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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-19-43 The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2019
OIG-20-31 DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) in fiscal year 2019 by meeting all six of the IPERA requirements.  DHS also complied with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments.  Additionally, we reviewed DHS’ processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates.  Based on our review, we determined DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting.  We made one recommendation to DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division to properly follow the requirements in the DHS Improper Payment Reduction Guidebook. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2019 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2020
OIG-21-33 We determined DHS did not comply with Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)  in fiscal year 2020 because it did not achieve and report an improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for 2 of 12 programs reported in its FY 2020 Agency Financial Report.  DHS complied with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public its FY 2020 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports.  We made two recommendations to DHS to follow Office of Management and Budget requirements and ensure the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues its remediation process to reduce improper payments.  DHS concurred with both recommendations. 

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2021
OIG-22-45 Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 2022
OIG-05-53 Department of Homeland Security's Procurement and Program Management Operations 2005
OIG-18-24 DHS reported using its Other Transaction Authority to work with non-traditional contractors, DHS did not always follow statutory requirements when entering, modifying, and overseeing its agreements. Inadequate internal policies contributed to DHS falling short of meeting all statutory requirements for using OTAs. In addition, DHS acquisition policy staff reported that competing priorities prevented timely reporting to Congress. As a result, DHS may have taken on more risks and costs than necessary and impeded Congress’ ability to oversee DHS’ use of OTAs.

>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority 		2018
OIG-13-47 In fiscal year 2010, the Federal Government’s total improper payment amount was at a high of $121 billion. In that same year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010.(IPERA or the Act) in an effort to reduce improper payments. Our audit objective was to determine whether DHS complied with the Act. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high‐risk program as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2012 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 		2013
OIG-14-64 (Revised) Our audit objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) complied with the Act in fiscal year 2013. In addition, we also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and its efforts to reduce and recover improper payments for fiscal year 2013. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each program deemed susceptible to improper payments. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA. We reviewed the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and DHS’ efforts to reduce and recover improper payments.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2013 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 		2014
OIG-20-37 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) does not effectively coordinate and share best practices to enhance security across the commercial facilities sector.  Specifically, CISA does not coordinate within DHS on security assessments to prevent potential overlap, does not always ensure completion of required After Action Reports to share best practices with the commercial facilities sector, and does not adequately inform all commercial facility owners and operators of available DHS resources.  This occurred because CISA does not have comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities’ Sector-Specific Agency (SSA).  Without such policies and procedures, CISA cannot effectively fulfill its SSA responsibilities and limits its ability to measure the Department’s progress toward accomplishing its sector-specific objectives.  CISA may also be missing opportunities to help commercial facility owners and operators identify threats and mitigate risks, leaving the commercial facilities sector vulnerable to terrorist attacks and physical threats that may cause serious damage and loss of life.  We made three recommendations to improve CISA’s coordination and outreach to safeguard the commercial facilities sector.  CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats 		2020
OIG-15-140 We audited the DHS components’ coordination in performing their cyber missions. We sought to determine whether their cyber roles and responsibilities have been well delineated and a process is in place for department-wide information sharing and coordinated response to cyber incidents and criminal investigations. We also evaluated the components’ compliance with applicable DHS information security requirements. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have strengthened coordination in performing their cyber missions. For example, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and United States Secret Service (USSS) have enhanced relationships with the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to improve information sharing and coordination on incident response and investigation. Despite these positive steps, the Department can take additional actions to improve its cyber mission coordination. For example, the Office of Policy has not developed a cyber strategic implementation plan due to its recent establishment and limited staff. Without a strategic plan, DHS cannot effectively align the components’ cyber responsibilities and capabilities with DHS’ overall mission.

>DHS Can Stregthen its Cyber Million Coordination Efforts 		2015
OIG-12-112  

>DHS Can Strengthen Its International Cybersecurity Programs (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-04-31 DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information, August 2004 2004
OIG-14-82 According to DHS, during fiscal year 2012, DHS components hosted or sponsored 35 conferences exceeding $100,000 at atotal cost of$7.5 million. We conducted this audit as a follow-on to our prior report DHS' Policies and Procedures Over Conferences, OIG-13-96, to determine whether the DHS conference spending was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary. The amount DHS spent on conferences was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary in most instances. Conference packages submitted for approval stated the purpose of the conference. In addition, the conference agenda reflected appropriate content and encompassed full working days for the attendees. In many instances, the components made an effort to reduce conference costs by limiting the number of attendees and selecting a location within the local area.

>DHS Conference Spending 		2014
OIG-20-09 DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

>DHS Confirmed It Has Applied Lessons Learned in the Latest Financial System Modernization Effort 		2020
OIG-11-116  

>DHS Continues to Face Challenges in the Implementation of Its OneNet Project 		2011
OIG-22-04 DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain 2022
OIG-16-58 On March 4, 2015, Congress enacted Public Law 114–4, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015. According to Section 518(a), the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2015, to the Office o Inspector General, listing all grants and contracts awarded by any means other than full and open competition during fiscal year (FY) 2015. As required, we reviewed the report and assessed departmental compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.

>DHS Contracts and Grants Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2015 		2016
OIG-15-59 On January 17, 2014, Congress enacted Public Law 113-76, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. According to Section 520 (a), the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2014, to the Office of Inspector General, listing all grants and contracts awarded by any means other than full and open competition during fiscal year (FY) 2014. As required, we reviewed the report and assessed departmental compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures. In FY 2014, DHS awarded 399 noncompetitive contracts worth about $306 million. This represents a continuing decrease of more than $3 billion obligated through noncompetitive contracts over a 6-year period. We reconciled the entire FY 2014 contract listing against the Federal Procurement Data System and found that the data between the two lists were 99.8 percent identical. Also in FY 2014, DHS awarded 66 noncompetitive grants worth about $126 million. Although three noncompetitive grants worth approximately $3.2 million did not meet accuracy, timeliness, or completeness standards, approximately 95.5 percent did meet the requirements as set forth in the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006.

>DHS Contracts and Grants Awarded through Other than Full and Open Competition, FY 2014 		2015
OIG-09-94  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2007 		2009
OIG-10-71  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2008 		2010
OIG-10-55  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2009 		2010
OIG-11-41  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2010 		2011
OIG-12-37  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2011 		2012
OIG-13-36 The Department obligated about $389 million for noncompetitive contracts during fiscal year 2012. Our review of 40 contract files with a reported value of more than $174 million showed that, compared with previous reviews of noncompetitive contracts awarded during fiscal years 2008 through 2011, the Department continued to improve its management oversight of acquisition personnel’s compliance with policies and procedures. However, these personnel did not always document their consideration of vendors’ past performance when researching background on eligible contractors. As a result, the Department cannot be assured that acquisition personnel always awarded government contracts to eligible and qualified vendors as required.

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2012 		2013
OIG-10-10 DHS Contracts With Low Wage Payments  2010
OIG-14-126 In fiscal year 2012, Federal agency fleets consisted of more than 650,000 motor vehicles around the world. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had the second largest civilian motor vehicle fleet in the Federal Government, owning or leasing about 56,000 vehicles, with reported annual operating costs of about $534 million. Our audit objective was to determine whether, for fiscal year 2012, DHS met requirements to right-size its motor vehicle fleet composition, eliminate underused vehicles, and acquire vehicles that reduce petroleum use and greenhouse gas emissions.

>DHS Does Not Adequately Manage or Have Enforcement Authority Over Its Components' Vehicle Fleet Operations 		2014
OIG-16-95 The Department of Homeland Security has a substantial number of employees who travel and work abroad. Off-duty misconduct can undermine the Department’s credibility and integrity and hinder its ability to achieve its mission. Our objective was to determine whether DHS has adequate policies and training governing off-duty conduct while abroad.

>DHS Does Not Have Comprehensive Policies or Training for Off-duty Conduct of Employees Traveling and Working Abroad 		2016
OIG-17-09 We determined that the Department’s oversight of its drug interdiction efforts did not align with the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy.  .  This occurred because DHS lacks formal oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure its drug interdiction performance activities met both ONDCP and legislative requirements.  As a result, DHS could not ensure its drug interdiction efforts met required national drug control outcomes nor accurately assess the impact of the approximately $4.2 billion it spends annually on drug control activities.  We made two recommendations that, if implemented, will improve DHS’ drug interdiction efforts.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement 		2017
OIG-20-73 DHS has not fulfilled most of the 13 responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act.  To comply with one responsibility, DHS has a Geospatial Information Officer and a dedicated Geospatial Management Office whose duties include overseeing the Act’s implementation and to coordinate with other agencies.  However, DHS has only partially met, or not met, the remaining 12 responsibilities in the Act.  DHS’ lack of progress in complying with the responsibilities outlined in the Act can be attributed to multiple external and internal factors.  External factors include the need for additional guidance from the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Office of Management and Budget to properly interpret and implement certain responsibilities.  Internal factors include competing priorities that diverted resources away from fulfilling the Act’s 13 responsibilities.  We made three recommendations that focus on increasing the resources necessary to comply with DHS’ 13 responsibilities under the Act.  The Department concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 		2020
OIG-18-82 Department of Homeland Security shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2017, to the DHS Office of Inspector General listing all grants and contracts awarded by other than full and open competition (OTFOC) during fiscal years 2016 and 2017. We contracted with Williams, Adley & Company-DC, LLC to review the OTFOC report and assess DHS compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.  Williams Adley concluded that DHS complied with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies governing grants and contracts awarded by OTFOC in FY 2017. During that year, DHS awarded 62 noncompetitive grants worth about $140 million and 121 noncompetitive contracts worth about $118 million through OTFOC. The independent auditors determined that DHS’ Report on OTFOC for FY 2017 as well as the information related to these grants and contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation and USASpending.gov were accurate. The auditors also found that DHS followed written policies and procedures and the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 when awarding grants and contracts

noncompetitively.

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2017 		2018
OIG-21-17 Based on our review of 45 judgmentally sampled awards (15 non-competitive grants and 30 other than full and open competition [OTFOC] contracts), we found DHS complied with applicable laws and regulations.  We made two recommendations to help improve DHS’ procedures and ensure future reporting submissions are accurate.  The Department concurred with the two recommendations.  

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019 		2021
OIG-20-43 DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities.  This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability.  We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.      

>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems 		2020
OIG-21-38 We determined DHS had not yet strengthened its cybersecurity posture by implementing a Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program.  DHS spent more than $180 million between 2013 and 2020 to design and deploy a department-wide continuous monitoring solution but faced setbacks.  DHS initially planned to deploy its internal CDM solution by 2017 using a “One DHS” approach that restricted components to a standard set of common tools.  We attributed DHS’ limited progress to an unsuccessful initial implementation strategy, significant changes to its deployment approach, and continuing issues with component data collection and integration.  As of March 2020, DHS had developed a key element of the program, its internal CDM dashboard.  However, the dashboard contained less than half of the required asset management data.  As a result, the Department cannot leverage intended benefits of the dashboard to manage, prioritize, and respond to cyber risks in real time.  Finally, we identified vulnerabilities on CDM servers and databases.  This occurred because DHS did not clearly define patch management responsibilities and had not yet implemented required configuration settings.  Consequently, databases and servers could be vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, and the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data could be at risk.  We made three recommendations for DHS to update its program plan, address vulnerabilities, and define patch management responsibilities

>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program 		2021
OIG-20-62 Since 2017, DHS has continued to make progress in meeting its Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) reporting requirements, but challenges remain.  To enable more effective tracking of Federal spending, DHS must continue to take action to accurately align its budgetary data with the President’s budget, reduce award misalignments across DATA Act files, improve the timeliness of financial assistance reporting, implement and use government-wide data standards, and address risks to data quality.  Without these actions, DHS will continue to experience challenges in meeting its goal of achieving the highest possible data quality for submission to USAspending.gov.  We made five recommendations to help strengthen DHS’ controls for ensuring complete, accurate, and timely spending data.  The Department concurred with all five recommendations. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain 		2020
OIG-20-40 Two years since enactment, DHS and its components have mostly complied with SAVE Act requirements.  The SAVE Act requires the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), as delegated by DHS, to collect and review components’ vehicle use data, including their analyses of the data and plans for achieving the right types and sizes of vehicles to meet mission needs.  Most components developed their plans as required.  However, only two of the 12 components we reviewed fully met requirements to analyze and document vehicle use and cost data to help them achieve the right type and size of fleet vehicles to meet their missions.  This occurred because DHS did not require components to include data analyses in their OCRSO-reviewed submissions, as mandated by the SAVE Act.  Had ORSCO thoroughly evaluated component submissions, it would have identified that components did not fully comply with SAVE Act requirements.  DHS concurred with all four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the Department’s oversight over its vehicle fleets. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management 		2020
OIG-14-129 A severe influenza pandemic presents a tremendous challenge, which may affect millions of Americans, cause significant illnesses and fatalities, and substantially disrupt our economic and social stability. It is DHS’ responsibility to ensure it is adequately prepared to continue critical operations in the event of a pandemic. In 2006, Congress appropriated $47million in supplemental funding to DHS for necessary expenses to plan, train, and prepare for a potential pandemic. DHS reported that it spent this funding on personal protective equipment, pandemic research, exercises, and medical countermeasures. The Department and components purchased personal protective equipment and medical countermeasures (specifically, antiviral medical countermeasures) to reduce potential effects of a pandemic and ensure the workforce can continue operations. We conducted an audit of the DHS pandemic preparedness efforts to determine if DHS effectively manages its pandemic preparedness supply of personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures.

>DHS Has Not Effectively Managed Pandemic Personal Protective Equipment and Antiviral Medical Countermeasures 		2014
OIG-16-141 The Reducing Over- Classification Act requires Federal Government Inspectors General of departments that make original classification determinations to conduct no less than two evaluations of their agencies’ classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the two recommendations from our first evaluation. In this second evaluation, we assessed DHS’ progress in its classification management program after implementing the recommendations. What We

>DHS Has Not Trained Classified Network Users on the Classification Management Tool 		2016
OIG-21-01 DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure 2021
OIG-14-21 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has one of the largest motor vehicle fleets in the Federal Government, with more than 56,000 vehicles costing approximately $534 million annually. Home-to-work transportation is the use of government passenger carriers, including motor vehicles, by employees for transportation between their homes and places of work. According to DHS, home-to-work transportation is a flexible and powerful tool for meeting mission requirements and enhancing the overall responsiveness to emergency situations. Our audit objective was to determine whether DHS has implemented appropriate internal controls to ensure that home-to-work transportation is justified and used efficiently.

>DHS Home-to-Work Transportation 		2014
OIG-IT-03-02 DHS Information Security Program Evaluation, FY2003, The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) to perform an independent evaluation of DHS' information security program and practices. 2003
OIG-12-82  

>DHS Information Technology Management Has Improved, But Challenges Remain 		2012
OIG-13-49 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had minimal involvement in the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Operation Fast and Furious. Our review of DHS involvement in the operation determined that senior DHS officials in Washington, DC had no awareness of the methodology used by the task force to investigate Operation Fast and Furious until media reports were published in March 2011.

>DHS Involvement in OCDETF Operation Fast and Furious (Revised) 		2013
OIG-20-53 According to the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act (SAFA), the program should provide oversight, lead policy initiatives, and coordinate with DHS components and Federal agencies.  However, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has not yet carried out a program to meet SAFA’s requirements.  This occurred because CWMD believes it does not have clearly defined authority from the Secretary to carry out the requirements of the SAFA.  In addition, since its establishment in December 2017, CWMD has not prioritized SAFA requirements but instead has focused its resources on other mission areas.  As a result, CWMD has limited awareness of DHS’ ongoing efforts and cannot ensure it is adequately prepared to respond to a terrorist attack against the Nation’s food, agriculture, or veterinary systems.  We made three recommendations to DHS’ CWMD to improve oversight, policy initiatives, and coordination of the Department’s efforts to protect the Nation’s food, agriculture, and veterinary systems. 

>DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department's Efforts to Defend the Nation's Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism 		2020
OIG-17-05 We determined that CBP, ICE and USSS have been able to maintain staffing levels close to the authorized number of law enforcement personnel, but they continue to have significant delays in hiring. The additional steps in the hiring process add to the time it takes to hire law enforcement officers, but the components also do not have the staff or comprehensive automated systems needed to hire personnel as efficiently as possible.  Although they have taken steps to reduce the time it takes to hire law enforcement personnel, it is too early to measure the long-term effects of the Department’s and the components’ recent actions. We made five recommendations to make the law enforcement hiring process more efficient.

>DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel 		2017
OIG-17-22 We determined that DHS has not done enough to minimize the risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers.  Specifically, the Department does not:  (1) have an office responsible for managing and overseeing component use of force activities; (2) ensure the collection and validation of component data needed to assess use of force activities, minimize risks, and take corrective actions; (3) ensure use of force policies have been updated to reflect current operations and lessons learned; or (4) establish consistent requirements for less-lethal recurrent training and ensure training was completed as required.  Additionally, each component varies on their use of force activities.  Without improvements in the management and oversight of use of force activities, the Department may increase its risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers.  DHS concurred with our two recommendations, which, if implemented, will help the Department actively oversee and assist with component use of force activities, update policies, and improve training.

>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-21-35 We determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees as required.  Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Protective Service inconsistently collected DNA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA.  DHS did not adequately oversee its law enforcement components to ensure they properly implemented DNA collection.  Based on our analysis, we project the DHS law enforcement components we audited did not collect DNA for about 212,646, or 88 percent, of the 241,753 arrestees from fiscal years 2018 and 2019.  Without all DHS arrestees’ DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches.  Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components.  We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements.  DHS concurred with all four of our recommend.

>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees 		2021
OIG-20-74 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) increased the number of Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) participants as well as the volume of cyber threat indicators it has shared since the program’s inception in 2016.  However, CISA made limited progress in improving the overall quality of information it shares with AIS participants to effectively reduce cyber threats and protect against attacks.  The lack of progress can be attributed to the limited number of AIS participants sharing cyber indicators with CISA, delays in receiving cyber threat intelligence standards, and insufficient staff.  To be more effective, CISA should hire the staff it needs to provide outreach, guidance, and training.  We made four recommendations to CISA to enhance the program’s overall effectiveness and cyber threat information sharing.  CISA concurred with all four recommendations.  

>DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018 		2020
OIG-15-85 DHS uses prosecutorial discretion in deciding to what extent it will enforce immigration laws, including whether to place aliens in or take them out of the removal process. However, the Department does not collect and analyze data on the use of prosecutorial discretion to fully assess its current immigration enforcement activities and to develop future policy. Although the Office of Policy is responsible for developing department-wide policies and programs, DHS has not required this office to gather or use data to assess the effect of prosecutorial discretion on immigration enforcement activities. The Department also does not have a mechanism to continuously monitor its use of prosecutorial discretion and improve future policy. As a result, DHS may not be using its significant investment in immigration enforcement as efficiently as possible. The Department may also be missing opportunities to strengthen its ability to remove aliens who pose a threat to national security and public safety.

>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen its Immigration Enforcement Efforts 		2015
OIG-08-61 DHS Must Address Internet Protocol Version 6 Challenges 2008
OIG-06-47 DHS Must Address Significant Security Vulnerabilities Prior To TWIC Implementation (Redacted) 2006

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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