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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Sort descending Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-09-18  

>Customs and Border Protection Award Fees for Enforcement Equipment Maintenance and Field Operations Support Contract
2009
OIG-11-43  

>Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Its Inspection Procedures for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
2011
OIG-11-16 Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry 2011
OIG-10-113  

>Customs and Border Protection's Importer Self-Assessment Program
2010
OIG-12-117  

>Customs and Border Protection's Office of Regulatory Audit
2012
OIG-23-44 Cybersecurity System Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Selected High Value Asset 2023
OIG-19-40 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions 2019
GC-HQ-06-51 Debit Card Overdrafts 2006
OIG-16-92 December 3, 2015 – San Bernardino Incident 2016
OIG-22-80 Del Rio Area Struggled with Prolonged Detention, Consistent Compliance with CBP's TEDS Standards, and Data Integrity 2022
OIG-14-23 HSGP guidance requires a State Administrative Agency to administer and manage grant funding awarded under the HSGP. The State Administrative Agency also allocates funds to local, regional, and other government entities. The Delaware Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) serves as Delaware’s State Administrative Agency. Delaware is identified as one jurisdiction for security and emergency management purposes.

>Delaware’s Management of State Homeland Security Program Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012
2014
OIG-12-133  

>Department of Homeland Security Compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation Revisions on Proper Use and Management of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
2012
OIG-07-37 Department of Homeland Security Executive Transportation and Shuttle Bus Services Contract Review 2007
OIG-11-97 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by U.S. Customs and Border Protection for Construction of Land Ports of Entry (Revised) 2011
OIG-11-81 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk 2011
Department of Homeland Security Section - Top Challenges Facing Federal Agencies: COVID-19 Emergency Relief and Response Efforts 2020
OIG-10-42  

>Department of Homeland Security's Acquisition Data Management Systems 
2010
OIG-12-48 Department of Homeland Security's Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 2012
OIG-15-94 (Revised) Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). We also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and DHS’ performance in reducing and recapturing improper payments. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of IPERA, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high-risk program as required by OMB. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)
2015
OIG-16-88 Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). We also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
2016
OIG-17-59 We determined that DHS did not fully comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because it did not publish accurate accompanying materials to the Agency Financial Report (AFR) as required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.  The Department also did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high-risk program.  DHS did comply with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public DHS’ FY 2016 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports. Additionally, we determined DHS did not properly perform oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting.  We made five recommendations that would help DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division (RM&A) strengthen its oversight and review procedures for IPERA risk assessments.  We also recommended that RM&A follows OMB requirements to comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
2017
OIG-18-72 DHS did not comply with IPERA because it did not meet one of the six IPERA requirements. Specifically, DHS did not meet its annual reduction targets for 2 of 14 programs. Additionally, we determined that DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the component’s improper testing and reporting.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
2018
OIG-19-43 The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
2019
OIG-20-31 DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) in fiscal year 2019 by meeting all six of the IPERA requirements.  DHS also complied with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments.  Additionally, we reviewed DHS’ processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates.  Based on our review, we determined DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting.  We made one recommendation to DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division to properly follow the requirements in the DHS Improper Payment Reduction Guidebook. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2019 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
2020
OIG-21-33 We determined DHS did not comply with Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)  in fiscal year 2020 because it did not achieve and report an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for 2 of 12 programs reported in its FY 2020 Agency Financial Report.  DHS complied with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public its FY 2020 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports.  We made two recommendations to DHS to follow Office of Management and Budget requirements and ensure the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues its remediation process to reduce improper payments.  DHS concurred with both recommendations. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
2021
OIG-22-45 Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 2022
OIG-05-53 Department of Homeland Security's Procurement and Program Management Operations 2005
OIG-18-24 DHS reported using its Other Transaction Authority to work with non-traditional contractors, DHS did not always follow statutory requirements when entering, modifying, and overseeing its agreements. Inadequate internal policies contributed to DHS falling short of meeting all statutory requirements for using OTAs. In addition, DHS acquisition policy staff reported that competing priorities prevented timely reporting to Congress. As a result, DHS may have taken on more risks and costs than necessary and impeded Congress’ ability to oversee DHS’ use of OTAs.

