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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-11-59  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-09-34  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Management of 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Mission Assignment Funding 		2009
OIG-11-86  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program-Offshore Vessel Inspections 		2011
OIG-12-73  

>U.S. Coast Guards Maritime Patrol Aircraft 		2012
OIG-10-94  

>U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team Makes Progress in Securing Cyberspace, but Challenges Remain 		2010
OIG-20-64 We determined CBP’s use of tear gas on these dates, in response to physical threats, appeared to be within CBP’s use of force policy.  However, U.S. Border Patrol obtained an acoustic device and used it in an “alert tone” mode on November 25, 2018, which did not conform to CBP’s Use of Force policy because Border Patrol did not get advance authorization to have a device with this capability.  CBP’s Use of Force policy would have permitted use of the alert tone in a manner reasonable and necessary for self-defense or the defense of another person in threatening, emergent situations.  However, the policy does not authorize the carrying of any weapon for duty use that is not authorized, included on the Authorized Equipment List, or specifically approved by the LESC director.  Using the acoustic device in alert mode may increase the risk of temporary or permanent hearing loss to those exposed to the sound and thereby increase the Government’s liability.  CBP’s own internal investigation of the November 25, 2018 incident regarding the acoustic device was incomplete and inaccurate and did not provide all the information CBP needed to determine whether the CBP officer and Border Patrol agents involved had complied with the use of force policy.  In addition, not all Border Patrol agents had the required training and certification to carry less-lethal devices.  This occurred because Border Patrol lacked internal controls to ensure agents had fulfilled these requirements.  Border Patrol agents using less-lethal devices for which they are not certified could result in unintended serious injury or death, increasing the Government’s liability.  We made four recommendations to CBP to ensure compliance with its Use of Force policy and improve its investigative process.  CBP concurred with all four recommendations.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Compliance with Use of Force Policy for Incidents on November 25, 2018 and January 1, 2019 - Law Enforcement Sensitive 		2020
OIG-15-39 CBP did not effectively target and examine rail shipments entering the United States from Mexico and Canada. Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPO) did not always target shipments using the mandatory Automated Targeting System (ATS) targeting criteria. CBPOs also did not always use the required radiation detection equipment to examine high-risk shipments. Finally, CBPOs did not always record the results of their rail cargo examinations in the Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS). CBPOs were unaware of the correct targeting criteria or inadvertently used inappropriate criteria. In addition, one port did not have the required radiation detection equipment for its rail team, and CBPOs at two other ports used Personal Radiation Detectors to examine shipments. Rail CBPOs also received insufficient training on the use of ATS and CERTS. Finally, Supervisory CBPOs did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure CBPOs followed CBP policy. As a result, CBP may have failed to target or properly examine rail shipments that were at an increased risk to contain contraband or dangerous materials. In addition, CBP has no assurance that decisions to release these high-risk shipments into U.S. commerce were appropriate.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Did Not Effectively Target and Examine Rail Shipments From Canada and Mexico 		2015
OIG-13-118 We reviewed the efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to address the risk posed by trusted insiders. Our objective was to assess CBP’s progress toward protecting its information technology assets from threats posed by its employees, especially those with trusted or elevated access to sensitive information systems or data. CBP has made progress in addressing the risk of insider threats across the organization. Specifically, CBP established a working group and a committee focused on the risk. Further, CBP researches employee behavior, conducts pre-employment screening including polygraph assessments, and participates in border corruption task forces with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Taken Steps To Address Insider Threat, but Challenges Remain (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-12-78  

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Privacy Stewardship 		2012
OIG-21-53 CBP did not effectively manage its aviation fleet acquisitions to meet operational mission needs.  Specifically, AMO acquired and deployed 16 multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) that did not contain the necessary air and land interdiction capabilities to perform its mission.  In addition, CBP AMO initiated the MEA and medium lift helicopter program without well-defined operational requirements and key performance parameters — critical items in the acquisition planning process.  This occurred because CBP did not provide oversight and guidance to ensure acquisition personnel followed key steps required by the DHS Acquisition Lifecycle Framework.  As a result, AMO expended approximately $330 million procuring multi-role enforcement aircraft that, at the time of acceptance, did not effectively respond to emergent air threats along the northern or southern borders, and experienced schedule delays deploying the medium lift helicopter.  Without effective oversight and guidance, AMO risks aviation acquisitions taking longer to deliver, at a greater cost, and without the needed capabilities.  We made four recommendations aimed at improving CBP’s acquisition management of aviation fleet to meet operational needs.  CBP concurred with three of the four recommendations. 

