April 12, 2016

Why We Did This Review

We conducted this review of the Secret Service as part of an overall review of the Secret Service’s presidential protective function to determine whether in three incidents the Secret Service followed its own protective policies, what actions were taken to correct identified deficiencies, and whether these corrections are adequate.

What We Recommend

We are making 14 recommendations to improve Secret Service operations.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

What We Found

On September 19, 2014, an intruder jumped over the North Fence of the White House Complex and entered the White House before Secret Service personnel could apprehend him. A confluence of technical problems with radios, security equipment, and notification systems, as well as problems associated with the White House’s infrastructure and surrounding physical environment, impeded the protective response.

Although they may have only indirectly contributed to the events of that night, underlying and continuing resource and management issues are negatively affecting the Uniformed Division and, potentially, its ability to protect the White House and its occupants. In particular, the Uniformed Division is severely understaffed, which has led to inadequate training, fatigue, low morale, and attrition. In addition, there is a lack of full and open communication and information sharing between management and Uniformed Division Officers.

The Secret Service has attempted to resolve technical issues, as well as some problems with Uniformed Division staffing and training. In most cases, it is too early to tell whether these actions will lead to more effective protective operations and whether the Secret Service can continue to fund and sustain the corrections and improvements. Overcoming more deeply rooted challenges will require diligence and the full commitment of Secret Service leadership.

Secret Service Response

The Secret Service concurred with our recommendations and is taking steps to address them.
April 12, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Joseph P. Clancy
Director
United States Secret Service

FROM: John Roth
Inspector General

SUBJECT: 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident

Attached for your action is our final report, 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident. We incorporated the Secret Service’s formal comments.

The report contains 14 recommendations aimed at improving Secret Service operations. Your office concurred with all 14 recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider all 14 recommendations open and resolved. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your corrective action plan and target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the recommendations will be considered open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please send your response or closure request to OIGInspectionsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version of the report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Evaluations, at (202) 254-4100.

Attachment
Background

At 7:19 p.m. on September 19, 2014, Omar Gonzalez jumped over the North Fence of the White House Complex (WHC) and in less than 30 seconds reached the White House North Portico doors and entered the interior of the mansion. Gonzalez bypassed several layers of security before the Secret Service apprehended him. No other fence jumper has ever made it so far through Secret Service’s defenses. A detailed account of the incident is included in appendix C. Before the incident, Gonzalez was arrested by state and local law enforcement and came to the attention of Federal law enforcement, including the Secret Service, but was not deemed to pose a threat to the President or the White House. Appendix D contains a timeline of pre-incident interactions with Gonzalez.

Prior to our review, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Deputy Secretary and the Secret Service’s Protective Mission Panel (PMP) conducted two separate reviews of the September 19, 2014 incident and related issues. On November 1, 2014, the Deputy Secretary issued a Report on the White House Incursion Incident of September 19, 2014, which describes in detail what happened that evening and includes findings about the Secret Service’s failure to stop Gonzalez from entering the White House. The PMP, established by the DHS Secretary to undertake a broad, independent review of the Secret Service’s WHC protection, completed its review on December 15, 2014. The PMP made 19 recommendations in an unclassified report. We conducted our review to assess whether other root causes contributed to the incident. We identified the same root causes as the PMP, but in our report we detail other issues that played a part in the deficient response. This fiscal year (FY), we are also initiating a new review to assess the Secret Service’s compliance with the PMP’s recommendations.

Secret Service White House Protection

The Secret Service has an integrated mission to protect current and former Presidents and visiting foreign dignitaries and to safeguard the Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems. As part of its mission, the Secret Service protects the WHC, defined as the White House grounds within the fence line, the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the Treasury building and Annex, 1724 F street, Winder Building, and the New Executive Office Building.

1A number of the PMP’s recommendations contained classified material and are not included in the report.
The Secret Service Office of Protective Operations (OPO) is mainly responsible for protecting the WHC, the President, the First Family, the Vice President, the Second Family, and all former Presidents, Vice Presidents (for a limited term), and their spouses. OPO also protects qualified presidential and vice presidential candidates, visiting foreign leaders, and other designated protectees. OPO is responsible for security at the Naval Observatory and approximately 500 foreign missions. The Assistant Director of OPO manages the following three entities with primary responsibility for protecting the WHC and its occupants.

**Presidential Protective Division**

Presidential Protective Division Special Agents provide the President’s and First Family’s personal protection. The division’s Special Agent in Charge is ultimately responsible for the security of the WHC and its occupants.

**Uniformed Division**

The Uniformed Division (UD) performs day-to-day security operations at the WHC. UD Officers from the White House Branch carry out their protective responsibilities through a network of fixed security posts, foot, bicycle, vehicular and motorcycle patrols. The UD also includes the Naval Observatory Branch, Foreign Missions Branch, and the Special Operations Branch.

**Special Operations Division**

The Special Operations Division provides specialized operational and tactical support for the Secret Service’s protective missions. The division manages and coordinates the activities of Secret Service Special Agents and specialized UD personnel, such as Emergency Response Team (ERT) Officer Technicians, ERT Canine Unit Officer Technicians, Counter Assault Team, and Counter Sniper Unit, which provide tactical response to unlawful intrusions and other protective challenges to the White House and its grounds.

Two other Secret Service divisions also have roles in protecting the WHC and its occupants.

- The Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division, part of the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information, guides and coordinates protective intelligence investigations when the Secret Service is alerted to individuals expressing interest in protectees or protective sites. The division analyzes, evaluates, disseminates, and maintains incoming
information about individuals, groups, and activities, both foreign and domestic, which pose a potential threat to protectees or the White House.

- The Technical Security Division, part of the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support, plans, designs, implements, and maintains technical security equipment for Secret Service-specific applications. The Information Resources Management Division manages the component’s communications and information management systems. These two divisions evaluate equipment and other related measures that support the Secret Service’s protective responsibilities.

**WHC Communications and Notification Infrastructure**

In emergency situations, such as fence jumping incidents or other security breaches, the Secret Service relies on the following infrastructure to coordinate a response:

**Joint Operations Center**

The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is located at [redacted]. During an emergency or incident at the WHC, JOC staff monitor alarms and surveillance cameras, coordinate all radio traffic at the WHC, and screen radio frequencies. JOC staff also coordinate WHC operations, answer all incoming phone calls for the Secret Service, guide all UD personnel movements at the WHC, and perform other functions as required. When advised of an emergency, the JOC’s Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge and the UD Lieutenant make appropriate notifications. The JOC notifies and coordinates all operational entities in or around the WHC.

**White House Branch Radio System**

The Secret Service primarily uses radio communication to alert all personnel about a major incident at the WHC. UD Officers are required to carry and monitor their radios at all times. Although the White House Branch of the UD (UDW) predominantly uses the [redacted] radio frequency, the JOC monitors more than [redacted] other frequencies.
White House Branch

In the event of an incursion or other urgent circumstances, the [REDACTED] is intended to communicate critical or emergency information to all fixed posts in the WHC simultaneously.
Source: Secret Service procedures

WHC Alarms and Cameras

What went wrong on the night of September 19, 2014?

On September 19, 2014, an intruder jumped over the North Fence Line surrounding the WHC and entered the White House before Secret Service personnel could apprehend him. A combination of technical problems with radios, JOC equipment, and notification systems, as well as problems related to the infrastructure and physical environment around the White House, impeded the protective response. Specifically:
A key ERT post did not have audio capability.

The intruder was able to scale the 7-foot-6-inch fence at a point that was under construction, bushes blocked Officers’ visibility, and the North Portico doors were open and unlocked.

**Radios**

Because of problems with radio transmissions, many UDW Officers and ERT members in key posts were unaware of the unfolding security incident and did not respond in a timely manner. These technical problems may have been exacerbated by inadequate training and inexperience using radios. In addition, the Secret Service’s radios and radio infrastructure are outdated. Many of these problems, which directly or indirectly affected the protective response, are ongoing.

A majority of the UDW Officers and ERT members at the WHC could not communicate with each other.

According to ERT members we interviewed, this lack of communication forced them to react belatedly, based on their observations of responses by other Secret Service personnel.
According to UDW Officers.

That night, there was [redacted] on [redacted], which included both procedural transmissions and those related to the incident. For example, after Gonzalez landed on the White House grounds, UDW Officers immediately began clearing pedestrians from the North Fence Line. Officers explained that

According to UDW Officers.

New UDW Officers’ receive little radio training and have limited experience using radios. A number of UDW Officers and officials voiced concerns about the limited opportunities for hands-on radio training and practice provided to new UDW Officers. Of the 592 hours of training for new Officers, 5 hours, or less than 1 percent of the training time, are dedicated to radio communications. According to UDW Officers and supervisors we interviewed, inexperience and low confidence in using radios is evident in the new classes of Officers who struggle to provide appropriate and complete information over the radio.

The Secret Service’s radios and radio infrastructure are outdated.
As a result of a recent performance audit of the Secret Service's radio systems, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that the Secret Service needs to upgrade the radio systems used around the WHC, the Vice President's residence, and foreign diplomatic embassies because the radios and [REDACTED] may not be working as effectively as needed. We also concluded that continued use of the outdated systems could negatively affect protective operations.²

**JOC Monitor Displays**

Just prior to Gonzalez jumping the fence, the President had departed by helicopter from the South Grounds of the White House, [REDACTED] Gonzalez was being escorted from the White House.

**Notification Systems**

[REDACTED] at the White House cost valuable seconds in reaction time, preventing a timely response to the incident.

**System**

In September 2013, the Secret Service installed new [REDACTED] throughout the WHC, including the West Wing, without the ability to sound an audible alarm. According to the Secret Service, by removing the audible alarm, it sought to minimize panic and disruption in the White House.

When Gonzalez jumped over the fence, UDW Officers at a post west of the North Fence Line followed standard protocols and activated the [REDACTED] activation.

² OIG-16-20, *U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems*
Numerous Officers we spoke with were unaware and surprised the [redacted] alarms in the White House were not audible. UD personnel called the silencing of the alarms “shocking,” “negligent,” and “a mistake.” The decision to silence the audible alarm in the White House was made in response to requests from UD and Presidential Protective Division personnel during stakeholder meetings in November 2012. It is unclear how or whether this decision was communicated to staff, especially those working posts with silenced [redacted] alarms. Further, a September 2013 email sent to all UDW Sergeants reminded them that “[the] [redacted] located inside the mansion were designed so that they will not announce a [redacted] inside the mansion. No trouble ticket should be created for that reason.” Many UDW Officers and supervisors we spoke with were unaware the [redacted] inside the White House were muted.