>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority
2018
OIG-13-47 In fiscal year 2010, the Federal Government’s total improper payment amount was at a high of $121 billion. In that same year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010.(IPERA or the Act) in an effort to reduce improper payments. Our audit objective was to determine whether DHS complied with the Act. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high‐risk program as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2012 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)
2013
OIG-14-64 (Revised) Our audit objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) complied with the Act in fiscal year 2013. In addition, we also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and its efforts to reduce and recover improper payments for fiscal year 2013. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each program deemed susceptible to improper payments. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA. We reviewed the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and DHS’ efforts to reduce and recover improper payments.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2013 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)
2014
DA-10-01 Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)  2010
OIG-18-51 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010.  The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today.

>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement
2018
OIG-11-78  

>Design and Implementation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Management Performance Grant
2011
OIG-06-33 Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2006
OIG-22-41 DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-52 DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement - (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-22-62 DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks 2022
OIG-20-37 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) does not effectively coordinate and share best practices to enhance security across the commercial facilities sector.  Specifically, CISA does not coordinate within DHS on security assessments to prevent potential overlap, does not always ensure completion of required After Action Reports to share best practices with the commercial facilities sector, and does not adequately inform all commercial facility owners and operators of available DHS resources.  This occurred because CISA does not have comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities’ Sector-Specific Agency (SSA).  Without such policies and procedures, CISA cannot effectively fulfill its SSA responsibilities and limits its ability to measure the Department’s progress toward accomplishing its sector-specific objectives.  CISA may also be missing opportunities to help commercial facility owners and operators identify threats and mitigate risks, leaving the commercial facilities sector vulnerable to terrorist attacks and physical threats that may cause serious damage and loss of life.  We made three recommendations to improve CISA’s coordination and outreach to safeguard the commercial facilities sector.  CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats
2020
OIG-13-39 This transition allowed remote control of processes and exposed industrial control systems to cyber security risks that could be exploited over the Internet. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, a division of the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), is the operational arm of NPPD and is responsible for providing full-time monitoring, information sharing, analysis, and incident response capabilities to protect Federal agencies’ networks and critical infrastructure and key resources, such as industrial control systems.

>DHS Can Make Improvements to Secure Industrial Control Systems
2013
OIG-15-140 We audited the DHS components’ coordination in performing their cyber missions. We sought to determine whether their cyber roles and responsibilities have been well delineated and a process is in place for department-wide information sharing and coordinated response to cyber incidents and criminal investigations. We also evaluated the components’ compliance with applicable DHS information security requirements. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have strengthened coordination in performing their cyber missions. For example, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and United States Secret Service (USSS) have enhanced relationships with the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to improve information sharing and coordination on incident response and investigation. Despite these positive steps, the Department can take additional actions to improve its cyber mission coordination. For example, the Office of Policy has not developed a cyber strategic implementation plan due to its recent establishment and limited staff. Without a strategic plan, DHS cannot effectively align the components’ cyber responsibilities and capabilities with DHS’ overall mission.

>DHS Can Stregthen its Cyber Million Coordination Efforts
2015
OIG-12-112  

>DHS Can Strengthen Its International Cybersecurity Programs (Redacted)
2012
OIG-13-95 The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), which is primarily responsible for fulfilling DHS security missions, assumed this responsibility for the Department. Subsequent to the President’s issuance of Executive Order 13618 in July 2012, NPPD’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications was reorganized in an effort to promote security, resiliency, and reliability of the Nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure.

>DHS Can Take Actions To Address Its Additional Cybersecurity Responsibilities
2013
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces
2020
OIG-04-31 DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information, August 2004 2004
OIG-22-67 DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited 2022
OIG-23-35 DHS Components Did Not Always Adhere to Internal Control Policies and Procedures for Ensuring That Bankcard Program Spending Limits Are Established Based on Procurement Needs 2023
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-14-82 According to DHS, during fiscal year 2012, DHS components hosted or sponsored 35 conferences exceeding $100,000 at atotal cost of$7.5 million. We conducted this audit as a follow-on to our prior report DHS' Policies and Procedures Over Conferences, OIG-13-96, to determine whether the DHS conference spending was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary. The amount DHS spent on conferences was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary in most instances. Conference packages submitted for approval stated the purpose of the conference. In addition, the conference agenda reflected appropriate content and encompassed full working days for the attendees. In many instances, the components made an effort to reduce conference costs by limiting the number of attendees and selecting a location within the local area.

>DHS Conference Spending
2014
OIG-10-19 DHS Conference Spending Practices and Oversight 2010
OIG-20-09 DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

>DHS Confirmed It Has Applied Lessons Learned in the Latest Financial System Modernization Effort
2020