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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Sort ascending Fiscal Year
OIG-24-11 Summary of Selected DHS Components that Did Not Consistently Restrict Access to Systems and Information 2024
OIG-23-49 FEMA's Technological Hazards Division Assisted State, Local, and Tribal Governments with Preparing to Respond to Radiological and Chemical Incidents 2023
OIG-23-42 Ineffective Controls Over COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Leave the Program Susceptible to Waste and Abuse 2023
OIG-23-37 FEMA Continues to Make Improper Reimbursements through the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant Program 2023
OIG-23-34 FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage the Distribution of COVID-19 Medical Supplies and Equipment 2023
OIG-23-32 FEMA Did Not Always Secure Information Stored on Mobile Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access 2023
OIG-23-20 FEMA Should Increase Oversight to Prevent Potential Misuse of Humanitarian Relief Funds* 2023
OIG-23-14 FEMA Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight of Project Airbridge 2023
OIG-22-76 FEMA’s Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement 2022
OIG-22-77 FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage Disaster Case Management Program Funds in Support of Hurricane Maria Recovery Services 2022
OIG-22-74 FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations 2022
OIG-22-69 FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program 2022
OIG-22-72 A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Response and Relief 2022
OIG-22-56 FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program 2022
OIG-22-51 Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program 2022
OIG-22-46 FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions 2022
OIG-22-43 FEMA's Waiver Authority under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 2022
OIG-22-36 Management Alert - FEMA's COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses 2022
OIG-22-35 FEMA Successfully Assisted HHS in Providing Shelter and Supplies to Unaccompanied Children from the Southwest Border 2022
OIG-22-32 FEMA Followed Its Declaration Request Policies, but Could Improve Its Records Management 2022
OIG-22-25 FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs 2022
OIG-22-11 FEMA Continues to Phase Out Its Use of Alternative Contracting Methods to Administer the National Flood Insurance Program 2022
OIG-22-07 FEMA Did Not Always Accurately Report COVID-19 Contract Actions in the Federal Procurement Data System 2022
OIG-21-71 FEMA does not always appropriately report and investigate employee allegations of sexual harassment and workplace sexual misconduct.  For FYs 2012 to 2018, we identified 305 allegations from FEMA employees potentially related to sexual harassment and sexual misconduct such as sexual assault, unwelcome sexual advances, and inappropriate sexual comments.  However, we were unable to determine whether FEMA properly handled 153 of these allegations, because it could not provide complete investigative and disciplinary files.  For allegations that had complete files available, at times we were unable to determine whether FEMA conducted an investigation.  Finally, we found FEMA did not document whether it investigated some sexual harassment EEO complaints as potential employee misconduct.  We attribute the inconsistent investigations and incomplete files to inadequate policies, processes, and training. These shortcomings may fuel employee perceptions that FEMA is not addressing sexual harassment and sexual misconduct and is not supportive of employees reporting that type of behavior.  We made five recommendations to improve FEMA’s handling of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations including establishing a comprehensive case management system; developing and implementing formal processes and procedures to appropriately address all harassment allegations; providing investigative training; and ensuring allegations are appropriately referred to DHS OIG.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct
OIG-21-64 FEMA did not have reliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure accurate adjudication of resource requests, it did not have a process to allocate the limited supply of PPE, and FEMA’s strategic documents did not clearly outline roles and responsibilities to lead the Federal response.  We made three recommendations that FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC, formally document the policies and procedures for allocating critical lifesaving supplies and equipment, and that FEMA work with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to clarify the agencies’ pandemic response roles and responsibilities under Stafford Act declarations.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations which remain open and resolved.

>Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19
OIG-21-54 FEMA did not use its SFM initiative to ensure that Public Assistance (PA) funds were obligated in accordance with Federal, Department, and component requirements.  Specifically, FEMA obligated PA funds for 83 projects from fiscal years 2017 through 2019 that we reviewed, even though the subrecipients did not need the funding until after 180 days, which made them eligible for incremental obligation under SFM.  This occurred because FEMA did not provide adequate oversight to its Regions.  FEMA relied on the Regions’ decisions to determine whether subrecipients’ projects were eligible for SFM funding, without ensuring there was sufficient supporting documentation to validate the determinations.  This increases the risk of projects being over obligated.  As a result, FEMA is not meeting the intent of SFM, which is to better manage resources in the Disaster Relief Fund to fulfill present and future disaster funding requirements.  We made two recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s management and oversight of the Disaster Relief Fund.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

