Skip to main content
U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

Government Website

Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Safely connect using HTTPS

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock () or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-18-30 This is a Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General management alert to make the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its partners aware of active attempts — observed during our ongoing disaster oversight work in Puerto Rico — to profit from disaster survivors seeking FEMA assistance. We observed posted notices featuring a logo similar to FEMA’s, advertising paid services to complete the FEMA disaster assistance application on behalf of survivors. These services appear to be associated with FEMA, but actually are not, and demand a fee for services FEMA provides at no cost.

To complete the disaster assistance application forms, the paid service requires disaster survivors to provide their Personally Identifiable Information (PII) — such as their social security number, household annual income, and bank account numbers — to a third party, which exposes survivors to unnecessary risks.

>Management Alert - FEMA Must Take Steps to Stop Those Attempting to Profit from Disaster Survivors Seeking Assistance in Puerto Rico 		2018
OIG-18-62 The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, through its main engineering contractor (Contractor C), presented incorrect data and misinformed FEMA in obtaining a Federal grant of more than $33 million for its pipeline replacement and relocation project. Authority officials wanted to move the pipeline outside of the Mojave Riverbed, but noted the high cost to do so. Authority officials knew that replacing and relocating the pipeline was the most expensive repair option, as their Contractors A and C informed them. However, through Contractor C, Authority officials repeatedly provided FEMA incorrect data that made Alternative 2 appear to be the least expensive. Based on the incorrect information Authority officials provided, FEMA funded $11 million for the replacement and relocation project in 2013 and an additional $22 million in 2014, a total of $33 million. We question the entire $33 million as ineligible because the Authority did not comply with Federal regulations, and FEMA policies and procedures, in preparing cost estimates for FEMA.

>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its $33 Million Project 		2018
OIG-18-31 During our August 2017 site visit to the FLETC Artesia Training Center, we identified a potential safety issue at a warehouse, Building 13. The Border Patrol Academy had been using the warehouse to train new hires on search and conveyance. In 2009, a vehicle from an adjacent driving course struck the warehouse. FLETC officials could not provide documentation to support that an engineering evaluation was conducted to determine whether the accident affected the integrity of the warehouse structure. Border Patrol Academy officials also expressed safety concerns about using the warehouse to train new hires.

>Management Alert - Safety Issue at FLETC Artesia Warehouse 		2018
OIG-18-61 We conducted a verification review to determine the adequacy, effectiveness, and timeliness of USCIS' corrective actions to address the seven report recommendations in Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance, OIG-17-11, November 16, 2016. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful. At the time of our audit fieldwork in spring 2016, USCIS’ efforts to address the errors were inadequate. USCIS conducted a number of efforts to recover the inappropriately issued cards; however, these efforts also were not fully successful.

>Verification Review: Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance (OIG-17-11) 		2018
OIG-18-29 This is a Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General (OIG) special report on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FEMA recipient and sub recipient disaster-related procurements. FEMA is currently responding to some of the most catastrophic disasters in U.S. history — Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and the October 2017, California wildfires. Because of the massive scale of damage and the large number and high-dollar contracts that will likely be awarded, there is a significant risk that billions of taxpayer dollars may be exposed to waste, fraud, and abuse.

>Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related Procurement and Contracting 		2018
OIG-18-60 At the time of our audit, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the City of Waterloo, Iowa (City), sustained approximately $1.9 million in damages from severe storms and flooding from September 21 through October 3, 2016. The City did not provide all requested information and explanations necessary to perform our review; therefore, we were unable to assess whether the City’s policies, procedures, and business practices were adequate to account for FEMA Public Assistance grant funds properly. The City’s failure to cooperate with a Federal audit put approximately $1.9 million dollars in potential FEMA grant funding at risk of being deobligated or not funded.

>The City of Waterloo, Iowa Jeopardizes $1.9 Million in Estimated FEMA Grant Funding 		2018
OIG-18-26 Severe winter storms, flooding, and mudslides during January and February 2017 caused significant damage to Solano County, California (County). County officials estimate damages at $1.6 million. Based on our limited testing, the County appears to have in place policies, procedures, and business practices to generally account for and expend FEMA Public Assistance grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. The County should be able to account for disaster-related costs on a project-by-project basis and adequately support these costs.

