Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number	Title	Issue Date	Fiscal Year Sort descending
OIG-17-31	ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures to comply with the requirements of ONDCP’s Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that ICE’s FY 2016 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular. KPMG did not make any recommendations as a result of its review. >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	02/01/2017	2017
OIG-17-119	We determined that the seven facilities we inspected were generally following U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidance for documenting decisions on segregating detainees with mental health conditions and promptly reporting segregation placement information for detainees with mental health conditions to ICE field offices. However, the field offices we reviewed did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases. Also, ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system. Unless ICE field offices comply with requirements to report and record these reviews, ICE headquarters cannot be sure required reviews are taking place and may not have all the information needed to assess the use of segregation, which could put detainees and facility staff at risk of harm. We made three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions. >ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions	09/29/2017	2017
OIG-17-103-MA	We determined that two DHS Components – CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details and staffed them without clear legal authority. We made two recommendations to the DHS secretary to direct CBP and ICE to (1) discontinue security details pending a legal review by the DHS General Counsel and (2) develop directive regarding the scope and circumstances when a security detail is permitted for DHS component heads including the requirements for departmental level authorization; pending the results of the legal review. >Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns (OIG-17-103-MA)	09/14/2017	2017
OIG-17-43-MA	A recent unannounced inspection of the Theo Lacy Facility, an ICE detention facility in Orange, California, raised serious concerns, some that pose health risks and others that violate ICE’s 2008 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and result in potentially unsafe conditions at the facility. Overall, we had concerns about food handling, confinement conditions, and services. We made three recommendations to ensure compliance with ICE detention standards and strengthen ICE’s oversight of TLF. >Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California (OIG-17-43-MA)	03/06/2017	2017
OIG-18-86	We identified a number of serious issues that violate U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and pose significant health and safety risks at the facility. Specifically, we are concerned about nooses in detainee cells, improper and overly restrictive segregation, and untimely and inadequate detainee medical care. We recommended that ICE conduct a full review and inspection of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center and the GEO Group’s management of the center to immediately to ensure compliance with ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards. Specifically, ICE must review and ensure compliance with: Personal Care Required; Segregation; and Medical Care. We made one recommendation to improve conditions at the facility. >Management Alert - Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California	09/27/2018	2018
OIG-18-77	We examined whether ICE is effectively overseeing and managing the 287(g) program as it expands. Under the 287(g) program, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) delegates authority to state and local law enforcement agencies to help ICE in its immigration enforcement mission in their jurisdictions. After the Executive Order was issued, the 287(g) program expanded quickly, it rose from 36 to 76. ICE approved 40 additional applicants without planning for a corresponding increase in program management staffing, determining how to promptly deliver needed information technology (IT) equipment to participants, or ensuring participants are fully trained. Without effective oversight, it is difficult to monitor and measure performance to determine whether program participants are assisting ICE in its immigration enforcement mission. Further, without the necessary equipment and training, program participants may not be acting as a force multiplier to identify removable aliens. ICE may also not be able to fully expand the program and include new localities interested in participating. >Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program	09/19/2018	2018
OIG-18-76	We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased. >Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers	09/07/2018	2018
OIG-18-67	Neither type of inspection ICE uses to examine detention facilities ensures consistent compliance with detention standards or comprehensive correction of identified deficiencies. Specifically, because the Nakamoto inspection scope is too broad, ICE’s guidance on procedures is unclear, and Nakamoto’s inspection practices are not consistently thorough, its inspections do not fully examine actual conditions or identify all compliance deficiencies. In contrast, ODO uses effective methods and processes to thoroughly inspect facilities and identify deficiencies, but the inspections are too infrequent to ensure the facilities implement all corrections. Moreover, ICE does not adequately follow up on identified deficiencies or systematically hold facilities accountable for correcting deficiencies, which further diminishes the usefulness of both Nakamoto and ODO inspections. >ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements	06/26/2018	2018
OIG-18-53	U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill asked us to review ICE’s modification of its intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) with the City of Eloy in Arizona to procure family detention space in Dilley, Texas. We also reviewed other selected IGSAs to determine whether they complied with applicable laws and regulations. (ICE) is responsible for the detention of removable aliens. ICE commonly uses a type of agreement called an IGSA to reserve space at detention facilities owned or operated by state or local governments. In September 2014, ICE improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy (Eloy) in Arizona to establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, more than 900 miles away. Although ICE could have contracted directly with the private company that operates the South Texas Family Residential Center, CCA, it instead created an unnecessary “middleman” by modifying its existing IGSA with Eloy. Eloy’s sole function under the modification is to act as the middleman between ICE and CCA; Eloy collects about $438,000 in annual fees for this service. >Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services	02/21/2018	2018