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs 		2021
OIG-11-06 U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition of 25 Acres of Land in Lordsburg, New Mexico 2011
OIG-08-15 U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2007 Internal Control 2008
OIG-11-27  

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Ground Transportation of Detainees 		2011
OIG-15-17 We conducted this audit to determine the effectiveness and cost of the Unmanned Aircraft System program, in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP) has invested significant funds. Although CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System program contributes to border security, after 8 years, CBP cannot prove that the program is effective because it has not developed performance measures. The program has also not achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals, and we found little or no evidence CBP has met its program expectations. We estimate it costs $12,255 per flight hour to operate the program; CBP’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include all operating costs. By not recognizing all operating costs, CBP cannot accurately assess the program’s cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program expansion. In addition, Congress and the public may be unaware of all the resources committed to the program. As a result, CBP has invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot demonstrate how much the program has improved border security. The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion could be put to better use by investing in alternatives.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations 		2015
OIG-14-47 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing regulations, including those related to trade, customs, and immigration. CBP’s Advanced Training Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, provides advanced law enforcement training to CBP personnel. We performed this audit to determine whether CBP provided effective oversight and managed the fourth phase of the Advanced Training Center acquisition in accordance with Federal, departmental, and Component requirements. CBP did not effectively oversee and manage the fourth phase of the Advanced Training Center acquisition. The $55.7 million Interagency Agreement between CBP and its Economy Act service provider, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was not developed and executed according to ederal, departmental, and Component requirements.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Advanced Training Center Acquisition 		2014
OIG-12-05 U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative 2012
OIG-12-131 U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Penalty Process – Statute of Limitations 2012
OIG-14-117 To improve operations, CBP developed a threer-pronged Resource Optimization Strategy. The second prong of the strategy is the Workload Staffing Model, which CBP uses to identify staffing needs for its Office of Field Operations’ CBP Officers at ports of entry. We conducted this audit to determine the reliability of the Workload Staffing Model in establishing the number of CBP Officers needed to fulfill mission requirements. CBP’s Workload Staffing Model includes a sound methodology to determine its staffing needs for CBP Officers and identify staffing shortages. However, the results of the model may not be accurate because CBP cannot ensure that the data entered into the model is reliable. CBP also does not have adequate internal controls over the model. Specifically, CBP’s Office of Field Operations does not (1) catalog, track, and validate all data and systems used in workload calculations; (2) systematically approve changes and additions to the Workload Staffing Model; and (3) have written policies and procedures on developing and using the model. In its December 2013 Strategy and Action Plan (2014 tо 2017), CBP acknowledges concerns about data from other systems used in the Workload Staffing Model.

>U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Workload Staffing Model 		2014
OIG-11-26  

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Identification of Criminal Aliens in Federal and State Custody Eligible for Removal from the United States 		2011
OIG-15-22 ICE’s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program offers alternatives to detention. We reviewed whether: (1) the rate at which individuals in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program have absconded or committed criminal acts has been reduced since 2009; (2) ICE can improve the effectiveness of its alternatives to detention program, either by revising or expanding its Intensive Supervision Appearance Program contract, or through other cost-effective means; and (3) ICE’s Risk Classification Assessment is effective. According to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program is effective because, using its performance metrics, few program participants abscond. However, ICE has changed how it uses the program and no longer supervises some participants throughout their immigration proceedings. As a result, ICE cannot definitively determine whether the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program has reduced the rate at which aliens, who were once in the program but who are no longer participating, have absconded or been arrested for criminal acts. ICE should adjust its performance metrics to reflect changes in its criteria for program participation.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Alternatives to Detention (Revised) 		2015
OIG-18-22 Representative Raúl M. Grijalva requested that we review U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) decision to award GEO Care, LLC a contract to establish a Family Case Management Program (FCMP). We sought to determine whether ICE awarded the FCMP contract in accordance with laws, regulations, and guidance. We also conducted a limited review of post-award contract modifications. FCMP is an alternative to detention that uses case managers to ensure participants comply with their release conditions, such as attending court hearings, while allowing them to remain in their community as they move through immigration proceedings. We determined that ICE properly awarded FCMP contracts.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract 		2018
OIG-11-64  

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-09-22  

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management of 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Mission Assignment Funding 		2009
OIG-20-13 Through its Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can successfully identify aliens charged with or convicted of crimes.  However, because ICE relies on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies, it sometimes faces challenges apprehending aliens in uncooperative jurisdictions.  ICE’s inability to detain aliens identified through CAP contributes to increased risk those aliens will commit more crimes.  Furthermore, having to arrest “at-large” aliens may put officer, detainee, and public safety at risk and strains ICE’s staffing resources.  We made four recommendations to ICE focused on improving CAP.  ICE concurred with all four recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings. 

