
May 13, 2016
OIG-16-89
May 13, 2016

Why We Did This Audit

Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

What We Found

We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2015. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general IT controls and business process application controls at other Department of Homeland Security components (Management). KPMG, LLP identified general IT control deficiencies at Management related to access controls.

The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited Management’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

What We Recommend

We recommend that Management, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to its financial systems and associated information technology security program.

For Further Information:

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at (202) 254-4100, or email us at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov
May 13, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR: Luke McCormack
Chief Information Officer

Chip Fulghum
Deputy Under Secretary for Management
Chief Financial Officer

FROM: Sondra McCauley
Assistant Inspector General
Office of Information Technology Audits


The independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP conducted the audit of DHS’ FY 2015 financial statements and is responsible for the attached information technology management letter and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express opinions on DHS’ financial statements or internal control, nor do we provide conclusions on compliance with laws and regulations. We will post the final report on our website.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Sharon Huiswoud, Director, Information Systems and Acquisitions Division, at (202) 254-5451.

Attachment

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-16-89
December 20, 2015

Office of Inspector General,
Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In planning and performing our audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department), as of and for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”), in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements, we considered internal control over financial reporting (internal control) as a basis for designing our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the financial statements. In conjunction with our audit of the consolidated financial statements, we also performed an audit of internal control over financial reporting in accordance with attestation standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

During our audit, we noted certain matters involving internal control and other operational matters at Management Directorate, a component of DHS that are presented for your consideration. These comments and recommendations, all of which have been discussed with the appropriate members of management, are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

With respect to financial systems at Management Directorate, we noted certain internal control deficiencies in the general information technology (IT) control area of access controls. These matters are described in the Findings and Recommendations section of this letter.

Additionally, at the request of the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), we performed additional non-technical information security procedures to identify instances where Management Directorate personnel did not adequately comply with requirements for safeguarding sensitive material or assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. These matters are described in the Observations Related to Non-Technical Information Security section of this letter.

We have provided a description of the key Management Directorate financial system and IT infrastructure within the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit in Appendix A,
and a listing of each Management Directorate IT Notice of Finding and Recommendation communicated to management during our audit in Appendix B.

During our audit we noted certain matters involving financial reporting internal controls (comments not related to IT) and other operational matters at Management Directorate, and communicated them in writing to management and those charged with governance in our Independent Auditors’ Report and in a separate letter to the OIG and the DHS Chief Financial Officer.

Our audit procedures are designed primarily to enable us to form opinions on the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements and on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and therefore may not bring to light all deficiencies in policies or procedures that may exist. We aim, however, to use our knowledge of DHS’ organization gained during our work to make comments and suggestions that we hope will be useful to you.

We would be pleased to discuss these comments and recommendations with you at any time.

The purpose of this letter is solely to describe comments and recommendations intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies. Accordingly, this letter is not suitable for any other purpose.

Very truly yours,

KPMG LLP
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## APPENDICES

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OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH

Objective

We audited the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) for the year ended September 30, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements”). In connection with our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we performed an evaluation of selected general information technology (IT) controls (GITCs), and IT application controls at Management Directorate, a component of DHS, to assist in planning and performing our audit engagement. At the request of the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), we also performed additional information security testing procedures to assess certain non-technical areas related to the protection of sensitive IT and financial information and assets.

Scope and Approach

General Information Technology Controls and IT Entity-Level Controls

The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), formed the basis for our GITC and IT entity-level control (ELC) evaluation procedures.

FISCAM was designed to inform financial statement auditors about IT controls and related audit concerns to assist them in planning their audit work and to integrate the work of auditors with other aspects of the financial statement audit. FISCAM also provides guidance to auditors when considering the scope and extent of review that generally should be performed when evaluating GITCs, IT ELCs, and the IT environment of a Federal agency. FISCAM defines the following five control categories to be essential to the effective operation of GITCs, IT ELCs, and the IT environment:

1. **Security Management** – Controls that provide a framework and continuing cycle of activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of computer-related security controls.

2. **Access Control** – Controls that limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities) and protect against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure.

3. **Configuration Management** – Controls that help prevent unauthorized changes to information system resources (software programs and hardware configurations) and provide reasonable assurance that systems are configured and operating securely and as intended.

4. **Segregation of Duties** – Controls that constitute policies, procedures, and an organizational structure to manage who can control key aspects of computer-related operations.