The JOC [redacted] alarm also failed to alert staff to the incident because they could not hear it over the noise in the JOC. According to JOC employees, during an incident, noise levels and activity in the JOC spike. The [redacted] in the JOC announces at a relatively low volume, similar to a phone tone, and blends with the loud background noise.

Alarms

An alarm panel at a key ERT post east of the North Portico also did not alarm audibly. As a result, ERT Officer Technicians did not respond to the incident until they heard a yell coming from the North Fence Line. This late response gave Gonzalez a crucial head start in crossing the White House North Grounds. Because ERT Officer Technicians at this post [redacted]

Further, ERT Canine Unit Officer Technicians were operating out of vehicles [redacted] so the Canine Unit Officer Technician had to rely on radio broadcast for alarm breaks. That night, the alarm breaks were not broadcast by radio, causing a delay in releasing the canine.

System

More than a third of the personnel we interviewed indicated delays and other problems with [redacted] notifications that evening. Certain posts did not have access to the [redacted] Non-fixed posts, such as foot beats and bike patrols, and several other posts around the WHC either do not have
Without the [redacted] these posts must rely on radio broadcasts of [redacted] elevation, but many Officers, Officer Technicians, and officials reported not hearing audible [redacted] over the radio until the incident was over.

**WHC Infrastructure and Physical Environment**

Structural challenges contributed to Gonzalez’s ability to bypass Secret Service personnel and enter the White House. Gonzalez had unfettered access to the North Fence Line and easily climbed over a portion of the fence that was under construction. Additionally, bushes and other foliage on the White House North Grounds limited Secret Service personnel’s ability to see Gonzalez as he climbed over the White House fence and ran toward the fountain on the North Lawn. Finally, the UDW Officer posted directly inside the White House could not lock the doors before Gonzalez forced his way inside.

*North Fence Line*

The height of the North Fence is 7 feet 6 inches. According to Secret Service personnel, the fence’s low height and the adjacent cement ledge allowed Gonzalez to climb over the fence with minimal delay. He also accessed a portion of the fence that was undergoing construction and missing an iron finial. Two foot beat UDW Officers posted on Pennsylvania Avenue did not have enough time to respond and prevent Gonzalez from climbing over the fence, even though one Officer attempted to reach him.

UDW Officers and ERT Officer Technicians, including the Canine Unit Officer Technician, who were directly involved, said their response was delayed by poor visibility of the North Grounds because of the height of the bushes and other foliage. Without reliable radio transmissions and unable to see Gonzalez clearly, UD and ERT personnel relied on cues from fellow Officers outside the North Fence Line and each other. The UDW Officer posted on the North Portico outside the White House also had limited visibility because of bushes, sports utility vehicles parked directly in front of the North Portico, and flower pots and pillars outside the White House. In addition, ERT Officer Technicians did not anticipate Gonzalez would run through the bushes in front of the North Portico to escape them and access the North Portico.
North Portico Doors

The North Portico doors to the White House consist of [redacted]. The UDW Officer posted directly inside the White House was responsible for locking them in case of emergency. On the night of the incident, Secret Service personnel anticipated the Officer posted just inside the White House would close and lock the doors as Gonzalez approached the North Portico. However, the Officer did not receive initial radio communications of the incident or notification and rushed to close and lock the doors only after observing an Officer outside the mansion with a gun drawn.

Has the Secret Service addressed these technical and physical environment problems?

The Secret Service has tried to fix the technical and structural problems that contributed directly to the delayed response that night, as well as those that may have had an indirect effect. Some fixes were implemented immediately; others are planned and depend on future funding. In particular, the Secret Service plans to invest in upgrades of its aging radio systems. It has also requested funding for a “technology refresh” of the JOC equipment. Finally, the Secret Service has requested funding for fence and perimeter enhancements.

Radios

The Secret Service’s [redacted] are widely acknowledged among Secret Service leadership and the staff we interviewed. A Secret Service official explained that the communications budget for the component is very complex, consisting of numerous functional areas, such as radios, voice, wireless, communications security, and video, funded through various sources, including legacy programs, modernization initiatives, campaign funds, and expansion funding. According to Secret Service records, some planned improvements and expansion efforts for communications infrastructure have been limited because of Secret Service and DHS funding decisions. For example:

- Before FY 2006, the Information Resources Management Division (IRMD) received $4.8 million annually for “radio life cycle support.” Beginning in FY 2007, the Secret Service reduced IRMD’s annual base funding for equipment to about $500,000, which according to IRMD, was not enough
to support life cycle costs. In subsequent years, IRMD requested reinstatement of funding for life cycle support and attempted to fund radios through other programs, but without success.

- The Secret Service’s request for a “technology refresh” program, Integrated Command & Control Systems, to replace technology and modernize its systems, including radios, was included in the FY 2013 President’s Budget. Congress appropriated $12.1 million for the program. However, of the $12.1 million appropriated, because of sequestration and the Secret Service’s reprogramming of some funds, only $6.7 million was available for Integrated Command & Control Systems. IRMD’s FY 2014 request for the program was not forwarded to DHS as part of Secret Service funding request.

From FYs 2013 through 2015, Congress appropriated more overall funding to the Secret Service than it had requested. However, because the Secret Service prioritizes funding to support operational activities, such as unexpected events or trips, it often shifts funds to these activities to the detriment of technology. As a result, instead of an urgently needed overhauling of the technical staff can only fix isolated problems.

IRMD plans to invest about $45 million over the next 2 to 3 fiscal years to upgrade its contingent on funding becoming available. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provides about $43.7 million (available until September 30, 2018) for Secret Service investment in the Information Integration and Technology Transformation program.

In response to the PMP report, IRMD requested almost $9.5 million to upgrade, sustain, and “refresh” video equipment, video conferencing, network
equipment, servers, and other specialized systems in the JOC. Overall, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provides about $84.5 million for enhancements associated with the PMP’s findings. Given the large increase in funding and the complexity of these enhancements, we will assess the Secret Service’s use of the funds and whether IRMD is being given sufficient funds in our planned review of the Secret Service’s compliance with the PMP’s recommendations.

Notification Systems

Shortly after the incident, the Secret Service took steps to fix technical problems with the notification systems. In October 2014, Secret Service UD and Technical Security Division personnel assessed throughout the WHC and in December 2014, upgraded White House mansion posts. Also in October 2014, the Secret Service requested

At the time of our review, the Secret Service was

Infrastructure and Physical Environment

Immediately following the incident, the Secret Service also took action to fix problems associated with infrastructure and the physical environment. A bike rack was added on the sidewalk adjacent to the North Fence Line to impede fence jumpers, and The National Park Service (NPS) put up a and according to Secret Service personnel, the bushes were trimmed shortly after the incident.

The PMP recommended the Secret Service replace the current fence around the entire perimeter of the WHC “as quickly as possible.” In FY 2016, the Secret Service requested $8.2 million for construction of a new fence and other enhancements around the White House perimeter to who might try to climb the fence and give Secret Service personnel more time to respond; the Secret Service received the requested $8.2 million to replace the fence. The Director of the Secret Service anticipates it will take less than 2 years to plan and build a new fence. In July 2015, as an interim solution, the Secret Service and NPS began installing steel pencil points adjacent to the fence’s iron finials to impede fence jumpers.
Were these fixes adequate?

In most cases, the initial plans for technology and infrastructure improvements and the additional funding should address security challenges exposed by the incident and lead to more effective protective operations. However, some enhancements to the physical environment and technical fixes applied soon after the incident may not have fully resolved these issues and continue to raise concerns.

During a June 2015 site visit to the WHC, we identified potential ongoing issues. We observed that although the Secret Service had added

A tour of the North Grounds during the same visit revealed that visibility from on and around the North Portico remains limited.

According to a Secret Service official, NPS trimmed the bushes before and shortly after September 19, 2014, but officials could not provide evidence of any ongoing arrangements with NPS to trim the bushes.

We recommend that the Director of the Secret Service:

Recommendation 1: Develop a schedule to regularly test radio functionality around the White House Complex. Ensure some testing simulates an emergency environment.

Recommendation 2: Enhance radio training and hands-on instructional scenarios during Uniformed Division Officers’ basic training to ensure Officers graduate with a working knowledge of radio operations and communication.
Recommendation 3: Establish protocols for the Joint Operations Center to monitor cameras on the North and South Grounds of the White House Complex.

Recommendation 4: Prioritize funding and provide a timeline for implementing the Information Resources Management Division’s Joint Operations Center technology refresh request.

Recommendation 5: Conduct annual assessments of the White House Complex and the Joint Operations Center to evaluate the functionality of the radio infrastructure system, alarms, cameras, and notification systems. The assessments should include analysis of the Joint Operations Center’s log entries for technical issues, as well as input from the Office of Protective Operations, Presidential Protective Division, and the Uniformed Division, and should result in action plans and a timeline to resolve outstanding issues. The Technical Security Division should present assessment results and action plans to Secret Service management, including the Chief Financial Officer and the Chief Information Officer.

Recommendation 6: Continue to work with White House stakeholders to prioritize planned initiatives to replace the existing fence and enhance associated infrastructure. Also, determine the optimal height for the bushes in front of the North Portico to provide the visibility of the North Fence Line and coordinate with the National Park Service to establish a schedule for trimming the bushes.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

The Secret Service concurred with all 14 of our recommendations and is taking steps to address them. Appendix B contains a copy of the Secret Service’s management comments in their entirety. We also received and incorporated technical comments as appropriate. Based on the Secret Service’s response to our draft report, we consider all recommendations resolved and open.

The following section contains summaries of the Secret Service’s written responses to the first six report recommendations and our analysis of the responses.

Management Response to Recommendation 1: The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, the JOC conducts daily operational radio checks with select users to test radio functionality. In addition, the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
conducts radio coverage checks around the WHC and at other locations as needed. The CIO is establishing a regular schedule of coverage testing with other stakeholders. The Secret Service anticipates establishing the schedule by May 1, 2016.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s planned actions are responsive to recommendation 1. We consider the recommendation resolved, but open. We will close this recommendation when we receive and have reviewed the CIO’s regular schedule of coverage testing.