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges 		2020
OIG-13-80 During fiscal years 2010 and 2011 audits of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) financial statements, independent auditors noted concerns with recorded obligations for some Enforcement and Removal Operations contracts. Since the scope of the financial statements audit does not necessarily include an in-depth review of matters that are not material to the audit, we conducted a performance audit of the processes. Our audit objective was to determine whether ICE is appropriately managing its contract funding and payment processes.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Enforcement and Removal Operations’ Contract Funding and Payment Processes 		2013
OIG-12-51  

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-13-66 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-14-66 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-14-105 In fiscal year 2012, ICE had 2,253 cases totaling approximately $21 million in workers’ compensation related costs. Our audit objective was to determine whether ICE is effectively managing the program to minimize lost workdays and related compensation costs. ICE has not effectively managed its Federal Employees’ Compensation Act program to control costs. Specifically, it has not ensured correct processing of claims and monitoring of workers’ compensation cases. In addition, ICE has not implemented management controls needed to manage the program. As a result, ICE has not minimized lost workdays and related compensation costs. For example, we identified five cases in which individuals received approximately $1 million in compensation after they were cleared to return to work.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Management of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Program (Revised) 		2014
OIG-14-33 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for an effective worksite enforcement strategy to protect critical infrastructure, target employers who violate employment laws, and protect employment opportunities for the Nation’s lawful workforce. In 2009, ICE revised its worksite enforcement strategy to prioritize identifying employers who knowingly hire illegal workers, arresting and removing illegal workers, and using all available civil and administrative tools to penalize and deter illegal employment. From fiscal years 2009 through 2012, Congress allocated about $531 million to fund and implement ICE’s worksite enforcement strategy. Over that same period, ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations directorate conducted about 9,140 administrative inspections and issued about $31.2 million in civil fines to employers. The audit objective was to determine whether ICE is meeting the requirements of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 through the administrative inspection process for its worksite enforcement strategy.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Worksite Enforcement Administrative Inspection Process 		2014
OIG-16-20 Secret Service has a dual mission of protection and criminal investigations. To support its protective mission, officers carry radios, which are their first line of communication for events such as fence jumpers, suspicious packages, or protests. These radio systems are critical for day-to-day protective operations. Secret Service needs to upgrade the radio systems used around the White House complex, the Vice President’s Residence, and Foreign Diplomatic Embassies. If Secret Service continues to use these outdated radio communications systems, it may negatively impact their protective operations.

>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-11-56  

>U.S. Secret Service's Information Technology Modernization Effort 		2011
OIG-17-84 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited USCIS’ financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including monitoring and recording employee completion of the annual ethics and integrity training; review and approval of H1-B and L fraud fee journal entries; recording of property, plant, and equipment; and inaccurate and unsupported data in some systems.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-16-79 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-14-19 In 1990, Congress created the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Immigrant Investor Program, also known as the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Program. The program’s intent was to stimulate the United States (U.S.) economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors. Three years later, the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 created the regional center pilot program for pooling investor money in a defined industry and geographic area. Our audit objective was to determine whether the USCIS’ Employment-Based Fifth Preference regional center program is administered and managed effectively

>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Employment-Based Fifth Preference (EB-5) Regional Center Program 		2014
OIG-15-55 USCG has taken some steps to address the risk of insider threats to its information systems and data. For example, USCG established an Insider Threat Working Group designed to implement a holistic program focused on the insider risk. In addition, USCG implemented a process to verify that system administrators have the appropriate level of access to information technology systems and networks to perform their assigned duties. Further, USCG established the Cyber Security Operations Center to monitor and respond to potential insider threat risks or incidents against USCG information systems and networks. However, additional steps are needed to further address the risk posed by trusted insiders at USCG

>United States Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, but Challenges Remain 		2015
OIG-23-36 United States Coast Guard Instituted Controls for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Extraordinary Relief Request, But Guidance Could Be Improved 2023
OIG-15-87 The USCG has made progress in developing a culture of privacy. Separately, the USCG Privacy Office and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Office are working to meet requirements of pertinent legislation, regulations, directives, and guidance. These offices ensure their staff annually receive mandatory privacy training, which helps embed shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices for complying with requirements to properly handle sensitive personally identifiable information and protected health information (privacy data). Also, USCG has completed required privacy and security documentation for managing its information technology systems containing privacy data. However, USCG faces challenges in protecting privacy data effectively because it lacks a strong organizational approach to resolving privacy issues.

