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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-09-41  

> Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Tracking and Transfer of Detainees 		2009
OIG-10-38  

> Management and Oversight of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of International Affairs Internal Controls for Acquisitions and Employee Integrity Processes 		2010
OIG-19-57 A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations 2019
OIG-06-57 A Review of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Discipline Procedures 2006
OIG-10-122  

>Age Determination Practices for Unaccompanied Alien Children - Update 		2010
OIG-10-12 Age Determination Practices for Unaccompanied Alien Children in ICE Custody 2010
OIG-04-20 AMOC Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies, March 2004 2004
OIG-07-34 An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fugitive Operations Teams 2007
OIG-18-76 We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased.

>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers 		2018
OIG-05-32 Audit of ICE's Budgetary Status and Other Areas of Concern 2005
OIG-20-45 We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at each, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and review of documents revealed several common issues.  At three facilities, we found segregation practices infringing on detainee rights.  Detainees at all four facilities had difficulties resolving issues through the grievance and communication systems, including allegations of verbal abuse by staff.  Two facilities had issues with classifying detainees according to their risk levels, which could affect safety.  Lastly, we identified living conditions at three facilities that violate ICE standards.  We recommended the Acting Director of ICE ensure the Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices overseeing the detention facilities covered in the report address identified issues and ensure facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  We made one recommendation that will help ICE ensure compliance with detention standards. ICE concurred with the recommendation.

>Capping Report: Observations of Unannounced Inspections of ICE Facilities in 2019 		2020
OIG-23-61 CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data - (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-20-65 We determined that children brought to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods, and in many cases overnight, to be reunited with their parents.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on the first day of attempted mass reunifications.  ICE and U.S. Health and Human Services had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to promptly out-process the parents of arriving children.  As a result, some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous access to food, water, and restrooms.  As the mass reunifications continued, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port Isabel closer to the court’s July 26, 2018 deadline.  The report contains no recommendations.

>Children Waited for Extended Periods in Vehicles to Be Reunified with Their Parents at ICE's Port Isabel Detention Center in July 2018 		2020
OIG-12-66 Communication Regarding Participation in Secure Communities (Revised) 2012
OIG-18-32 In response to concerns raised by immigrant rights groups and complaints to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Hotline about conditions for detainees held in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody, we conducted unannounced inspections of five detention facilities to evaluate their compliance with ICE detention standards. We identified problems that undermine the protection of detainees’ rights, their humane treatment, and the provision of a safe and healthy environment. Although the climate and detention conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at all of them, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and our review of documents revealed several issues. Upon entering some facilities, detainees were housed incorrectly based on their criminal history. Further, in violation of standards, all detainees entering one facility were strip searched. Available language services were not always used to facilitate communication with detainees. Some facility staff reportedly deterred detainees from filing grievances and did not thoroughly document resolution of grievances. Staff did not always treat detainees respectfully and professionally, and some facilities may have misused segregation. Finally, we observed potentially unsafe and unhealthy detention conditions.

>Concerns About ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities 		2018
OIG-19-47 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities 2019
OIG-07-55 Coordination Between FBI and ICE on Investigations of Terrorist Financing, 2007
OIG-16-92 December 3, 2015 – San Bernardino Incident 2016
OIG-11-81 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk 2011
OIG-18-51 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010.  The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today.

>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-06-33 Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2006
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces 		2020
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-10-19 DHS Conference Spending Practices and Oversight 2010
OIG-11-100  

>DHS Detainee Removals and Reliance on Assurances 		2011
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-18-37 Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image.

>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted) 		2018
OIG-20-66 DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA 		2020
OIG-22-02 DHS could not provide any performance measures and provided only limited data to demonstrate the full extent or effectiveness of its efforts to enforce wildlife trafficking laws.  In addition, CBP personnel inconsistently recorded data on wildlife encounters, and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents did not always completely or accurately record actions and data related to wildlife trafficking.  CBP personnel also did not always demonstrate that they involved ICE HSI special agents when suspecting wildlife trafficking crimes.  Finally, DHS did not establish performance goals to measure the results of its efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  We attributed these issues to DHS, CBP, and ICE not providing adequate oversight, including clear and comprehensive policies and procedures, of wildlife trafficking efforts.  As a result, DHS may be missing opportunities to curtail the spread of zoonotic viruses and disrupt transnational criminal organizations that use the same networks for other illicit trafficking, such as narcotics, humans, and weapons.  We made one recommendation to improve the Department’s efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.  The Department concurred with the recommendation and provided a plan to improve its efforts.

>DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking 		2022
OIG-17-56 We determined that DHS’ information technology systems did not effectively support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) visa tracking operations.  Specifically, ICE personnel responsible for investigating visa overstays had to piece together information from dozens of systems and databases, some of which were not integrated and did not electronically share information.  Additionally, ICE did not ensure that its field personnel received the training and guidance needed to properly use the systems currently available to conduct visa overstay tracking.  Further, DHS lacked a completed comprehensive biometric exit system at U.S. ports of departure to capture information on nonimmigrants departing the country.  As a result, DHS could not account for all visa overstays in a report to the Congress.  Manual checking across multiple systems used for visa tracking contributed to delays in investigating suspects who potentially posed public safety or homeland security risks.  We recommended the DHS Chief Information Officer continue to work with components to further eliminate duplication, improve information sharing, and properly align system access, especially for system modernization efforts, across DHS according to visa tracking mission requirements.  We made five recommendations.

>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology 		2017
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019
OIG-21-29 DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge 2021
OIG-17-40 We determined that U.S. Customs and Immigration Services’ and ICE’s social media screening pilots, on which DHS plans to base future department-wide use of social media screening, lack criteria for measuring performance to ensure they meet their objectives.  Although the pilots include some objectives, it is not clear DHS is measuring and evaluating the pilots’ results to determine how well they are performing against set criteria.  Absent measurement criteria, the pilots may provide limited information for planning and implementing an effective, department-wide future social media screening program.  We recommended developing and implementing a plan to evaluate the performance of social media screening pilots that includes well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives.

>DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-13-103 In June 2012, Egyptian Hani Nour Eldin visited the United States as a member of an Egyptian parliamentary delegation to meet with U.S. Government officials and business leaders. During this visit, Mr. Eldin raised with White House officials the possibility of transferring Omar Abdel Rahman, a convicted terrorist, from U.S. custody to Egyptian custody. In June 2012, former Chairman Peter T. King, of the House Committee on Homeland Security, raised concerns that Mr. Eldin, a self-proclaimed member of Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), which the Department of State has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997, was issued a visa and granted admission into the United States. Former Chairman King requested that we review DHS admissibility processes for members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. He also asked that we establish whether DHS has a potential role or has been consulted about transferring convicted terrorist Omar Abdel Rahman from U.S. custody to Egyptian custody, for “humanitarian and health reasons.”

>DHS’ Efforts To Screen Members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Redacted) 		2013
OIG-11-107  

>DHS’ Role in Nominating Individuals for Inclusion on the Government Watchlist and Its Efforts to Support Watchlist Maintenance 		2011
OIG-20-42 We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff.  The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility.  Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread.  At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.

>Early Experiences with COVID-19 at ICE Detention Facilities 		2020
OIG-09-51  

>Federal Protective Service Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process 		2009
OIG-15-112 As part of the follow-up to Management Alert – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s San Pedro Service Processing Center, San Pedro, California, December 11, 2014, we obtained and analyzed additional information to determine ICE’s long-term plan for, and how much it spent on, the facility. Although U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is taking action to repair the safety issues at the San Pedro facility identified in our Management Alert, we have concerns regarding ICE’s process to renovate this facility. ICE did not develop a long-term plan for the facility and renovated a portion of the first floor by performing several small projects. Including the safety repairs, ICE will have spent $6 million on a mostly unused and unoccupied facility.

>Follow-up to Management Alert - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California 		2015
OIG-20-59 determined ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing.  However, existing agreements and guidance on HSI’s participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated.  Additionally, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF.  We recommended DHS JTTF contributors evaluate and update agreements governing JTTF participation as needed.  HSI should renegotiate and update the 2003 agreement on terrorism financing, as well as update its related guidance accordingly.  We also recommended DHS coordinate with Department of Justice and Department of State, as well as within the DHS, to develop agreements to allow for the more direct sharing of critical investigative information.  We made five recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing.  DHS concurred with two recommendations and non-concurred with three.