**Management Response to Recommendation 2:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, it has enhanced radio training of UD recruits with live exercises during which recruits interact with a dispatcher; a trained JOC officer/Control Center officer assists with dispatching during training. The Secret Service has also purchased new radios to replace the outdated training radios and is calibrating the equipment for use in its training environment. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain open pending our receipt of the enhanced training curriculum with a detailed description of new radio training initiatives, as well as the time allotted for the enhanced training.

**Management Response to Recommendation 3:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, JOC personnel can view multiple cameras simultaneously at the WHC. JOC internal operating procedures have been revised to reflect enhanced situational awareness requirements and are available to all JOC personnel. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of the revised JOC internal operating procedures.

**Management Response to Recommendation 4:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. At the request of the Secret Service’s CIO, the U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is conducting an engineering study of the JOC, which is scheduled to conclude at the end of March 2016. According to the Secret Service, the NAVAIR study will provide options for refreshing the technology in the JOC and will be the focus of future budget requests. In addition, the Secret Service has invested significant financial resources in the JOC and is committed to investments in future years. The
Secret Service’s planned upgrades to the JOC are expected to be completed by September 30, 2017.

**OIG Analysis:** We consider these actions responsive to the intent of recommendation. This recommendation is resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of the NAVAIR study, as well as documentation of spending for JOC operations during FYS 2015 and 2016.

**Management Response to Recommendation 5:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, it has enhanced its regular evaluations of security and communications systems supporting protective operations at the WHC. The NAVAIR study will factor into the annual assessment for FY 2016. In addition to annual Program Management Reviews for individual programs, Secret Service personnel regularly and routinely evaluate the security and communications systems surrounding the WHC. In August 2015 and December 2015, the Secret Service began regular testing of its alert systems and alarm zones. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s ongoing and planned actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved, but open, pending our receipt of the NAVAIR study and the latest annual Program Management Reviews for all programs related to the security and communications systems surrounding the WHC.

**Management Response to Recommendation 6:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. In its response, the Secret Service said it continues to pursue a permanent solution for a new White House perimeter fence with the appropriate stakeholders, such as NPS, National Capital Planning Commission, and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts. The Secret Service does not have exclusive authority to make determinations about the fence or landscaping, but regularly communicates with NPS, which helps better coordinate security issues connected to NPS’ area of responsibility, including WHC landscaping. Given the ongoing collaboration between the Secret Service and these stakeholders, the Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. In its corrective action plan and subsequent updates, the Secret Service should inform OIG about its progress in replacing the existing fence and provide appropriate documentation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open pending our receipt of an established schedule or a similar written
agreement for trimming the bushes in front of the North Portico, according to determined optimal height.

**Did any other problems contribute to the inadequate response?**

Although they may have only indirectly contributed to the Secret Service’s inadequate response to the fence jumper, our work highlighted underlying and continuing resource and management issues that negatively affect the UD and could potentially hinder the division’s ability to protect the White House and its occupants. In particular, the UD is severely understaffed, which has led to inadequate training, fatigue, low morale, and attrition. In addition, inconsistent guidance leads to confusion about proper security protocols and a lack of full and open communication and information sharing negatively affects the Secret Service’s mission and workforce.

**The UD Is Severely Understaffed**

On the night of the fence jumping incident, the White House Branch (UDW) had covered every security post under its purview, but because of severe understaffing, the Secret Service achieved full security coverage by having UD Officers work overtime, canceling days off and leave, and virtually eliminating in-service training. This shortage of staff also resulted in scheduling decisions that put UDW Officers without appropriate training in key posts at the White House. Although the Secret Service has taken steps to address some issues, UD staffing shortages and its negative consequences continue to the present.

On September 19, 2014, the UDW was authorized [redacted] employees, but had a deficit of 96 Officers. As of September 30, 2015, the UDW had [redacted] Officers, which is still 72 Officers short of the authorized number. Secret Service officials explained, however, that employing [redacted] UD Officers would not eliminate overtime or canceled days off and would not cover in-service training. In fact, UD officials said that to provide regular days off and not cancel leave, the UDW would need at least [redacted] Officers, 183 more than were available the night of the incident and 159 more than employed as of September 30, 2015. Moreover, according to a UD staffing analysis, to stop relying on excessive overtime and re-introduce spending a minimum of 10 percent of the time in training, the UDW needs [redacted] Officers. Finally, UD Officers regularly travel to support the Secret Service’s mission; to cover this travel and 10 percent of time in training, without depending on working overtime and canceled days off, the UDW would need 52 more Officers or [redacted] Officers in total.
Table 1 shows actual, authorized, and needed UDW and overall UD staffing levels.

Table 1. UD Personnel in 2014 and as of September 30, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Actual UD Personnel (including recruits not yet operational)</th>
<th>Authorized UD Personnel</th>
<th>UD Personnel Needed for Training, Travel Support, and without Reliance on Overtime</th>
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<td>UDW on September 19, 2014</td>
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<td>UD, 2014</td>
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<td>UDW, as of September 30, 2015</td>
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<td>UD, as of September 30, 2015</td>
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Source: Secret Service data

According to the *United States Secret Service Strategic Plan for FYs 2014–2018*, 25 percent of its total workforce will be eligible to retire by FY 2016. Also, according to the strategic plan, maintaining appropriate staffing levels, recruiting the best candidates, training and equipping staff, and retaining valued employees by ensuring appropriate work-life balance are crucial to mission success. During our review, we interviewed more than 40 Secret Service employees, and 95 percent of them had serious concerns with UD staffing shortages; the majority of our interviewees also expressed concerns, which we share, about UD workforce training, retention, and work-life balance.

*The UD Depends on Overtime and Canceled Time-off to Ensure Posts Are Filled*

To staff WHC posts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the UD operates permanent shifts and [redacted] To fill these posts, the Secret Service relies on UD Officers working overtime and cancels days off and leave. Of the more than 40 UDW Officers, Special Agents, and other employees we interviewed, at least 20 UDW Officers and ERT Officer Technicians had a direct role in attempting to prevent Gonzalez’s security breach. Half of those 20 reported working overtime that day.
The UDW Officers and Officer Technicians working overtime on the night of the incident did not report feeling overly fatigued or distracted, but during our field work, UDW Officers and supervisors explained that working excessive overtime and having their days off routinely canceled have a long-term negative impact on Officers’ alertness and preparedness. UDW Officers reported working 12 to 60 hours of overtime in a pay period. They explained that working 12-hour shifts for 4 or 5 consecutive days was not sustainable and took a mental and a physical toll. According to Officers, this is especially true when one or both days off are canceled and the Officer must report to work at the end of an already excessive work week.

UDW Officers gave the following examples of unsustainable schedules and the resulting stress:

- In 2014, a UDW Officer was instructed in the middle of his White House day shift to finish the shift and depart that afternoon for the night shift at the United Nations General Assembly. The Officer finished his shift, packed, and caught a train to New York City. Thus, the Officer worked 20 hours — from 10:30 a.m. the first day until 6:00 a.m. next day. The Officer recalled being stressed and grateful that nothing happened that night because he was “tired and not in good condition to make fast and sound protective decisions.”

- An Officer explained that a 12-hour shift can be physically and mentally taxing. For example, by the time an Officer arrives home from a shift, it is after midnight; the Officer has to leave the house at 8:30 a.m. to start a shift the next day. The Officer said “imagine doing that 3 or 4 days in a row and then a day off canceled at the end of this stretch and the operational readiness and the morale take a hit.”

- An Officer worked a shift, but actually left at around 11:30 p.m., which is common. The Officer had to be back at work the next morning at 6:00 a.m. The Officer explained that although the
Secret Service must give Officers 8 hours off between shifts, the count starts when the shift ends, not when an Officer actually leaves the WHC.

As shown in table 2, in FYs 2013 through 2015, the Secret Service increased the use of overtime and assigned work during a substantial number of days off.

**Table 2. UDW Officer Overtime and Cancelled Days off Worked, FYs 2013–2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workload Averages (UDW Officers)</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overtime per FTE (hours)</td>
<td>362.5</td>
<td>514.7</td>
<td>597.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime per FTE (hours in a pay period)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Off Worked*</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Days Off Worked*</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Secret Service data

*Not all days off worked are the result of working a shift on a day that was supposed to be a day off; a portion of overtime hours resulting from working 12-hour shifts in a pay period can also be counted as working a day off.

In interviews, UDW Officers, Supervisors, and Agents attributed Officers’ fatigue and lack of work-life balance, as well as low morale and attrition, to excessive “forced” overtime.

**Understaffing Is Leading to Attrition**

For 2 of the past 3 fiscal years, although the Secret Service has hired more Officers, the UD has suffered a net loss of personnel. Numerous Secret Service employees said that due to exceedingly strenuous work hours, along with the resultant fatigue, stress, and low morale, the UD is “hemorrhaging” personnel. In FY 2013, the UD had 28 new hires, but lost 95 people for a net loss of 67 staff members. In FY 2014, 117 Officers were hired and 107 left the UD for a net gain of 10. According to the Secret Service, 152 UD Officers were hired in FY 2015, but as of the end of the fiscal year, 169 Officers had left the UD.3 Merely hiring new personnel will not fully resolve this problem; the Secret Service must also work on retaining UD Officers. Table 3 shows UD personnel losses from FYs 2013 through 2015.

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3 Although the Secret Service prioritized hiring UD personnel in FY 2015, hiring is a complex and lengthy process. OIG is currently reviewing DHS’ law enforcement hiring practices to assess whether the Secret Service, among other DHS components, is effective and efficient in filling law enforcement vacancies.
Table 3. UD Personnel Losses, FYs 2013–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer to other Secret Service Positions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer to Other Government Agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Year Totals</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secret Service data

The Secret Service Uses Special Agent Detailees to Alleviate UD Staffing Deficits

In May 2014, to alleviate staffing deficits, the Secret Service began detailing Special Agents from the field to augment UDW staff posted at the WHC. Except for 1 month in 2014, this practice continued at least through June 2015. The number of Special Agents working at the WHC on 2-week rotations has varied from [ ] to as many as [ ] per day (following the September 2014 incident). In May 2015, the Secret Service increased the number of Special Agents assigned to the WHC per day to [ ]

At the time of our review, the Secret Service was uncertain of the total cost of travel, lodging, per diem, and other miscellaneous expenses for the Special Agent augmentation because the Secret Service did not track associated costs under specific codes. Without tracking costs for such practices, the Secret Service cannot evaluate whether such temporary solutions are cost effective. Further, using potentially cost inefficient solutions may be contributing to the Secret Service’s need to reprogram funds from critical technology issues, such as radio communications, to fund protective operations.