>Solano County, California, Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant Funding 		2018
OIG-18-59 Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, we reviewed the Department’s security program, including its policies, procedures, and system security controls for the enterprise-wide intelligence system. Since our FY 2016 evaluation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has continued to provide effective oversight of the department-wide intelligence system and has implemented programs to monitor ongoing security practices. In addition, the United States Coast Guard is in the process of migrating its intelligence users to a system that is jointly managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Geospatial Agency.

>Fiscal Year 2017 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems 		2018
OIG-18-28 Osceola Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Osceola) received a $10 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award for damages caused by a severe winter storm in April 2013. Although the disaster occurred 4 years ago, Osceola has not completed all FEMA projects. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas in which Osceola may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance. Osceola generally accounted for and expended $10 million FEMA Public Assistance Funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.

>Osceola Electric Cooperative, Iowa, Generally Managed FEMA Grant Funds According to Federal Requirements 		2018
OIG-18-58 "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, including applications for permanent resident cards, also known as green cards. In response to congressional concerns, we examined green card application processing times, as well as why processing times vary among USCIS field offices. USCIS regularly posts information on its website about the time it takes field offices to adjudicate green card applications (processing time). Yet, the information is unclear and not helpful to USCIS’ customers because it does not reflect the actual amount of time it takes field offices, on average, to complete green card applications.

>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications 		2018
OIG-18-89-UNSUM We conducted our review of the Science and Technology’s (S&T) insider threat program between January 2017 and June 2017.  S&T is the primary research arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Its mission is to strengthen the Nation’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative solutions to support DHS mission operations.  Specifically, Congress created S&T in 2003 to conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of the Department.  S&T oversees laboratories where scientists perform mission-critical research on chemical and biological threats, radiological and nuclear detection, animal diseases, transportation security, and explosives trace identification.  S&T employees, contractors, and business partners—especially those with special or elevated privileges—can potentially use their inside knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to mission-critical systems and operations.  We made nine recommendations that, if implemented, should strengthen S&T’s management of insider threat risks.  The Department concurred with all of the recommendations.

>(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain 		2018
OIG-18-27 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intended to expand TSA PreCheck to 25 million air travelers at a rate of more than 5 million enrollments per year. We evaluated whether the current TSA PreCheck Application Program adjudication process will allow TSA to meet its enrollment goals. TSA did not allocate additional resources or staff to the TSA Adjudication Center, which had multiple vacancies and was tasked with manually processing about 26 percent of TSA PreCheck Application Program applications. To make matters worse, in June 2016, TSA PreCheck applications surged, leaving the Adjudication Center overwhelmed with applications to process. As the application queue grew, TSA brought on detailees from other Federal agencies to assist with adjudications part time, but they did not have a significant impact. Further, the Adjudication Center relies on a manual caseload assignment and reporting process, which is inefficient for the volume of TSA PreCheck applications needing adjudication.

>TSA's Adjudication Resources are Inadequate to Meet TSA PreCheck Enrollment Goals 		2018
OIG-18-57 The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires the Office of Inspector General to conduct an annual risk assessment and periodic audits on agency charge card programs. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security implemented internal controls to prevent illegal, improper, and erroneous purchases and payments. During fiscal year 2016, DHS reported spending approximately $1.2 billion in purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions. Although the Department has established internal controls for its charge card programs, the components we reviewed did not always follow DHS’ procedures. Our testing results of purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions revealed internal control weaknesses. Specifically, we found major internal control weaknesses that persisted at the United States Coast Guard and some control weaknesses within CBP’s Fleet Card Program.

>Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains 		2018
OIG-18-85 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its Public Assistance (PA) Program, is currently responding to Hurricane Irma — one of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history.  FEMA’s damage estimates for Florida and Georgia exceed $4.2 billion, with debris removal operations constituting approximately 36 percent of the total PA cost.  Debris removal costs in Florida and Georgia are estimated to reach approximately $1.5 billion as of May 2018.  FEMA’s guidance for debris monitoring lacks sufficient information to ensure adequate oversight.  In the 2011 OIG report, FEMA’s Oversight and Management of Debris Removal Operations, we identified deficiencies in FEMA’s debris removal guidance.  To resolve these deficiencies, we made 10 recommendations to, in part, strengthen FEMA’s debris removal guidance and procedure.  In response, FEMA released additional criteria pertaining to debris estimating and monitoring to enhance the overall effectiveness of the process.  FEMA removed the detailed responsibilities when it released its Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG).  Going forward from the PAPPG version 1.0, FEMA relies solely on the subrecipient to monitor the debris removal operations, and removes monitoring responsibilities from both FEMA and the State.  Subrecipients now have a greater responsibility to identify issues or concerns during debris removal operations.  We made three recommendations that when implemented will strengthen FEMA’s debris monitoring operations.  FEMA concurred with all recommendations.

>Management Alert - Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma 		2018
OIG-18-22 Representative Raúl M. Grijalva requested that we review U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) decision to award GEO Care, LLC a contract to establish a Family Case Management Program (FCMP). We sought to determine whether ICE awarded the FCMP contract in accordance with laws, regulations, and guidance. We also conducted a limited review of post-award contract modifications. FCMP is an alternative to detention that uses case managers to ensure participants comply with their release conditions, such as attending court hearings, while allowing them to remain in their community as they move through immigration proceedings. We determined that ICE properly awarded FCMP contracts.

>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract 		2018
OIG-18-56 We reviewed DHS’ information security program in accordance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA). Our objective was to determine whether DHS’ information security program and practices were adequate and effective in protecting the information and information systems that supported DHS’ operations and assets in fiscal year 2017.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2017 		2018
OIG-18-86 We identified a number of serious issues that violate U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and pose significant health and safety risks at the facility.  Specifically, we are concerned about nooses in detainee cells, improper and overly restrictive segregation, and untimely and inadequate detainee medical care.  We recommended that ICE conduct a full review and inspection of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center and the GEO Group’s management of the center to immediately to ensure compliance with ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards.  Specifically, ICE must review and ensure compliance with: Personal Care Required; Segregation; and Medical Care.  We made one recommendation to improve conditions at the facility.

>Management Alert - Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California 		2018
OIG-18-25 The Omaha Tribe’s serious financial management weaknesses combined with inadequate and missing documentation resulted in unreliable financial records. As a result, we have little confidence that the transactions recorded in the accounting system actually occurred or that the tribe completed its FEMA-authorized projects. Therefore, we question $13.9 million as unsupported. Due to the unreliable financial information, we calculated the amount unsupported as the entire $16.9 million FEMA provided for both grants, less $2.8 million in unused Federal funding that FEMA should put to better use; $165,000 in unclaimed insurance coverage; and approximately $74,749 that we were able to verify as supported and eligible.

>The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska and Iowa Mismanaged $14 Million in FEMA Disaster Grants 		2018
OIG-18-55 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (USIA) David J. Glawe used a personal email account to send an invitation to his ceremonial swearing-in event to staff members of the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Because the invitation came from a non-DHS email account and resembled a phishing email, Senator Claire McCaskill asked the DHS Office of Inspector General to review the circumstances surrounding the invitation

>Special Review: Swearing-In Ceremony of David J. Glawe, DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 		2018
OIG-18-88 DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law.  This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort.  As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment.  This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities.  Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.  Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.  During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list.  This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life.  Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures.  This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards.  The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.

>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program 		2018
OIG-18-24 DHS reported using its Other Transaction Authority to work with non-traditional contractors, DHS did not always follow statutory requirements when entering, modifying, and overseeing its agreements. Inadequate internal policies contributed to DHS falling short of meeting all statutory requirements for using OTAs. In addition, DHS acquisition policy staff reported that competing priorities prevented timely reporting to Congress. As a result, DHS may have taken on more risks and costs than necessary and impeded Congress’ ability to oversee DHS’ use of OTAs.

>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority 		2018
OIG-18-54 In November 2015, we reported that the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) information technology (IT) management approach did not adequately address technology planning, governance, and system support challenges to effectively support its mission. We issued five recommendations to the FEMA Chief Information Officer (CIO) aimed at improving the agency’s management of IT.1 Specifically, we recommended the CIO finalize key planning documents related to IT modernization; execute against those planning documents; fully implement an IT governance board; improve integration and functionality of existing systems; and implement agency-wide acquisition, development, and operation and maintenance standards.

 

>Management Alert - Inadequate FEMA Progress in Addressing Open Recommendations from our 2015 Report, "FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology" (OIG-16-10) 		2018
OIG-18-87 CBP facilities we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search.  With the exception of inconsistent cleanliness of the hold rooms, we observed that unaccompanied alien children had access to toilets and sinks, drinking water, beverages (including milk and juice drinks), as well as snacks and food.  Unaccompanied alien children had access to hygiene items and clean bedding at all facilities we visited.  We did not encounter issues with temperatures or ventilation, access to emergency medical care, inadequate supervision, or access to telephones.  We also observed that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry had offices and storage spaces redesigned into hold rooms to be able to detain more unaccompanied alien children, family units, and other border crossers referred for processing. We made no recommendations in this report.

>Results of Unannounced Inspections into Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody 		2018
OIG-18-23 USCIS deployed this capability in April 2016 to improve processing of approximately 84,000 naturalization applications received each month. However, as before, the ELIS capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to­-end Form N-400 processing. ELIS repeatedly experienced outages and did not always perform as intended. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment. Given its focus on meeting established system release dates, USCIS did not fully address our prior report recommendations to improve user support, stakeholder engagement, performance measurement, and testing to ensure ELIS met user needs and improved operations.

>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery 		2018
OIG-18-53 U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill asked us to review ICE’s modification of its intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) with the City of Eloy in Arizona to procure family detention space in Dilley, Texas. We also reviewed other selected IGSAs to determine whether they complied with applicable laws and regulations. (ICE) is responsible for the detention of removable aliens. ICE commonly uses a type of agreement called an IGSA to reserve space at detention facilities owned or operated by state or local governments. In September 2014, ICE improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy (Eloy) in Arizona to establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, more than 900 miles away. Although ICE could have contracted directly with the private company that operates the South Texas Family Residential Center, CCA, it instead created an unnecessary “middleman” by modifying its existing IGSA with Eloy. Eloy’s sole function under the modification is to act as the middleman between ICE and CCA; Eloy collects about $438,000 in annual fees for this service.

>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services 		2018
OIG-18-84 Special Review - Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy 2018
OIG-18-21 FEMA is currently responding to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, one of the largest disasters in U.S. history, with current damage estimates reported to exceed $100 billion. Due to the massive scale of damage, FEMA and Texas, as a FEMA grantee, will face many challenges in the recovery phase of the disaster. As FEMA moves into the recovery phase for Hurricane Harvey, it will begin to obligate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars from the Disaster Relief Fund for administrative costs and for Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation grants to eligible state, tribal, and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations. Texas, as FEMA’s grantee, will be responsible for oversight and monitoring of the disaster grants to Texas subrecipients.

>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior DHS-OIG Reports Related to FEMA's Response to Texas Disasters and Texas' Management of FEMA Grant Funds 		2018
OIG-18-52 In light of the heightened public and congressional interest in the misuse of government-owned, government-leased, and chartered aircraft, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a special review of the use of government aircraft by the heads of the Department and several of DHS’s operational components. DHS OIG’s review also included a review of other-than-coach-class travel by this same group of senior officials. We determined that each instance of the use of government aircraft by DHS’s senior leaders during the time period of our review generally complied with relevant laws, rules, regulations, policies, and guidance.

With respect to DHS senior leaders’ other-than-coach-class (OTCC) commercial air travel over the same time period, we determined that such travel generally qualified as allowable premium travel. We could not definitively determine, however, whether one trip taken by a former Deputy Secretary met all of the Department’s criteria for allowable OTCC travel. We also identified two specific instances of non-compliance with the Department’s internal request and approval processes for such travel; however, the related travel was properly justified, and the process deviations were quickly identified and corrected by the Department.

>Special Review: DHS Executive Travel Review 		2018
OIG-18-83 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for inspecting all international mail arriving at U.S. airports, with limited exceptions. A major challenge for CBP is preventing imports of opioids and other illegal items mailed from overseas through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP's air mail inspection processes at JFK airport are effective and have adequate information technology (IT) security controls. CBP has ineffective processes and IT security controls to support air mail inspection operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), the largest of nine USPS facilities that receive and handle incoming international mail. Despite legislative requirements to systematically target and widely prevent illegal imports, CBP inspects only a limited number of the hundreds of thousands of pieces of incoming air mail each day, largely due to difficulty inventorying and locating targeted mail, as well as having inadequate guidance, equipment, and resources. These air mail inspection deficiencies hinder CBP's efforts to prevent prohibited items (particularly opioids) from entering the United States.

>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport 		2018
OIG-18-20 We evaluated the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) privacy safeguards for protecting the personally identifiable information (PII) it collects and maintains. OHA has not implemented an effective organizational framework for safeguarding PII in accordance with Federal requirements. OHA appointed a Privacy Officer, but this official lacks adequate authority and resources to carry out the various required privacy management responsibilities. This official also has not received OHA senior leadership support to issue the policies and procedures needed for effective organization-wide privacy management. Further, there was no central tracking to ensure that all employees completed annual privacy training and to accurately report this information to the Department and Congress as required.

>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program 		2018
OIG-18-51 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 requires that Federal agencies implement a government-wide standard for secure, reliable identification for their employees and contractors to access facilities and systems. Our objective was to assess DHS’ progress in implementing and managing the HSPD-12 program since our prior audits in 2007 and 2010.  The Department of Homeland Security has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program department-wide. Many of the same issues we previously reported in 2007 and 2010 pose challenges today.

>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement 		2018
OIG-18-82 Department of Homeland Security shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2017, to the DHS Office of Inspector General listing all grants and contracts awarded by other than full and open competition (OTFOC) during fiscal years 2016 and 2017. We contracted with Williams, Adley & Company-DC, LLC to review the OTFOC report and assess DHS compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.  Williams Adley concluded that DHS complied with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies governing grants and contracts awarded by OTFOC in FY 2017. During that year, DHS awarded 62 noncompetitive grants worth about $140 million and 121 noncompetitive contracts worth about $118 million through OTFOC. The independent auditors determined that DHS’ Report on OTFOC for FY 2017 as well as the information related to these grants and contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation and USASpending.gov were accurate. The auditors also found that DHS followed written policies and procedures and the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 when awarding grants and contracts

noncompetitively.

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2017 		2018
OIG-18-07
    1. Report: O:\Special Projects\508 Reports\FY18\MGMT
    2. Press release:  O:\Special Projects\508 Reports\FY17\PR
    3. Testimony: O:\Special Projects\508 Reports\FY17\TM
  • PTS or final report folder
  • 508 compliant- need default tools
    1. Action Wizard tab
    • >DHS Needs a More Unified Approach         		2018
    OIG-18-50 The TSA SSI Program Office's Identification and Redaction of Sensitive Security Information 2018
    OIG-18-81 DHS support components do not have sufficient processes and procedures to address misconduct. Support Components provide resources, analysis, equipment, research, policy development, and other specific assistance to operational components. These deficiencies exist because no single office or entity

    is responsible for managing and overseeing misconduct issues across support components. According to Government Accountability Office (GAO) guidance, it is important for agencies to establish organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority, so they can achieve their objectives. Support components need to improve their processes and procedures for addressing misconduct. Specifically, support components do not maintain comprehensive data about misconduct  allegations; refer misconduct allegations consistently to OIG; provide guidance for supervisors and investigators on handling misconduct; and manage misconduct allegations effectively.

    >DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct         		2018
    OIG-18-17 The Hospital must improve its policies, procedures, and business practices to account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. Specifically, it did not properly document and adequately account for project costs; comply with its overtime policy; and comply with Federal requirements for insurance. Additionally, there were major differences in the damage estimates FEMA and the Hospital calculated.

    >Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its $6.7 Million FEMA Grant         		2018
    OIG-18-49 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the City of Cedar Falls, Iowa (City), had sustained approximately $893,000 in damage caused by severe storms and flooding from September 21 through October 3, 2016. We audited early in the grant process to identify areas in which the City may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal procurement requirements. Except for procurement, the City’s policies, procedures, and business practices appear to be adequate to account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA policies. Specifically, the City’s procurement policies did not provide sufficient opportunities for disadvantaged firms to compete for contracts, or prevent awarding contracts to debarred or suspended contractors. After we discussed these issues, City officials moved quickly to modify procurement policies to comply with Federal requirements.

    >City of Cedar Falls, Iowa Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant         		2018
    OIG-18-80 In 2017, CBP made considerable progress developing and implementing a biometric capability to track air passenger exits using facial recognition technology. CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program conducted a pilot at nine airports and demonstrated ability using this technology to match 98 percent of passengers’ identities at departure gates. However, During the pilot, CBP encountered various technical and operational challenges that limited biometric confirmation to only 85 percent of all passengers processed. These challenges included poor network availability, a lack of dedicated staff, and compressed boarding times due to flight delays. Further, due to missing or poor quality digital images, CBP could not consistently match individuals of certain age groups or nationalities.

    >Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures Nationwide         		2018
    OIG-18-13 FEMA and CBP Oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program Needs Improvement 2018
    OIG-18-48 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. There are six program offices within CBP that are tasked with drug-control responsibilities: the United States Border Patrol (USBP), the Offices of Field Operations (OFO), Information and Technology (OIT), Training and Development (OTD), Acquisition (OA), and Air and Marine (AMO)).

    >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds         		2018
    OIG-18-79 In December 2014, OIG previously reported on the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.2 Our report disclosed CBP had not developed performance measures needed to accurately assess program effectiveness and make informed decisions. CBP also did not recognize all UAS operating costs and, as such, the Congress and public may be unaware of the amount of resources invested in the program. This audit determined that CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for surveillance information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Without a privacy assessment, CBP could not determine whether ISR Systems contained data requiring safeguards per privacy laws, regulations, and DHS policy. CBP’s failure to implement adequate security controls according to Federal and DHS policy could result in potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ISR Systems and its operations.

    >CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems         		2018
    OIG-18-18 CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption.

    >Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509         		2018
    OIG-18-19 Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017 (Redacted) 2018
    OIG-18-47 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. This Performance Summary Report contains the performance measures aligned to drug control decision units as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular: Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The drug control decision units are as follows: (1) Salaries and Expenses, (2) Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement and (3) Border Security Fence, Infrastructure and Technology.

    >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report         		2018
    OIG-18-78 USCIS has inadequate controls for verifying that foreign nationals seeking lawful permanent residence status meet health-related standards for admissibility. First, USCIS is not properly vetting the physicians it designates as civil surgeons. We determined that USCIS designated physicians with a history of patient abuse or a criminal record as civil surgeons. This is occurring because USCIS does not have adequate policies to ensure only suitable physicians are designated as civil surgeons. Second, when reviewing these foreign nationals’ required medical forms, ISOs are accepting incomplete and inaccurate forms because they are not adequately trained and because USCIS is not enforcing its existing policies. USCIS may be placing foreign nationals at risk of abuse by some civil surgeons. USCIS could also be exposing the U.S. population to contagious or dangerous health conditions from foreign nationals erroneously granted lawful permanent resident status.

    >USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement         		2018
    OIG-18-46 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all

    funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a multi-mission bureau, and obligations are reported pursuant to an approved drug methodology. ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Domestic Investigations, International Operations (IO) and Office of Intelligence uphold U.S. drug control policy delegated amid the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) initiatives, by fully supporting the overall ICE mandate to detect, disrupt, and dismantle smuggling organizations.

    >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds         		2018
    OIG-18-77 We examined whether ICE is effectively overseeing and managing the 287(g) program as it expands. Under the 287(g) program, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) delegates authority to state and local law enforcement agencies to help ICE in its immigration enforcement mission in their jurisdictions. After the Executive Order was issued, the 287(g) program expanded quickly, it rose from 36 to 76.  ICE approved 40 additional applicants without planning for a corresponding increase in program management staffing, determining how to promptly deliver needed information technology (IT) equipment to participants, or ensuring participants are fully trained.  



    Without effective oversight, it is difficult to monitor and measure performance to determine whether program participants are assisting ICE in its immigration enforcement mission. Further, without the necessary equipment and training, program participants may not be acting as a force multiplier to identify removable aliens. ICE may also not be able to fully expand the program and include new localities interested in participating.

    >Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program         		2018
    OIG-18-15 Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight 2018
    OIG-18-45 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY).  The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is required to conduct a review of the report and provide a conclusion about the reliability of each assertion made in the report. Independent Accountants’ Report on the

    U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) FY 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013 (Circular).

    >Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report         		2018
    OIG-18-76 We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased.

    >Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers         		2018

    *NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

    Return to top of page