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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-12-77  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2011 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2012
OIG-12-85  

>CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security 		2012
OIG-12-86  

>Improvements Needed To Strengthen the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Initial Validation Process for Highway Carriers 		2012
OIG-12-95  

>CBP Information Technology Management: Strengths and Challenges (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-12-117  

>Customs and Border Protection's Office of Regulatory Audit 		2012
OIG-12-132  

>CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross Border Tunnels 		2012
OIG-12-131 U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Penalty Process – Statute of Limitations 2012
OIG-13-26 DNDO reported that there are currently 444 radiation portal monitors operating at seaports throughout the U.S., which are meeting the requirement to screen all containerized cargo at the 22 seaports with the most container volume. We were unable to determine whether DNDO and CBP initially deployed radiation portal monitors to ensure operational efficiency because the components did not thoroughly document deployment decisions and plans. Although all cargo is being screened, we identified some radiation portal monitors utilized infrequently or not utilized at all.

>United States Customs and Border Protection’s Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports 		2013
OIG-13-35 We have reviewed the accompanying Performance Summary Report of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. CBP’s management is responsible for the Performance Summary Report and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2013
OIG-13-34 We have reviewed the accompanying Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. CBP’s management is responsible for the preparation of the Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations, related disclosures, and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations 		2013
OIG-13-53 We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a Component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as of September 30, 2012 and 2011, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statements of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as “consolidated financial statements”) for the years then ended. The objective of our audits was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these consolidated financial statements. In connection with our fiscal year 2012 audit, we also considered CBP’s internal control over financial reporting and tested CBP’s compliance with certain provisions of applicable laws, regulations, and contracts that could have a direct and material effect on these consolidated financial statements.

>Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2012 Financial Statements 		2013
OIG-13-48 We have audited the consolidated balance sheets of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a Component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as of September 30, 2012 and 2011, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and the combined statements of budgetary resources (hereinafter, referred to as “consolidated financial statements”) for the years then ended. In planning and performing our audit of CBP’s consolidated financial statements, we considered CBP’s internal control over financial reporting in order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the consolidated financial statements.

>Management Letter for U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2013
OIG-13-88 We have audited the consolidated balance sheets of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a Component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as of September 30, 2012, and 2011, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and the combined statements of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as “consolidated financial statements”) for the years then ended. In planning and performing our audit engagement of CBP’s consolidated financial statements, we considered CBP’s internal control over financial reporting in order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the consolidated financial statements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2012 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit (Revised) 		2013
OIG-13-89 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 62 H-60 helicopters operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), both of which are converting the helicopters to add about 15 years of operational life. These conversions include repairing the airframes as well as installing updated equipment. We performed this audit to determine whether DHS, CBP, and the USCG have efficiently acquired, converted, and modified these helicopters.

>DHS’ H-60 Helicopter Programs (Revised) 		2013
OIG-13-119 Within the Department of Homeland Security, under the Foreign Military Sales program, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) procures and provides defense-related articles and services to foreign governments, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) controls exports of articles related to Foreign Military Sales. In February 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office deemed Foreign Military Sales a high risk area for the Federal Government. We performed this audit to determine whether CBP and the USCG have adequate controls over the Foreign Military Sales export process.

>CBP’s and USCG’s Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales 		2013
OIG-13-118 We reviewed the efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to address the risk posed by trusted insiders. Our objective was to assess CBP’s progress toward protecting its information technology assets from threats posed by its employees, especially those with trusted or elevated access to sensitive information systems or data. CBP has made progress in addressing the risk of insider threats across the organization. Specifically, CBP established a working group and a committee focused on the risk. Further, CBP researches employee behavior, conducts pre-employment screening including polygraph assessments, and participates in border corruption task forces with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Taken Steps To Address Insider Threat, but Challenges Remain (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-13-114 Following April 2012 media reports regarding the death of an undocumented immigrant while in the custody of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in May 2010, Senator Robert Menendez and 15 members of Congress requested that we review the use of force within CBP. We reviewed allegations of the use of excessive force by CBP employees and determined what reforms CBP has implemented. We also examined what effect adding more agents and officers to the workforce has had on training and professionalism. Allegations of employee misconduct that are entered into Department of Homeland Security (DHS) case management systems are assigned one of several case allegation types; however, there is no primary use of force designation. As a result, we were unable to identify the total number of excessive force allegations and investigations involving CBP employees.