Staffing Shortages Led to Lack of Mission In-Service Training for UD Officers

In FYs 2013 and 2014, the UD’s staffing shortages and unpredictable assignments that demanded additional protective engagement resulted in the virtual elimination of mission in-service training. As a Secret Service official noted, “the Officers were gridlocked with work,” and there were not enough Officers to cover posts and attend training. During these 2 fiscal years, less

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4 From September 6 through October 6, 2014, the Secret Service discontinued this practice because it needed to provide security for the 69th United Nations General Assembly.
5 Appendix E describes the courses offered during mission in-service training, which include courses on active shooters, deceptive behavior, and characteristics of an armed gunman.

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than 5 percent of UDW staff, with the exception of specialty units, received mission in-service training. In extreme cases, according to officials, some UD Officers had not received in-service training in as many as 8 years.

Since the fence jumper incident, the UD has made efforts to prioritize training. As a result, by the end of FY 2015, 369 of (or about percent) UDW Officers had received mission in-service training. However, the Secret Service still has difficulty training UD Officers without canceling leave and forcing staff to work overtime.

Table 4 shows the number and percentage of UDW Officers who received 3-day mission in-service training in FYs 2013 through 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission In-Service Training</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of UDW Officers who received 3-day mission in-service training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of UDW Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of UDW Officers who received training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secret Service data

Insufficient post-academy training for UD personnel is not new. A UD official explained that scheduling any training or even allowing Officers to complete has been very difficult for years because the UD “had to use any available body” to cover shifts at the WHC. Appropriate and ongoing training is essential for law enforcement personnel. For Secret Service members specifically, a constant, rigorous, and innovative training regimen is a must because there is no room for error in their protective mission. Lack of training results in stale and degraded operational skills and could lead to incorrect or inadequate responses during emergencies.

The Secret Service Has Taken Steps to Enhance Training

According to Secret Service personnel, it was “unthinkable” that a fence jumper could make it as far as Gonzalez did, which led to a void in training for scenarios in which an intruder would bypass ERT and UDW Officers and enter the White House. Also, before the incident, the Secret Service never trained UDW Officers, ERT personnel, and Special Agents together. This lack of joint training for UDW Officers and their ERT counterparts on fence jumper

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6 Specialty units include the
scenarios resulted in confusion and delays and contributed to the overall failure to prevent Gonzalez’s incursion.

Before the incident, UD Officers were trained on handling fence jumpers only during their initial training. According to Officers working on the North Grounds that evening, they followed instructions from this training. UDW Officers and ERT Officer Technicians we interviewed confirmed that before the incident they had Gonzalez evaded the ERT, and it became the UDW Officers’ task to stop him, but the Officers’ actions and reactions revealed a degree of confusion and lack of trained responses. One Officer hesitated to block the North Portico door, and another Officer could not immediately subdue Gonzalez.

ERT Officer Technicians which delayed their pursuit of Gonzalez. Before the incident, so ERT Officer Technicians were

Since the incident, the Secret Service has addressed two training weaknesses:

- The Secret Service implemented familiarization tours of the White House ground floor and state floor for [redacted] personnel. As of July 2015 [redacted] of the members completed this tour.

On the night of the incident, because of staffing shortages that prevented it, at least three of the Officers guarding posts inside the White House had not received [redacted] training and were not on the [redacted] Trained list. Since the incident, the Secret Service has ensured that UDW Officers assigned to White House posts receive further [redacted] training on all internal operating procedures and emergency actions. Only permanent or trained alternate UDW Officers may work those posts inside the White House.
The [redacted] training and White House 
are significant improvements, but the Secret Service 
brought personnel in on their days off to take this training. Given the current 
personnel deficit within the UD, we question whether the training initiatives 
implemented as a result of this incident are sustainable. Also, the Secret 
Service

Figure 2.
Source: Secret Service

According to Secret Service officials, ERT members, and UDW Officers, a more 
realistic training area would be beneficial. The PMP report recommended that 
the Secret Service train in conditions that replicate the physical environment in 
which they will operate. In his March 17, 2015 congressional testimony, the 
Director reported that $8 million of the Secret Service’s FY 2016 budget request 
would go toward building a better mockup of the White House for training. The 
FY 2016 enacted budget did not provide the full amount of requested funds for 
this project, but did approve $750,000 for a feasibility study and design plan 
for the proposed White House training facility. In our opinion, given the PMP 
recommendation and information provided by both Secret Service leadership 
and rank and file members, training in a realistic setting is imperative. 
However, the Secret Service needs to complete a comprehensive study to 
identify the best and most cost effective option to provide this training before 
taking action to build a facility or otherwise commit resources to a pre-selected 
solution.
Scheduling Decisions Lead to Junior Officers and New Supervisors Working the Same Shifts

On the night of the incident, because of scheduling decisions, many junior UDW Officers and recently promoted supervisors were working together on the same shift. UDW Officers working at the WHC that night had an “average time on assignment” of less than 3 years. Six out of the 12 UDW Officers we interviewed, who covered key posts along Gonzalez’s path or inside the White House, had worked at the WHC 1 year or less. In addition, the Watch Commander responsible for the WHC on that shift and a Lieutenant in charge of the north side of the WHC had only 3 months’ experience each in their assignments.

This occurred because of an internal UDW operating procedure, the Annual Pick of Assignments, in which Officers receive their choice of shifts and days off based on seniority. As a result of this well-intentioned procedure, less desirable shifts, such as those on afternoons or weekends, are assigned to UDW Officers with the least seniority. Recently promoted supervisors also “lose” their seniority in new assignments and are generally left to pick from less desirable shifts. During our field work, a UD official said the UDW was reviewing current shift assignments to avoid having too many inexperienced employees working together.

Guidance and Communication

In addition to staffing constraints and the accompanying problems, UDW Officers may have difficulty carrying out their protective duties because the guidance is not always reliable and consistent, and there are gaps in communication and information sharing. Specifically, UDW Officers cannot always easily access post procedures for guidance on duties, and some of the procedures are outdated. Guidance from Sergeants and more experienced Officers is not always accurate and up to date. These issues can hinder implementation of procedures and result in confusion among Officers, potentially diminishing security at the WHC. Also, UD management does not always fully communicate important information on key operational decisions. Although the Secret Service has taken steps to improve communication, UDW Officers expressed continuing dissatisfaction with the clarity of information and a perceived lack of respect in the way management communicates.

UDW Post Procedures Are Not Always Accessible and Updated, and Guidance Can Be Inconsistent
WHC post procedures are generally located [REDACTED] and are also posted electronically on the Secret Service’s intranet site. According to Secret Service officials, the procedures should provide clear guidance on proper protocols for each post as well as what to do in case of an emergency; updated procedures supersede older versions and should be available to Officers at the [REDACTED]

At the time of the September 2014 incident, many UDW post procedures dated back to 2011 or 2012. The security breach resulted in enhanced protocols for many posts; in the fall of 2014 and the spring of 2015, the Secret Service updated the procedures. In June 2015, we attempted to review [REDACTED] of procedures at [REDACTED] relevant to the fence jumping incident. [REDACTED] of procedures could not be located at the [REDACTED] and another set of procedures was located at an [REDACTED]. Of the [REDACTED] of post procedures we did locate, only [REDACTED] contained updated Secret Service protocols; the other [REDACTED] were outdated.

According to Secret Service personnel, UDW Officers can also access electronic copies of procedures on the intranet site while in a designated “roll call” room at the WHC, but Officers do not always have time to review post procedures during short breaks and while frequently working overtime. Also, many post procedures only give general requirements and do not account for the variety of possible operational situations at the WHC.

When unsure about a post procedure, Officers are encouraged to seek guidance from Sergeants or other officials. Yet, according to UDW personnel, it is not uncommon to receive inconsistent guidance about the same WHC post, depending on the Sergeant giving guidance. Secret Service officials reported that supervisory training for Sergeants has been delayed in recent years, and Sergeants returning to the UDW after working at other UD branches might not receive refresher training on WHC posts and may be unaware of updates. Hence, UDW Officers who do not have immediate access or time to read post procedures may carry out their post duties based on inaccurate or outdated instruction from their Sergeants. Inconsistent guidance can lead to confusion about proper security protocols at the WHC and could potentially lead to future security breaches.

UDW Officers may also have difficulty implementing WHC procedures consistently. At times, the Secret Service adapts standard procedures to the White House’s unique operational environment. According to UDW general post procedures, “flexibility and initiative should be used when applying procedures.” Secret Service personnel may also have to alter security protocols to accommodate White House stakeholders. Secret Service officials explained although there needs to be some flexibility and discretion in implementing
procedures, Officers should strive to follow them consistently. They also said that when needed, Officers should elevate disagreements to higher level officials for resolution.

According to UDW Officers, however, there are too many exceptions to the protocols, and at times those exceptions can potentially create security vulnerabilities. UDW personnel gave the following examples of exceptions to protocols they witnessed:

The Officer said he “got chewed out” due to the lack of internal communication.

Secret Service officials said they support UDW Officers in enforcing written procedures and UDW personnel should not be reprimanded for following policies and procedures. However, Officers described being chided for both following procedures and making exceptions. According to UDW Officers and supervisors, an Officer might be admonished for enforcing security protocols instead of using discretion or for trying to exercise discretion only to be told that a specific exemption was not appropriate.

Management Does Not Fully Communicate with UDW Staff on Important Matters

Secret Service officials do not always fully communicate essential information to UDW Officers, which can result in rumors, unawareness of key operational decisions, and low morale. Given the complexities of security operations at the WHC and its constantly changing environment, mission success requires
effective communication. In interviews, UDW personnel repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of communication from Secret Service management. For example, on the evening of the incident, [redacted] Secret Service personnel we interviewed thought people outside the Secret Service had requested they be muted when, in fact, Presidential Protective Division and UD officials had made the request. Secret Service management agreed that UDW Officers should receive this type of information. According to one Secret Service manager, “communication could always improve” and that “boots on the ground should have known.”