5. **Contingency Planning** – Controls that involve procedures for continuing critical operations without interruption, or with prompt resumption, when unexpected events occur.
While each of these five FISCAM categories were considered during the planning and risk assessment phase of our audit, we selected GITCs for evaluation based on their relationship to the ongoing effectiveness of process-level automated controls or manual controls with one or more automated components. This includes those controls that depend on the completeness, accuracy, and integrity of information provided by the entity in support of our financial audit procedures. Consequently, FY 2015 GITC procedures at Management Directorate did not necessarily represent controls from each FISCAM category.

**Business Process Application Controls**

Where relevant GITCs were determined to be operating effectively, we performed testing over selected IT application controls (process-level controls that were either fully automated or manual with an automated component) on financial systems and applications to assess the financial systems’ internal controls over the input, processing, and output of financial data and transactions.

FISCAM defines business process application controls as the automated and/or manual controls applied to business transaction flows and related to the completeness, accuracy, validity, and confidentiality of transactions and data during application processing. They typically cover the structure, policies, and procedures that operate at a detailed business process (cycle or transaction) level and operate over individual transactions or activities across business processes.

**Financial System Functionality**

In recent years, we have noted that limitations in Management Directorate’s financial systems’ functionality may be inhibiting the agency’s ability to implement and maintain internal controls, including effective GITCs and IT application controls supporting financial data processing and reporting. Management Directorate’s financial system is hosted by its service provider, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Therefore, in FY 2015, we continued to evaluate and consider the impact of financial system functionality on internal control over financial reporting.

**Non-Technical Information Security Testing**

To complement our IT controls test work, we conducted limited after-hours physical security testing and social engineering at selected Management Directorate facilities to identify potential weaknesses in non-technical aspects of IT security. This includes those related to Management Directorate personnel awareness of policies, procedures, and other requirements governing the protection of sensitive IT and financial information and assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. This testing was performed in accordance with the FY 2015 DHS Security Testing Authorization Letter (STAL) signed by KPMG, DHS OIG, and DHS management.

Appendix A provides a description of the key Management Directorate financial systems and IT infrastructure within the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

During FY 2015, we identified GITC deficiencies at Management Directorate related to access controls.

The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited Management Directorate’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Of the five IT Notices of Findings and Recommendations (NFRs) issued during our FY 2015 testing at Management Directorate, two were repeat findings, either partially or in whole from the prior year, and three were new findings. The five IT NFRs issued represent deficiencies and observations related to two of the five FISCAM GITC categories.

The majority of findings resulted from the lack of properly documented, fully designed and implemented, adequately detailed, and consistently implemented financial system controls to comply with the requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Information Technology Security Program; National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance; and Management Directorate policies and procedures, as applicable. The most significant weakness from a financial statement audit perspective included access control documentation not being maintained.

During our IT audit procedures, we also evaluated and considered the impact of financial system functionality on financial reporting. In recent years, we have noted that limitations in Management Directorate’s financial systems’ functionality, which is hosted and supported by ICE, may be inhibiting Management Directorate’s ability to implement and maintain effective internal control and to effectively and efficiently process and report financial data. Many key financial and feeder systems have not been substantially updated since being inherited from legacy agencies several years ago. Many key Management Directorate financial systems were not compliant with Federal financial management system requirements as defined by the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) and Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A-123 Appendix D, Compliance with FFMIA.

While the recommendations made by us should be considered by Management Directorate, it is the ultimate responsibility of Management to determine the most appropriate method(s) for addressing the deficiencies identified.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

During our audit of the FY 2015 DHS consolidated financial statements, we identified the following GITC deficiencies at Management Directorate:

Access Controls and Segregation of Duties

- A complete and accurate listing of contractors separated during the fiscal year cannot be produced.
- Access authorization documentation was not maintained for the two Human Resources (HR) related systems.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) and the Management Directorate Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO), in coordination with the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) and the DHS OCFO, make the following improvements to Management Directorate’s financial management systems and associated IT security program (in accordance with Management and DHS requirements, as applicable):

Access Controls

- Develop a check-out process for departing contractors.
- Develop, document, and implement an access approval process for users.
OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO NON-TECHNICAL INFORMATION SECURITY

To complement our IT controls test work during the FY 2015 audit, we performed additional non-technical information security procedures at Management Directorate. These procedures included after-hours physical security walkthroughs and social engineering to identify instances where Management Directorate personnel did not adequately comply with requirements for safeguarding sensitive material or assets from unauthorized access or disclosure. These procedures were performed in accordance with the FY 2015 STAL, signed by DHS OIG management, KPMG management, and DHS management on May 20, 2015, and transmitted to the DHS CIO Council on May 27, 2015.