>CBP Use of Force Training and Actions To Address Use of Force Incidents (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-14-41 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 10, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Detailed Accounting Submission and related disclosures. This report contains no recommendations.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2013 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2014
OIG-14-40 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 10, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Performance Summary Report. This report contains no recommendations

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2013 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2014
OIG-14-32 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program in 1995, as a border management initiative to accelerate the inspection of pre-enrolled low-risk travelers at designated southern land border United States ports of entry. Participants voluntarily provide personally identifiable information to CBP, undergo background checks, and use dedicated lanes that allow CBP to maintain border integrity, security, and law enforcement responsibilities. However, some program members have abused their privileges and transported illicit goods across the border. Smugglers and drug traffickers have also targeted program participants as conduits for illegal cross-border activities. In addition, some CBP officers serving at ports of entry potentially pose an insider threat. As a result, effective internal controls are essential for the program to deter and detect illegal activity.

>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP’s Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program (Redacted) 		2014
OIG-14-47 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing regulations, including those related to trade, customs, and immigration. CBP’s Advanced Training Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, provides advanced law enforcement training to CBP personnel. We performed this audit to determine whether CBP provided effective oversight and managed the fourth phase of the Advanced Training Center acquisition in accordance with Federal, departmental, and Component requirements. CBP did not effectively oversee and manage the fourth phase of the Advanced Training Center acquisition. The $55.7 million Interagency Agreement between CBP and its Economy Act service provider, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was not developed and executed according to ederal, departmental, and Component requirements.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Advanced Training Center Acquisition 		2014
OIG-14-59 We have audited the accompanying consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which comprise the consolidated balance sheets as of September 30, 2013 and 2012, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statements of budgetary resources for the years then ended, and the related notes to the consolidated financial statements.

>Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2013 Financial Statement 		2014
OIG-14-65 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’ (CBP) fiscal year (FY) 2013 consolidated financial statements. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG is responsible for the attached management letter dated March 19, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it.

>Management Letter for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2013 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2014
OIG-14-96 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2013 consolidated financial statements. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG is responsible for the attached management letter dated March 11, 2014, and the conclusion expressed in it.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2013 United States Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2014
OIG-11-97 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by U.S. Customs and Border Protection for Construction of Land Ports of Entry (Revised) 2011
OIG-14-117 To improve operations, CBP developed a threer-pronged Resource Optimization Strategy. The second prong of the strategy is the Workload Staffing Model, which CBP uses to identify staffing needs for its Office of Field Operations’ CBP Officers at ports of entry. We conducted this audit to determine the reliability of the Workload Staffing Model in establishing the number of CBP Officers needed to fulfill mission requirements. CBP’s Workload Staffing Model includes a sound methodology to determine its staffing needs for CBP Officers and identify staffing shortages. However, the results of the model may not be accurate because CBP cannot ensure that the data entered into the model is reliable. CBP also does not have adequate internal controls over the model. Specifically, CBP’s Office of Field Operations does not (1) catalog, track, and validate all data and systems used in workload calculations; (2) systematically approve changes and additions to the Workload Staffing Model; and (3) have written policies and procedures on developing and using the model. In its December 2013 Strategy and Action Plan (2014 tо 2017), CBP acknowledges concerns about data from other systems used in the Workload Staffing Model.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model 		2014
OIG-14-131 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures our Nation’s borders and facilitates lawful international trade and travel while enforcing Federal laws and regulations. To accomplish its mission, CBP often stations officers and agents in remote areas of the country without adequate housing options. In 2008, CBP identified a need for employee housing along the southwest border, particularly in Arizona and Texas, given the remoteness and limited housing market. CBP began planning the construction of employee housing in Ajo, Arizona, in 2008 and completed construction in late 2012. We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP followed good business practices in planning and managing employee housing in Ajo, Arizona.

