Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit

March 23, 2016
OIG-16-50
March 23, 2016

Why We Did This Audit

Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

What We Recommend

We recommend that TSA, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to its financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

What We Found

We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2015. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general IT controls and business process application controls at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). KPMG, LLP determined that TSA made improvements over consistently implementing certain technical account security controls and audit log reviews.

However, KPMG continued to identify general IT control deficiencies (GITCs) related to access controls for TSA’s core financial and feeder systems. New control deficiencies reflected weaknesses over controls for systems that were new to the scope of testing GITCs for the FY 2015 audit. The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited TSA’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Stephen Rice  
Chief Information Officer  
Transportation Security Administration  

Pat Rose, Jr.  
Chief Financial Officer  
Transportation Security Administration  

FROM: Sondra McCauley  
Assistant Inspector General  
Office of Information Technology Audits  

SUBJECT: Information Technology Management Letter for the  
Transportation Security Administration Component of  
the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security  
Financial Statement Audit

Attached for your information is our final report, Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit. This report contains comments and recommendations related to information technology internal control deficiencies. The observations did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 13, 2015, which was included in the FY 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

The independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP conducted the audit of DHS’ FY 2015 financial statements and is responsible for the attached information technology management letter and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express opinions on DHS’ financial statements or internal control, nor do we provide conclusions on compliance with laws and regulations. We will post the final report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sharon Huiswoud, Director, Information Systems and Acquisitions Audit Division, at (202) 254-5451.

Attachment

www.oig.dhs.gov
December 20, 2015

Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and
Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer,
Transportation Security Administration,
Washington, DC

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In planning and performing our audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department), as of and for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”), in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements, we considered internal control over financial reporting (internal control) as a basis for designing our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the financial statements. In conjunction with our audit of the consolidated financial statements, we also performed an audit of internal control over financial reporting in accordance with attestation standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

During our audit we noted certain matters involving internal control and other operational matters at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a component of DHS that are presented for your consideration. These comments and recommendations, all of which have been discussed with the appropriate members of management, are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

With respect to financial systems at TSA, we noted certain internal control deficiencies in the general IT control area of access controls. These matters are described in the Findings and Recommendations section of this letter.

Additionally, at the request of the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), we performed additional non-technical information security procedures to identify instances where TSA personnel did not adequately comply with requirements for safeguarding sensitive material or assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. These matters are described in the Observations Related to Non-Technical Information Security section of this letter.

We have provided a description of key TSA financial systems and IT infrastructure within the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit in Appendix A, and a listing of each TSA
IT Notice of Finding and Recommendation communicated to management during our audit in Appendix B.

During our audit we noted certain matters involving financial reporting internal controls (comments not related to IT) and other operational matters at TSA, and communicated them in writing to management and those charged with governance in our Independent Auditors’ Report and in a separate letter to the OIG and the TSA Chief Financial Officer.

Our audit procedures are designed primarily to enable us to form opinions on the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements and on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and therefore may not bring to light all deficiencies in policies or procedures that may exist. We aim, however, to use our knowledge of TSA’s organization gained during our work to make comments and suggestions that we hope will be useful to you.

We would be pleased to discuss these comments and recommendations with you at any time.

The purpose of this letter is solely to describe comments and recommendations intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies. Accordingly, this letter is not suitable for any other purpose.

Very truly yours,

KPMG LLP
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OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH

Objective

We audited the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”). In connection with our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we performed an evaluation of selected general information technology (IT) controls (GITCs) and IT application controls at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a component of DHS, to assist in planning and performing our audit engagement. At the request of the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), we also performed additional information security testing procedures to assess certain non-technical areas related to the protection of sensitive IT and financial information and assets.

Scope and Approach

General Information Technology Controls

The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), formed the basis of our GITC evaluation procedures.

