May 10, 2016

Why We Did This Audit

Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

What We Recommend

We recommend that S&T, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to its financial systems and associated information technology security program.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

What We Found

We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2015. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general IT controls and business process application controls at the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). KPMG, LLP determined that S&T took corrective action to address certain prior year IT control deficiencies.

However, KPMG continued to identify general IT control deficiencies related to access controls for S&T’s core financial system. The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited S&T’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Rick Stevens
Chief Information Officer
Science and Technology Directorate

Richard Williams
Chief Financial Officer
Science and Technology Directorate

FROM: Sondra McCauley
Assistant Inspector General
Office of Information Technology Audits


Attached for your information is our final report, Information Technology Management Letter for the Science and Technology Directorate Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit. This report contains comments and recommendations related to information technology internal control deficiencies. The observations did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 13, 2015, which was included in the FY 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

The independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP conducted the audit of DHS’ FY 2015 financial statements and is responsible for the attached information technology management letter and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express opinions on DHS’ financial statements or internal control, nor do we provide conclusions on compliance with laws and regulations. We will post the final report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sharon Huiswoud, Director, Information Systems and Acquisitions Division, at (202) 254-5451.

Attachment
December 20, 2015

Office of Inspector General,  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and  
Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer,  
Science and Technology Directorate,  
Washington, DC

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In planning and performing our audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department), as of and for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”), in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements, we considered internal control over financial reporting (internal control) as a basis for designing our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the financial statements. In conjunction with our audit of the consolidated financial statements, we also performed an audit of internal control over financial reporting in accordance with attestation standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

During our audit, we noted certain matters involving internal control and other operational matters at Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), a component of DHS that are presented for your consideration. These comments and recommendations, all of which have been discussed with the appropriate members of management, are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

With respect to financial systems at S&T, we noted certain internal control deficiencies in the general information technology (IT) control areas of access controls. These matters are described in the Findings and Recommendations section of this letter.

We have provided a description of the key S&T financial system and IT infrastructure within the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit in Appendix A, and listed the S&T IT Notice of Finding and Recommendation communicated to management during our audit in Appendix B.

During our audit we noted certain matters involving financial reporting internal controls (comments not related to IT) and other operational matters at S&T, including certain deficiencies in internal control that we consider to be significant deficiencies and material weaknesses, and communicated them in writing to management and those charged with governance in our

Our audit procedures are designed primarily to enable us to form opinions on the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements and on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and therefore may not bring to light all deficiencies in policies or procedures that may exist. We aim, however, to use our knowledge of S&T’s organization gained during our work to make comments and suggestions that we hope will be useful to you.

We would be pleased to discuss these comments and recommendations with you at any time.

The purpose of this letter is solely to describe comments and recommendations intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies. Accordingly, this letter is not suitable for any other purpose.

Very truly yours,

KPMG LLP
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective, Scope, and Approach</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Finding</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding and Recommendation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Description of Key S&amp;T Financial System and IT Infrastructure within the Scope of the FY 2015 DHS Financial Statement Audit</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>FY 2015 IT Notice of Findings and Recommendations at S&amp;T</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH

Objective

We audited the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”). In connection with our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we performed an evaluation of selected general information technology (IT) controls (GITCs) and IT application controls at Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), a component of DHS, to assist in planning and performing our audit engagement.

Scope and Approach

General Information Technology Controls

The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), formed the basis for our GITC evaluation procedures.

FISCAM was designed to inform financial statement auditors about IT controls and related audit concerns to assist them in planning their audit work and to integrate the work of auditors with other aspects of the financial statement audit. FISCAM also provides guidance to auditors when considering the scope and extent of review that generally should be performed when evaluating GITCs and the IT environment of a Federal agency. FISCAM defines the following five control categories to be essential to the effective operation of GITCs and the IT environment:

1. Security Management – Controls that provide a framework and continuing cycle of activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of computer-related security controls.
2. Access Control – Controls that limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities) and protect against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure.
3. Configuration Management – Controls that help prevent unauthorized changes to information system resources (software programs and hardware configurations) and provide reasonable assurance that systems are configured and operating securely and as intended.
4. Segregation of Duties – Controls that constitute policies, procedures, and an organizational structure to manage who can control key aspects of computer-related operations.
5. Contingency Planning – Controls that involve procedures for continuing critical operations without interruption, or with prompt resumption, when unexpected events occur.

While each of these five FISCAM categories were considered during the planning and risk assessment phase of our audit, we selected GITCs for evaluation based on their relationship to the ongoing effectiveness of process-level automated controls or manual controls with one or more automated components. This includes those controls that depend on the completeness, accuracy, and integrity of
information provided by the entity in support of our financial audit procedures. Consequently, FY 2015
GITC procedures at S&T did not necessarily represent controls from each FISCAM category.

Business Process Application Controls

Where relevant GITCs were determined to be operating effectively, we performed testing over selected IT
application controls (process-level controls that were either fully automated or manual with an automated
component) on financial systems and applications to assess the financial systems’ internal controls over
the input, processing, and output of financial data and transactions.

FISCAM defines Business Process Application Controls as the automated and/or manual controls applied
to business transaction flows and related to the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality of
transactions and data during application processing. They typically cover the structure, policies, and
procedures that operate at a detailed business process (cycle or transaction) level over individual
transactions or activities across business processes.

Financial System Functionality

In recent years, we have noted that limitations in S&T’s service provider’s financial systems’
functionality may be inhibiting the agency’s ability to implement and maintain internal controls,
including effective GITCs and IT application controls supporting financial data processing and reporting.
S&T’s service provider is Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Therefore, in FY 2015, we
continued to evaluate and consider the impact of financial system functionality on internal control over
financial reporting.
SUMMARY OF FINDING

During FY 2015, we identified GITC deficiencies at S&T related to access controls for S&T’s core financial system.

The conditions supporting our finding collectively limited S&T’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The one IT NFR issued during our testing at S&T represents deficiencies and observations related to one of the five FISCAM GITC categories.

The finding resulted from the lack of properly documented, fully designed and implemented, adequately detailed, and consistently implemented financial system controls to comply with the requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Information Technology Security Program; National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance; and S&T policies and procedures, as applicable.

While the recommendation made by us should be considered by S&T, it is the ultimate responsibility of S&T management to determine the most appropriate method(s) for addressing the deficiencies identified.
FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding

During our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we identified the following GITC deficiency at S&T:

Access Controls

- Federal employees and contractors maintained access to the main financial application after their separation or termination.

Recommendation

We recommend that the S&T Finance and Budget Division, in coordination with the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) and the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), make the following improvements to S&T’ s financial management systems and associated IT security program (in accordance with S&T and DHS requirements, as applicable):

Access Controls

- Enhance account management procedures to include supervisors and contracting officers to provide monthly positive confirmations of user’s roles and employment status and annual recertification of users.
Appendix A

Description of Key S&T Financial System and IT Infrastructure within the Scope of the FY 2015 DHS Financial Statement Audit
Below is a description of the significant S&T financial management system and supporting IT infrastructure included in the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit.

Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)

FFMS is a mainframe-based major application and the official accounting system of record for S&T. It is used to create and maintain a record of each allocation, commitment, obligation, travel advance, and accounts receivable. The system supports all internal and external financial reporting requirements.

The S&T instance of FFMS is hosted and supported by the ICE OCIO, exclusively for internal use by the S&T user community and, on a limited basis, ICE OCIO and finance center personnel performing support services for S&T.

The application is hosted at Datacenter 2 in Clarksville, VA and is supported by the IBM z/OS mainframe and Oracle databases.
Appendix B

FY 2015 IT Notice of Finding and Recommendations at S&T
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2015 NFR #</th>
<th>NFR Title</th>
<th>FISCAM Control Area</th>
<th>New Issue</th>
<th>Repeat Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Appendix E
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Under Secretary for Management
Chief Privacy Officer

Immigration Customs and Enforcement

Director
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Information Officer
Audit Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov.

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.

OIG HOTLINE

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:

Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305