The Secret Service has taken steps to improve communication with UDW staff. Prior to the incident, UDW Officers at the WHC did not regularly attend roll calls at the start of their shift and therefore may have missed information such as protectee locations, alarm statuses, post procedure updates, and advisories about suspicious persons around the WHC. After the incident, the Secret Service started requiring attendance for the roll calls. At the time of our field work, UDW Officers were required to attend one of the [redacted] roll calls the Secret Service held every day or read the printed documentation discussed during roll calls if the Officers were working [redacted] and were unable to attend a scheduled roll call. However, some Officers commented that when they had questions or concerns, the information they received during roll calls was often incomplete and obfuscated and did not address their questions or concerns.

UDW Officers also receive email on topics ranging from administrative matters and intelligence alerts to career opportunities and policy updates. UDW Officers indicated they may receive 60 to 300 email messages daily and are not always able to read them all because their duties require vigilance and undivided attention, and there is very limited time during breaks and between shifts.

UD personnel also said the manner in which Secret Service managers and UD supervisors communicate with them can be “unprofessional.” The following statements summarize their comments.

- Some UD Officers and Sergeants communicate so unprofessionally it is “hard to understand how a premier law enforcement agency can get away with that.”
- UD managers are constantly “talking down” to Officers. The verbal abuse is commonplace, unnecessary, and counterproductive.
- Demeaning or disrespectful communication further erodes UD Officers’ morale.
UD Officers are not pursuing promotions within the UD as much as they could.
UD supervisors seem poorly trained in leadership and communication.

UDW Officers also believed Secret Service management was unresponsive and apathetic about their suggestions and concerns. Several Officers described their attempts to forward memos with suggestions or concerns up their chain of command and receiving limited or no feedback from UD supervisors. Officers and ERT members expressed concern that certain security issues were left unaddressed and unresolved despite their efforts to identify and document problems.

Conclusion

In most cases, it is too early to tell whether the Secret Service’s remedial actions for technical and structural problems will lead to more effective protective operations or whether the Secret Service will be able to continue funding and sustain corrections and improvements. The resource and management issues related to Secret Service staffing and communication, which profoundly affect the UD and its mission, are more deeply embedded. These underlying problems are not subject to the relatively quick fixes such as those applied to the technical or structural problems. Overcoming these challenges will require diligence and the full commitment of Secret Service leadership. It is imperative, however, that the Secret Service tackles these more fundamental and persistent resource and management issues, or it risks being unable to respond adequately or accomplish its protective mission.

We recommend that the Director of Secret Service:

Recommendation 7: Ensure staffing levels in the Uniformed Division support coverage of all posts without relying on overtime and allow for consistent in-service training, given known contingencies, such as expected travel and annual leave.

Recommendation 8: Adjust shift assignment and scheduling procedures to ensure that all shifts include more experienced Uniformed Division Officers and supervisors.

Recommendation 9: Establish and implement regular joint training for all entities protecting the White House Complex and the President, as well as regular familiarization tours of the White House for [redacted] staff. In addition, continually evaluate training trends and needs for protecting the White House Complex, modifying the training accordingly, and scheduling refresher courses as needed to update training. Train and brief Uniformed
Division officials transitioning to the White House Branch from other branches on the most up-to-date policies and procedures.

**Recommendation 10:** Complete a comprehensive study to identify the best and most cost effective option to provide training in a realistic setting as part of the feasibility study and design plan for the White House Training Facility.

**Recommendation 11:** Schedule regular reviews of post procedures at the White House Complex to ensure the most up to date information at [redacted] is available and accessible.

**Recommendation 12:** Implement post procedure refresher training and table top exercises for Uniformed Division Officers and Secret Service officials to ensure procedures are enforced consistently.

**Recommendation 13:** Implement a standard process to alert appropriate Secret Service personnel about malfunctions, modifications, or upgrades to any notification system or equipment at all White House Complex posts.

**Recommendation 14:** Establish an intake process to ensure Secret Service management receives, reviews, and provides feedback on suggestions for improvement and other concerns of White House Complex personnel.

The following section contains summaries of the Secret Service’s written responses to the final eight report recommendations and our analysis of the responses.

**Management Response to Recommendation 7:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation and provided a copy of its Human Capital Plan, which outlines plans for increasing the number of UD Officers through the end of FY 2019. According to the Secret Service, the increase in staffing levels will not completely address recommendation 7 and it is identifying more staffing increases beyond FY 2019. In the interim, the Secret Service is assigning newly graduated Special Agents to temporary duties with the UD at the WHC. In addition, Officers from the Transportation Security Administration augment the UD’s magnetometer screening responsibilities for Secret Service protective events away from the WHC. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s ongoing and planned actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of the new policy that assigns newly graduated Special Agents to temporary duties at the WHC, a copy of the...
agreement with the Transportation Security Administration about the support it provides to Secret Service protective events, and any documentation for identifying additional expected increases in staffing beyond FY 2019.

**Management Response to Recommendation 8:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, since September 19, 2014, UD senior managers evaluate the seniority level within their respective branches to ensure that each shift combines both junior and senior Officers. As new Officers graduate or are transferred from one branch to another, the UD ensures that Officers are appropriately and proportionally distributed to the various operation sections. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** We consider Secret Service’s proposed actions responsive to the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved; it will remain open until we receive and have reviewed the policies, procedures, or other relevant documentation detailing how UD senior managers evaluate the seniority level within their respective branches to ensure that each shift combines both junior and senior Officers.

**Management Response to Recommendation 9:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, because of the 2016 election campaign and the current staffing levels, it has not been able to establish a standard schedule for joint training. The Secret Service described the following training:

- When feasible, UD members train with the protective divisions, and members of the ERT conduct joint training exercises with UD recruits during their initial training.
- Joint training may be scheduled during mission in-service training.
- All newly appointed sergeants and lieutenants who transfer to the White House Branch and all ERT Officer Technicians and officials complete on-the-job training, including familiarization with applicable policies and procedures.
- All Officers working at the White House receive 2 weeks of on-the-job familiarization training at the White House.

The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of documentation and records detailing the training
efforts described in the Secret Service’s response. Also, in its corrective action plan, the Secret Service should update OIG on plans to establish a standard schedule for joint training once the election campaign ends.

Management Response to Recommendation 10: The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. The Secret Service has been developing a proposal that would provide realistic environment scenario-based training exercises for all UD Officers and Special Agents throughout basic recruit and in-service training. Based on the request for a feasibility study, the RTC had received a draft study on options and costs and anticipated receiving the final version in mid-March 2016. Once the Secret Service receives the completed feasibility study and considers all options, it will submit a conceptual design of the White House Training Facility and surrounding grounds for approval by the National Capital Planning Commission. The Secret Service expects to submit the request for commission approval in the fourth quarter of FY 2016 or the first quarter of FY 2017.

OIG Analysis: We consider the Secret Service’s proposed actions responsive to the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved, but open. We will close this recommendation when we receive and review a study on options and costs for the training facility, as well as a copy of the request the Secret Service prepares for National Capital Planning Commission approval.

Management Response to Recommendation 11: The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, relevant White House Branch procedures have been updated and transferred to the Secret Service’s intranet site, its directives management system, and the White House Branch shared drive. White House Branch supervisors are also required to ensure that all updated policies are read in roll calls. Further, the White House Branch recently conducted an audit and has ensured the most current versions of relevant procedures are available to all Officers. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

OIG Analysis: The Secret Service’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of the written requirement that all updated White House Branch policies are read in roll calls. In addition, we request a copy of the aforementioned audit results, as well as a tentative schedule for regular reviews of post procedures at the WHC.

refresher training and table top exercises. Training is typically held during supervisory and Officer roll call briefings. Larger scale exercises are coordinated by OPO and may involve external law enforcement partners within the Washington, DC metropolitan area. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of the relevant records and documentation detailing that White House Branch supervisors and managers ensure that post procedure refresher training and table top exercises are conducted.

**Management Response to Recommendation 13:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. In its response, the Secret Service said that it routinely advises its personnel of notification system and equipment malfunctions, modifications, and/or upgrades during roll calls and division briefings prior to the start of all shifts. The Secret Service also said that significant changes to notification systems and equipment are communicated via email and/or official messages as appropriate. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt and review of records (from FY 2015 and FY 2016 up to March 2016) of significant changes to notification systems and equipment.

**Management Response to Recommendation 14:** The Secret Service concurred with the recommendation. The Secret Service said that White House Branch management regularly attends roll calls and encourages suggestions from UD Officers on a range of issues. UD members are also encouraged to submit their suggestions for improvements and other concerns through various means, such as immediate supervisors, Secret Service-sponsored focus groups, or official memorandums. In addition, in October 2015, the Secret Service launched its Spark! program, a web-based communication platform that allows employees to submit ideas, suggestions, and recommendations for improving the Secret Service. The Secret Service requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**OIG Analysis:** The Secret Service’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of copies of any official communication encouraging UD members to submit their suggestions and concerns to Secret Service management. We also need to receive and review official communication on
launching the Spark! program, a sample of ideas and suggestions Secret Service management received through Spark!, and any records of what has been implemented as a result of this program.
Appendix A
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. We conducted this review to determine whether the Secret Service followed its own protective policies, what actions were taken to correct identified deficiencies, and whether these corrections are adequate.

On September 19, 2014, Omar Gonzalez jumped over the North Fence of the White House Complex, in less than 30 seconds reached the White House North Portico doors, and entered the interior of the mansion. Gonzalez bypassed several layers of security before the Secret Service apprehended him. We reviewed the causes of the incident, the extent to which Secret Service personnel followed security plans and protocols, and if Secret Service personnel followed security plans and protocols, why security measures were not sufficient to prevent the security breach. We also evaluated what actions were taken to correct identified deficiencies and whether these corrections are adequate. This is one of a series of reviews of the Secret Service.

