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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-15-71 KPMG LLP reviewed the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains five observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations.

>United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-16-80 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-17-71 KPMG, LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses nine observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including intra-governmental payment and collection expense approval; accounts payable analysis, payroll cash reconciliation; performance reviews; and financial disclosure reporting.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-10-04 United States Secret Service After-Action Review of Inaugural Security  2010
OIG-20-18 The U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support.  Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service’s protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive.  We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled.  Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs.  We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs.  We made no recommendations. 

>United States Secret Service Expenses Incurred at Trump Turnberry Resort 		2020
OIG-17-87 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the United States Secret Service’s financial statements and internal control over financial.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including financial reporting; time and attendance approval; invoice entry and disbursements; and confidential financial disclosure reporting.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-15-58 KPMG LLP reviewed the United States Secret Service’s (U.S. Secret Service) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains seven observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations. KPMG LLP noted deficiencies and the need for improvements in certain U.S. Secret Service processes. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2014, included in DHS’ fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report. These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-16-81 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. For

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-11-54  

>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-13-65 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>United States Secret Service’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-14-74 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>United States Secret Service’s Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
DD-08-06 University of North Dakota Grand Forks, ND, FEMA Disaster No. DR-1174-ND, Public Assistance ID No. 000-92004, Audit. 2006
DD-03-04 University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, FEMA Disaster No. 1174-DR-ND, Public Assistance ID No. 000-92004 2004
DD-07-01 University of Texas Health Science Center, Houston, TX, FEMA Disaster No. DR-1379-TX, 2007
DD-11-01 University of Texas, MD Anderson Cancer Center 2011
OIG-13-102 In 2012, FEMA announced that it would no longer use park models as a housing option, and instead would use only manufactured housing certified by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Unless FEMA takes actions to ensure that it maintains the ability to use temporary housing units similar in size to the park model, this decision will increase program costs by tens of millions of dollars annually, and may hinder FEMA’s ability to provide shelter to disaster survivors quickly. In reacting to the decision, FEMA field staff expressed concerns to us about their ability to house disaster survivors quickly and cost effectively. Further, FEMA officials said that many homeowners prefer units that can fit on their home sites, because it allows them to remain on their own property near their places of employment and schools while they rebuild their homes.

>Unless Modified, FEMA’s Temporary Housing Plans Will Increase Costs by an Estimated $76 Million Annually 		2013
DS-13-10 Our audit objective Is to determine whether the County accounted for and expended FEMA PA grant funds according to federal regulation and FEMA guide lines. The california Emergency Managemenl Agency (Cal EMA), a FEMA grantee, awarded t he County $54.9 million for costs resulting from storms, flooding. debris flows, and mudslides during the period of Decemher 27, 2004, through January 11, 2005. The award provided 75 percent FEMA funding for 143 large projects and 3S small projects. Our audit covered the period from December 27, 2004, to January 29, 2013. We are in the process of auditing a total of 108 large projects, with total awarded funding of $44.S million. We are comprehensively auditing 12 of those projects-with total awarded funding of $17.0 million- and auditing 96 projects - with total awarded funding of $27.8 miliion- exclusively for funds that can be deobligated and put to better use.

>Unneeded Funding and Management Challenges Associated with the FEMA Grant Awarded to Los Angeles County, California: Third Interim Report 		2013
OIG-18-38 Facing continued negative publicity and pressure from Members of Congress, FEMA established the Sandy Claims Review Process (SCRP). In doing so, FEMA did not rely on legislatively mandated internal controls designed to ensure appropriate payments for flood victims. Additionally, during the formation and operation of the SCRP, FEMA failed to establish contractor expectations or provide consistent guidance and oversight related to Hurricane Sandy claims. These omissions resulted in policyholders receiving unsupported additional payments, excessive costs to operate the SCRP, and time delays in processing the claims

>Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process 		2018
OIG-11-91  

>Update on DHS’ Procurement and Program Management Operations 		2011
OIG-08-80 US Custom’s and Border Protection’s Management of 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Mission Assignment Funding 2008
OIG-08-79 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Visa Security Program 2008
OIG-12-111 US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities (Redacted) 2012
OIG-06-16 US-VISIT System Security Management Needs Strengthening (Redacted) 2006
OIG-13-93 As of November 2012, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) reported more than 15,000 laptop computers in its inventory. These laptops are used by USCG’s military personnel and civilian employees to perform their job functions both in the United States and abroad. Our overall objective was to determine the effectiveness of USCG’s efforts to protect its laptop computers and controls implemented to safeguard its laptops and wireless networks and devices from potential exploits. We reviewed USCG’s policies and procedures for managing its laptop inventory. In addition, we reviewed the effectiveness of configuration management and technical controls implemented to protect the sensitive information processed by and stored on selected laptops.