>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED) 		2020
OIG-15-57 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Air Operations (ICE Air) is responsible for moving and removing detainees in ICE custody by providing air transportation services to Enforcement and Removal Operations’ (ERO) 24 field offices. We reviewed this program to determine whether ICE Air was ensuring the most effective use of its resources. Although ICE Air met its mission by transporting 930,435 detainees over a 3-1/2-year period, it could have used its resources more effectively. In fact, ICE Air may have missed opportunities to improve the program’s overall effectiveness even though it has identified some ways to reduce costs associated with detainee transportation. Furthermore, ICE Air does not capture complete and accurate data essential to support operational decisions. This occurred because ERO did not provide the planning, management, and reporting tools needed to operate effectively, and it does not have a mechanism in place to obtain feedback on how well its processes are performing. ERO management has not developed a data management plan, assessed staffing and training needs, or implemented formal policies and procedures. It also has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of current operations for making informed business decisions that will safeguard the program’s resources. As a result, ICE Air operated charter flights with empty seats and could have realized cost savings of up to $41.1 million upon determining optimum flight capacity. This estimate is based on the average of charter costs incurred during the scope period for the missions analyzed. Although the estimated potential cost savings will not be claimed as funds put to better use, it is an indicator of ICE Air’s potential for future cost savings.

>ICE Air Transportation of Detainees Could Be More Effective 		2015
OIG-23-12 ICE and CBP Deaths in Custody during FY 2021 2023
OIG-22-70 ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations 2022
OIG-16-17 We conducted this audit to determine how human traffickers used legal means to bring potential victims to the United States. We also assessed whether improvements in data quality and exchange could help Department of Homeland Security (DHS) better identify human traffickers. Our match of ICE and USCIS data from 2005 to 2014 indicated that work and fiancé visas were the primary means by which 17 of 32 known traffickers brought victims into the United States. In addition, we determined that 274 subjects of ICE human trafficking investigations successfully petitioned USCIS to bring 425 family members and fiancés into the United States. Available data could not confirm whether or not these cases actually involved human trafficking. ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to facilitate the ability to identify instances of human trafficking.

>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases 		2016
OIG-17-51 We determined that ICE does not effectively manage the deportation of aliens under its supervision.  ICE does not collect and analyze data about employee workloads to allocate staff judiciously and determine achievable caseloads.  ICE also has not clearly and widely communicated deportation priorities to Deportation Officers; has not issued up-to-date, comprehensive, and accessible procedures; and has not provided sufficient training.  ICE’s failure to effectively balance and adequately prepare its workforce also makes it harder to address other obstacles to deportation, which may require significant time and resources.  These management deficiencies and unresolved obstacles make it difficult for ICE to deport aliens expeditiously.  ICE concurred with our five recommendations and has taken steps to improve its management of deportation operations

>ICE Deportation Operations 		2017
OIG-23-52 ICE Did Not Accurately Measure and Report Its Progress in Disrupting or Dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations 2023
OIG-21-36 We determined that before July 12, 2018, migrant parents did not consistently have the opportunity to reunify with their children before removal.  Although DHS and ICE have claimed that parents removed without their children chose to leave them behind, there was no policy or standard process requiring ICE officers to ascertain, document, or honor parents’ decisions regarding their children.  As a result, from the time the Government began increasing criminal prosecutions in July 2017, ICE removed at least 348 separated parents without documenting whether those parents wanted to leave their children in the United States.  In fact, ICE removed some parents without their children despite having evidence the parents wanted to bring their children back to their home country.  In addition, we found that some ICE records purportedly documenting migrant parents’ decisions to leave their children in the United States were significantly flawed.  We made two recommendation that will ensure ICE documents separated migrant parents’ decisions regarding their minor children upon removal from the United States, and develops a process to share information with Government officials to contact parents for whom ICE lacks documentation on reunification preferences.  ICE concurred with our recommendations.

>ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal 		2021
OIG-22-44 ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights 2022
OIG-19-18 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained.

>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards 		2019
OIG-19-28 The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process.

>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens 		2019
OIG-21-40 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not adequately identify and track human trafficking crimes.  Specifically, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) did not accurately track dissemination and receipt of human trafficking tips, did not consistently take follow-up actions on tips, and did not maintain accurate data on human trafficking. These issues occurred because HSI did not have a cohesive approach for carrying out its responsibilities to combat human trafficking. We made one recommendation to improve ICE’s coordination and human trafficking efforts to assist victims. ICE concurred with our recommendation.

>ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims 		2021

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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