To achieve our objectives, we interviewed Secret Service employees affiliated with operational, administrative, training, and technical aspects of the UDW and the JOC. We also interviewed a White House staff member and Secret Service personnel directly involved in the September 19, 2014 incident, as well as pre-incident investigative actions regarding Omar Gonzalez. We reviewed the results of inquiries conducted by the Secret Service’s Office of Professional Responsibility and the DHS Deputy Secretary.

We visited the JOC, the RTC, and exterior and interior White House posts. We reviewed the Secret Service’s video and graphic footage from September 19, 2014, photos, records, emails, training materials, reports, presentations, planned initiatives, organizational charts, statistics, policies, guidance, and White House procedures. We reviewed the Secret Service’s investigative files on Omar Gonzalez, including police records, fusion center reports, and case files. We also reviewed previous reports about the September 19, 2014 incident.

We appreciate the courtesy and full cooperation Secret Service and White House personnel extended to us throughout this review.

We conducted this review from October 2014 through August 2015 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to
the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Roth  
Inspector General  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  

FROM: Joseph P. Clancy  
Director  


March 8, 2016  

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject draft report. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) appreciates the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) work in conducting its review and issuing this report. In accordance with the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, this memorandum provides formal management comments on the draft report. The Secret Service concurs with the 14 recommendations provided in this constructive draft report and has and will continue to work diligently to address the issues which may have contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the September 19, 2014 incident. As detailed below, and in response to the Protective Mission Panel’s recommendations, we have already taken steps to address many of them. We share the OIG’s belief that fully implementing its recommendations will represent a significant change in our operations and will enhance our organization.

Before describing the actions we are taking in response to the recommendations, it is important to provide additional perspective on two issues mentioned in the report. One of the issues highlighted in the report relates to the Secret Service’s abilities to track financial expenditures as a means to evaluate the cost effectiveness of our investments in security for the White House Complex. The Secret Service is committed to being a responsible steward of its financial resources and has been enhancing its financial systems to provide higher fidelity not only in our financial reporting, but also as a foundation for our Mission Based Budgeting efforts. Once fully implemented, Mission Based Budgeting will allow us to optimize our investments as we continually improve our programs and operations, as well as enhance our ability to perform accurate forecasting and planning.

The second issue concerns the current challenges with Secret Service organizational staffing levels. Specifically, the draft report details the reduced staffing levels experienced by the
Uniformed Division, which the OIG determined indirectly contributed to the inadequate response on the evening of September 19, 2014. As captured in the Secret Service Human Capital Plan (FY 2014 – FY 2018), compiled pursuant to a requirement set forth in House Report 113-9 and which accompanied the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76), the Secret Service has been concerned about its organizational staffing levels. In 2014, as part of the FY 2016 Resource Allocation Planning Process, we requested additional funding to significantly increase our staffing levels. This position was further reinforced with the Secret Service Human Capital Plan (FY 2015 – FY 2019), compiled pursuant to a requirement in the Joint Explanatory Statement and which accompanied the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-4).

I am pleased to say that, through the support of our stakeholders, including the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress, we have secured financial resources allowing us to make progress toward increasing our staffing levels. The Secret Service is engaged in a two-pronged strategy that focuses on both hiring and retention. In Fiscal Year 2015, the agency re-tooled and kick-started its dormant hiring process, with 207 special agents, 151 Uniformed Division officers, and 142 administrative, professional and technical (APT) staff members hired in this first year alone. Building on this momentum, the Secret Service plans to hire 300 special agents, 300 Uniformed Division officers, and 260 APT personnel this fiscal year. This is an ambitious goal, but we are working tirelessly to achieve it. The agency has already placed 88 special agent recruits and 96 Uniformed Division officer recruits into training classes. This initial progress is significant—re-tooling and producing are extremely hard to do at the same time. However, as new personnel complete training and enter their operational roles, I anticipate that employees across the organization will become increasingly aware of the operational benefit throughout the remainder of this year.

While the Secret Service has made significant progress on our hiring goals, these achievements have little effect if attrition is ignored. As such, the retention of our existing workforce is a priority. The agency’s biggest retention effort to date was directed at our Uniformed Division workforce, where we were able to implement the Uniformed Division Retention Bonus Program. So far, over 1,000 uniformed officers have elected to participate in this two-year program. The Secret Service is implementing a more comprehensive retention program aimed at all members of our workforce. Initiatives such as student loan payback, tuition assistance, expanded telework and alternative work schedules, and alternative compensation options for lost time are in development. We look forward to working with our stakeholders and their continued support in increasing and maintaining the staffing levels necessary or the Secret Service to succeed in its critical mission.
Responses to Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Develop a schedule to regularly test radio functionality around the White House Complex. Ensure some testing simulates an emergency environment.

Response: Concur. On a daily basis, the Joint Operations Center (JOC) conducts operational radio checks with select users to test radio functionality. Any Uniformed Division officer may also request radio checks from the JOC at any time during his/her tour of duty. These tests generally ensure the functioning of the radio system without overwhelming the operational radio channels.

In addition, the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) currently conducts radio coverage checks on a periodic basis around the White House Complex, and at other locations as needed. However, in coordination with the Uniformed Division and Office of Protective Operations, the CIO is in the process of establishing a regular schedule of coverage testing.

Finally, it should be noted that the JOC has robust transmission capability in the vicinity of the White House Complex to accommodate various environments and operational postures. [Estimated Completion Date (ECD): May 1, 2016]

Recommendation 2: Enhance radio training and hands-on instructional scenarios during Uniformed Division Officers’ basic training to ensure Officers graduate with a working knowledge of radio operations and communication.

Response: Concur. The Secret Service has made a number of enhancements to Uniformed Division recruit training since September 19, 2014. Prior to September 2014, recruits received a limited amount of classroom instruction regarding radio communications. Uniformed Division recruits are now trained in live exercises which involve required interaction with a dispatcher. Further, training involves the use of a trained JOC officer/Control Center (CC) officer to assist with dispatching during certain exercises for officers. This CC officer is also used during other training scenarios in which recruits/officers are subjected to simulated emergency situations at the White House. The Secret Service has purchased new radios to replace the outdated training radios, and is in the process of calibrating the equipment for use in our training environment. In addition, all employees receive in-class, instructional training upon receipt of newly issued radios and prior to utilization for official use.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 3: Establish protocols for the Joint Operations Center to monitor cameras on the North and South Grounds of the White House Complex.
Response: Concur. JOC personnel have the ability to view multiple cameras simultaneously at the White House Complex. The JOC internal operating procedures have been revised to reflect enhanced situational awareness requirements, and are available to all JOC personnel.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 4: Prioritize funding and provide a timeline for implementing the Information Resources Management Division’s Joint Operations Center technology refresh request.

Response: Concur. The Secret Service continues to recognize that the JOC is an essential element to the agency’s protective operations. The JOC requires support for its critical functions, and the Secret Service understands the importance of ensuring that necessary investments are made to its systems and infrastructure in order to maintain appropriate levels of mission performance. At the request of the Secret Service’s CIO, the U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is conducting an engineering study of the JOC, which is scheduled to conclude at the end of March 2016. The NAVAIR study will provide options for refreshing the technology within the JOC and will be the focus of future budget requests.

Regarding more near-term investments, the Secret Service has invested significant financial resources and is committed to continued investments in future years. In FYs 2015 and 2016, the Secret Service will have spent a total of nearly $7 million on JOC operations, maintenance, and redundancy. In addition to these amounts, the Secret Service intends to invest nearly $9.5 million for JOC upgrades in FY 2016, and has requested an additional $4.9 million in FY 2017 for further upgrades. [ECD: September 30, 2017]

Recommendation 5: Conduct annual assessments of the White House Complex and Joint Operations Center to evaluate the functionality of the radio infrastructure system, alarms, cameras, and notification systems. The assessments should include analysis of the Joint Operations Center’s log entries for technical issues, as well as input from the Office of Protective Operations, Presidential Protective Division, and the Uniformed Division, and should result in action plans and a timeline to resolve outstanding issues. The Technical Security Division should present assessment results and action plans to Secret Service management, including the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Information Officer.

Response: Concur. Since the September 19, 2014 incident, the Secret Service has enhanced its practice of conducting regular evaluations and assessments of the functionality of the various security and communications systems supporting protective operations at the White House Complex. The NAVAIR study referenced in the response to Recommendation 4 will factor into the annual assessment for FY 2016.
In addition to the annual Program Management Reviews (PMR) for individual programs as part of budget discussions, Secret Service personnel perform regular and routine evaluations of the security and communications systems surrounding the White House Complex. JOC personnel perform checks of the secondary and backup radio systems in the JOC on every shift and conduct weekly checks of the various phone systems. Regular testing of the North/South Grounds alarm zones also occurs multiple times per day. In August 2015, the Secret Service began quarterly testing of its alert system through a coordinated effort between the JOC and Technical Security Division (TSD). In December 2015, the Secret Service began daily testing of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB)/Treasury alarm zones.

The Secret Service manages camera and alarm issues via on-site support through electronic trouble ticket systems and related logs. Issues are prioritized and resolved via immediate response personnel or through normal issue resolution protocols, depending upon the nature of the issue.

Given the aforementioned actions, the Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**Recommendation 6:** Continue to work with White House stakeholders to prioritize planned initiatives to replace the existing fence and enhance associated infrastructure. Also, determine the optimal height for the bushes in front of the North Portico to provide the visibility of the North Fence Line and coordinate with the National Park Service to establish a schedule for trimming the bushes.

**Response:** Concur. The Secret Service is continuing to aggressively pursue a permanent solution for a new White House perimeter fence with the appropriate stakeholders. We are actively engaged with partners from the National Park Service (NPS), National Capitol Planning Commission (NCPC), and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA) on replacing the White House Complex fence. While the Secret Service does not have exclusive authority to make determinations regarding the fence or landscaping, continuing our established regular communication with NPS will allow us to better coordinate on security issues with a nexus to NPS’ area of responsibility, including landscaping at the White House Complex.

Given the ongoing collaboration between the Secret Service, NPS, NCPC, and CFA, the Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**Recommendation 7:** Ensure staffing levels in the Uniformed Division support coverage of all posts without relying on overtime and allow for consistent in-service training, given known contingencies, such as expected travel and annual leave.
Response: Concur. The Secret Service’s Human Capital Plan provides a roadmap for aggressively increasing the number of Uniformed Division officers through the end of FY 2019. While this increase in staffing levels will not completely address this recommendation, the Secret Service is identifying additional expected increases in staffing levels beyond FY 2019 that should result in further reductions in the need for overtime within the Uniformed Division workforce.