>CBP Did Not Effectively Plan and Manage Employee Housing in Ajo, Arizona (Revised) ( 		2014
OIG-14-139 The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs radio frequency identification technology in its Trusted Traveler Programs to allow preͲscreened travelers expedited processing at designated ports of .Radio frequency identification is a form of automatic identification and data capture technology that uses radio frequencies to transmit information. The flexibility and portability of radio frequency identification technology has introduced new security risks to agency systems, such as cloning of an identification tag and the security of the database that stores personal data. Without effective security controls and procedures over this technology and its supporting infrastructure, unauthorized individuals could modify identification tag content or access sensitive data stored in the system databases.

>Enhancements in Technical Controls and Training Can Improve the Security of CBP’s Trusted Traveler Programs 		2014
OIG-14-144 An anonymous whistleblower alleged that USBP agents assigned to headquarters “illegally claim” AUO daily but do not perform duties justifying their AUO claims. Further, the whistleblower asserted that, “the duties and responsibilities of Border Patrol headquarters employees are regular, predictable, and controllable and that headquarters work is not sufficiently urgent to warrant the use of AUO.”

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Border Patrol Headquarters ( 		2014
OIG-15-07 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ysleta Border Patrol Station (Ysleta Station) in El Paso, Texas. The whistleblower alleged that supervisors and border patrol agents at the Ysleta Station claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. The whistleblower also alleged that supervisors at the Ysleta Station authorize AUO to compensate injured agents who are assigned administrative duties and are not working overtime hours. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Ysleta Station did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most activities that second-line supervisory border patrol agents performed during AUO hours and some activities that first-line supervisory agents and nonsupervisory agents performed appear to have been administratively controllable. We did not find evidence to substantiate that Ysleta Station agents who sustained work-related injuries were paid AUO improperly.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Border Patrol, Ysleta Station 		2015
OIG-15-11 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees at U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center–Cargo, in Herndon, Virginia and the National Targeting Center– Passenger, in Reston, Virginia. The whistleblower alleged that employees in both locations regularly claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. The National Targeting Center did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most of the tasks employees performed during AUO hours appear to have been administratively controllable.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center 		2014
OIG-15-13 In most instances, the CBP Miami Field Office complied with CBP policies and procedures. We found only minor deficiencies in CBP Miami Field Office operations for cargo targeting and seized asset management. For passenger screening, Miami International Airport leveraged an existing system to track passengers who have records for violations of laws or other significant events. Other Miami Field Office ports of entry could benefit from this “one-stop system” that would allow them to document, monitor, and report on targeting passengers in real time. The field office could improve the consistency of its recordkeeping for changes to the biometric watchlist. Also, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to improve its compliance with safeguards for using high security bolt seals during cargo screening. Lastly, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to update its policy and procedures for agriculture inspections so they align with current U.S. Department of Agriculture procedures.