OIG-18-51	Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010. The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today. >Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement	02/14/2018	2018
OIG-18-46	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a multi-mission bureau, and obligations are reported pursuant to an approved drug methodology. ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Domestic Investigations, International Operations (IO) and Office of Intelligence uphold U.S. drug control policy delegated amid the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) initiatives, by fully supporting the overall ICE mandate to detect, disrupt, and dismantle smuggling organizations. >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds	01/30/2018	2018
OIG-18-45	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY). The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required to conduct a review of the report and provide a conclusion about the reliability of each assertion made in the report. Independent Accountants’ Report on the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) FY 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular). >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	01/30/2018	2018
OIG-18-42	Management Alert - ICE's Training Model Needs Further Evaluation	01/25/2018	2018
OIG-18-37	Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image. >DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted)	01/18/2018	2018
OIG-18-36	ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) faces challenges in implementing the Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol (KSTEP) screening process, which is used to identify aliens who may be known or suspected terrorists. Although ERO uses KSTEP to screen all aliens who are in ICE custody, ERO policy does not require continued screening of the approximately 2.37 million aliens when released and under ICE supervision. We sampled and tested 40 of 142 ERO case files of detained aliens identified as known or suspected terrorists during fiscal years 2013–15. All 40 files had at least one instance of noncompliance with KSTEP policy, generating greater concerns regarding the population of aliens screened and determined to have no connections to terrorism. >ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)	01/05/2018	2018
OIG-18-32	In response to concerns raised by immigrant rights groups and complaints to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Hotline about conditions for detainees held in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody, we conducted unannounced inspections of five detention facilities to evaluate their compliance with ICE detention standards. We identified problems that undermine the protection of detainees’ rights, their humane treatment, and the provision of a safe and healthy environment. Although the climate and detention conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at all of them, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and our review of documents revealed several issues. Upon entering some facilities, detainees were housed incorrectly based on their criminal history. Further, in violation of standards, all detainees entering one facility were strip searched. Available language services were not always used to facilitate communication with detainees. Some facility staff reportedly deterred detainees from filing grievances and did not thoroughly document resolution of grievances. Staff did not always treat detainees respectfully and professionally, and some facilities may have misused segregation. Finally, we observed potentially unsafe and unhealthy detention conditions. >Concerns About ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities	12/11/2017	2018
OIG-18-22	Representative Raúl M. Grijalva requested that we review U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) decision to award GEO Care, LLC a contract to establish a Family Case Management Program (FCMP). We sought to determine whether ICE awarded the FCMP contract in accordance with laws, regulations, and guidance. We also conducted a limited review of post-award contract modifications. FCMP is an alternative to detention that uses case managers to ensure participants comply with their release conditions, such as attending court hearings, while allowing them to remain in their community as they move through immigration proceedings. We determined that ICE properly awarded FCMP contracts. >U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract	11/30/2017	2018
OIG-19-57	A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations	07/31/2019	2019
OIG-19-47	Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities	06/03/2019	2019
OIG-19-28	The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process. >ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens	03/11/2019	2019
OIG-19-30	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY). ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Williams Adley was unable to assess the accuracy of the number of products reported in Metric 2, “Number of counter-narcotics intelligence requests satisfied,” as part of the PSR. >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	03/08/2019	2019
OIG-19-25	Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds	03/07/2019	2019
OIG-19-20	This inspection is part of an ongoing review of ICE detention facilities. While conducting an unannounced visit to the Essex County Correctional Facility using ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards, we identified serious violations. As part of this assessment, ICE must review and ensure compliance with those standards addressing unreported security incidents, food safety, and facility conditions that include ceiling leaks, unsanitary shower stalls, bedding, and outdoor recreation areas. >Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey	02/13/2019	2019
