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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-16-29 KPMG LLP, under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountants’ Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) Detailed Accounting Submission. Coast Guard’s management prepared the Table of FY 2015 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures to comply with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG LLP’s attention that caused it to believe that the Coast Guard’s FY 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular. KPMG LLP did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2015 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2016
OIG-09-93  

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard Enterprise Architecture Implementation Process 		2009
OIG-18-88 DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law.  This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort.  As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment.  This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities.  Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.  Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.  During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list.  This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life.  Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures.  This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards.  The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.

>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program 		2018
OIG-04-50 Re-Engining of the HH-65 Helicopter, United States Coast Guard, September 2004 2004
OIG-17-74-IQO The objective of this review was to determine whether the United States Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) was complying with applicable policies.  However, significant issues with the agency’s case management system prevented us from making substantive observations about compliance with investigative policies.  We also noted issues with outdated policies, an absence of a Privacy Impact Assessment, poor training records management, and inconsistent documentation of finalized investigations.  CGIS employees voiced concerns with trust in senior leadership as well as questionable hiring practices, and articulated a need for more resources.  We made 32 recommendations to address the findings of our review and CGIS concurred with all of them.

>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service 		2017
OIG-13-92 Our audit objective was to determine whether the USCG has adequate processes to investigate, take corrective actions, and enforce Federal regulations following reported marine casualties. The USCG does not have adequate processes to investigate, take corrective actions, and enforce Federal regulations related to the reporting of marine accidents. These conditions exist because the USCG has not developed and retained sufficient personnel, established a complete process with dedicated resources to address corrective actions, and provided adequate training to personnel on enforcement of marine accident reporting.

>Marine Accident Reporting, Investigations, and Enforcement in the United States Coast Guard 		2013
OIG-21-67 During our ongoing audit of DHS law enforcement virtual training, we learned that the Coast Guard uses functional firearms to conduct DVD-based simulation training.  We identified this issue in Coast Guard’s Commandant Instruction 3574.5C, 18 September 2014, Coast Guard Judgmental Use of Force Evaluation and observed a demonstration of this training at one Coast Guard location.  According to testimony or policy from four other DHS components that employ or train law enforcement personnel, the use of functional firearms during video-based simulation training is prohibited within their respective components.  By using functional firearms capable of firing ammunition, even if emptied of ammunition, in DVD-based simulation training, Coast Guard increased the risk of unintentional injury or death.  Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation and took immediate corrective actions to discontinue the use of functional firearms during DVD-based simulation training.  The recommendation is resolved and closed.

>Management Alert - The United States Coast Guard Discontinued the Use of Functional Firearms in DVD Simulation Training 		2021
OIG-19-03 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an investigation into allegations that the whistleblower was retaliated against for, among other things, communicating with Members of Congress regarding discrimination and retaliation against the whistleblower. The whistleblower alleged being subjected to retaliatory investigations by CGIS in violation of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). We recently learned that CGIS executed a search warrant against the whistleblower several months after the whistleblower retired from the Coast Guard, but soon after CGIS became aware of the OIG’s whistleblower retaliation investigation. Our information indicates that a CGIS agent obtained the search warrant in connection with a CGIS-directed investigation.

>Management Alert - Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications 		2019
OIG-08-24 Maintenance, Rehabilitation, and Upgrading of Shore Facilities in Support of United States Coast Guard Missions 2008
OIG-12-49  

>IT Matters related to the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2011 DHS Financial Statement Audit 		2012
OIG-09-47  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY2008 DHS Financial Statement Audit 		2009
OIG-15-47 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls and business process application controls at the United States Coast Guard (USCG). KPMG, LLP determined that USCG took corrective action over designing and consistently implementing certain account management and configuration management controls. However, KPMG, LLP continued to identify general information technology control deficiencies related to security management, logical access, configuration management, segregation of duties, and contingency planning for USCG’s core financial and feeder systems. Such control deficiencies limited USCG’s ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical financial and operational data.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2014 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-13-63 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012, and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). We were also engaged to audit the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements. The objective of our audit engagement was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of the FY 2012 financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2012 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2013
OIG-11-80  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2010 DHS Financial Statement Audit ( 		2011
OIG-10-77  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2009 DHS Integrated Audit 		2010
OIG-14-35 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 04, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Performance Summary Report. This report contains no recommendation.

>Independent Review of U.S. Coast Guard’s Reporting of FY 2013 Drug Control Performance Summary Report ( 		2014
OIG-13-31 We have reviewed the accompanying Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) United States Coast Guard (USCG) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. USCG’s management is responsible for the Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations, related disclosures, and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Coast Guard’s Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations 		2013
OIG-14-39 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 04, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Detailed Accounting Submission. This report contains no recommendation.