>FEMA Prematurely Obligated $478 Million in Public Assistance Funds from FY 2017 through FY 2019
OIG-21-50 FEMA did not ensure Louisiana adequately managed and provided oversight of PA grants to make certain they complied with Federal regulations.  Specifically, Louisiana had a backlog of 600 incomplete projects beyond their approved completion dates.  We attributed this to the State not conducting regular site visits to assess subrecipients’ ongoing projects, identify and resolve issues as they arose, or ensure prompt project completion.  In addition, FEMA had a backlog of 2,150 completed grant projects it had not closed out due to inadequate oversight of its Region 6 staff to ensure they promptly carried out this responsibility.  As of the fourth quarter of 2018, the combined backlog of 2,750 grant projects represented nearly $6.6 billion in obligated funds.  By May 2020, FEMA had reduced the backlog, but the significant number of remaining projects could lead to delays reimbursing applicants as well as deobligating funds that could be put to better use.  We made three recommendations to FEMA to strengthen its oversight of project completion and closeout processes to ensure they are timely and compliant.  FEMA concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two.  However, FEMA’s responses resulted in all three recommendations being considered open and unresolved.

>Inadequate FEMA Oversight Delayed Completion and Closeout of Louisiana's Public Assistance Projects
OIG-21-43 FEMA has not prioritized compliance with the DMA 2000.  According to FEMA officials, the agency has instead focused on immediate needs of disaster operations and other high- profile initiatives necessary to carry out its mission.  As such, FEMA has not published regulations and related policies as required by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to reduce repetitive damages to facilities, including the Nation’s roads and bridges.  We made four recommendations to FEMA, including that FEMA should prioritize the DMA 2000 by addressing the unresolved implementation issues and publishing a regulation as required. 

>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges
OIG-21-44 Specifically, in reviewing 16 contract files, we found files that did not have relevant Federal tax information, were missing information on the contractor’s past performance evaluations, and contained incomplete and inconsistent documentation.  We attribute these deficiencies to FEMA not providing guidance on procedures for implementing Federal regulations to contracting personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security removing guidance from its acquisition manual that is used by component personnel.  As a result of inadequate guidance, FEMA personnel awarded contracts without making fully informed determinations as to whether prospective contractors could meet contract demands.  If contractors cannot meet demands, FEMA may have to cancel contracts it has awarded, which has happened in the past and continues.  In fact, between March and May 2020, FEMA awarded and canceled at least 22 contracts, valued at $184 million, for crucial supplies in response to the national COVID-19 pandemic.  By awarding contracts without ensuring prospective contractors can meet contract demands, FEMA will continue wasting taxpayer dollars and future critical disaster and pandemic assistance will continue to be delayed.  We made one recommendation that, when implemented, should help strengthen FEMA’s responsibility determination process.  The Department concurred with our recommendation. 

>FEMA Must Strengthen Its Responsibility Determination Process
OIG-21-42 FEMA’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with the Texas General Land Office (TxGLO) was appropriate to ensure direct housing assistance program compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  However, FEMA initiated the IGSA without first developing the processes and controls TxGLO needed to administer the program.  As a result, FEMA and the State had to develop and finalize implementation guidelines after signing the IGSA, delaying TxGLO’s disaster response.  In addition, FEMA disaster personnel had to prepare the necessary guidance, toolkits, and training resources while simultaneously responding to Hurricane Harvey.  Also, FEMA used workarounds and TxGLO set up a separate system, creating additional operational challenges and inefficiencies.  We made three recommendations to improve future state administered direct housing assistance efforts.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

>FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls
OIG-21-41 We determined that FEMA followed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance in its efforts to provide funding for reconstruction of the Vieques’ Community Health Center.  FEMA’s assessment of the funding needs for the project is complete and $39,569,695 (Federal share) was obligated on January 21, 2020 for a full facility replacement.  We did not make any recommendations but announced an audit to assess FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Alternative Procedures process for all permanent work projects.