OIG-19-18	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained. >ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards	01/29/2019	2019
OIG-19-14	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigative offices accurately maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. Investigative staff were diligent in complying with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, we found that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis. >Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division	12/06/2018	2019
OIG-19-07	On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers. Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority. >DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers	11/20/2018	2019
OIG-20-66	DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA). Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims. Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims. We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role. Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent. We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures. DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open. >DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA	08/27/2020	2020
OIG-20-65	We determined that children brought to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods, and in many cases overnight, to be reunited with their parents. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on the first day of attempted mass reunifications. ICE and U.S. Health and Human Services had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to promptly out-process the parents of arriving children. As a result, some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous access to food, water, and restrooms. As the mass reunifications continued, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port Isabel closer to the court’s July 26, 2018 deadline. The report contains no recommendations. >Children Waited for Extended Periods in Vehicles to Be Reunified with Their Parents at ICE's Port Isabel Detention Center in July 2018	08/19/2020	2020
OIG-20-59	determined ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing. However, existing agreements and guidance on HSI’s participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated. Additionally, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF. We recommended DHS JTTF contributors evaluate and update agreements governing JTTF participation as needed. HSI should renegotiate and update the 2003 agreement on terrorism financing, as well as update its related guidance accordingly. We also recommended DHS coordinate with Department of Justice and Department of State, as well as within the DHS, to develop agreements to allow for the more direct sharing of critical investigative information. We made five recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing. DHS concurred with two recommendations and non-concurred with three. >HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED)	08/13/2020	2020
OIG-20-54	U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not follow its written policy when conducting disciplinary reviews of Senior Executive Employees (SES) employees, which risks creating an appearance that SES employees receive more favorable treatment than non-SES employees. We reviewed the disciplinary proceedings of the former SES official to evaluate whether ICE’s deviation from the written policy, or any other evidence, in that case indicated that the official received favorable treatment, as alleged. We did not find evidence of actual favoritism or inappropriate influence in the official’s disciplinary or security clearance review processes. We recommended that ICE finalize and issue its draft policy documenting the process for disciplining SES members. We made one recommendation that will enhance transparency in ICE’s disciplinary program. ICE concurred with our recommendation and took action to resolve and close it. >Special Report - ICE Should Document Its Process for Adjudicating Disciplinary Matters Involving Senior Executive Service Employees	07/20/2020	2020
OIG-20-45	We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment. Although the conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at each, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and review of documents revealed several common issues. At three facilities, we found segregation practices infringing on detainee rights. Detainees at all four facilities had difficulties resolving issues through the grievance and communication systems, including allegations of verbal abuse by staff. Two facilities had issues with classifying detainees according to their risk levels, which could affect safety. Lastly, we identified living conditions at three facilities that violate ICE standards. We recommended the Acting Director of ICE ensure the Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices overseeing the detention facilities covered in the report address identified issues and ensure facility compliance with relevant detention standards. We made one recommendation that will help ICE ensure compliance with detention standards. ICE concurred with the recommendation. >Capping Report: Observations of Unannounced Inspections of ICE Facilities in 2019	07/01/2020	2020
OIG-20-42	We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff. The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees. These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure. However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19. Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations. The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility. Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread. At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020. >Early Experiences with COVID-19 at ICE Detention Facilities	06/18/2020	2020
OIG-20-13	Through its Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can successfully identify aliens charged with or convicted of crimes. However, because ICE relies on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies, it sometimes faces challenges apprehending aliens in uncooperative jurisdictions. ICE’s inability to detain aliens identified through CAP contributes to increased risk those aliens will commit more crimes. Furthermore, having to arrest “at-large” aliens may put officer, detainee, and public safety at risk and strains ICE’s staffing resources. We made four recommendations to ICE focused on improving CAP. ICE concurred with all four recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings. >U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges	02/18/2020	2020