Social Engineering

Social engineering is defined as the act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging sensitive information. The term typically applies to trickery or deception for the purpose of gathering information or obtaining computer system access. The objective of our social engineering tests was to identify the extent to which Management Directorate personnel were willing to divulge network or system passwords that, if exploited, could compromise Management Directorate’s sensitive information.

To conduct this testing, we made phone calls from various Management Directorate locations at various times throughout the audit. Posing as Management Directorate technical support personnel, we attempted to solicit access credentials from Management Directorate users. Attempts to log into Management Directorate systems were not performed; however, we assumed that disclosed passwords that met the minimum password standards established by DHS policy were valid exceptions. During social engineering performed at Management Directorate, we attempted to call a total of 45 employees and contractors and reached 13. Of those 13 individuals with whom we spoke, three divulged passwords in violation of DHS policy.

The selection of attempted or connected calls was not statistically derived, and, therefore, the results described here should not be used to extrapolate to Management Directorate as a whole.

After-Hours Physical Security Walkthroughs

Multiple DHS policies, including the DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, the DHS Privacy Office Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally-Identifiable Information (PII), and DHS Management Directive (MD) 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) (FOUO) Information, mandate the physical safeguarding of certain materials and assets that, if compromised either due to external or insider threat, could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, or exploitation of sensitive IT or financial information.

We performed procedures to determine whether Management Directorate personnel consistently exercised responsibilities related to safeguarding sensitive materials as defined in these policies. Specifically, we performed escorted walkthroughs of workspaces – including cubicles, offices, shared workspaces, and/or common areas (e.g., areas where printers were hosted) – at Management Directorate facilities that processed, maintained, and/or had access to financial data during FY 2015. We inspected
workspaces to identify instances where materials designated by DHS policy as requiring physical security from unauthorized access were left unattended. Exceptions noted were validated by designated representatives from Management Directorate, DHS OIG, and DHS OCIO.

During after-hours physical security walkthroughs performed at Management Directorate, we inspected a total of 28 workspaces. Of those, 12 were observed to have material – including, but not limited to, system passwords, information marked “FOUO”, documents containing sensitive PII, and government-issued laptops or storage media – left unattended and unsecured after business hours in violation of DHS policy.

The selection of inspected areas was not statistically derived, and, therefore, the results described here should not be used to extrapolate to Management Directorate as a whole.
Appendix A

Description of Key Management Directorate Financial Systems and IT Infrastructure within the Scope of the FY 2015 DHS Financial Statement Audit
Below is a description of the significant Management Directorate financial management systems and supporting IT infrastructure included in the scope of the FY 2015 DHS financial statement audit.

Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)

FFMS is a mainframe-based major application and the official accounting system of record for Management Directorate. It is used to create and maintain a record of each allocation, commitment, obligation, travel advance, and accounts receivable. The system supports all internal and external financial reporting requirements.

The Management Directorate instance of FFMS is hosted and supported by the ICE OCIO, exclusively for internal use by the Management Directorate user community and on a limited basis, ICE OCIO and finance center personnel performing support services for Management Directorate.

The application is hosted at Datacenter 2 in Clarksville, VA, and is supported by the IBM z/OS mainframe and Oracle databases.

Web Time and Attendance (WebTA)

WebTA is a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) web-based major application hosted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Finance Center (NFC) and developed, operated, and maintained by the NFC IT Services Division and NFC Risk Management Staff. The DHS Office of Human Capital (OHC) utilizes NFC and WebTA to process the front-end input and certification of time and attendance entries by the Management Directorate user community to facilitate payroll processing.

EmpowHR

EmpowHR is a COTS web-based major application hosted by the USDA NFC and developed, operated, and maintained by the NFC IT services division and NFC Risk Management Staff. DHS components utilize NFC and EmpowHR to initiate, authorize and send personnel data to NFC for processing.
Appendix B

FY 2015 IT Notices of Findings and Recommendations at Management Directorate
<table>
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<th>FY 2015 NFR #</th>
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Appendix E
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Under Secretary for Management
Chief Privacy Officer

Management

Deputy Under Secretary
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Information Officer

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

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