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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-13-91 We audited the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program. The program’s intent is to screen passengers by observing their behavior in order to detect potential high-risk travelers. This program uses Behavior Detection Officers to detect passenger behaviors that may be indicative of stress, fear, or deception. Congressman Bennie Thompson requested an audit of TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program to determine its effectiveness, efficiency, and economy as a security screening protocol at airports. The audit objective was to determine whether TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program is structured to ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective and cost-effective manner to identify potential terrorists.

>Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-13-99 As of January 2013, 16 airports were participating in the Screening Partnership Program. Under the program, an airport operator may apply to use a private company to screen passengers and baggage rather than use Federal Government screening personnel. TSA reviews and approves applications to participate, awards contracts to private screening companies, and oversees the private screening workforce. We performed this audit to determine whether TSA administered the Screening Partnership Program in accordance with Federal regulations.

>Transportation Security Administration’s Screening Partnership Program 		2013
OIG-07-01 Treatment of Immigration Detainees Housed at Immigration and Customs Enforcement Facilities, 2007
DS-09-01 Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc 2009
OIG-22-13 Trusted Traveler Revocations for Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-15-98 TSA’s multi-layered process to vet aviation workers for potential links to terrorism was generally effective. In addition to initially vetting every application for new credentials, TSA recurrently vetted aviation workers with access to secured areas of commercial airports every time the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist was updated. However, our testing showed that TSA did not identify 73 individuals with terrorism-related category codes because TSA is not authorized to receive all terrorism-related information under current interagency watchlisting policy.

>TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-17-04 We determined that airports do not always properly account for access media badges after they have been issued, and that the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) current inspection practice of relying on information reported by airports about access media badges limits its oversight of controls over badge accountability.  We made three recommendations to improve TSA’s oversight of airport access media badge controls. 

>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-21-52 TSA partially complied with the Act by establishing operational processes for routine activities within its Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT)  program for surface transportation.  Specifically, TSA has a national training program for canines and handlers, uses canine assets to meet urgent security needs, and monitors and tracks canine assets.  However, TSA did not comply with the Act’s requirements to evaluate the entire EDCT program for alignment with its risk-based security strategy or develop a unified deployment strategy for its EDCTs for surface transportation.  We recommended that TSA coordinate with its law enforcement agency partners to conduct an evaluation of the EDCT program and develop an agency-wide deployment strategy for surface transportation consistent with TSA's Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy.  TSA concurred with both recommendations.   

>TSA Did Not Assess Its Explosives Detection Canine Team Program for Surface Transportation Security 		2021
OIG-21-68 TSA implemented 167 of the 251 (67 percent) requirements in both Acts, 55 of the 167 (33 percent) were not completed by the Acts’ established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining 84 requirements.  TSA was unable to complete 33 of these requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside of TSA's control. The shortfalls occurred because TSA did not: (1) designate a lead office to establish internal controls, conduct oversight, and provide quality assurance for implementing the legislatively mandated requirements; (2) develop formal policies and procedures to ensure consistency and accountability for implementing the requirements on time; or (3) plan or develop an effective system to maintain relevant supporting documentation for the Acts’ requirements to help ensure information accuracy, continuity, and record retrieval capability. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders.  Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems.  TSA provided a corrective action plan but did not concur with the recommendation.

>TSA Has Not Implemented All Requirements of the 9/11 Act and the TSA Modernization Act 		2021
OIG-12-128  

>TSA Management and Oversight at Honolulu International Airport (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-19-35 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs to continue to improve its retention, hiring, and training of Transportation Security Officers (TSO). Specifically, TSA needs to better address its retention challenges because it currently does not share and leverage results of TSO exit surveys and does not always convey job expectations to new-hires. TSA does not fully evaluate applicants for capability as well as compatibility when hiring new TSOs. Thus, the agency may be making uninformed hiring decisions due to inadequate applicant information and a lack of formally documented guidance on ranking potential new-hires

>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers 		2019
OIG-21-39 We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not manage the Recruitment and Hiring (R&H) contract in a fiscally responsible manner.  Specifically, TSA did not properly plan contract requirements prior to awarding the contract and did not develop accurate cost estimates for all contract modifications.  We recommended TSA establish a cross-functional requirements working group for planning and awarding the R&H re-compete efforts as well as other Personnel Futures Program contract requirements.  The working group should develop a holistic and forward-thinking acquisition strategy, as well as implement a comprehensive process for reviewing and determining requirements.  We also recommended TSA ensure Human Capital improves contract management activities including, but not limited to, requirements planning and realistic cost estimate development by obtaining additional expert resources or leveraging existing expertise.  We made two recommendations to improve TSA’s contract management.  TSA concurred with both recommendations.

>TSA Needs to Improve Its Oversight for Human Capital Contracts 		2021
OIG-21-11 TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program (REDACTED) 2021
OIG-20-33 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities.  Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document.  These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system.  Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports.  We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system.  TSA concurred with our recommendations.

>TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System 		2020
OIG-16-91 We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the policies, processes, and oversight measures to improve security at the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). TSA has limited regulatory oversight processes to strengthen passenger security at Amtrak because the component has not fully implemented all requirements from Public Law 110–53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act). Federal regulations require Amtrak to appoint a rail security coordinator and report significant security concerns to TSA. Although the9/11 Act requires TSA to establish additional passenger rail regulations, the component has not fully implemented those regulations. Specifically, TSA has not issued regulations to assign rail carriers to high-risk tiers; established a rail training program; and conducted security background checks of frontline rail employees. In the absence of formal regulations, TSA relies on outreach programs, voluntary initiatives, and recommended measures to assess and improve rail security for Amtrak.

>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security 		2016
OIG-18-27 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intended to expand TSA PreCheck to 25 million air travelers at a rate of more than 5 million enrollments per year. We evaluated whether the current TSA PreCheck Application Program adjudication process will allow TSA to meet its enrollment goals. TSA did not allocate additional resources or staff to the TSA Adjudication Center, which had multiple vacancies and was tasked with manually processing about 26 percent of TSA PreCheck Application Program applications. To make matters worse, in June 2016, TSA PreCheck applications surged, leaving the Adjudication Center overwhelmed with applications to process. As the application queue grew, TSA brought on detailees from other Federal agencies to assist with adjudications part time, but they did not have a significant impact. Further, the Adjudication Center relies on a manual caseload assignment and reporting process, which is inefficient for the volume of TSA PreCheck applications needing adjudication.

>TSA's Adjudication Resources are Inadequate to Meet TSA PreCheck Enrollment Goals 		2018
OIG-10-37  

>TSA's Breach of Sensitive Security Information 		2010
OIG-20-28 TSA's Challenges With Passenger Screening Canine Teams (Redacted) 2020
OIG-19-56 The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) methods for classifying its Office of Inspection (OOI) criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. TSA’s criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The FY 2017 timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met the 50 percent requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. This occurred because OOI officials lacked oversight and accountability for the timesheet submission, review, and approval processes. Further, criminal investigators and their supervisors did not always complete and approve certification forms as required to verify eligibility for premium pay. In some instances, incorrect timesheet calculations inflated the annual average of unscheduled duty hours criminal investigators worked to be eligible for premium pay. OOI management did not develop and implement guidance to review these key calculations annually. Without better oversight and valid timesheet data, TSA cannot ensure it is accurately classifying criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA also may be wasting agency funds on criminal investigators ineligible to receive premium pay. We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its OOI criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA concurred with all of our recommendations.

>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement 		2019
OIG-16-32 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded a human capital services contract valued at $1.2 billion. We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which TSA is effectively monitoring and enforcing the terms and conditions of the contract. Although TSA ensures the contractor meets the terms and conditions of the human capital services contract, its oversight could be more effective. Specifically, TSA has limited options for holding the contractor accountable for performance deficiencies. There were instances in which TSA did not hold the contractor monetarily accountable for personally identifiable information violations. TSA also did not hold the contractor monetarily liable for noncompliance with statement of work requirements relating to veterans’ preference.

>TSA's Human Capital Services Contract Terms and Oversight Need Strengthening 		2016
OIG-17-107 We determined that although a complainant alleged there were systemic security challenges in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), there were few documented security incidents over the past 5 years, all of which OIA addressed with corrective actions.  Further, OIA has improved the effectiveness of its Field Intelligence Division and the Field Intelligence Officers by hiring qualified, experienced intelligence professionals and implementing clear policies and procedures, but it could enhance officer training.  OIA is also addressing weaknesses in coordination among its watches and perceived delays in intelligence reporting.  We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of OIA operations; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred with both recommendations.

>TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis Has Improved Its Field Operations 		2017
OIG-11-95  

>TSA's Oversight of the Airport Badging Process Needs Improvement (Redacted) 		2011
OIG-10-68  

>TSA's Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies  		2010
OIG-09-69  

>TSA's Role in General Aviation Security 		2009
OIG-09-05 TSA's Security Screening Procedures for Employees at Orlando International Airport and the Feasibility of 100 Percent Employee Screening (Redacted) 2009
OIG-08-66 TSA’s Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs 2008
OIG-12-53  

>TSA’s Management Letter for FY 2011 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2012
OIG-08-90 TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at Jackson-Evers International and Other Selected Airports (Unclassified Summary) 2008
OIG-14-138 In 2007,TSA began deploying advanced imaging technology to screen airline passengers for weapons, explosives, and other concealed objects. In 2009 and 2010, TSA used American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds to purchase 251 Secure 1000SP advanced imaging technology units from Rapiscan Systems. By June 2013, TSA had removed the units from service because the company could not develop enhanced software to enable the units to comply with the privacy requirements of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Rapiscan Systems assumed all costs associated with their removal and storage. In May 2013, Representative Bennie Thompson requested that we review TSA’s management of its advanced imaging technology inventory. Specifically, Mr. Thompson requested that we review the removal and potential redistribution of the noncompliant units, and related costs.

