Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number	Title	Issue Date Sort descending	Fiscal Year
OIG-17-92	KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The resulting management letter discusses 14 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration. The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including revenue accrual, personnel actions, journal entry reviews, performance reviews, contract expense approvals, time keeping, and intra-governmental payment and collection expense approvals. These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report. >National Protection and Programs Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit	07/03/2017	2017
OIG-17-96	KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the Management Directorate’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The resulting management letter discusses five observations related to internal control for management’s consideration. These issues were related to journal entry review; financial system reconciliations; ineffective obligation analysis; contract expense approval, improper invoice posting; and intra-governmental payment and collection expense approval. These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report. >Management Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit	07/07/2017	2017
OIG-17-94	We determined that the Department failed to report 6 conferences in FY 2014 and 14 conferences in FY 2015 that were greater than $100,000 in its Annual Report to the Office of Inspector General and on the public website, as required by Federal regulations. The total dollar value of these unreported conferences was $862,881 and $2,822,561 for FYs 2014 and 2015, respectively. In addition, the Department did not always report actual conference costs timely or accurately. We made five recommendations that would improve conference reporting and recordkeeping and ensure the accuracy and timeliness of conference submissions. DHS concurred with all five of our recommendations and has implemented corrective actions, resulting in the resolution and closure of all the recommendations. >Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 Conference Spending	07/10/2017	2017
OIG-17-104	TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-53), required us to review the Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS’) policies and procedures for identifying misuse of Government resources, as well as the administration of FAMS’ code of conduct or integrity policies with respect to instances of misconduct. We incorporated this requirement into our ongoing department-wide audit of conduct and discipline, which seeks to determine whether DHS and its components have sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. We determined that FAMS has sufficient policies and procedures to establish expectations for appropriate conduct, identify misuse of government resources, and address misconduct allegations. The report contains no recommendations. >The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing Misconduct	09/13/2017	2017
OIG-18-20	We evaluated the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) privacy safeguards for protecting the personally identifiable information (PII) it collects and maintains. OHA has not implemented an effective organizational framework for safeguarding PII in accordance with Federal requirements. OHA appointed a Privacy Officer, but this official lacks adequate authority and resources to carry out the various required privacy management responsibilities. This official also has not received OHA senior leadership support to issue the policies and procedures needed for effective organization-wide privacy management. Further, there was no central tracking to ensure that all employees completed annual privacy training and to accurately report this information to the Department and Congress as required. >Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program	11/30/2017	2018
OIG-18-31	During our August 2017 site visit to the FLETC Artesia Training Center, we identified a potential safety issue at a warehouse, Building 13. The Border Patrol Academy had been using the warehouse to train new hires on search and conveyance. In 2009, a vehicle from an adjacent driving course struck the warehouse. FLETC officials could not provide documentation to support that an engineering evaluation was conducted to determine whether the accident affected the integrity of the warehouse structure. Border Patrol Academy officials also expressed safety concerns about using the warehouse to train new hires. >Management Alert - Safety Issue at FLETC Artesia Warehouse	12/08/2017	2018
OIG-18-37	Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image. >DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted)	01/18/2018	2018
OIG-18-51	Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010. The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today. >Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement	02/14/2018	2018
OIG-18-65	Between January 2016 and April 2017, DHS OIG received dozens of allegations regarding a variety of issues at the FLETC facility in Glynco, Georgia. Following extensive investigation, DHS OIG determined that many of the allegations could not be substantiated. However, with respect to certain other allegations, DHS OIG’s findings indicate that some of FLETC’s senior managers, including former Director Connie Patrick, failed to exercise the judgment, stewardship, and leadership expected of DHS senior officials. This report focuses on two specific allegations that exemplify the broader issues uncovered by DHS OIG’s investigation. Many of the allegations DHS OIG received regarding FLETC related to the official travel of the former FLETC Director, Connie Patrick. Patrick served as the Director of FLETC from 2002 until her retirement in June 2017. During this time, she frequently traveled domestically and internationally on FLETC-related business. DHS OIG conducted an extensive review of Patrick’s travel for the period January 15, 2014 through June 23, 2016 to identify any instances of impropriety. In addition to multiple complaints about Patrick’s alleged noncompliance with federal, DHS, and FLETC travel rules and regulations, DHS OIG received complaints alleging that Patrick pressured FLETC managers to hire her husband, John Patrick (JP), for a term position within the FLETC Law Enforcement Leadership Institute (LELI). DHS OIG’s investigation determined that JP was hired to a term position with LELI on January 3, 2010 and completed the term on September 11, 2011 — all during Patrick’s tenure as Director of FLETC >Special Report - Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials	05/22/2018	2018
OIG-18-89-UNSUM	We conducted our review of the Science and Technology’s (S&T) insider threat program between January 2017 and June 2017. S&T is the primary research arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its mission is to strengthen the Nation’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative solutions to support DHS mission operations. Specifically, Congress created S&T in 2003 to conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of the Department. S&T oversees laboratories where scientists perform mission-critical research on chemical and biological threats, radiological and nuclear detection, animal diseases, transportation security, and explosives trace identification. S&T employees, contractors, and business partners—especially those with special or elevated privileges—can potentially use their inside knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to mission-critical systems and operations. We made nine recommendations that, if implemented, should strengthen S&T’s management of insider threat risks. The Department concurred with all of the recommendations. >(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain	09/28/2018	2018
OIG-19-07	On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers. Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority. >DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers	11/20/2018	2019
OIG-19-15	National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Chief of Staff requested a review to determine whether Federal Protective Service (FPS) inspectors’ positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors’ excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Specifically, 11 of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This kind of extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States. Furthermore, FPS’ increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for fiscal year 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk. The inspectors were able to accumulate the extensive overtime because of poor internal controls, such as management not monitoring the use of overtime. >The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively	12/11/2018	2019
OIG-19-19	DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs	01/30/2019	2019
OIG-19-24	Prompted by the suspicious cyber activities on election systems in 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson designated the election infrastructure as a subsector to one of the Nation’s existing critical sectors. Our audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department’s efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation’s election infrastructure. DHS has taken some steps to mitigate risks to the Nation’s election infrastructure; however, improved planning, more staff, and clearer guidance could better facilitate the Department’s coordination with state and local officials. Specifically, despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, or established metrics to measure progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and insufficient guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS’ ability to accomplish such planning. >Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure	02/28/2019	2019
OIG-21-05	Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)	11/02/2020	2021
OIG-22-29	I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach (REDACTED)	03/04/2022	2022
OIG-22-30	S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects	03/07/2022	2022
OIG-22-41	DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures - (REDACTED)	04/26/2022	2022
OIG-22-42	Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative	05/10/2022	2022
OIG-22-49	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism	07/05/2022	2022
OIG-22-50	The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve its Open Source Intelligence Reporting Process	07/06/2022	2022
OIG-22-53	DHS Has Controls to Safeguard Watchlist Data.	07/25/2022	2022
OIG-22-54	DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome	07/27/2022	2022
OIG-22-58	DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns	08/10/2022	2022
OIG-22-60	(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021	08/18/2022	2022
OIG-22-62	DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks	08/22/2022	2022
OIG-23-05	DHS Did Not Consistently Comply with National Instant Criminal Background Check System Requirements	12/22/2022	2023

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