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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-19-10 The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. We determined that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not always conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs. Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.

>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry 		2019
OIG-16-34 The mission of CBP’s Special Operations Group (SOG) is to train, organize, equip, resource, and deploy tactical and emergency response personnel worldwide to protect America. Based in El Paso, Texas, SOG plans, coordinates, and executes national, regional, and international level operations. We reviewed the SOG program to determine its cost and effectiveness. We determined that CBP does not have formal performance measures for its SOG program and does not track SOG’s total program cost. The incomplete records of SOG and other components of CBP that support SOG limited the determination of the SOG program’s total cost. SOG program efficiency and effectiveness cannot be accurately determined without total program costs or formal performance measures. As a result, CBP may be missing opportunities to improve effectiveness and identify potential cost savings in the SOG program.

>CBP's Special Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness are Unknown 		2016
OIG-10-52  

>CBP's Use of Container Security Initiative Information to Identify and Detect High-Risk Containers Prior to Landing 		2010
OIG-23-61 CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data - (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-20-05 From fiscal years 2015 through 2018, in the midst of a growing opioid epidemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Secret Service appropriately disciplined employees whose drug test results indicated illegal opioid use, based on their employee standards of conduct and tables of offenses and penalties.  Additionally, during the same time period, components have either implemented or are taking steps to evaluate whether employees using prescription opioids can effectively conduct their duties.  For example, components have established policies prohibiting the use of prescription opioids that may impact an employee’s ability to work, in addition to requiring employees to report such prescription opioid use.  They have also implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to evaluate the fitness for duty of employees using prescription opioids.  These policies establish consistent standards components can use to ensure they are allowing employees to use legally-prescribed opioids, while also ensuring their workforce is capable of effectively performing their duties.  We made two recommendations to improve components’ oversight of illegal and prescription opioid use by employees.  CBP and Secret Service concurred with the recommendations, which are both resolved and open.

>CBP, ICE, TSA, and Secret Service Have Taken Steps to Address Illegal and Prescription Opioid Use 		2020
OIG-13-119 Within the Department of Homeland Security, under the Foreign Military Sales program, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) procures and provides defense-related articles and services to foreign governments, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) controls exports of articles related to Foreign Military Sales. In February 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office deemed Foreign Military Sales a high risk area for the Federal Government. We performed this audit to determine whether CBP and the USCG have adequate controls over the Foreign Military Sales export process.

>CBP’s and USCG’s Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales 		2013
OIG-17-39 We determined that CBP likely did not act in direct response to the Sandia report, but it has instituted many border security programs and operations that align with the report’s recommendations. However, our review and analysis of these reports also highlighted some continuing challenges to CBP in its efforts to secure the southwest border. In particular, CBP does not measure the effectiveness of its programs and operations well; therefore, it continues to invest in programs and act without the benefit of the feedback needed to help ensure it uses resources wisely and improves border security.  CBP also faces program management challenges in planning, resource allocation, infrastructure and technology acquisition, and overall efficiency.  Finally, coordination and communication with both internal and external stakeholders could be improved.  This final report does not contain recommendations.

>CBP’s Border Security Efforts – An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of Entry 		2017
OIG-12-132  

>CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross Border Tunnels 		2012
OIG-06-36 CBP’s Trusted Traveler Systems Using RFID Technology Require Enhanced Security (Redacted) 2006
OIG-12-85  

>CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security 		2012
DD-09-07  

>Central Electric Cooperative, Inc. 		2009
DD-06-05 Central Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. Stillwater, Oklahoma FEMA Disaster Number 1401-DR-OK Public Assistance Identification Number 000-U05EC-00 2005
OIG-09-11 Challenges Facing FEMA's Acquisition Workforce ( 2009
OIG-09-70  

>Challenges Facing FEMA's Disaster Contract Management 		2009
OIG-05-44 Challenges in FEMA's Flood Map Modernization Program (PDF, 63 pages - 3.33 MB) 2005
OIG-09-95  

>Challenges Remain in DHS' Efforts to Secure Control Systems 		2009
OIG-08-48 Challenges Remain In Executing the Department of Homeland Security’s Information Technology Program For Its Intelligence Systems Unclassified Summary 2008
OIG-07-48 Challenges Remain in Securing the Nation's Cyber Infrastructure 2007
DD-11-05 Chambers County, Texas 2011
DD-06-03 Changes in State of Louisiana Compensation Policies 2006
DD-11-07  

>Chennault International Airport Authority, Lake Charles, Louisiana 		2011
OIG-20-65 We determined that children brought to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods, and in many cases overnight, to be reunited with their parents.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on the first day of attempted mass reunifications.  ICE and U.S. Health and Human Services had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to promptly out-process the parents of arriving children.  As a result, some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous access to food, water, and restrooms.  As the mass reunifications continued, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port Isabel closer to the court’s July 26, 2018 deadline.  The report contains no recommendations.

