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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces 		2020
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-22-64 DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-21-16 This report offers DHS OIG’s initial observations on the PACR and HARP programs based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso, Texas area and analysis of data and information provided by CBP and USCIS headquarters.  We determined that CBP rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness.  Additionally, we determined there are potential challenges with the PACR and HARP programs related to how aliens are held and provided access to counsel and representation, and how CBP and USCIS assign staff to program duties and track aliens in the various agency systems.  We made six recommendations to improve PACR and HARP program implementation.  DHS did not concur with five of the six recommendations, stating that lawsuits and the COVID-19 pandemic had, in effect, ended the programs.  We reviewed evidence provided by CBP and concluded the lawsuits themselves did not terminate the PACR and HARP pilot programs.  Therefore, the recommendations remain open and unresolved.  If the programs resume, we plan to resume actual or virtual site visits and issue a report detailing DHS’ full implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs.

>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs 		2021
OIG-18-37 Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image.

>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-20-66 DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA 		2020
OIG-20-06 DHS did not have the Information Technology (IT) system functionality needed to track separated migrant families during the execution of Zero Tolerance.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) adopted various ad hoc methods to record and track family separations, but this practice introduced widespread errors.  These conditions persisted because CBP did not address known IT deficiencies before the Zero Tolerance Policy was implemented in May 2018.  DHS also did not provide adequate guidance to personnel responsible for executing the policy.  Because of the IT deficiencies, we could not confirm the total number of families DHS separated during the Zero Tolerance period.  DHS estimated Border Patrol agents separated 3,014 children from their families while the policy was in place.  DHS also estimated it completed 2,155 reunifications, although this effort continued on for seven months beyond the July 2018 deadline for reunifying children with their parents.  However, we conducted a review of DHS data during the Zero Tolerance period and identified 136 children with potential family relationships that were not accurately recorded by CBP.  In a broader analysis of DHS data between the dates of October 1, 2017 to February 14, 2019, we identified an additional 1,233 children with potential family relationships not accurately recorded by CBP.  Without a reliable accounting of all family relationships, we could not validate the total number of separations, or the completion of reunifications.  Although DHS spent thousands of hours and more than $1 million in overtime costs, it did not achieve the original goal of deterring “Catch-and-Release” through the Zero Tolerance Policy.  Moreover, the surge in apprehended families during this time period resulted in children being held in CBP facilities beyond the 72-hour legal limit.  The Department concurred with all five report recommendations.

>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families 		2020
OIG-22-02 DHS could not provide any performance measures and provided only limited data to demonstrate the full extent or effectiveness of its efforts to enforce wildlife trafficking laws.  In addition, CBP personnel inconsistently recorded data on wildlife encounters, and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents did not always completely or accurately record actions and data related to wildlife trafficking.  CBP personnel also did not always demonstrate that they involved ICE HSI special agents when suspecting wildlife trafficking crimes.  Finally, DHS did not establish performance goals to measure the results of its efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  We attributed these issues to DHS, CBP, and ICE not providing adequate oversight, including clear and comprehensive policies and procedures, of wildlife trafficking efforts.  As a result, DHS may be missing opportunities to curtail the spread of zoonotic viruses and disrupt transnational criminal organizations that use the same networks for other illicit trafficking, such as narcotics, humans, and weapons.  We made one recommendation to improve the Department’s efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  The Department concurred with the recommendation and provided a plan to improve its efforts.

>DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking 		2022
OIG-21-60 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody and is not required to do so.  Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic individuals.  According to CBP officials, as a frontline law enforcement agency, it does not have the necessary resources to conduct such testing.  For migrants that are transferred or released from CBP custody into the United States, CBP coordinates with DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and other Federal, state, and local partners for COVID-19 testing of migrants.  In addition, although DHS generally follows guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for COVID-19 preventative measures, the DHS’ multi-layered COVID-19 testing framework does not require CBP to conduct COVID-19 testing at CBP facilities.  Further, DHS’ Chief Medical Officer does not have the authority to direct or enforce COVID-19 testing procedures.  We recommended DHS reassess its COVID-19 response framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while balancing its primary mission of securing the border.  Additionally, we recommended DHS ensure the components continue to coordinate with the DHS Chief Medical Officer and provide available resources needed to operate safely and effectively during the COVID-19 pandemic and any future public health crisis.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ response to COVID-19 at the southwest border.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border 		2021
OIG-20-16 DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components.  We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities.  We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices.  DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.

>DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 		2020
OIG-22-66 DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border 2022
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019
OIG-08-19 DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 2008
OIG-07-38 DHS' Progress In Addressing Coordination Challenges Between Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2007
OIG-09-100  

>DHS' Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need Improvement 		2009
OIG-13-89 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 62 H-60 helicopters operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), both of which are converting the helicopters to add about 15 years of operational life. These conversions include repairing the airframes as well as installing updated equipment. We performed this audit to determine whether DHS, CBP, and the USCG have efficiently acquired, converted, and modified these helicopters.