FISCAM was designed to inform financial statement auditors about IT controls and related audit concerns to assist them in planning their audit work and to integrate the work of auditors with other aspects of the financial statement audit. FISCAM also provides guidance to auditors when considering the scope and extent of review that generally should be performed when evaluating GITCs and the IT environment of a Federal agency. FISCAM defines the following five control categories to be essential to the effective operation of GITCs and the IT environment:

1. Security Management – Controls that provide a framework and continuing cycle of activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of computer-related security controls.

2. Access Control – Controls that limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities) and protect against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure.

3. Configuration Management – Controls that help prevent unauthorized changes to information system resources (software programs and hardware configurations) and provide reasonable assurance that systems are configured and operating securely and as intended.

4. Segregation of Duties – Controls that constitute policies, procedures, and an organizational structure to manage who can control key aspects of computer-related operations.

5. Contingency Planning – Controls that involve procedures for continuing critical operations without interruption, or with prompt resumption, when unexpected events occur.

While each of these five FISCAM categories were considered during the planning and risk assessment phase of our audit, we selected GITCs for evaluation based on their relationship to the ongoing
effectiveness of process-level automated controls or manual controls with one or more automated components. This includes those controls that depend on the completeness, accuracy, and integrity of information provided by the entity in support of our financial audit procedures. Consequently, FY 2015 GITC procedures at TSA did not necessarily represent controls from each FISCAM category.

Business Process Application Controls

Where relevant GITCs were determined to be operating effectively, we performed testing over selected IT application controls (process-level controls that were either fully automated or manual with an automated component) on financial systems and applications to assess the financial systems’ internal controls over the input, processing, and output of financial data and transactions.

FISCAM defines Business Process Application Controls as the automated and/or manual controls applied to business transaction flows and related to the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality of transactions and data during application processing. They typically cover the structure, policies, and procedures that operate at a detailed business process (cycle or transaction) level and operate over individual transactions or activities across business processes.

Financial System Functionality

In recent years, we have noted that limitations in TSA’s financial systems’ functionality may be inhibiting the agency’s ability to implement and maintain internal controls, including effective GITCs and IT application controls supporting financial data processing and reporting. Many key financial and feeder systems have not been substantially updated since being inherited from legacy agencies several years ago. Therefore, in FY 2015, we continued to evaluate and consider the impact of financial system functionality on internal control over financial reporting.

Non-Technical Information Security Testing

To complement our IT controls test work, we conducted limited after-hours physical security testing and social engineering at selected TSA facilities to identify potential weaknesses in non-technical aspects of IT security. This includes those related to TSA personnel awareness of policies, procedures, and other requirements governing the protection of sensitive IT and financial information and assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. This testing was performed in accordance with the FY 2015 DHS Security Testing Authorization Letter (STAL) signed by KPMG, DHS OIG, and DHS management.

Appendix A provides a description of the key TSA financial systems and IT infrastructure within the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

During FY 2015, we noted that TSA took corrective action to address certain prior year IT control deficiencies. For example, TSA made improvements over consistently implementing certain technical account security controls and audit log reviews. However, we continued to identify GITC deficiencies related to access controls for TSA core financial and feeder systems. New control deficiencies reflected weaknesses over controls for systems that were new to the scope of testing GITCs for the FY 2015 audit.

The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited TSA’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Of the three IT Notices of Findings and Recommendations (NFRs) issued during our FY 2015 testing at TSA, two were repeat findings, either partially or in whole from the prior year, and one was a new finding. The three IT NFRs issued represent deficiencies and observations related to two of the five FISCAM GITC categories.

The majority of findings resulted from the lack of consistently implemented financial system controls to comply with the requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Information Technology Security Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance, and TSA policies and procedures, as applicable.

During our IT audit procedures, we also evaluated and considered the impact of financial system functionality on financial reporting. In recent years, we have noted that limitations in TSA’s financial systems’ functionality may be inhibiting TSA’s ability to implement and maintain effective internal control and to effectively and efficiently process and report financial data. Many key TSA financial systems were not compliant with Federal financial management system requirements as defined by the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) and Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A-123 Appendix D, Compliance with FFMIA.