>Children Waited for Extended Periods in Vehicles to Be Reunified with Their Parents at ICE's Port Isabel Detention Center in July 2018 		2020
DS-10-04  

>Chugach Electric Association, Inc.  		2010
OIG-12-99  

>Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of a Security Clearance and Suitability Determination to a General Manager at TSA’s Legacy Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office 		2012
OIG-22-63 CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience 2022
OIG-21-59 CISA cannot demonstrate how its oversight has improved Dams Sector security and resilience because CISA has not coordinated or tracked its Dams Sector activities, updated overarching national critical infrastructure or Dams Sector plans, and collected and evaluated performance information on Dams Sector activities.  Furthermore, we found that CISA does not consistently provide information to FEMA to help ensure its assistance addresses the most pressing needs of the Dams Sector.  CISA and FEMA also do not coordinate their flood mapping information.  Finally, CISA does not effectively use the Homeland Security Information Network Critical Infrastructure Dams Portal to provide external Dams Sector Stakeholders with critical information.  We recommended that CISA update the Dams Sector-Specific Plan, its internal organization structures, and establish performance metrics to determine its impact on the Dams Sector.  We also recommended it coordinate with FEMA on its grants and flood mapping systems.  Finally, we recommended CISA implement a strategy to use the HSIN-CI Dams portal to its fullest potential.  We made five recommendations to update CISA’s Sector-Specific Plan, internal organization structures, and coordination with FEMA that, when implemented, will improve dam security and resilience.  CISA concurred with all five recommendations.

>CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience 		2021
OIG-23-19 CISA Made Progress but Resources, Staffing, and Technology Challenges Hinder Cyber Threat Detection and Mitigation 2023
OIG-24-09 CISA Needs to Improve Collaboration to Enhance Cyber Resiliency in the Water and Wastewater Sector 2024
OIG-22-15 CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data 2022
OIG-24-22 CISA's Use of Infrastructure Investment and Job Act Funds 2024
DD-10-03  

>City of Albuquerque, New Mexico  		2010
DA-10-04 City of Andalusia, Alabama, FEMA Disaster No. 1208-DR-AL 2004
DD-11-13  

>City of Austin, Texas 		2011
DA-03-04 City of Barnesville, Georgia, FEMA Disaster No. 1033-DR-GA and 1209-DR-GA 2004
DA-10-03 City of Biloxi, Mississippi  2010
DD-10-09  

>City of Bucyrus, Ohio  		2010
DA-10-10  

>City of Buffalo, New York  		2010
OIG-18-49 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the City of Cedar Falls, Iowa (City), had sustained approximately $893,000 in damage caused by severe storms and flooding from September 21 through October 3, 2016. We audited early in the grant process to identify areas in which the City may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal procurement requirements. Except for procurement, the City’s policies, procedures, and business practices appear to be adequate to account for and expend FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA policies. Specifically, the City’s procurement policies did not provide sufficient opportunities for disadvantaged firms to compete for contracts, or prevent awarding contracts to debarred or suspended contractors. After we discussed these issues, City officials moved quickly to modify procurement policies to comply with Federal requirements.

>City of Cedar Falls, Iowa Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant 		2018
DA-24-05 City of Clarksville, Tennessee 2005
DA-16-05 City of Columbus, Mississippi FEMA Disaster No. 1360-DR-MS 2005
DA-11-13  

>City of Deerfield Beach, Florida 		2011
OIG-16-137-D At the time of our audit, FEMA estimated that the City of Eureka, Missouri (City), had sustained approximately $1.5 million in damages from flooding in December 2015. We conducted the audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the City may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal procurement requirements.

>City of Eureka, Missouri, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its $1.5 Million FEMA Grant 		2016
OIG-14-125-D We audited Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance grant funds awarded to the City of Flagstaff, Arizona (City), Public Assistance Identification Number 005-23620-00. Our audit objective was to determine whether the City accounted for and expended FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. The Arizona Division of Emergency Management (Arizona), a FEMA grantee, warded the City $3.5 million for damages resulting from severe storms and flooding during the incident period of July 20, to August 7, 2010. The award provided 75 percent FEMA funding for one large project and four small projects. The audit covered the period of July 20, 2010, to August 8, 2013. We audited the one large project (Project 12) for a total of $3.3 million or 97 percent of the award. At the time of our audit, the City had ompleted work on the large project and submitted its final claim to Arizona. However, Arizona had not completed its review of the City’s final claim; therefore, the project remained open.

>City of Flagstaff, Arizona, Generally Accounted for and Expended FEMA Grant Funds Properly, But FEMA Should Disallow $124,443 and Deobligate $57,941 of Public Assistance Grant Funds 		2014
DA-10-19  

>City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida  		2010
W-09-03 City of Fremont, CA, Public Assistance ID No. 001-26000, FEMA Disaster No. 1203-DR-CA, 2003
DS-10-10  

>City of Glendale, California 		2010
DA-10-17  

>City of Greenvile, South Carolina  		2010
GC-AL-06-18 City of Gulf Shores, Alabama 2006
OIG-16-116-D At the time of our audit, the City of Hazelwood, Missouri (City), estimated it had sustained approximately $3.3 million in damages from flooding in December 2015. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the City may need additional technical assistance and monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements.

>City of Hazelwood, Missouri, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its Federal Grant 		2016
DA-10-12  

>City of Hialeah, Florida  		2010

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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