>FEMA's Efforts to Provide Funds to Reconstruct the Vieques Community Health Center
OIG-21-28 FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds 2021
OIG-21-23 We determined that the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) Region II (Region II) and New York State’s Division of Homeland Security Emergency Services (DHSES) have not adequately monitored or timely closed hundreds of projects, awarded at $578.8 million, for 7 disasters we reviewed. We made four recommendations that will help strengthen internal controls to improve oversight of the PA grant program.  FEMA concurred with all four of our recommendations.

>FEMA Needs to Reduce the $579 Million Backlog of Projects in its New York Public Assistance Grant Program
OIG-21-26 We determined that FEMA did not ensure procurements and costs for debris removal operations in Monroe County, Florida, met Federal requirements and FEMA guidelines.  Specifically, FEMA did not adequately review local entities’ procurements for debris removal projects and reimbursed local entities for questionable costs.  These deficiencies were due to weaknesses in FEMA training and its quality assurance process.  As a result, FEMA approved reimbursement to local entities for nearly $25.6 million (more than $23 million in Federal share) for debris removal projects, including contracts that may not have met Federal procurement requirements, and more than $2 million in questionable costs.  Without improvements to FEMA’s training and project review processes, FEMA risks continuing to expose millions of dollars in disaster relief funds to fraud, waste, and abuse.  We made three recommendations with which FEMA officials concurred.  Based on the information FEMA provided, we consider the three recommendations resolved and open.

>FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement
OIG-21-24 We determined that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure state and local law enforcement agencies expended FEMA’s grant for protection of the President’s non-governmental residences in accordance with Federal regulations and Agency guidelines. We made four recommendations to FEMA that should improve the management of the program.  FEMA concurred with three recommendations and nonconcurred with one recommendation.

>FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant
OIG-21-25 This report provides a summary of our previous findings and recommendations, which may inform future disaster response efforts.  Based on our prior work, we identified a pattern of internal control vulnerabilities that negatively affect both disaster survivors and disaster program effectiveness that may hinder future response efforts, including shortcomings in acquisition and contracting controls, interagency coordination challenges, and insufficient privacy safeguards that affect disaster survivors.  Additionally, FEMA did not adequately oversee disaster grant recipients and subrecipients, manage disaster assistance funds, or oversee its information technology environment.  This report discusses these vulnerabilities and the correlating recommendations we previously made that, if implemented, would better prepare FEMA to respond to future disasters.  We made no new recommendations. 

>Success of Future Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts Depends on FEMA Addressing Current Vulnerabilities
OIG-21-20 During the course of the audit, we determined that FEMA provided hotel rooms to about 90,000 households (nearly 227,000 survivors) after the 2017 California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.  However, FEMA did not oversee and manage the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program to ensure it operated efficiently and effectively to meet all disaster survivors’ needs.  We made two recommendations that when implemented, will improve FEMA’s oversight and pre-disaster planning of transitional sheltering.  FEMA concurred with both recommendations and the recommendations are resolved and open.

>Better Oversight and Planning are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program
OIG-21-10 FEMA Should Disallow $12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy 2021
OIG-21-04 Modernization has improved the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) ability to timely process policies and claims data, enhanced reporting capabilities, and provided more reliable address validation. Despite these improvements, the transition to PIVOT did not resolve longstanding data reliability issues, as FIMA migrated the vast majority of its historical legacy data, including errors, into the PIVOT system. FIMA also deployed PIVOT without adequate controls to prevent potentially erroneous transactions from being recorded in the system. We made three recommendations to improve the quality of data in the modernized NFIP system and educate stakeholders on data quality issues that exist in historical NFIP data. FEMA concurred with all three recommendations.

>FIMA Made Progress Modernizing Its NFIP System, but Data Quality Needs Improvement
OIG-20-76 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mismanaged the distribution of commodities in response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico.  FEMA lost visibility of about 38 percent of its commodity shipments to Puerto Rico, worth an estimated $257 million.  Commodities successfully delivered to Puerto Rico took an average of 69 days to reach their final destinations.  Inadequate FEMA contractor oversight contributed to the lost visibility and delayed commodity shipments.  FEMA did not use its Global Positioning System transponders to track commodity shipments, allowed the contractor to break inventory seals, and did not ensure documented proof of commodity deliveries.  Given lost visibility and delayed shipments, FEMA cannot ensure it provided commodities to Puerto Rico disaster victims as needed to sustain life and alleviate suffering as part of its response and recovery mission.  In addition, FEMA’s mismanagement of transportation contracts included multiple contracting violations and policy contraventions that ultimately led to contract overruns of about $179 million and at least $50 million of questioned costs.  We made five recommendations that, if implemented, should improve FEMA’s management and oversight of its disaster response activities. FEMA concurred with four of the five recommendations.  Recommendations 1 through 4 are considered open and resolved.  Recommendation 5 is considered resolved and closed

>FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria
OIG-20-63 As of October 2016, the Recovery School District in Louisiana (RSD) had received a $1.5 billion Public Assistance grant from Louisiana, a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grantee, for damages resulting from Hurricane Katrina.  We examined $1.3 billion for a consolidated project as part of the total amount awarded.  In some instances, RSD accounted for and expended portions of the $1.3 billion in Public Assistance grant funds we reviewed according to Federal regulations.  However, FEMA improperly awarded $216.2 million to repair or replace more than 292 Orleans Parish school facilities in RSD.  We made eight recommendations to FEMA to de-obligate $216.2 million of ineligible costs; follow Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines; and re-evaluate documented proof of assessments for the 35 identified projects and reclassify them, as appropriate, to repair-eligible, and de-obligate the cost difference.  FEMA concurred with recommendations 2 through 7 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 8.  We consider recommendations 2 through 7 resolved and open; recommendations 1 and 8 are unresolved and open.

>FEMA Should Recover $216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina
OIG-20-68 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is not adequately managing severe repetitive loss (SRL) properties covered by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  FEMA has not established an effective program to reduce or eliminate damage to SRL properties and disruption to life caused by the repeated flooding.  Primarily, FEMA does not have reliable, accurate information about SRL properties.  Secondly, FEMA’s Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program, which aims to mitigate flood damage for NFIP policyholders, provides neither equitable nor timely relief for SRL applicants.  We made three recommendations to FEMA to ensure the accuracy of the SRL list, as well as equitable and timely distribution of mitigation funding, and promoting the use of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Increased Cost of Compliance coverage.  FEMA concurred with all three of the recommendations

>FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties
OIG-20-60 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program (IHP) has no assurance of applicants’ eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) Dependent Other Needs Assistance (ONA) payments.  According to OMB Circular A-123, Appendix C, when documentation or verification is non-existent to support eligibility payment decisions it must be considered improper.  FEMA did not collect sufficient income and dependent documentation or verify self-reported information to determine whether applicants below the income threshold, known as Failed Income Test (FIT), were eligible for SBA Dependent ONA payments.  FEMA believed requiring documentation or verification would delay the disbursement of assistance and relied on an honor system to make eligibility and payment decisions.  We determined, according to FEMA-provided data, it has paid, and we are questioning, the more than $3.3 billion in improper payments to applicants deemed as FIT for SBA Dependent ONA since 2003.  Additionally, FEMA has not evaluated the program risk associated with not collecting or verifying income information.  Per Federal requirements, agencies must conduct risk assessments to determine whether programs are susceptible to improper payments.  Rather, FEMA assessed IHP at the overall program level and did not specifically evaluate each IHP form of assistance, such as SBA Dependent ONA.  These weaknesses have allowed applicants self-certifying income and dependent information to receive less oversight, despite posing the greatest risk for improper payments.  FEMA cannot assure Congress and taxpayers it is a prudent steward of Federal resources, and adequately assesses the risks of improper payments.  FEMA did not concur with all three report recommendations.  Therefore, these recommendations are considered unresolved and open.

>FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003
OIG-20-44 We identified debris removal contract performance issues and concerns.  In the report, we discuss our observations regarding the use of pre-disaster debris removal contracts in Florida following Hurricane Irma.  We also emphasize how FEMA can benefit from implementing effective controls to track systemic issues after a disaster and ensure FEMA follows procedures for uploading required documentation to support debris removal costs for proper grant management.  The report contains no recommendations.

>Pre-Disaster Debris Removal Contracts in Florida
OIG-20-58 The Federal Emergency Management Agency did not properly award or oversee its contract with Corporate Lodging Consultants (CLC) to administer disaster survivors’ hotel stays.  These deficiencies occurred because FEMA officials did not ensure staff responsible for the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) contract award and oversight had the guidance and training they needed to be effective.  As a result, FEMA released personally identifiable information for about 2.3 million disaster survivors, increasing the survivors’ risk to identity theft.  We made six recommendations that when implemented should strengthen FEMA contracting and compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and DHS requirements.  FEMA concurred with all six of our recommendations.