>TSA’s Management of Secure 1000SP Advanced Imaging Technology Units 		2014
OIG-13-14 his report is the result of a June 2011 letter from Congressman John L. Mica, U.S. House of Representatives, requesting that we provide updated information on our 2008 report, Transportation Security Administration’s National Deployment Force. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) National Deployment Force officers support airport screening operations during emergencies, seasonal demands, severe weather conditions, or increased passenger activity equiring additional screening personnel above those normally available to airports. In addition, officers may support other TSA functions as described in table 1 of our report.

>TSA’s National Deployment Force – FY 2012 Follow-Up 		2013
OIG-14-103-D At the time of our audit fieldwork, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (State), a FEMA grantee, was in the process of drafting the County's Project Worksheets with an estimated total award of $4.4 million for damages resulting from wildfires. The incident period for the declared disaster was from August 17, 2013, through October 24, 2013. The award will provide 75 percent funding for debris removal (Category A), emergency protective measures (Category B), and permanent work on roads and bridges and utilities (Categories C and F, respectively) for six large and two small projectsl We reviewed two of the six large projects totaling $1.2 million, or 28 percent of the projected FEMA award. The audit covered the period from August 17, 2013, through March 13, 2014. At that time, the County had not yet claimed any disaster related costs.

>Tuolumne County, California, Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices in Place Adequate To Manage FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds 		2014
OIG-16-128 We conducted this audit to determine whether TSA’s background check processes ensure only eligible individuals receive credentials and remain in the program.

>TWIC Background Checks are Not as Reliable as They Could Be 		2016
OIG-22-68 U.S. Border Patrol Faces Challenges Administering Post-Apprehension Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors 2022
OIG-22-71 U.S. Border Patrol Screened Migrants at the Southwest Border but Could Strengthen Processes 2022
OIG-14-112 Information technology plays a critical role in enabling U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to accomplish its mission. In 2009, we reported that insufficient information technology staffing and limited information technology budget authority impeded the Chief Information Officer. We conducted this follow-up audit to determine USCIS’ progress in establishing key information technology management capabilities to support mission needs. The USCIS Chief Information Officer has established key information technology management capabilities to support USCIS’ mission.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges 		2014
OIG-12-125  

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program Issues 		2012
OIG-12-83 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Laptop Safeguards Need Improvements 2012
OIG-15-72 KPMG LLP reviewed the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains five observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-11-63  

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-09-90  

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing Information Technology 		2009
OIG-07-11 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Progress in Modernizing Information Technology, 2007
OIG-13-57 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also engaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013
OIG-14-71 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG isresponsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-12-12 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Progress in Transformation 2012
OIG-13-97 We performed this audit to determine whether USCIS recorded information about adjudicated family-based petitions and applications suspected of being fraudulent according to agency policy requirements and in a manner that deterred immigration fraud. U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who petition to sponsor a qualifying family member, including a spouse, must file a PetitionfforfAlienfRelative (Form I-130) with USCIS.1 USCIS officers adjudicate I-130 petitions at field offices or service centers. Through the I-130 adjudication process, USCIS must validate that the petitioner is a U.S.citizen or lawful permanent resident.

>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Tracking and Monitoring of Potentially Fraudulent Petitions and Applications for Family-Based Immigration Benefits 		2013
OIG-15-05 The Coast Guard has undertaken a project to modernize information technology onboard certain ships and aircraft. This technology is referred to collectively as Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The C4ISR project is a major information technology investment with an acquisition life cycle cost of $1.5 billion through fiscal year 2026. The Coast Guard has implemented information technology systems that effectively support the mission needs of some ships and aircraft. Specifically, the systems have met overall performance requirements and have improved operational capabilities, including increased situational awareness, better communication within the Coast Guard and with its partners, and enhanced sensor capabilities. The Coast Guard, however, has not carried out some planned system enhancements that were necessary to support mission needs of certain aircraft and legacy ships. These enhancements were not carried out because of significant budget reductions. Revised plans do not fully address how the Coast Guard will meet the critical technology needs of these aircraft and legacy ships. As a result, these ships and aircraft continue to rely on obsolete technology which impacts mission performance and makes operations and maintenance more difficult and costly.

>U.S. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Modernization 		2015
OIG-12-68  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Acquisition of the Sentinel Class- Fast Response Cutter 		2012
OIG-09-82  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Acquisition of the Vertical-Takeoff-and-Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 		2009
OIG-11-82  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Anti-Deficiency Act Violations for the Response Boat-Medium Major Acquisition Project for Fiscal Years 2004 Through 2009 		2011
OIG-11-59  

>U.S. Coast Guard's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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