While the recommendations made by us should be considered by TSA, it is the ultimate responsibility of TSA management to determine the most appropriate method(s) for addressing the deficiencies identified.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

During our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we identified the following GITC deficiencies at TSA:

Access Controls

- User accounts on a database were not consistently or timely locked for users who no longer required that access.

Recommendations

We recommend that the TSA Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) and Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), in coordination with the DHS OCIO and the DHS OCFO, make the following improvements to TSA’s financial management systems and associated IT security program (in accordance with TSA and DHS requirements, as applicable):

Access Controls

- Recertify users for appropriateness on a quarterly basis and centralize user account maintenance to one office.
OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO NON-TECHNICAL INFORMATION SECURITY

To complement our IT controls test work during the FY 2015 audit, we performed additional non-technical information security procedures at TSA. These procedures included after-hours physical security walkthroughs and social engineering to identify instances where TSA personnel did not adequately comply with requirements for safeguarding sensitive material or assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. These procedures were performed in accordance with the FY 2015 STAL, signed by DHS OIG management, KPMG management, and DHS management on May 20, 2015, and transmitted to the DHS CIO Council on May 27, 2015.

Social Engineering

Social engineering is defined as the act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging sensitive information. The term typically applies to trickery or deception for the purpose of gathering information or obtaining computer system access. The objective of our social engineering tests was to identify the extent to which TSA personnel were willing to divulge network or system passwords that, if exploited, could compromise TSA sensitive information.

To conduct this testing, we made phone calls from various TSA locations at various times throughout the audit. Posing as TSA technical support personnel, we attempted to solicit access credentials from TSA users. Attempts to log into TSA systems were not performed; however, we assumed that disclosed passwords that met the minimum password standards established by DHS policy were valid exceptions. During social engineering performed at TSA, we attempted to call a total of 45 employees and contractors and reached 9. Of those 9 individuals with whom we spoke, three divulged passwords in violation of DHS policy.

The selection of attempted or connected calls was not statistically derived, and, therefore, the results described herein should not be used to extrapolate to TSA as a whole.

After-Hours Physical Security Walkthroughs

Multiple DHS policies, including the DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, the DHS Privacy Office Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally-Identifiable Information (PII), and DHS Management Directive (MD) 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) (FOUO) Information, mandate the physical safeguarding of certain materials and assets that, if compromised either due to external or insider threat, could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, or exploitation of sensitive IT or financial information.

We performed procedures to determine whether TSA personnel consistently exercised responsibilities related to safeguarding sensitive materials as defined in these policies. Specifically, we performed escorted walkthroughs of workspaces – including cubicles, offices, shared workspaces, and/or common areas (e.g., areas where printers were hosted) – at TSA facilities that processed, maintained, and/or had access to financial data during FY 2015. We inspected workspaces to identify instances where materials
designated by DHS policy as requiring physical security from unauthorized access were left unattended. Exceptions noted were validated by designated representatives from TSA, DHS OIG, and DHS OCIO.

During after-hours physical security walkthroughs performed at TSA, we inspected a total of 56 workspaces. Of those, 24 were observed to have material – including, but not limited to, system passwords, information marked “FOUO” or other sensitive information (per MD 11042.1), documents containing sensitive PII, and government-issued laptops or mobile devices left unattended and unsecured after business hours in violation of DHS policy.

The selection of inspected areas was not statistically derived, and, therefore, the results described here should not be used to extrapolate to TSA as a whole.
Appendix A

Description of Key TSA Financial Systems and IT Infrastructure within the Scope of the FY 2015 DHS Financial Statement Audit
Below is a description of the significant TSA financial management systems and supporting IT infrastructure included in the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit.

Core Accounting System (CAS)

CAS is a web-based major application and the official accounting system of record for TSA. It is used to record all income and expenses and create income statements, balance sheets, and other financial reports to show financial condition. Accounting and financial management functions supported by CAS include accounts payable, accounts receivable, general and expense ledgers, and asset (including capital asset) management. It contains interfaces with internal TSA feeder systems and external service providers, including the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service. It is hosted by the Coast Guard at Operations Systems Center (OSC) Detachment Chesapeake, in Chesapeake, VA.