>Inspection of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Miami Field Office Ports of Entry 		2015
OIG-15-17 We conducted this audit to determine the effectiveness and cost of the Unmanned Aircraft System program, in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP) has invested significant funds. Although CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP cannot prove that the program is effective because it has not developed performance measures. The program has also not achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals, and we found little or no evidence CBP has met its program expectations. We estimate it costs $12,255 per flight hour to operate the program; CBP’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include all operating costs. By not recognizing all operating costs, CBP cannot accurately assess the program’s cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program expansion. In addition, Congress and the public may be unaware of all the resources committed to the program. As a result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has improved border security. The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better use by investing in alternatives.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations 		2015
OIG-15-20 We conducted this evaluation in response to a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees in the U.S. Border Patrol’s (USBP) El Centro Sector Headquarters in El Centro, California. The whistleblower alleged that Border Patrol agents detailed to the El Centro Sector Headquarters as CrossFit instructors claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. Border Patrol agents also serve as CrossFit instructors in seven other Border Patrol sector headquarters. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Employees must remain on duty not merely because it is desirable, but because of compelling reasons inherently related to continuance of their duties, and of such a nature that failure to carry on would constitute negligence. CrossFit is a fitness program that employs endurance and fast-switch strength movements as a form of physical conditioning. Eight USBP sectors include CrossFit classes in their physical fitness programs. Six of the eight sectors paid AUO to Border Patrol agents engaged as CrossFit instructors. AUO paid to Border Patrol agents for CrossFit instruction and related activities, such as gym maintenance and class preparation, was inconsistent with Federal AUO regulations. The hours of duty for CrossFit instruction and related activities could have been controlled administratively. In addition, CrossFit duties were not so compelling that failure to complete those duties would have constituted negligence. USBP discontinued AUO payments for CrossFit instruction and related activities in January 2014.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse by U.S. Border Patrol Agents Engaged as CrossFit Instructors 		2015
OIG-15-26 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year (FY) 2014 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. CBP management prepared the Performance Summary Report and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of ONDCP circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary (Circular), dated January 18, 2013. Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that the Performance Summary Report for the year ended September 30, 2014, is not presented, in all material respects, in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2015
OIG-15-25 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Detailed Accounting Submission. CBP management prepared the Table of fiscal year 2014 Drug Control Obligations (Table) and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary (Circular), dated January 18, 2013. Some of the assumptions CBP used for computing obligations by decision units are based on surveys completed in prior years. While CBP management represented that the assumptions used continue to be valid for purposes of computing obligations presented in the Table, KPMG was unable to perform review procedures supporting that representation. Based on its review, except for matters noted above, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that the Detailed Accounting Submission for the year ended September 30, 2014, is not presented, in all material respects, in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2015
OIG-15-36 Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Internal Affairs (OSC File No. DI-14-0666) 2015
OIG-15-39 CBP did not effectively target and examine rail shipments entering the United States from Mexico and Canada. Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPO) did not always target shipments using the mandatory Automated Targeting System (ATS) targeting criteria. CBPOs also did not always use the required radiation detection equipment to examine high-risk shipments. Finally, CBPOs did not always record the results of their rail cargo examinations in the Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS). CBPOs were unaware of the correct targeting criteria or inadvertently used inappropriate criteria. In addition, one port did not have the required radiation detection equipment for its rail team, and CBPOs at two other ports used Personal Radiation Detectors to examine shipments. Rail CBPOs also received insufficient training on the use of ATS and CERTS. Finally, Supervisory CBPOs did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure CBPOs followed CBP policy. As a result, CBP may have failed to target or properly examine rail shipments that were at an increased risk to contain contraband or dangerous materials. In addition, CBP has no assurance that decisions to release these high-risk shipments into U.S. commerce were appropriate.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Did Not Effectively Target and Examine Rail Shipments From Canada and Mexico 		2015
OIG-15-53 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) program is vital to securing the Nation’s borders while facilitating efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP uses NII equipment to screen cargo and conveyances at our Nation’s land, sea, and air ports of entry. In fiscal year 2014, CBP awarded six contracts and one interagency agreement valued at approximately $90.4 million to perform preventive and corrective maintenance of NII equipment. We performed this audit to determine whether maintenance is being performed on CBP’s screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. CBP monitored NII operations using methods such as conducting daily meetings to discuss NII availability and reviewing field office submissions of utilization reports. However, CBP has not ensured that contractors perform preventive and corrective maintenance on its screening equipment in accordance with contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. This deficiency occurred because CBP has not verified that maintenance is performed in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, evaluated contractors’ performance, and assessed the reliability of maintenance data. Without a process to validate maintenance data and to evaluate and assess that NII equipment is being repaired and maintained in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications, CBP’s NII equipment may not be repaired and maintained to retain full functionality and maximum useful life.

>CBP's Oversight of Its Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment Maintenance Contracts Needs Improvement 		2015
OIG-15-64 U .S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Houston Seaport is the fifth largest port for arriving containers and the largest petrochemical complex in the Nation. CBP is responsible for identifying high-risk cargo shipments arriving at the port that pose a possible threat to national security. We conducted this review to determine whether the Houston Seaport complied with CBP's National Maritime Targeting Policy (NMTP) and Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS) Port Guidance. The Houston Seaport generally complied with the NMTP and CERTS Port Guidance. However, CBP could improve its documentation of waivers and exceptions to mandatory examinations of high-risk cargo. In addition, CBP could improve access controls for authorizing Port Director waivers within CERTS.

>CBP's Houston Seaport Generally Complied with Cargo Examination Requirements but Could Improve Its Documentation of Waivers and Exceptions (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-15-76 The independent public accounting firm, KPMG LLP, has issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s fiscal year 2014 consolidated financial statements. In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of CBP as of September 30, 2014.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Financial Statements 		2015
OIG-15-81 KPMG LLP reviewed CBP’s internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains 20 observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s consideration.

