct OIG’s revised analysis. DHS believes the Principles-based analysis would have been more

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1[https://www.gao.gov/greenbook](https://www.gao.gov/greenbook)
valuable compared to a traditional capping report of previously published work received.

- Discussed 45 reports with 130 recommendations related to the SWB and issued from FY 2018 through FY 2022; however, the draft report provided for DHS’ formal management response included 61 reports and 178 recommendations; an increase of 36 and 37 percent in reports and recommendations reviewed, respectively. DHS realizes that the NFR represented the preliminary results of OIG’s work and was subject to further review and revision, but nevertheless notes that this significant scope change appeared in the draft report without any communication from the OIG. DHS officials might have chosen to allocate resources to review and engage with the NFR differently had they known the NFR was not fully representative of draft report on which they would later be asked to comment.

DHS encourages frequent and open communication between program officials and audit and inspection teams, including about shifts in findings and messaging, in accordance with the spirit and intent of Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency “Blue Book” guidance. We hope that moving forward our two organizations can work more closely together in this regard.

The draft report did not contain any recommendations. DHS previously submitted technical comments addressing several accuracy, contextual and other issues under a separate cover for OIG’s consideration.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

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Appendix C:
List of Reports Included in This Review

We compiled and analyzed the recommendations from the following DHS OIG reports, which identified challenges at the Southwest border during the past 5 FYs.

Audits


**Inspections and Reviews**


**Unannounced Inspections**


Appendix D:
Report Distribution

**Department of Homeland Security**

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Chief, CBP – U.S. Border Patrol
Executive Assistant Commissioner, CBP – Office of Field Operations
Acting Executive Associate Director, ICE – Homeland Security Investigations
Acting Executive Associate Director, ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations
Associate Director, USCIS – Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate
CBP Audit Liaison
ICE Audit Liaison
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**Office of Management and Budget**

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

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