The CAS application is an Oracle Federal Financials product with an Oracle database with Microsoft Windows-based and HP-UX and Red Hat UNIX-based servers.

CAS is hosted and supported by the Coast Guard Office of the Director of Financial Operations/Comptroller and the Coast Guard OCIO on behalf of TSA (under the terms established through an interagency agreement between the two Components). It is exclusively for internal use by the TSA user community and, on a limited basis, Coast Guard personnel performing support services for TSA.

Finance Procurement Desktop (FPD)

FPD is a web-based major application that supports TSA funds management processes by creating and managing simplified procurement documents and maintaining accurate accounting records agency-wide. Functions performed by FPD include budgeting and funds distribution, procurement requests and simplified acquisitions, receipt of goods/services (accruals), and program element status reporting. It is integrated with CAS and contains interfaces with other internal TSA feeder systems, including the Contract Management Information System, and external service providers such as the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service.

The FPD application is supported by an Oracle database with Microsoft Windows-based and HP-UX and Red Hat UNIX-based servers.

FPD is hosted and supported by the Coast Guard Office of the Director of Financial Operations/Comptroller and the Coast Guard OCIO on behalf of TSA (under the terms established through an interagency agreement between the two Components). It is exclusively for internal use by the TSA financial management and acquisitions user community and, on a limited basis, Coast Guard personnel performing support services for TSA. It is hosted by the Coast Guard at Operations Systems Center (OSC) Detachment Chesapeake, in Chesapeake, VA.
Sunflower Assets

Sunflower is a web-based application used by TSA for property management. It is comprised of modules including the management of inventory assets, excess assets, agreement assets, and inactive assets, and is integrated with FPD and the fixed assets module within CAS to create assets from purchase orders or receipts.

The Sunflower application is supported by an Oracle database with Microsoft Windows-based and HP-UX and Red Hat UNIX-based servers.

Sunflower is hosted and supported by the Coast Guard Office of the Director of Financial Operations/Comptroller and the Coast Guard OCIO on behalf of TSA (under the terms established through an interagency agreement between the two Components). It is exclusively for internal use by the TSA financial management and property management user community. It is hosted by the Coast Guard at Operations Systems Center (OSC) Detachment Chesapeake, in Chesapeake, VA.

MarkView

MarkView is a web-based application used by TSA to manage invoice imaging and workflow activities and interfaces with the accounts payable module within CAS.

The Markview application is supported by an Oracle database with Microsoft Windows-based and HP-UX and Red Hat UNIX-based servers.

MarkView is hosted and supported by the Coast Guard Office of the Director of Financial Operations/Comptroller and the Coast Guard OCIO on behalf of TSA (under the terms established through an interagency agreement between the two Components). It is exclusively for internal use by the TSA financial management and procurement user community and Coast Guard Finance Center support personnel. It is hosted by the US Coast Guard at Operations Systems Center (OSC) Detachment Chesapeake, in Chesapeake, VA.

Web Time and Attendance (WebTA)

WebTA is a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) web-based major application hosted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Finance Center (NFC) and developed, operated, and maintained by the NFC IT Services Division and NFC Risk Management Staff. DHS components utilize NFC and WebTA to process the front-end input and certification of time and attendance entries by the DHS user community to facilitate payroll processing.

EmpowHR

EmpowHR is a COTS web-based major application hosted by the NFC and developed, operated, and maintained by the NFC IT services division and NFC Risk Management Staff. DHS components utilize NFC and EmpowHR to initiate, authorize, and send personnel data to NFC for processing.
Appendix B

FY 2015 IT Notices of Findings and Recommendations at TSA
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Appendix E
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Under Secretary for Management
Chief Privacy Officer

Transportation Security Administration

Administrator
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Information Officer
Audit Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
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Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305