USCIS

We identified deficiencies in E-Verify’s processes for confirming identity during employment verification.  E-Verify’s photo matching process is not fully automated, but rather, relies on employers to confirm individuals’ identities by manually reviewing photos.  We attribute these deficiencies to USCIS not developing or evaluating the plans and internal controls needed to improve its processes and detect, track, and investigate system errors.  Until USCIS addresses E-Verify’s deficiencies, it cannot ensure the system provides accurate employment eligibility results.  We made 10 recommendations to improve E-Verify’s accuracy, internal controls, and workload capabilities.  USCIS concurred with all 10 recommendations.

We determined that DHS needs to improve the collection and management of data across its multiple components to better serve and safeguard the public.  The data access, availability, accuracy, completeness, and relevance issues we identified presented numerous obstacles for DHS personnel who did not have essential information they needed for decision making or to effectively and efficiently carry out day-to-day mission operations.  Although DHS has improved its information security program and developed plans to improve quality and management of its data, follow through and continued improvement will be essential to address the internal control issues underlying the data deficiencies highlighted in the report.  We made no recommendations in the summary report.

This report offers DHS OIG’s initial observations on the PACR and HARP programs based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso, Texas area and analysis of data and information provided by CBP and USCIS headquarters.  We determined that CBP rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness.  Additionally, we determined there are potential challenges with the PACR and HARP programs related to how aliens are held and provided access to counsel and representation, and how CBP and USCIS assign staff to program duties and track aliens in the various agency systems.  We made six recommendations to improve PACR and HARP program implementation.  DHS did not concur with five of the six recommendations, stating that lawsuits and the COVID-19 pandemic had, in effect, ended the programs.  We reviewed evidence provided by CBP and concluded the lawsuits themselves did not terminate the PACR and HARP pilot programs.  Therefore, the recommendations remain open and unresolved.  If the programs resume, we plan to resume actual or virtual site visits and issue a report detailing DHS’ full implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs.

DHS’ information security program was effective for fiscal year 2018 because the Department earned the targeted maturity rating, “Managed and Measurable” (Level 4) in four of five functions, as compared to last year’s lower overall rating, “Consistently Implemented” (Level 3). We attributed DHS’ progress to improvements in information security risk, configuration management practices, continuous monitoring, and more effective security training. By addressing the remaining deficiencies, DHS can further improve its security program ensuring its systems adequately protect the critical and sensitive data they store and process.

USCIS has inadequate controls for verifying that foreign nationals seeking lawful permanent residence status meet health-related standards for admissibility. First, USCIS is not properly vetting the physicians it designates as civil surgeons. We determined that USCIS designated physicians with a history of patient abuse or a criminal record as civil surgeons. This is occurring because USCIS does not have adequate policies to ensure only suitable physicians are designated as civil surgeons. Second, when reviewing these foreign nationals’ required medical forms, ISOs are accepting incomplete and inaccurate forms because they are not adequately trained and because USCIS is not enforcing its existing policies. USCIS may be placing foreign nationals at risk of abuse by some civil surgeons. USCIS could also be exposing the U.S. population to contagious or dangerous health conditions from foreign nationals erroneously granted lawful permanent resident status.

We conducted a verification review to determine the adequacy, effectiveness, and timeliness of USCIS' corrective actions to address the seven report recommendations in Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance, OIG-17-11, November 16, 2016. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful.

"U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, including applications for permanent resident cards, also known as green cards. In response to congressional concerns, we examined green card application processing times, as well as why processing times vary among USCIS field offices. USCIS regularly posts information on its website about the time it takes field offices to adjudicate green card applications (processing time). Yet, the information is unclear and not helpful to USCIS’ customers because it does not reflect the actual amount of time it takes field offices, on average, to complete green card applications.

In light of the heightened public and congressional interest in the misuse of government-owned, government-leased, and chartered aircraft, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a special review of the use of government aircraft by the heads of the Department and several of DHS’s operational components. DHS OIG’s review also included a review of other-than-coach-class travel by this same group of senior officials. We determined that each instance of the use of government aircraft by DHS’s senior leaders during the time period of our review generally complied with relevant laws, rules, regulations, policies, and guidance.

With respect to DHS senior leaders’ other-than-coach-class (OTCC) commercial air travel over the same time period, we determined that such travel generally qualified as allowable premium travel. We could not definitively determine, however, whether one trip taken by a former Deputy Secretary met all of the Department’s criteria for allowable OTCC travel. We also identified two specific instances of non-compliance with the Department’s internal request and approval processes for such travel; however, the related travel was properly justified, and the process deviations were quickly identified and corrected by the Department.

USCIS deployed this capability in April 2016 to improve processing of approximately 84,000 naturalization applications received each month. However, as before, the ELIS capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to­-end Form N-400 processing. ELIS repeatedly experienced outages and did not always perform as intended. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment. Given its focus on meeting established system release dates, USCIS did not fully address our prior report recommendations to improve user support, stakeholder engagement, performance measurement, and testing to ensure ELIS met user needs and improved operations.

CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption.

ICE, CBP, and USCIS continue to experience challenges with emerging immigration enforcement and administration activities. Although DHS has established unity of effort initiatives to break silos and centralize decision making related to immigration, problems remain. We identified challenges related to mission allocation and expenditure comparisons, the affirmative asylum application process, and the Department’s struggle to understand immigration outcomes and decisions. DHS will continue to allow vulnerabilities that may affect national security and public safety to persist.

 

USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B participants are compliant and not engaged in fraudulent activity. These visits assess whether petitioners and beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B petitions each year, which could include extensions and amendments. As of April 2017, USCIS reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. However, during FYs 2014–16, USCIS conducted an average of 7,200 ASVVP site visits annually. For the limited number of visits conducted, USCIS does not always ensure the IOs are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Further limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not ensure the agency always takes proper and timely action when IOs identify potential fraud or noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of fraud; however, the agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the results of these visits.

 

We determined that 9,389 aliens identified as having multiple identities had received an immigration benefit.  When taking into account the most current immigration benefit these aliens received, we determined that naturalization, permanent residence, work authorization, and temporary protected status represent the greatest number of benefits, accounting for 8,447 or 90 percent of the 9,389 cases.  Benefits for the remaining 10 percent of cases include applications for asylum and appeals to immigration court decisions.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has drafted a policy memorandum, Guidance for Prioritizing IDENT Derogatory Information Related to Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records, outlining how it will review cases of individuals with multiple identities whose fingerprints were uploaded into the Automated Biometric Identification System through Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records.  We did not make any recommendations.

KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited USCIS’ financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including monitoring and recording employee completion of the annual ethics and integrity training; review and approval of H1-B and L fraud fee journal entries; recording of property, plant, and equipment; and inaccurate and unsupported data in some systems.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls for the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (USCIS) core financial and feeder systems.  The deficiencies collectively limited USCIS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that USCIS, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s CIO and ACFO, make improvements to USCIS’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

We determined that USCIS charges employers a flat fee per H-2 petition, regardless of whether 1) the employer is petitioning for one temporary non-immigrant worker, or hundreds of workers, and 2) it takes just minutes or days and weeks for USCIS to process the petition.  USCIS also did not limit the number of workers that employers can request on one petition, thus creating disparities in the cost employers pay to bring foreign workers into the United States.  We also found that large petitions are prone to errors that can have national security implications.  According to USCIS, the flat fee is used because USCIS systems do not capture the time required to adjudicate petitions with various numbers of workers.  We made three recommendations to improve the fee structure and vetting process.