OIG-20-80	DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs. In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program. We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements. We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements. DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs >DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces	09/30/2020	2020
OIG-21-61	During our unannounced inspection of Otay Mesa in San Diego, California, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that compromised the health, safety, and rights of detainees. Otay Mesa complied with standards for classification and generally provided sufficient medical care to detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Otay Mesa did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing. Overall, we found that Otay Mesa did not meet standards for grievances, segregation, or staff-detainee communications. Specifically, Otay Mesa did not respond timely to detainee grievances and did not forward staff misconduct grievances to ICE as required. In addition, Otay Mesa was not consistently providing required services for detainees in segregation including access to recreation, legal calls, laundry, linen exchange, mail, legal materials, commissary, and law library. Further, ICE did not consistently respond to detainee requests timely and did not specify times for visits with detainees. Finally, we determined the declining detainee population at Otay Mesa caused ICE to pay more than $22 million for unused bed space under a guaranteed minimum contract. We made seven recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations to ensure the San Diego ERO Field Office overseeing Otay Mesa addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with six recommendations and non-concurred with one recommendation. >Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Otay Mesa Detention Center	09/14/2021	2021
OIG-21-58	ICE has taken various actions to prevent the pandemic’s spread among detainees and staff at their detention facilities. At the nine facilities we remotely inspected, these measures included maintaining adequate supplies of PPE such as face masks, enhanced cleaning, and proper screening for new detainees and staff. However, we found other areas in which detention facilities struggled to properly manage the health and safety of detainees. For example, we observed instances where staff and detainees did not consistently wear face masks or socially distance. In addition, we noted that some facilities did not consistently manage medical sick calls and did not regularly communicate with detainees regarding their COVID-19 test results. Although we found that ICE was able to decrease the detainee population to help mitigate the spread of COVID-19, information on detainee transfers was limited. We also found that testing of both detainees and staff was insufficient, and that ICE headquarters did not generally provide effective oversight of their detention facilities during the pandemic. Overall, ICE must resolve these issues to ensure it can meet the challenges of not only the COVID-19 pandemic, but future pandemics as well. We made six recommendations to improve ICE’s management of COVID-19 in its detention facilities. ICE concurred with all six recommendations. >ICE’s Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses	09/07/2021	2021
OIG-21-57	Although ICE had controls in place that required Capgemini Government Solutions, LLC to provide qualified labor, ICE did not properly construct or monitor the contract. This occurred because ICE awarded a firm-fixed-price contract but required a labor-hour performance measurement to monitor and track work hours, which was not appropriate for this type of contract. The contractor also did not provide the number of staff ICE required for specific labor categories. As a result, ICE cannot ensure it received all services, and it overpaid $769,869 in labor costs. Finally, ICE did not ensure the contractor met statement of work requirements for staff skill sets, education, and work experience, nor did it ensure all contractor staff worked at the designated place of performance >ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs Improvement	08/26/2021	2021
OIG-21-46	During our unannounced inspection of Adams in Natchez, Mississippi, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. Although Adams generally provided sufficient medical care, we identified one case in which the medical unit examined a sick detainee but did not send the detainee to the hospital for urgent medical treatment, and the detainee died. We also found the medical unit did not document outcomes of detainee sick calls or ensure proper review and follow-up of detainee test results. In addressing COVID-19, Adams took some measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, but detainees did not consistently follow some guidelines, including use of facial coverings and social distancing, which may have contributed to repeated COVID-19 transmissions. Adams did not meet standards for classification, grievances, segregation, or staff-detainee communications. Specifically, we discovered a low custody detainee comingled with higher custody detainees, and found the facility did not always identify detainees with special vulnerabilities or those requiring translation services. Adams also did not respond timely to detainee grievances and was not consistently providing required care for detainees in segregation including access to recreation, legal calls, laundry, linen exchange, mail, legal materials, commissary, law library, and to ICE forms and drop-boxes for detainees to make requests. In addition, ICE did not consistently respond to detainee requests timely. Finally, we determined the declining detainee population at Adams resulted in ICE paying more than $17 million for unused bed space under a guaranteed minimum contract. We made seven recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the New Orleans ERO Field Office overseeing Adams addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all seven recommendations. >Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Adams County Correctional Center	07/14/2021	2021