>USCG Must Improve the Security and Strengthen the Management of Its Laptops 		2013
OIG-09-75  

>USCG's Plans to Improve Deepwater Accountability (Letter Report) 		2009
OIG-11-31  

>USCG's Polar Icebreaker Maintenance, Upgrade, and Acquisition Program 		2011
OIG-12-58  

>USCG’s Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-05-49 USCIS Approval of H-1B Petitions Exceeded 65,000 Cap in Fiscal Year 2005 2005
OIG-16-48 Since 2005, USCIS has worked to transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and automated immigration benefits processing environment. As we previously reported, past automation attempts have been hampered by ineffective planning, multiple changes in direction, and inconsistent stakeholder involvement. Current USCIS efforts to automate immigration benefits processing also could be improved. Although USCIS deployed the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS) in May 2012, to date only two of approximately 90 types of immigration benefits and services are available for online customer filing. The current ELIS approach also has not ensured stakeholder involvement, performance metrics, system testing, or user support needed for ELIS to be effective. As it struggles to address these issues, USCIS now estimates that it will take three more years—over four years longer than estimated—and an additional $1 billion to automate all benefit types as expected. Until USCIS fully implements ELIS with all the needed improvements, the agency will remain unable to achieve its workload processing, customer service, and national security goals.

>USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains Ineffective 		2016
OIG-14-36 We audited USCIS’ foreign worker petition process to determine whether employers comply with the requirements of Public Law 111-230. Our objectives were to: 1) validate that the border security fees were paid when required, and 2) assess USCIS controls to verify that employers accurately disclosed information on the number and composition of their employees when petitioning for foreign workers

>USCIS Controls To Ensure Employers Sponsoring H-1B and L-1 Employees Pay Applicable Border Security Fee 		2014
OIG-05-41 USCIS Faces Challenges in Modernizing Information Technology 2005
OIG-18-23 USCIS deployed this capability in April 2016 to improve processing of approximately 84,000 naturalization applications received each month. However, as before, the ELIS capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to­-end Form N-400 processing. ELIS repeatedly experienced outages and did not always perform as intended. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment. Given its focus on meeting established system release dates, USCIS did not fully address our prior report recommendations to improve user support, stakeholder engagement, performance measurement, and testing to ensure ELIS met user needs and improved operations.

>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery 		2018
OIG-23-40 USCIS Has Generally Met Statutory Requirements to Adjudicate Asylum Applications from Paroled Afghan Evacuees 2023
OIG-18-58 "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, including applications for permanent resident cards, also known as green cards. In response to congressional concerns, we examined green card application processing times, as well as why processing times vary among USCIS field offices. USCIS regularly posts information on its website about the time it takes field offices to adjudicate green card applications (processing time). Yet, the information is unclear and not helpful to USCIS’ customers because it does not reflect the actual amount of time it takes field offices, on average, to complete green card applications.

>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications 		2018
OIG-10-39  

>USCIS Implementation of the Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act 		2010
OIG-18-03 USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B participants are compliant and not engaged in fraudulent activity. These visits assess whether petitioners and beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B petitions each year, which could include extensions and amendments. As of April 2017, USCIS reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. However, during FYs 2014–16, USCIS conducted an average of 7,200 ASVVP site visits annually. For the limited number of visits conducted, USCIS does not always ensure the IOs are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Further limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not ensure the agency always takes proper and timely action when IOs identify potential fraud or noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of fraud; however, the agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the results of these visits.