>United States Coast Guard Safeguards For Protected Health Information Need Improvement 		2015
OIG-15-32 After an alteration of the BNSF Railway bridge (Burlington bridge) in Burlington, Iowa, was completed in 2012, the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) requested that we audit the sharing of costs, known as the final apportionment of cost, to determine its accuracy. Coast Guard could not provide proper documentation to support the final apportionment of cost for the Burlington bridge alteration, of which $74 million was allocated to the Coast Guard and $8 million to BNSF Railway (BNSF). Specifically, the Coast Guard did not properly document its review of the construction contractors who bid on the new bridge. In addition, the financial documentation for changes to originally planned work did not always support the cost of the work. The Coast Guard also did not have a process to evaluate and verify BNSF’s reported salvage value or expected savings in maintenance and repair costs. Based on our review of available documentation, we were unable to confirm either the Coast Guard’s or BNSF’s share of the final cost to alter the Burlington bridge. As a result, the Coast Guard cannot be certain it was appropriate to pay $74 million as the Federal share of the final cost of the bridge alteration.

>United States Coast Guard's Alteration of the Burlington Bridge Project 		2015
OIG-11-115  

>United States Coast Guard's Internal Controls and Cost Capturing for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 		2011
OIG-17-89 KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the United States Coast Guard’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses 12 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including financial disclosure reports; accounts receivable; civilian and military payroll; financial reporting process; and accounts payable accrual.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Coast Guard's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-16-77 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101- 576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>United States Coast Guard's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-08-51 United States Coast Guard's Management of the Marine Casualty Investigations Program 2008
OIG-11-17 United States Coast Guard's Reported Anti-Deficiency Violations for Shore Construction and Improvement Projects for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009 2011
OIG-19-22 We intended to verify whether the U.S. Coast Guard is properly reporting service members who are prohibited from possessing a firearm (“prohibited individuals”) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, in comparing relevant databases with data into the National Instant Background Check System (NICS), We identified a number of issues that led us to question the reliability of the Coast Guard’s data.  As a result, OIG cannot identify the full scope of prohibited individuals or verify that the Coast Guard properly reported prohibited individuals to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and to Congress.  Despite our concerns about the quality of Coast Guard’s data, OIG identified 210 service members who committed offenses that placed them in one of the categories of prohibited individuals.  Of these 210, Coast Guard did not enter 16 service members (8 percent) into NCIS.  This underreporting occurred because Coast Guard policy did not require attorneys to forward information about all individuals referred for trial by general court martial for reporting to the FBI.  Additionally, Coast Guard’s reporting to the FBI is centralized, and does not allow investigators in field offices to have direct access to NICS.  We made eight recommendations that will enhance Coast Guard’s reporting of prohibited individuals to the FBI.  The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations.

>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 		2019
OIG-15-68 KPMG LLP reviewed the United States Coast Guard’s (U.S. Coast Guard) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains six observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations. KPMG LLP noted deficiencies and the need for improvements in certain U.S. Coast Guard processes. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2014, included in DHS’ fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report. These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>United States Coast Guards' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-13-59 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>United States Coast Guard’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-14-69 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>United States Coast Guard’s Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-12-63  

>United States Customs and Border Protection’s Management of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Program 		2012
OIG-13-26 DNDO reported that there are currently 444 radiation portal monitors operating at seaports throughout the U.S., which are meeting the requirement to screen all containerized cargo at the 22 seaports with the most container volume. We were unable to determine whether DNDO and CBP initially deployed radiation portal monitors to ensure operational efficiency because the components did not thoroughly document deployment decisions and plans. Although all cargo is being screened, we identified some radiation portal monitors utilized infrequently or not utilized at all.

>United States Customs and Border Protection’s Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports 		2013

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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