>Management Letter for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit ( 		2015
OIG-15-60 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls, entity level controls, and business process application controls. KPMG LLP determined that CBP took corrective action by designing and consistently implementing certain account management controls.

>Information Technology Management Letter For the FY 2014 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-15-91 The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the commercial trade system designed to automate border processing to enhance border security and foster our Nation's economic security. CBP spent approximately $3.2 billion on the development of the ACE program from fiscal year 2001 through July 2013, when it was restructured to a rapid deployment strategy called Agile. Currently, in large part due to the implementation of Agile, CBP is on track to meet its milestones for the deployment of ACE. However, CBP has not ensured the internal control environment has kept pace with the rapid deployment of the ACE program. Specifically, CBP has not conducted risk assessments to identify potential gaps in data reliability, and has not fully developed and implemented performance measures for the program.

>CBP is on Track to Meet ACE Milestones, but It Needs to Enhance Internal Controls 		2015
OIG-15-95 Streamline is an initiative to criminally prosecute individuals who illegally enter the United States through defined geographic regions along the Southwest border. Although U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol measures Streamline’s effect on re-entry of illegal aliens, its metrics do not reflect an alien’s crossing history, re-entry, or re-apprehension over multiple years. As a result, Border Patrol is not fully and accurately measuring Streamline’s effect on deterring aliens from entering and re­entering the country illegally. Additionally, because Border Patrol does not distinguish Streamline costs from the costs of its other border enforcement consequences, Border Patrol is not able to differentiate Streamline-associated costs. Finally, according to ICE ERO, Streamline has increased the workload at some of its Southwest border field offices. However, ERO cannot be certain which aliens it removes as a result of Streamline and which removals result from other enforcement actions.

>Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing 		2015
OIG-12-104 CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management Tracking System (Revised) 2012
OIG-15-137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed the Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI)—an index of relevant data in existing systems—to augment Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) ability to gather and develop information about persons, events, and cargo of interest. We performed this audit to determine the status of AFI implementation and whether effective controls have been applied to protect the sensitive information processed and stored by the system. CBP has made significant progress in implementing AFI. CBP fully deployed AFI on schedule and within budget, and has taken measures to secure the sensitive information the system processes and stores from unauthorized access. In addition, CBP developed a privacy impact assessment to ensure that privacy considerations for operating AFI were addressed throughout system deployment. Since deployment, system users have provided positive feedback to the component about AFI’s functionality and usefulness. Despite these positive steps, we identified deficiencies that the component must address to further secure the system.

>Enhancements to Technical Controls Can Improve the Security of CBP's Analytical Framework for Intelligence 		2015
OIG-16-25 In June 2015, we received a hotline complaint that “due to repair cost,” CBP’s contractor in the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector was transporting some detainees in non-air-conditioned vehicles. The complainant also alleged the contractor did not maintain some vehicles adequately and would hide “defective” vehicles from inspection. In August 2015, we conducted unannounced spot inspections of CBP’s contractor’s vehicles in the Tucson sector. The contractor did not hide vehicles from inspection. Through our inspections, we determined the contractor’s vehicles could reach reasonable temperatures or were operating at reasonable temperatures; we also determined that CBP and its contractor had addressed previously known problems with inadequate vehicle air conditioning. Finally, we reviewed the contractor’s maintenance program and determined the contractor has adequate policies, procedures, and processes to maintain detainee transport vehicles, and the Border Patrol’s Tucson sector has sufficient oversight of the contractor’s program.

>Response to Allegations that a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Contractor Transport Detainees in Non-Air-Conditioned Vehicles (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-27 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Detailed Accounting Submission. CBP’s management prepared the Table of FY 2015 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). CBP management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the underlying assumptions used to calculate the total obligations reported in the Table for all Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Function assumptions. As a result, KPMG was unable to complete their review procedures over those assumptions. Except as noted above, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused them to believe that the FY 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria set forth in the Circular.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2016
OIG-16-26 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year 2015 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. CBP’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2015 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2015 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2016

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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