>FEMA Did Not Properly Award and Oversee the Transitional Sheltering Assistance Contract
OIG-20-57 The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) complied with Federal procurement requirements for its noncompetitive procurement of the Whitefish contract.  However, the contract costs may not have complied with Federal cost principles that costs must be reasonable to be eligible for Federal awards.  PREPA’s oversight of the Cobra contract did not comply with PA program guidelines.  Finally, FEMA’s Public Assistance grant to PREPA for the Cobra contract did not fully comply with PA program guidelines.  We made two recommendations for FEMA to provide technical assistance to Puerto Rico to ensure compliance with Federal regulations and PA program guidelines.  We made two other recommendations for FEMA to develop guidance to verify its subrecipients’ oversight of time and material contracts and determine the reasonableness and eligibility of time and material contract costs.  FEMA concurred with three of the recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.

>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines
OIG-20-50 We contracted this audit with Cotton & Company LLP, which found that FEMA did not ensure the Florida Department of Emergency Management (FDEM) monitored the Polk County School Board (PCSB) to ensure it established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend PA grant funding in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  For example, PCSB was unable to support $46,168 in food spoilage costs; requested and received funding through a Florida Public Assistance grant for ineligible contract costs incurred under Project 2658 for debris removal and related costs; and charged $897 in unallowable costs associated with ineligible fringe benefits for substitute employees.  We made 13 recommendations that, when implemented, should improve PCSB’s management of FEMA Public Assistance funds.  FEMA concurred with our 13 recommendations.

>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
OIG-20-51 We contracted this audit with Cotton & Company LLP, which found that FEMA did not ensure Monroe County, Florida (the County) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to ensure it accounted for and expended Public Assistance program grant funds awarded to disaster areas in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically, the County did not allocate anticipated and actual insurance proceeds totaling $5 million to reduce FEMA’s share of disaster costs; charged $265,928 for ineligible stand-by time and other ineligible expenses; and requested $84,681 in unsupported and ineligible costs for multiple tasks including clearing emergency access and costs related to flooding.  Additionally, the County overstated $34,378 in force account labor costs that were unreasonable and therefore ineligible for grant funding; overpaid a debris removal contractor, resulting in $2,403 in ineligible costs; and charged $1,080 to PW 1512 for security costs that were unsupported and are therefore ineligible for grant funding. We made 18 recommendations that that, when implemented, should improve Monroe County, Florida’s management of FEMA Public Assistance funds.  FEMA concurred with our 18 recommendations.

>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants in Monroe County, Florida
OIG-20-48 We contracted this audit with Cotton & Company LLP, which found that FEMA did not ensure Lee County, Florida (the County) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to ensure it accounted for and expended PA program grant funds awarded to disaster areas in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically, the County requested FEMA funding for $994,425 in unsupported force account labor, equipment, and materials; was unable to provide supporting documentation for $16,210 in costs incurred to operate an emergency shelter; did not maintain adequate documentation to support $267,452 in costs incurred for road repair services; did not include all required provisions in its contracts to obtain disaster recovery services related to Hurricane Irma; and had not evaluated the risk of subrecipients’ noncompliance with Federal requirements, obtained subrecipient audit reports, or developed plans for monitoring subrecipients.  We made nine recommendations that, when implemented, should improve Lee County, Florida’s management of FEMA Public Assistance funds.  FEMA concurred with all nine recommendations.

>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
OIG-20-49 We determined that the city of Houston has adequate policies, procedures, and business practices that comply with Federal procurement regulations and FEMA guidelines to expend FEMA grant funds.  We found Houston may have inappropriately included the $73.8 million cost of Houston First Corporation’s (Houston First) disaster damages in its damage estimate, even though it was not an eligible applicant for them.  We did not examine procurement policies and procedures related to Houston First because the entity was outside the scope of our audit.  During the audit, FEMA acknowledged it would reiterate in writing to the City of Houston the importance of proper oversight for all procurements executed by Houston First.  This report contains no recommendations. 

>Houston, Texas Has Adequate Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant