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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-18-04 We identified limitations with FAMS contributions to aviation security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We are making five recommendations that when implemented, should improve FAMS

 

>FAMS’ Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security is Questionable (Unclassified Summary) 		2018
OIG-05-16 Follow-Up Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures at Domestic Airports (Unclassified Summary) 2005
OIG-12-94  

>Implementation and Coordination of TSA’s Secure Flight Program (Redacted)  		2012
OIG-05-31 Improved Security Required for Transportation Security Administration Networks (Redacted) 2005
OIG-11-99  

>Improvements in Patch and Configuration Management Controls Can Better Protect TSA’s Wireless Network and Devices (Redacted) 		2011
OIG-07-14 Improvements Needed in TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, 2007
OIG-09-68  

>Independent Auditor's Report on TSA's FY 08 Mission Action Plans Included in DHS FY 2009 Internal Control Playbook 		2009
OIG-08-05 Independent Auditor's Report on TSA's FY 2006 Balance Sheet 2008
OIG-09-57  

>Independent Auditors' Report on the Transportation Security Administration's Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30, 2008 		2009
OIG-10-78  

>Independent Auditors' Report on Transportation Security Administration's Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30, 2009 		2010
OIG-08-74 Independent Auditor’s Report of TSA’s FY 2008 Mission Action Plans 2008
OIG-08-72 Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2007 Transportation Security Administration Balance Sheet Audit (Redacted) 2008
OIG-10-82  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2009 Transportation Security Administration Financial Integrated Audit 		2010
OIG-11-73  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2010 DHS Financial Statement Audit 		2011
OIG-13-78 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012, and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to as the “fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). We were also engaged to audit the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements. The objective of our audit engagement was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of the FY 2012 financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2012 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2013
OIG-14-98 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2013 consolidated financial statements. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG is responsible for the attached management letter dated March 11, 2014, and the conclusion expressed in it.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2013 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2014
OIG-15-46 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls and business process application controls at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). KPMG, LLP determined that TSA took corrective action to design and consistently implement certain technical security account controls. However, KPMG, LLP continued to identify general information technology control deficiencies related to logical access to TSA’s core financial and feeder systems. Such control deficiencies limited TSA’s ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical financial and operational data.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2014 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-16-50 KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general IT controls and business process application controls at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). KPMG, LLP determined that TSA made improvements over consistently implementing certain technical account security controls and audit log reviews. However, KPMG continued to identify general IT control deficiencies (GITCs) related to access controls for TSA’s core financial and feeder systems. New control deficiencies reflected weaknesses over controls for systems that were new to the scope of testing GITCs for the FY 2015 audit. The conditions supporting our findings collectively limited TSA’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-17-73 Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls for TSA’s core financial and feeder systems. The deficiencies collectively limited TSA’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We recommend that TSA, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to TSA’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-08-07 Information Technology Management Needs to Be Strengthened at the Transportation Security Administration 2008
OIG-09-62  

>Information Technology Managment Letter for the FY2008 Transportation Security Administration Financial Statement Audit 		2009
OIG-09-43  

>Investigation Concerning TSA's Compromise of Covert Testing Methods 		2009
OIG-05-18 Irregularities in the Development of the Transportation Security Operations Center 2005
OIG-16-87 We previously reported on deficiencies in information technology (IT) security controls of the Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP), a data management system that connects airport transportation security equipment (TSE) to servers. We conducted this audit to assess the current extent of the deficiencies and the actions the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken to address them. Wha

>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-12-47  

>IT Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2011 DHS Financial Statement Audit 		2012
OIG-08-58 Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at the Los Angeles International Airport (Redacted) 2008
ISP-02-03 The OIG reviewed the Transportation Security Administration's training and testing of checked baggage screeners to assess allegations that they were given the answers in advance of their certification examinations

>Letter Report on Testing of Airport Screeners, August 29, 2003 		2003
OIG-06-44 Letter Report: TSA's Development of Its Weapons Management System Using RFID (Redacted) 2006
OIG-07-73 Letter Report: TSA's Management of Aviation Security Activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport 2007
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021
OIG-17-45-MA The Inspector General advised the Acting Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding internal TSA guidance to employees that, if followed, would improperly delay and restrict the OIG’s access to documents.  The Management Alert contained one recommendation with which TSA concurred.

>Management Alert Regarding Inspector General Access to Information (OIG 17-45-MA) 		2017
OIG-09-54  

>Management Letter for the Audit of the Transportation Security Administration's Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30,2008 		2009
OIG-10-79  

>Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration's Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30, 2009 		2010
OIG-10-14 Management of the Transportation Security Administration's Logistics Center  2010
OIG-09-99  

>Penetration Testing of Law Enforcement Credential Used to Bypass Screening (Unclassified Summary) 		2009
OIG-13-05 The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office was established as the lead for conducting security threat assessments and credentialing initiatives for domestic passengers on public and commercial modes of transportation, transportation industry workers, and individuals seeking access to critical infrastructure. Two programs, the Secure Flight Operations Center and the Security Threat Assessment Operations Adjudication Center, were established to conduct case-specific adjudications of potential threats to transportation security. In 2010, TSA initiated an administration-wide restructuring that includes reviewing all personnel position descriptions and realigning Transportation Threat Assessment and credentialing Office functions under other TSA offices.

>Personnel Security and Internal Control at TSA’s Legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office 		2013
OIG-13-111 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan stipulates that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) coordinate preparedness activities among ransportation sector partners to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards that could affect U.S. transportation systems. TSA, with the collaboration and coordination of other Federal agencies and the surface transportation industry, created the Surface Transportation Research and development Working Group. The group’s mission is to gather and consolidate sector-directed research and development efforts from all transportation security partners. It identifies security vulnerabilities—capability gaps—and refers them to DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) for further review and possible initiation of research and development projects.

>Research and Development Efforts to Secure Rail Transit Systems 		2013
OIG-12-96  

>Review of Allegations of Misconduct and Mismanagement Within TSA’s Office of Global Strategies (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-07-04 Review of Allegations Regarding San Francisco International Airport 2007
OIG-05-01 Review of Alleged Actions by Transportation Security Administration to Discipline Federal Air Marshals for Talking to the Press, Congress, or the Public 2005
OIG-18-88 DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law.  This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort.  As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment.  This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities.  Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.  Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.  During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list.  This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life.  Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures.  This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards.  The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.

>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program 		2018
OIG-12-41  

>Review of Costs Invoiced by Jackson Hole Airport Board Relating to Jackson Hole Airport Checked Baggae Screening Project Under Other Transaction Agreement Number HSTSo4-09-H-REC-125 Awarded by TSA 		2012
OIG-12-60  

>Review of Costs Invoiced by the City of Atlanta for a Checked Baggage Screening Project At Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport 		2012
OIG-12-44 Review of Costs Invoiced by the City of San Antonio Relating to the San Antonio International Airport Terminal B Checked Baggage Screening Project Under Other Transaction Agreement Number HSTS04-09-H-REC168 Awarded by the Transportation Security Administration

>Review of Costs Invoiced by the City of San Antonio Relating to the San Antonio International Airport Terminal B Checked Baggage Screening Project 		2012
OIG-11-104  

>Review of Costs Invoiced by the City of San Francisco Relating to the Terminal 2 Checked Baggage Screening Project at San Francisco International Airport Under Other Transaction Agreement Number HSTS04-09-H-REC123 		2011
OIG-12-76  

>Review of Costs Invoiced by the Spokane Airport Board for Closed Circuit Television Cameras at Spokane International Airport Under Other Transaction Agreement Number HSTS04-09-H-REC304 Awarded by the Transportation Security Administration 		2012
OIG-06-31 Review of Department's Handling of Suspicious Passengers Aboard Northwest Flight 327 2006
OIG-06-35 Review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Collection of Aviation Security Service Fees 2006
OIG-06-18 Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Management Controls Over the Screener Recruitment Program, December 2005 2006
OIG-05-12 Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Role in the Use and Dissemination of Airline Passenger Data, (Redacted) 2005

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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