OIG-21-40	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not adequately identify and track human trafficking crimes. Specifically, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) did not accurately track dissemination and receipt of human trafficking tips, did not consistently take follow-up actions on tips, and did not maintain accurate data on human trafficking. These issues occurred because HSI did not have a cohesive approach for carrying out its responsibilities to combat human trafficking. We made one recommendation to improve ICE’s coordination and human trafficking efforts to assist victims. ICE concurred with our recommendation. >ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims	06/04/2021	2021
OIG-21-36	We determined that before July 12, 2018, migrant parents did not consistently have the opportunity to reunify with their children before removal. Although DHS and ICE have claimed that parents removed without their children chose to leave them behind, there was no policy or standard process requiring ICE officers to ascertain, document, or honor parents’ decisions regarding their children. As a result, from the time the Government began increasing criminal prosecutions in July 2017, ICE removed at least 348 separated parents without documenting whether those parents wanted to leave their children in the United States. In fact, ICE removed some parents without their children despite having evidence the parents wanted to bring their children back to their home country. In addition, we found that some ICE records purportedly documenting migrant parents’ decisions to leave their children in the United States were significantly flawed. We made two recommendation that will ensure ICE documents separated migrant parents’ decisions regarding their minor children upon removal from the United States, and develops a process to share information with Government officials to contact parents for whom ICE lacks documentation on reunification preferences. ICE concurred with our recommendations. >ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal	05/19/2021	2021
OIG-21-32	During our unannounced inspection of Pulaski County Jail, we identified violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Pulaski did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing, which may have contributed to repeated COVID-19 transmissions at the facility. Pulaski did not meet standards for classification, medical care, segregation, or detainee communication. We found that the facility was not providing a color-coded visual identification system based on the criminal history of detainees, causing inadvertent comingling of a detainee with significant criminal history with detainees who had no criminal history. The facility generally provided sufficient medical care, but did not provide emergency dental services and the medical unit did not have procedures in place for chronic care follow-up. We also found that the facility was not consistently providing required oversight for detainees in segregation by conducting routine wellness checks. Finally, we found deficiencies in staff communication practices with detainees. Specifically, ICE did not specify times for staff to visit detainees and could not provide documentation that it completed facility visits with detainees during the pandemic. We did find that Pulaski generally complied with the ICE detention standard for grievances. We made five recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Chicago ERO Field Office overseeing Pulaski addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all five recommendations. >Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Pulaski County Jail	04/29/2021	2021
OIG-21-31	Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon. However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020. Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland. This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements. We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property. DHS concurred with both recommendations. >DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities	04/16/2021	2021
OIG-21-30	Violations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ	03/30/2021	2021
OIG-21-29	DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge	03/18/2021	2021
OIG-21-15	ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment,” OIG-21-15. We determined the Worksite Enforcement (WSE) program compliance, civil enforcement, and outreach activities are not as effective as they could be to support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) immigration enforcement strategy. ICE officials did not consistently enforce ICE guidance, take timely and affirmative steps against unauthorized alien workers, and ensure the outreach program achieved measurable progress and was cost effective. We made four recommendations with which ICE officials concurred. Based on the information ICE provided, we consider the four recommendations resolved and open. >ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment	01/15/2021	2021
OIG-21-12	ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility	12/18/2020	2021
OIG-21-09	DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment	11/13/2020	2021
OIG-21-05	Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)	11/02/2020	2021
OIG-21-03	We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment. Although the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) generally complied with ICE detention standards regarding communication, it did not meet the standards for detainee searches, food service, and record requirements for segregation and medical grievances. We determined HCDC excessively strip searched ICE detainees when leaving their housing unit to attend activities within the facility, in violation of ICE detention standards and the facility’s own search policy. In addition, HCDC failed to provide detainees with two hot meals per day, as required. For those in segregation, HCDC did not document that detainees received three meals per day and daily medical visits. Further, HCDC did not properly document the handling of detainee medical grievances. We made two recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Baltimore ERO Field Office overseeing HCDC addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with both recommendations and is implementing a corrective action plan to address the concerns we identified. >ICE Needs to Address Concerns About Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center	10/28/2020	2021
OIG-22-75	Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Torrance County Detention Facility	09/28/2022	2022

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