>Independent Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2013 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2014
OIG-13-27 We have reviewed the accompanying Performance Summary Report of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) United States Coast Guard (USCG) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. USCG’s management is responsible for the Performance Summary Report and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2013
OIG-12-32  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Reporting of FY 2011 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2012
OIG-09-27  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guards's  Reporting for FY 2008 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2009
OIG-12-31  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2011 Drug Control Obligations 		2012
OIG-11-35  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2011
OIG-11-34  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Obligations 		2011
OIG-10-48  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2009 Drug Control Obligations 		2010
OIG-10-47  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2009 Drug Conrol Performance Summary Report 		2010
OIG-09-26  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2008 Drug Control Obligations 		2009
OIG-08-42 Independent Review of The U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Obligations 2008
OIG-07-70 Independent Review of The U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2006 Drug Control Funds, 2007
OIG-05-13 Independent Review of the U.S. Coast Guard (CG) Reporting of FY 2004 Drug Control Funds Report 2005
OIG-08-73 Independent Auditor’s Report of USCG’s FY 2008 Mission Action Plans 2008
OIG-09-73  

>Independent Auditor's Report on USCG's FY 2008 Mission Action Plans Included in the DHS FY 2009 Internal Control Playbook 		2009
OIG-06-55 Improvements Needed in the U.S. Coast Guard's Acquisition and Implementation of Deepwater Information Technology Systems 2006
OIG-05-30 Improved Security Required for U.S. Coast Guard Networks (Redacted) 2005
OIG-13-19 According to the Department of Homeland Security, in fiscal year 2011, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) was responsible for 15 percent of the Department’s personal property and, between fiscal years 2008 and 2010, disposed of approximately $3.3 billion worth of such property. Reutilizing excess personal property maximizes the return on taxpayers’ dollars and minimizes expenditures for new procurements. Federal agencies are required to reutilize excess personal property unless doing so causes serious hardship, is impractical, or impairs operations. We conducted an audit to determine if the USCG’s policies, procedures, and processes ensure the proper identification and classification of excess personal property, as well as the proper reutilization and disposal of this property.

>Identification, Reutilization, and Disposal of Excess Personal Property by the United States Coast Guard 		2013
OIG-04-43 FY 2003 Mission Performance United States Coast Guard, September 2004 2004
OIG-08-82 Enhanced Configuration Controls and Management Policies can Improve USCP Network Security(Redacted)IG- 2008
OIG-12-87  

>DHS’ Intelligence Community Members’ Continuity of Operations and Intelligence Readiness 		2012
OIG-20-16 DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components.  We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities.  We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices.  DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.

>DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices 		2020
OIG-10-84  

>Coast Guard's Blueprint for Acquisition Reform Needs Improved Oversight  ( 		2010
OIG-21-65 Summary: Rescue 21 Alaska, Coast Guard’s maritime search and rescue communication system, has experienced outages resulting from antiquated equipment in Coast Guard’s District 17.  Challenges and funding shortages during system acquisition caused Coast Guard to limit the purchase of new equipment for Rescue 21 Alaska, requiring District 17 to maintain existing equipment for longer than initially planned.  Alaska’s winter weather conditions and remote access to communication site locations cause lengthy repair times, further exacerbating the outage impacts.  The outages have prevented Coast Guard, at times, from effectively receiving and responding to distress calls from mariners.  Coast Guard has made some upgrades to the Rescue 21 Alaska system to enhance distress communication availability and reliability.  Although Coast Guard plans for further upgrades, outages persist.  When notifying the public about the outages, Coast Guard primarily relies on a “Local Notice to Mariners” posted on their public website.  However, this limits who can receive the notices, as not all mariners go to the internet to determine outage locations.  Alaska mariners shared other effective methods Coast Guard could use to improve its notifications to the public when there are known VHF distress communications outages.  Adequately upgrading the communications equipment and ensuring robust attempts are made to notify the public when outages occur is essential for Coast Guard to achieve its search and rescue mission in Alaska.  We made two recommendations to ensure the Coast Guard is prioritizing Rescue 21 Alaska upgrades and appropriately notifying the public of outages. Coast Guard concurred with both recommendations.

>Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand Its Public Notifications during Outages 		2021
OIG-24-08 Coast Guard National Maritime Center's Oversight of Merchant Mariner Training and Examinations 2024
OIG-18-15 Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight 2018
OIG-11-108  

>Coast Guard Has Taken Steps To Strengthen Information Technology Management, but Challenges Remain 		2011
OIG-19-02 CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector 2019
OIG-05-29 Audit of the Coast Guard's Civilian Pay Budget Process 2005
OIG-13-122 The objective of this review was to determine the extent to which the USCG Is maintaining Its historical level of effort on non-homeland security missions. To address our objective, we reviewed the resource hours the USCG used to perform its various missions. We also reviewed the USCG's performance measures and results for each non-homeland security and homeland security mission. We did not verify the accuracy of the USCG-provided data. According to the USCG's data, the gap between resource hours for homeland security versus non-homeland security missions has narrowed from approximately 14 percent in fiscal year 2007 to approximately 4 percent in fiscal year 2012 (52 percent of resource hours for homeland security missions versus 48 percent for non-homeland security missions).

>Annual Review of the United States Coast Guard’s Mission Performance (FY 2012) 		2013
OIG-12-119  

>Annual Review of the United States Coast Guard’s Mission Performance (FY 2011) 		2012
OIG-11-111  

>Annual Review of the United States Coast Guard’s Mission Performance (FY 2010) 		2011
OIG-14-140 This report presents our annual review of the United States Coast Guard’s (USCG) mission performance, as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act defines the USCG’s 11 statutory missions as either non homeland security missions or homeland security. The act also prohibits the Secretary of Homeland Security from substantially reducing any of the USCG’s missions after its transfer to the Department of Homeland Security, except as specified in subsequent acts.

>Annual Review of the United States Coast Guard's Mission Performance (FY 2013) 		2014

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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