As an interim measure, the Secret Service recently implemented a policy that will temporarily provide additional staffing resources to the Uniformed Division by assigning newly graduated special agents to temporary post-standing assignments at the White House Complex prior to them reporting to their respective field offices.

In addition, Transportation Security Administration officers are being utilized to augment the Uniformed Division’s magnetometer screening responsibilities in support of Secret Service protective events primarily away from the White House Complex. This partnership enables increased availability of Uniformed Division officers at the White House Complex.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 8: Adjust shift assignment and scheduling procedures to ensure that all shifts include more experienced Uniformed Division Officers and supervisors.

Response: Concur. Since September 19, 2014, Uniformed Division senior managers perform regular evaluations of the seniority level within their respective branches to ensure that each shift is comprised of a combination of both junior and senior officers, in accordance with the overall protective posture being maintained within a branch. As new officers graduate, or are transferred from one branch to another, the Uniformed Division ensures that officers are appropriately and proportionally distributed to the various operation sections. The Uniformed Division’s leadership ensures that appropriate distributions are maintained in the event of a realignment of branch personnel.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 9: Establish and implement regular joint training for all entities protecting the White House Complex and the President, as well as regular familiarization tours of the White House for staff. In addition, continually evaluate training trends and needs for protecting the White House Complex, modifying the training accordingly, and scheduling refresher courses as needed to update training. Train and brief Uniformed Division officials transitioning to the White House Branch from other branches on the most up-to-date policies and procedures.
Response: Concur. The Secret Service is committed to enhancing its efforts to provide joint training for all personnel responsible for protection of the White House Complex and the President. Since the September 19, 2014 incident, we have conducted 18 joint training classes/exercises. However, at this time, due to the campaign and the current staffing levels, we have not been able to establish a standard schedule for joint training. Members of Uniformed Division are participating in training with the protective divisions. Members of the Emergency Response Team are also conducting joint training exercises with Uniformed Division recruits during their initial training. In addition, joint training with operational personnel may be scheduled during mission-in-service training.

All newly appointed sergeants and lieutenants who transfer to the White House Branch are provided on-the-job training (OJT), to include familiarization with applicable policies and procedures, based on their previous experience. Likewise, all emergency response technicians and officials complete familiarization training. In addition, all officers working at the White House receive two weeks of on the job familiarization training at the White House.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 10: Complete a comprehensive study to identify the best and most cost effective option to provide training in a realistic setting as part of the feasibility study and design plan for the White House Training Facility.

Response: Concur. The Secret Service understands the critical importance of training its personnel in realistic settings and is committed to improving its efforts to do so. The Secret Service has been working on developing a comprehensive proposal that would provide realistic environment scenario-based training exercises for all Uniformed Division officers and special agents throughout basic recruit and in-service training. Based on its request for a feasibility study, the Rowley Training Center (RTC) has received a draft study on options and costs and anticipates receiving the final version in mid-March 2016. Once we have received the completed feasibility study and have considered all options, the Secret Service will submit a conceptual design of the White House Training Facility and surrounding grounds for the NCPC's approval as part of the revised master plan. ECD: The Secret Service expects to submit our request for NCPC approval in the 4th quarter of FY16 or the 1st quarter of FY17.

Recommendation 11: Schedule regular reviews of post procedures at the White House Complex to ensure the most up to date information is available and accessible.

Response: Concur. Relevant White House Branch procedures have been updated and transferred to the USSS directives management system, the USSS Intranet, as well as the White House Branch shared drive. White House Branch supervisors are also required to ensure that all updated
policies are read in roll calls. Further, the White House Branch recently conducted an audit and has ensured the most current versions of relevant procedures are available to all officers.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**Recommendation 12:** Implement post procedure refresher training and table top exercises for Uniformed Division Officers and Secret Service officials to ensure procedures are enforced consistently.

**Response:** Concur. White House Branch supervisors and managers ensure that post procedure refresher training and table-top exercises are conducted with the workforce. Trainings are typically held during supervisory and officer roll call briefings. Larger scale exercises are coordinated by the Office of Protective Operations and may involve external law enforcement partners within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**Recommendation 13:** Implement a standard process to alert appropriate Secret Service personnel about malfunctions, modifications, or upgrades to any notification system or equipment at all White House Complex posts.

**Response:** Concur. Secret Service personnel are routinely advised of notification system and equipment malfunctions, modifications, and/or upgrades during roll calls and division briefings prior to the start of all shifts, which are in support of the White House Complex. Significant changes to notification systems and equipment are communicated via emails and/or official messages as appropriate and required.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

**Recommendation 14:** Establish an intake process to ensure Secret Service management receives, reviews, and provides feedback on suggestions for improvement and other concerns of White House Complex personnel.

**Response:** Concur. The White House Branch management regularly attends roll calls and encourages suggestions from Uniformed Division officers on a range of issues that may be of concern to the workforce. Members are encouraged to submit their suggestions for improvements and other concerns through various means, including via their immediate supervisors, Secret Service-sponsored focus groups, or through official memoranda.

In addition, in October 2015, the Secret Service launched its Spark! program, a web-based communication platform that allows employees to submit ideas, suggestions, and recommendations for improving the Secret Service. Spark! is comprised of a dedicated staff
which ensures that ideas are received, reviewed, and responded to by the appropriate resource within the agency.

The Secret Service requests that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

Conclusion

Once again, thank you for the constructive recommendations provided in this report. We are confident that the actions being undertaken by the Secret Service demonstrate its commitment to continually enhancing our organization and its operations, and we look forward to the OIG’s agreement to close the recommendations made by your office.
Appendix C
September 19, 2014 Fence Jumping Incident

On September 19, 2014, at approximately 7:19 p.m., two UDW foot beat Officers outside the White House’s North Fence Line saw Omar Gonzalez attempting to scale over the fence. Gonzalez had one foot on the side walk, one foot on the fence’s cement footer, and both hands on the fence posts in a position Secret Service refers to as “posting up.” The two Officers ran towards Gonzalez while yelling commands ordering him to stop. One Officer attempted to transmit “fence jumper” on the radio while in pursuit of Gonzalez. The other foot beat Officer attempted to reach for Gonzalez as he climbed, but did not succeed. Gonzalez landed east on the White House North Grounds and began running toward the fountain on the North Lawn.

At approximately 7:20 p.m., as Gonzalez was running on the White House North Grounds east of the fountain, two ERT Officer Technicians stationed at a post east of the White House’s North Portico ran out of their booth, after they heard a commotion at the North Fence Line; a moment later, they saw Gonzalez running on the North Grounds. These Officers did not hear any radio communications about the fence jumper. Both ERT Officer Technicians ran towards Gonzalez and yelled commands for him to stop. Gonzalez diverted away from the Officer Technicians and ran into bushes located on the White House’s North Grounds, in front of the North Portico. One Officer Technician followed Gonzalez into the bushes. The second Officer Technician maintained a position outside the bushes with his gun drawn and continued to issue commands.

As Gonzalez ran from the fountain toward the bushes, an ERT canine handler and another ERT Officer Technician were positioned west of the North Portico. These two Officer Technicians also did not see Gonzalez jump over the fence or hear initial radio communications alerting them to the fence jumper.
As Gonzalez reached the top of the fence, a UD Officer at the JOC noticed a “break” on the alarm panel and yelled “jumper” by instinct. The JOC personnel received an “excited and muffled” radio transmission. While attempting to replay initial radio traffic, the JOC received another transmission indicating there was a fence jumper on the North Grounds. JOC personnel did not hear the notification due to noise in the JOC. The JOC dispatcher rebroadcast a message that there was a fence jumper on the North Grounds, but the broadcast did not go through. By the time the system broadcasted, Gonzalez was inside the mansion.

The canine handler, who was on his personal cellular phone as Gonzalez climbed over the North Fence Line, noticed Gonzalez only as he was running towards the White House. The canine handler immediately began retrieving his canine from the cage in the rear of the van, running with his dog approximately 8 seconds after the first ERT unit started running towards Gonzalez. The canine handler issued a required verbal warning about deploying a dog and moved north in the direction of Gonzalez, seconds after the jumper passed the fountain. The handler gave his canine the apprehension command, released the canine’s leash to approximately half its length, and approached the bushes from the west. Gonzalez proceeded into the bushes seconds before the canine handler arrived at the scene. The canine handler did not have a clear visual of Gonzalez. Therefore, the canine handler could not release the canine because he believed the dog did not have enough time to identify the fence jumper as a target. The second ERT Officer Technician who was positioned west of the North Portico, jumped out of a van and, after witnessing the canine handler deploy with the canine, readied his weapon and followed the canine handler towards the North Lawn.

Gonzalez exited the bushes and ran west onto the North Portico toward the mansion stairs. A UDW Officer posted outside the White House mansion doors did not receive initial radio transmission of the fence jumper, but saw ERT personnel running on the North Grounds with their weapons drawn. The Officer drew a weapon and sought cover behind a pillar east of the North Portico, reacting to what he thought was a fight near the bushes. As Gonzalez

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approached the top of the North Portico from the west, the Officer at [REDACTED] yelled at the fence jumper to “get down.” The Officer continued issuing commands from his position east of the North Portico. Gonzalez bypassed the Officer and pushed through the White House’s North Portico front doors less than 30 seconds after jumping the fence. Appendix G details why Secret Service restrained from using deadly force on Gonzalez. Figure 3 depicts Gonzalez’s movements from the moment he jumped over the fence until he pushed through the mansion doors.

Figure 3:

Source: OIG summary of Secret Service from September 19, 2014

Three ERT members, including the canine handler, approached the mansion doors approximately 2 seconds after Gonzalez entered the White House. As previously discussed, [REDACTED] Therefore, in line with their training, [REDACTED] two ERT members and the canine handler formulated the approach they would take and entered the mansion approximately 20 seconds later. The fourth Officer Technician maintained a position on the North Portico stairs.