 

>USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants 		2018
OIG-21-56 We identified deficiencies in E-Verify’s processes for confirming identity during employment verification.  E-Verify’s photo matching process is not fully automated, but rather, relies on employers to confirm individuals’ identities by manually reviewing photos.  We attribute these deficiencies to USCIS not developing or evaluating the plans and internal controls needed to improve its processes and detect, track, and investigate system errors.  Until USCIS addresses E-Verify’s deficiencies, it cannot ensure the system provides accurate employment eligibility results.  We made 10 recommendations to improve E-Verify’s accuracy, internal controls, and workload capabilities.  USCIS concurred with all 10 recommendations.

>USCIS Needs to Improve Its Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Process 		2021
OIG-22-65 USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information 2022
OIG-15-122 We did not find any evidence that the production and subsequent mailing of 3-year DACA-related EADs held in NPS from February 17 through February 19, 2015, was done in defiance of the Federal District Court’s injunction. We determined that a combination of factors led to the production, and mailing of about 2,000 of these 3-year EADs. USCIS Service Center Operations Directorate (SCOPS) management was not specific in its direction to USCIS Office of Information Technology (IT) staff. In addition, SCOPS management was mistaken in its assumptions about what IT staff was able to do or had done in halting production of the 3-year EADs. Finally, within IT, we concluded there was a lack of understanding about the consequences of actions taken related to release of the EADs that had been held. USCIS could not provide reliable data on the actual number of EADs held in NPS that were subsequently produced and mailed. USCIS also continues to discover EADs that were produced or issued after the injunction but not included in the 2,128 originally identified. Therefore, we cannot validate the number of 3-year EADs produced or issued after February 16, 2015.

>USCIS' Issuance of 3-year Employment Authorization Documents Following a Federal District Court Injunction 		2015
OIG-12-54  

>USCIS' Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-18-78 USCIS has inadequate controls for verifying that foreign nationals seeking lawful permanent residence status meet health-related standards for admissibility. First, USCIS is not properly vetting the physicians it designates as civil surgeons. We determined that USCIS designated physicians with a history of patient abuse or a criminal record as civil surgeons. This is occurring because USCIS does not have adequate policies to ensure only suitable physicians are designated as civil surgeons. Second, when reviewing these foreign nationals’ required medical forms, ISOs are accepting incomplete and inaccurate forms because they are not adequately trained and because USCIS is not enforcing its existing policies. USCIS may be placing foreign nationals at risk of abuse by some civil surgeons. USCIS could also be exposing the U.S. population to contagious or dangerous health conditions from foreign nationals erroneously granted lawful permanent resident status.

>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-22-10 USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-11-18 Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for the Transit Security Grants Program 2011
OIG-12-09 Use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds by the U.S. Coast Guard for the Alteration of Bridges Program 2012
OIG-11-101  

>Use of DHS Purchase Cards 		2011
OIG-14-153 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning the use of a risk-based rule by the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight program that may create a vulnerability in aviation security. We assigned our Office of Inspections team currently assessing Security Enhancements to the TSA Pre?™ Initiative to review this allegation. We interviewed the whistleblower and TSA senior officials involved in the risk-based rule decision-making process. We also analyzed documentation regarding these rules to determine whether an aviation security vulnerability exists.

>Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight (Redacted) 		2014
OIG-17-01 We determined that the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) did not have adequate protections in place on systems to which Master Central Index (MCI) information was migrated.  These problems occurred because USSS has not consistently made IT management a priority.  The USSS Chief Information Officer (CIO) lacked authority for all IT resources and was not effectively positioned to provide necessary oversight, inadequate attention was given to updating USSS IT policies, and high turnover and vacancies within the Office of the CIO meant a lack of leadership to ensure IT systems were properly managed.  In addition, USSS personnel were not adequately trained to successfully perform their duties. We made 10 recommendations to USSS and 1 recommendation to the DHS Privacy Office to reduce the risk of future unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information. The USSS and the DHS Privacy Officer concurred with these recommendations.

>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data 		2017
DA-15-05 V.I. Department of Housing, Parks and Recreation FEMA Disaster No. 1067-DR-VI 2005
OIG-05-47 Vehicle Disposal and Sales Program Within U.S. Border Patrol's, San Diego Sector 2005
DS-09-03  

>Ventura County Watershed Protection District 		2009

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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