Skip to main content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Government Website

Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Safely connect using HTTPS

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock () or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-12-33  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2011 Drug Control Obligations 		2012
OIG-11-39  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2011
OIG-11-38  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Obligations 		2011
OIG-10-45  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2009 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2010
OIG-08-45 Independent Review of The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Performance Summary 2008
OIG-08-44 Independent Review of The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Obligations 2008
OIG-07-71 Independent Review of The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's reporting of FY 2006 Drug Control Funds 2007
OIG-06-25 Independent Review of The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Reporting of FY 2005, Drug Control Funds 2006
OIG-05-15 Independent Review of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Reporting of FY 2004 Drug Control Funds 2005
OIG-10-70  

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's FY 2009 Consolidated Balance Sheet 		2010
OIG-10-100  

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Privacy Stewardship 		2010
OIG-10-13 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Policies and Procedures Related to Detainee Transfers 2010
OIG-10-36  

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Management Controls Over Detainee Telephone Services 		2010
OIG-10-90  

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Information Technology Management Progresses But Challenges Remain  		2010
OIG-18-53 U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill asked us to review ICE’s modification of its intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) with the City of Eloy in Arizona to procure family detention space in Dilley, Texas. We also reviewed other selected IGSAs to determine whether they complied with applicable laws and regulations. (ICE) is responsible for the detention of removable aliens. ICE commonly uses a type of agreement called an IGSA to reserve space at detention facilities owned or operated by state or local governments. In September 2014, ICE improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy (Eloy) in Arizona to establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, more than 900 miles away. Although ICE could have contracted directly with the private company that operates the South Texas Family Residential Center, CCA, it instead created an unnecessary “middleman” by modifying its existing IGSA with Eloy. Eloy’s sole function under the modification is to act as the middleman between ICE and CCA; Eloy collects about $438,000 in annual fees for this service.

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services 		2018
OIG-09-52  

>Immigration and Custom Enforcement Detention Bedspace Management 		2009
OIG-21-58 ICE has taken various actions to prevent the pandemic’s spread among detainees and staff at their detention facilities. At the nine facilities we remotely inspected, these measures included maintaining adequate supplies of PPE such as face masks, enhanced cleaning, and proper screening for new detainees and staff. However, we found other areas in which detention facilities struggled to properly manage the health and safety of detainees. For example, we observed instances where staff and detainees did not consistently wear face masks or socially distance. In addition, we noted that some facilities did not consistently manage medical sick calls and did not regularly communicate with detainees regarding their COVID-19 test results. Although we found that ICE was able to decrease the detainee population to help mitigate the spread of COVID-19, information on detainee transfers was limited. We also found that testing of both detainees and staff was insufficient, and that ICE headquarters did not generally provide effective oversight of their detention facilities during the pandemic. Overall, ICE must resolve these issues to ensure it can meet the challenges of not only the COVID-19 pandemic, but future pandemics as well. We made six recommendations to improve ICE’s management of COVID-19 in its detention facilities. ICE concurred with all six recommendations.

>ICE’s Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses 		2021
OIG-14-116 In February and March 2013, media sources reported U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) released hundreds of immigration detainees, including detainees with criminal convictions. The publicized releases occurred the weekend before sequestration went into effect on March 1, 2013, generating speculation that the releases were improperly motivated. We determined that the following factors influenced ICE’s decision to release 2,226 immigration detainees between February 9 and March 1, 2013.

>ICE's Release of Immigration Detainees (Revised) 		2014
OIG-21-57  Although ICE had controls in place that required Capgemini Government Solutions, LLC to provide qualified labor, ICE did not properly construct or monitor the contract.  This occurred because ICE awarded a firm-fixed-price contract but required a labor-hour performance measurement to monitor and track work hours, which was not appropriate for this type of contract.  The contractor also did not provide the number of staff ICE required for specific labor categories.  As a result, ICE cannot ensure it received all services, and it overpaid $769,869 in labor costs.  Finally, ICE did not ensure the contractor met statement of work requirements for staff skill sets, education, and work experience, nor did it ensure all contractor staff worked at the designated place of performance

>ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs Improvement 		2021
OIG-18-67 Neither type of inspection ICE uses to examine detention facilities ensures consistent compliance with detention standards or comprehensive correction of identified deficiencies. Specifically, because the Nakamoto inspection scope is too broad, ICE’s guidance on procedures is unclear, and Nakamoto’s inspection practices are not consistently thorough, its inspections do not fully examine actual conditions or identify all compliance deficiencies. In contrast, ODO uses effective methods and processes to thoroughly inspect facilities and identify deficiencies, but the inspections are too infrequent to ensure the facilities implement all corrections. Moreover, ICE does not adequately follow up on identified deficiencies or systematically hold facilities accountable for correcting deficiencies, which further diminishes the usefulness of both Nakamoto and ODO inspections.