As Gonzalez approached the North Portico, a UDW Officer posted inside the mansion [REDACTED] in a chair behind the doors and next to a window, saw through a window the UDW Officer at [REDACTED] with his gun drawn. The Officer at [REDACTED] did not receive the [REDACTED] notification because it had been muted and only heard a garbled transmission on the radio, but recognized the
emergency situation because the [redacted] Officer had a gun out. The [redacted] Officer immediately closed the wooden front doors and attempted to lock them when Gonzalez pushed through the doors, knocking the [redacted] Officer backward. The [redacted] Officer transmitted an emergency signal over the radio and issued commands, “stop right there; don’t move!” to Gonzalez. Gonzalez proceeded up the middle of the State Floor toward the Center Hall. The [redacted] Officer followed Gonzalez, grabbed his hand, and attempted to subdue him while issuing commands for him to get on the floor. Gonzalez pulled away from the Officer and walked toward the East Room as the Officer continued issuing commands. Once the Officer and Gonzalez entered the East Room, the Officer again attempted to subdue Gonzalez, but inadvertently grabbed a flashlight instead of a baton from the duty belt. The Officer then drew a weapon and continued issuing commands to Gonzalez.

After Gonzalez entered the East Room, a UDW Officer posted near the White House [redacted] heard a radio transmission about the fence jumper and saw the [redacted] Officer struggling with Gonzalez. The [redacted] Officer ensured another UDW Officer covered [redacted] ran to the East Room, and started to subdue Gonzalez to the ground.

Simultaneously, from their locations near the Diplomatic Room on the ground floor, two Presidential Protective Division Special Agents heard an altercation. The Agents had just completed their shifts and were returning to the White House after escorting members of the First Family to Marine One for departure. The two Agents ran up the Grand Staircase and saw the UDW Officer subduing Gonzalez directly outside the East Room. Both Agents assisted the Officer in apprehending and handcuffing Gonzalez. One Agent searched Gonzalez and located a pocket knife in his right front pocket. ERT Officer Technicians removed Gonzalez from the mansion and escorted him to the North Fence Line less than 3 minutes after he jumped over the fence. Figure 4 shows the movements of Gonzalez inside the mansion.
Secret Service Washington Field Office Special Agents interviewed Gonzalez shortly after the ERT removed him from the mansion. UDW Officers arrested Gonzalez and he was subsequently charged with (1) knowingly entering or remaining in a restricted building or grounds without lawful authority, and (2) carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon, namely, a knife during the offense.\(^8\)

The President and his daughters had departed the White House via the presidential helicopter on the South Lawn minutes prior to the incident. The First Lady was not in the mansion during the incident, but White House staff members were present.

The following timeline covers the approximately 3 minutes and 5 seconds between Gonzalez scaling the fence and the Secret Service escorting him out of the mansion.

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\(^8\) 18 U.S. Code §1752(a)(l) and §1752(b)(1)(A)
### Timeline of September 19, 2014 Fence Jumping Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:19:55 PM</td>
<td>González starts to climb over the North Fence. Two UDW Foot Beat Officers respond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:00 PM</td>
<td>González runs on the White House North Grounds toward the Fountain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:02 PM</td>
<td>ERT Officers deploy weapons and move across the driveway. Three seconds later González is South of the Fountain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:12 PM</td>
<td>Two ERT Officers (West Side) and a Canine are on the grass on the North Side of the Driveway. They move tactically to intercept González who is still running toward the bushes on the North Side of the Driveway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:18 PM</td>
<td>González exits the bushes and runs onto the driveway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:23 PM</td>
<td>González arrives on the North Portico midway to the Mansion Door. The UD Officer positions to the East of González and points his pistol at him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:26 PM</td>
<td>González breaches the Mansion Doors and proceeds toward the State Floor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:28 PM</td>
<td>ERT arrives on the North Portico and Driveway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:46 PM</td>
<td>ERT tactically prepares to enter the Mansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20:50 PM</td>
<td>ERT enters the Mansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:23:00 PM</td>
<td>ERT escorts González out of the Mansion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Secret Service video and camera footage from September 19, 2014*
Appendix D
Secret Service Pre-incident Interactions with Omar Gonzalez

Prior to the September 19, 2014 incident the Secret Service had several interactions with Gonzalez and investigated him. During each interaction with Gonzalez, Secret Service personnel determined he did not pose a threat to the component’s protectees or protective sites. An intelligence representative noted Gonzalez expressed a “loose” interest in the White House, but the White House is a historical site and its perimeter is open to the public. Secret Service Special Agents and Officers, who interacted with Gonzalez during interviews or consensual searches of his vehicle and person, reported he was polite and cooperative.

Secret Service personnel explained that the pre-incident investigation and its initial findings could not have resulted in Gonzalez’s arrest, thus potentially preventing him from jumping over the White House fence. Because the Secret Service did not determine Gonzalez posed a threat to protectees or protective sites, it did not put Gonzalez on the list of individuals to be on the lookout for if he were to return to the WHC. Therefore, as Gonzalez walked around the perimeter of the WHC on September 19, 2014, minutes prior to the incident, several Secret Service personnel recognized him from previous interactions, but could not legally prevent him from being in areas near the White House open to the general public, including near the fence.

Although several UDW Officers who previously knew of Gonzalez recognized him on September 19, 2014, as he walked around the perimeter of the WHC, they had no legal cause to detain him until he jumped over the White House fence, violating a Federal statute.

The following timeline shows how Gonzalez had come to the attention of the state, local, and Federal law enforcement, as well as the Secret Service, before the fence jumping incident. It also describes events on September 19, 2014, just prior to Gonzalez’s jumping the fence.
Appendix E
Uniformed Division Mission In-service Training

The Secret Service conducts mission in-service training over 3 days at the RTC in Beltsville, Maryland. The maximum number of students in a class is 24. The topics below are covered during the training; topics may vary from class to class, depending on facilities and instructor scheduling.

- Control tactics
- Employee Assistance Program briefings
- Air marshals course/aircraft tactics
- Characteristics of an armed gunman
- Deceptive behavior
- Legal
- Active shooter
- Briefing – Sovereign Citizens Domestic Terrorism
- Police contacts/use of force/standards of conduct
- Weapons retention/handcuffing
- Homicide bomber

Mission in-service courses do not include all other types of training offered by the RTC throughout the year. Other training topics include:

- Specialized or tactical unit training
- Emergency medical technician (EMT) or EMT refresher training
- First line supervisor training
- Retirement planning seminar
- Mountain bike training
- Cornerstone training (24 hours required annually for all supervisors)
- Online (Learning Management System) training
Appendix F
Uniformed Division Emergency Action and Building Defense Training

On Friday, September 26, 2014, the UD implemented a mandatory 10 hours of training for all personnel. The training is divided into two phases. Phase 1 consists of 4 hours of classroom instruction, and Phase 2 consists of 6 hours of practical and scenario-based training.
Appendix G
Secret Service Restrained from Using Deadly Force Appropriately

On September 19, 2014, both DHS’ and the Secret Service’s use of force policies⁹ As a result, Gonzalez bypassed eight Secret Service staff personnel unhindered before a UDW Officer and two Special Agents tackled and apprehended him inside the White House.

The Secret Service’s use of force policy authorizes Special Agents and UDW Officers to use force to control subjects in defense of themselves and others. Law enforcement officers often have to make split-second decisions in tense, uncertain, and rapidly-evolving circumstances.¹⁰ Secret Service personnel must evaluate the totality of all circumstances to determine a reasonable level of force to use against a subject. The following table shows various levels of force available to Secret Service personnel.

Source: Secret Service data

According to Secret Service and DHS policies on the use of deadly force, law enforcement personnel may use deadly force, i.e., the degree of force likely to cause serious bodily injury or death, only when they have reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the Officer, Agent, or another person. Additionally, both policies prohibit the use of deadly force solely to prevent a fleeing suspect from escaping. Secret Service personnel who exceed their authority and use excessive force may be subject to adverse administrative action, civil liability, and criminal prosecution.

UDW Officers, ERT Officer Technicians, and Special Agents who directly responded to the September 19, 2014 incident appropriately determined the reasonable amount of force to use against Gonzalez. As Gonzalez progressed from the White House North Grounds into the mansion, Secret Service personnel responding UDW Officers and ERT Officer Technicians were unaware Gonzalez had a knife in his pocket until he was apprehended.

Secret Service personnel appropriately determined that Gonzalez’s actions, including his decisions to ignore Officers’ verbal commands and continue to run toward the White House did not warrant the use of deadly force. Moreover, personnel did not believe Gonzalez posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to the members of the First Family because they were not in the White House at the time of the incident.

Less than Lethal Options

On September 19, 2014, Gonzalez evaded eight Secret Service personnel on the North Fence Line, North Grounds, White House North Portico, and inside the mansion’s doors. Officers and ERT members did not use options for the following reasons:

- Two foot beat UDW Officers outside the North Fence Line attempted to grab Gonzalez as he climbed over the fence, but he was not within the Officers’ reach and landed on the North Grounds within seconds.

- Three ERT Officer Technicians on the North Grounds attempted to corner Gonzalez and allow the canine to apprehend him, but Gonzalez
unexpectedly ran into bushes in front of the North Portico. The ERT Officer Technicians were not close enough to Gonzalez to corner him or apply control tactics.

- The ERT canine handler did not release the canine on the North Grounds or in the mansion because he did not believe the canine had Gonzalez to identify him as a suspect.

- The UDW Officer posted outside the North Portico doors opted not to use the physical force to affect Gonzalez and refrained from using it. Also, the Officer did not block the front doors and engage Gonzalez in a scuffle and instead took position to the right of the North Portico to allow the ERT to respond.

- The UDW Officer posted directly inside the mansion doors unsuccessfully used several non-lethal measures to subdue Gonzalez. The Officer grabbed Gonzalez after he ignored commands and attempted to use other methods, but Gonzalez evaded the Officer after each attempt. Additionally, the Officer mistakenly grabbed a flashlight instead of the baton from the duty belt while attempting to subdue Gonzalez.

Several UDW Officers and ERT Officer Technicians described their hesitation to physically engage Gonzalez after the initial contact. The UDW Officer who took down the subject and one of the Special Agents who assisted in subduing Gonzalez did not draw their weapons; they had the flexibility to apply control tactics on Gonzalez without endangering themselves or other Secret Service personnel.
Appendix H
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Appendix I
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
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