>DHS’ H-60 Helicopter Programs (Revised) 		2013
OIG-20-69 We surveyed staff at Border Patrol stations and OFO ports of entry from April 22, 2020 to May 1, 2020.  The 136 Border Patrol stations and 307 OFO ports of entry that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among travelers, detained individuals, and staff.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and having personal protective equipment for staff, as well as supplies available to those individuals with whom they come into contact.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing and the risk of exposure to COVID-19 due to the close-contact nature of their work.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities expressed concerns regarding staff availability, however, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 at the facility.  Overall, the majority of respondents reported that their facilities were prepared to address COVID-19.

>Early Experiences with COVID-19 at Border Patrol Stations and OFO Ports of Entry 		2020
OIG-04-40 Effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection's Procedures to Detect Uranium In Two Smuggling Incidents, September 2004 2004
OIG-23-03 El Centro and San Diego Facilities Generally Met CBP's TEDS Standards but Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Data Integrity 2023
OIG-22-57 El Paso Sector Border Patrol Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Consistent Compliance with TEDS Standards 2022
OIG-14-139 The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs radio frequency identification technology in its Trusted Traveler Programs to allow preͲscreened travelers expedited processing at designated ports of .Radio frequency identification is a form of automatic identification and data capture technology that uses radio frequencies to transmit information. The flexibility and portability of radio frequency identification technology has introduced new security risks to agency systems, such as cloning of an identification tag and the security of the database that stores personal data. Without effective security controls and procedures over this technology and its supporting infrastructure, unauthorized individuals could modify identification tag content or access sensitive data stored in the system databases.

>Enhancements in Technical Controls and Training Can Improve the Security of CBP’s Trusted Traveler Programs 		2014
OIG-15-137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed the Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI)—an index of relevant data in existing systems—to augment Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) ability to gather and develop information about persons, events, and cargo of interest. We performed this audit to determine the status of AFI implementation and whether effective controls have been applied to protect the sensitive information processed and stored by the system. CBP has made significant progress in implementing AFI. CBP fully deployed AFI on schedule and within budget, and has taken measures to secure the sensitive information the system processes and stores from unauthorized access. In addition, CBP developed a privacy impact assessment to ensure that privacy considerations for operating AFI were addressed throughout system deployment. Since deployment, system users have provided positive feedback to the component about AFI’s functionality and usefulness. Despite these positive steps, we identified deficiencies that the component must address to further secure the system.

>Enhancements to Technical Controls Can Improve the Security of CBP's Analytical Framework for Intelligence 		2015
OIG-14-32 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program in 1995, as a border management initiative to accelerate the inspection of pre-enrolled low-risk travelers at designated southern land border United States ports of entry. Participants voluntarily provide personally identifiable information to CBP, undergo background checks, and use dedicated lanes that allow CBP to maintain border integrity, security, and law enforcement responsibilities. However, some program members have abused their privileges and transported illicit goods across the border. Smugglers and drug traffickers have also targeted program participants as conduits for illegal cross-border activities. In addition, some CBP officers serving at ports of entry potentially pose an insider threat. As a result, effective internal controls are essential for the program to deter and detect illegal activity.

>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP’s Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program (Redacted) 		2014
OIG-14-144 An anonymous whistleblower alleged that USBP agents assigned to headquarters “illegally claim” AUO daily but do not perform duties justifying their AUO claims. Further, the whistleblower asserted that, “the duties and responsibilities of Border Patrol headquarters employees are regular, predictable, and controllable and that headquarters work is not sufficiently urgent to warrant the use of AUO.”

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Border Patrol Headquarters ( 		2014
OIG-15-07 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Ysleta Border Patrol Station (Ysleta Station) in El Paso, Texas. The whistleblower alleged that supervisors and border patrol agents at the Ysleta Station claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. The whistleblower also alleged that supervisors at the Ysleta Station authorize AUO to compensate injured agents who are assigned administrative duties and are not working overtime hours. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Ysleta Station did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most activities that second-line supervisory border patrol agents performed during AUO hours and some activities that first-line supervisory agents and nonsupervisory agents performed appear to have been administratively controllable. We did not find evidence to substantiate that Ysleta Station agents who sustained work-related injuries were paid AUO improperly.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Border Patrol, Ysleta Station 		2015
OIG-15-11 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees at U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center–Cargo, in Herndon, Virginia and the National Targeting Center– Passenger, in Reston, Virginia. The whistleblower alleged that employees in both locations regularly claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. OSC referred this allegation to DHS Acting Secretary Rand Beers. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation and several other AUO-related allegations from other DHS components. We assembled a taskforce of auditors, program analysts, investigators, and attorneys to review these allegations. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. The National Targeting Center did not have sufficient AUO documentation to allow us to specifically identify a violation of law, rule, or regulation. However, most of the tasks employees performed during AUO hours appear to have been administratively controllable.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center 		2014
OIG-15-36 Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Internal Affairs (OSC File No. DI-14-0666) 2015
OIG-15-20 We conducted this evaluation in response to a whistleblower disclosure concerning employees in the U.S. Border Patrol’s (USBP) El Centro Sector Headquarters in El Centro, California. The whistleblower alleged that Border Patrol agents detailed to the El Centro Sector Headquarters as CrossFit instructors claim administratively uncontrollable overtime (AUO), but fail to perform duties that qualify for AUO. Border Patrol agents also serve as CrossFit instructors in seven other Border Patrol sector headquarters. Federal regulations allow agencies to pay AUO annually to employees in positions that require substantial amounts of irregular or occasional overtime work and in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively. Employees must remain on duty not merely because it is desirable, but because of compelling reasons inherently related to continuance of their duties, and of such a nature that failure to carry on would constitute negligence. CrossFit is a fitness program that employs endurance and fast-switch strength movements as a form of physical conditioning. Eight USBP sectors include CrossFit classes in their physical fitness programs. Six of the eight sectors paid AUO to Border Patrol agents engaged as CrossFit instructors. AUO paid to Border Patrol agents for CrossFit instruction and related activities, such as gym maintenance and class preparation, was inconsistent with Federal AUO regulations. The hours of duty for CrossFit instruction and related activities could have been controlled administratively. In addition, CrossFit duties were not so compelling that failure to complete those duties would have constituted negligence. USBP discontinued AUO payments for CrossFit instruction and related activities in January 2014.