>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements 		2018
OIG-07-28 ICE's Compliance With Detention Limits for Aliens With a Final Order of Removal From the United States 2007
OIG-16-113-VR ICE Still Struggles to Hire and Retain Staff for Mental Health Cases in Immigration Detention 2016
OIG-22-37 ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels 2022
OIG-23-33 ICE Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information 2023
OIG-23-59 ICE Should Improve Controls Over Its Transportation Services Contracts 2023
OIG-08-52 ICE Policies Related to Detainee Deaths and the Oversight of Immigration Detention Facilities ( 2008
OIG-22-01 ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities 2022
OIG-21-12 ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility 2021
OIG-21-03 We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) generally complied with ICE detention standards regarding communication, it did not meet the standards for detainee searches, food service, and record requirements for segregation and medical grievances.  We determined HCDC excessively strip searched ICE detainees when leaving their housing unit to attend activities within the facility, in violation of ICE detention standards and the facility’s own search policy.  In addition, HCDC failed to provide detainees with two hot meals per day, as required.  For those in segregation, HCDC did not document that detainees received three meals per day and daily medical visits.  Further, HCDC did not properly document the handling of detainee medical grievances.  We made two recommendations to ICE’s Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the Baltimore ERO Field Office overseeing HCDC addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  ICE concurred with both recommendations and is implementing a corrective action plan to address the concerns we identified.

>ICE Needs to Address Concerns About Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center 		2021
OIG-24-16 ICE Major Surgeries Were Not Always Properly Reviewed and Approved for Medical Necessity 2024
OIG-23-41 ICE Has Limited Ability to Identify and Combat Trade-Based Money Laundering Schemes 2023
OIG-21-15 ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment,” OIG-21-15.  We determined the Worksite Enforcement (WSE) program compliance, civil enforcement, and outreach activities are not as effective as they could be to support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) immigration enforcement strategy.  ICE officials did not consistently enforce ICE guidance, take timely and affirmative steps against unauthorized alien workers, and ensure the outreach program achieved measurable progress and was cost effective.  We made four recommendations with which ICE officials concurred.  Based on the information ICE provided, we consider the four recommendations resolved and open.

>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment 		2021
OIG-17-119 We determined that the seven facilities we inspected were generally following U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guidance for documenting decisions on segregating detainees with mental health conditions and promptly reporting segregation placement information for detainees with mental health conditions to ICE field offices.  However, the field offices we reviewed did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases.  Also, ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system.  Unless ICE field offices comply with requirements to report and record these reviews, ICE headquarters cannot be sure required reviews are taking place and may not have all the information needed to assess the use of segregation, which could put detainees and facility staff at risk of harm.  We made three recommendations to ICE to improve oversight and accountability for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions.

>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions 		2017
OIG-18-36 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) faces challenges in implementing the Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol (KSTEP) screening process, which is used to identify aliens who may be known or suspected terrorists. Although ERO uses KSTEP to screen all aliens who are in ICE custody, ERO policy does not require continued screening of the approximately 2.37 million aliens when released and under ICE supervision. We sampled and tested 40 of 142 ERO case files of detained aliens identified as known or suspected terrorists during fiscal years 2013–15. All 40 files had at least one instance of noncompliance with KSTEP policy, generating greater concerns regarding the population of aliens screened and determined to have no connections to terrorism.

>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-21-40 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not adequately identify and track human trafficking crimes.  Specifically, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) did not accurately track dissemination and receipt of human trafficking tips, did not consistently take follow-up actions on tips, and did not maintain accurate data on human trafficking. These issues occurred because HSI did not have a cohesive approach for carrying out its responsibilities to combat human trafficking. We made one recommendation to improve ICE’s coordination and human trafficking efforts to assist victims. ICE concurred with our recommendation.

>ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims 		2021
OIG-19-28 The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process.

>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens 		2019
OIG-19-18 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained.

>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards 		2019
OIG-22-44 ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights 2022
OIG-21-36 We determined that before July 12, 2018, migrant parents did not consistently have the opportunity to reunify with their children before removal.  Although DHS and ICE have claimed that parents removed without their children chose to leave them behind, there was no policy or standard process requiring ICE officers to ascertain, document, or honor parents’ decisions regarding their children.  As a result, from the time the Government began increasing criminal prosecutions in July 2017, ICE removed at least 348 separated parents without documenting whether those parents wanted to leave their children in the United States.  In fact, ICE removed some parents without their children despite having evidence the parents wanted to bring their children back to their home country.  In addition, we found that some ICE records purportedly documenting migrant parents’ decisions to leave their children in the United States were significantly flawed.  We made two recommendation that will ensure ICE documents separated migrant parents’ decisions regarding their minor children upon removal from the United States, and develops a process to share information with Government officials to contact parents for whom ICE lacks documentation on reunification preferences.  ICE concurred with our recommendations.

>ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal 		2021
OIG-23-52 ICE Did Not Accurately Measure and Report Its Progress in Disrupting or Dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations 2023
OIG-17-51 We determined that ICE does not effectively manage the deportation of aliens under its supervision.  ICE does not collect and analyze data about employee workloads to allocate staff judiciously and determine achievable caseloads.  ICE also has not clearly and widely communicated deportation priorities to Deportation Officers; has not issued up-to-date, comprehensive, and accessible procedures; and has not provided sufficient training.  ICE’s failure to effectively balance and adequately prepare its workforce also makes it harder to address other obstacles to deportation, which may require significant time and resources.  These management deficiencies and unresolved obstacles make it difficult for ICE to deport aliens expeditiously.  ICE concurred with our five recommendations and has taken steps to improve its management of deportation operations

>ICE Deportation Operations 		2017
OIG-16-17 We conducted this audit to determine how human traffickers used legal means to bring potential victims to the United States. We also assessed whether improvements in data quality and exchange could help Department of Homeland Security (DHS) better identify human traffickers. Our match of ICE and USCIS data from 2005 to 2014 indicated that work and fiancé visas were the primary means by which 17 of 32 known traffickers brought victims into the United States. In addition, we determined that 274 subjects of ICE human trafficking investigations successfully petitioned USCIS to bring 425 family members and fiancés into the United States. Available data could not confirm whether or not these cases actually involved human trafficking. ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to facilitate the ability to identify instances of human trafficking.

>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases 		2016
OIG-22-70 ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations 2022
OIG-23-12 ICE and CBP Deaths in Custody during FY 2021 2023
OIG-15-57 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Air Operations (ICE Air) is responsible for moving and removing detainees in ICE custody by providing air transportation services to Enforcement and Removal Operations’ (ERO) 24 field offices. We reviewed this program to determine whether ICE Air was ensuring the most effective use of its resources. Although ICE Air met its mission by transporting 930,435 detainees over a 3-1/2-year period, it could have used its resources more effectively. In fact, ICE Air may have missed opportunities to improve the program’s overall effectiveness even though it has identified some ways to reduce costs associated with detainee transportation. Furthermore, ICE Air does not capture complete and accurate data essential to support operational decisions. This occurred because ERO did not provide the planning, management, and reporting tools needed to operate effectively, and it does not have a mechanism in place to obtain feedback on how well its processes are performing. ERO management has not developed a data management plan, assessed staffing and training needs, or implemented formal policies and procedures. It also has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of current operations for making informed business decisions that will safeguard the program’s resources. As a result, ICE Air operated charter flights with empty seats and could have realized cost savings of up to $41.1 million upon determining optimum flight capacity. This estimate is based on the average of charter costs incurred during the scope period for the missions analyzed. Although the estimated potential cost savings will not be claimed as funds put to better use, it is an indicator of ICE Air’s potential for future cost savings.

>ICE Air Transportation of Detainees Could Be More Effective 		2015
OIG-20-59 determined ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing.  However, existing agreements and guidance on HSI’s participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated.  Additionally, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF.  We recommended DHS JTTF contributors evaluate and update agreements governing JTTF participation as needed.  HSI should renegotiate and update the 2003 agreement on terrorism financing, as well as update its related guidance accordingly.  We also recommended DHS coordinate with Department of Justice and Department of State, as well as within the DHS, to develop agreements to allow for the more direct sharing of critical investigative information.  We made five recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing.  DHS concurred with two recommendations and non-concurred with three.

>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED) 		2020
OIG-15-112 As part of the follow-up to Management Alert – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s San Pedro Service Processing Center, San Pedro, California, December 11, 2014, we obtained and analyzed additional information to determine ICE’s long-term plan for, and how much it spent on, the facility. Although U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is taking action to repair the safety issues at the San Pedro facility identified in our Management Alert, we have concerns regarding ICE’s process to renovate this facility. ICE did not develop a long-term plan for the facility and renovated a portion of the first floor by performing several small projects. Including the safety repairs, ICE will have spent $6 million on a mostly unused and unoccupied facility.

>Follow-up to Management Alert - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California 		2015
OIG-09-51  

>Federal Protective Service Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process 		2009
OIG-20-42 We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff.  The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility.  Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread.  At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.

>Early Experiences with COVID-19 at ICE Detention Facilities 		2020
OIG-11-107  

>DHS’ Role in Nominating Individuals for Inclusion on the Government Watchlist and Its Efforts to Support Watchlist Maintenance 		2011

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

Return to top of page