>Evaluation of Alleged AUO Misuse by U.S. Border Patrol Agents Engaged as CrossFit Instructors 		2015
OIG-08-94 Evaluation of DHS’ Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2008 2008
OIG-IT-03-01 Final Obstacles Removed To Eliminate Customs Disaster Recovery Material Weakness 2003
OIG-03-083 This report was prepared by the Treasury Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) prior to the Homeland Security Department OIG's assumption on March 1, 2003 of responsibility for examining such matters. Homeland Security OIG will hereafter be responsible for monitoring the degree to which the report's recommendations are implemented

>FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Bureau of Customs And Border Protection Needs To Improve Compliance With The Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (CDSOA) 		2003
OIG-20-67 During our unannounced inspections of five U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities in the Laredo and San Antonio areas of Texas in February 2020, three Border Patrol stations and two Office of Field Operation ports of entry we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) standards we evaluated. We verified accessibility to water, food, toilets, sinks, basic hygiene supplies, and bedding. We observed clean facilities and verified that temperatures and ventilation in holding rooms were appropriate. Of the five facilities we visited, only one could provide on-site showers to detainees, but during our visits, no detainees were approaching the detention time threshold where a shower would be required. Because Border Patrol leadership directed all Border Patrol stations to implement Phase 2 of the enhanced medical screening ahead of the prescribed schedule outlined in CBP Directive 2100-004, the Border Patrol stations we visited were conducting alien intake health assessments using CBP Form 2500. These Ports of Entry had implemented Phase 1, but were not yet required to conduct Phase 2 assessments at the time of our inspection. We did not make any recommendations in this report.

>Five Laredo and San Antonio Area CBP Facilities Generally Complied with the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search 		2020
OIG-06-24 Follow Up Review of the Port Security Grant Program, (Revised) 2006
OIG-07-30 Follow-up Review on Recommendations from Audit of Procedures to Detect Uranium in Two Smuggling Incidents, Unclassified Summary 2007
OIG-12-84 Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver Eligibility 2012
OIG-10-51  

>FY 2009 Audit of CBP Consolidated Financial Statements 		2010
OIG-23-12 ICE and CBP Deaths in Custody during FY 2021 2023
OIG-22-70 ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations 2022
OIG-05-11 Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry 2005
OIG-06-64 Improved Administration Can Enhance U.S. Customs and Border Protection Classified Laptop Computer Security, Unclassified Summary 2006
OIG-07-16 Improved Administration Can Enhance U.S. Customs and Border Protection Laptop Computer Security (Redacted) 2007
OIG-05-39 Improved Security Required For U.S. Customs and Border Protection Networks (Redacted) 2005
OIG-12-86  

>Improvements Needed To Strengthen the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Initial Validation Process for Highway Carriers 		2012
OIG-09-14  

>Independent Auditor's Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2008 Consolidated Financial Statements ( 		2009
OIG-06-12 Independent Auditors' Report on CBP's FY 2005 Balance Sheet 2006
OIG-07-19 Independent Auditors' Report On CBP's FY 2006 Consolidated Financial Statements, 2007
OIG-17-36 KPMG, LLC expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s FY 2016 consolidated financial statements.  However, KPMG identified five significant deficiencies in internal control, three of which KPMG considers material weaknesses in the areas of information technology controls and financial systems functionality; financial reporting; and refunds and drawbacks of duties, taxes, and fees. The two other significant deficiencies in internal control are related to entity-level controls and custodial revenue - entry process.  KPMG made 18 recommendations to improve these areas.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2017
OIG-11-61  

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2010 Financial Statements 		2011
OIG-15-76 The independent public accounting firm, KPMG LLP, has issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s fiscal year 2014 consolidated financial statements. In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of CBP as of September 30, 2014.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2014 Financial Statements 		2015

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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