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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-20-36 We identified 16 allegations of race-based harassment involving cadets between 2013 and 2018 that the Coast Guard Academy (the Academy) was aware of and had sufficient information to investigate and address through internal hate and harassment procedures.  The OIG identified issues in how the Academy addressed 11 of them.  First, in six incidents, the Academy did not thoroughly investigate the allegations, and/or did not discipline cadets when investigations documented violations of cadet regulations or Coast Guard policy.  In two of these instances, cadets committed similar misconduct again.  The Academy also did not fully include civil rights staff as required in six instances (including two of the instances noted previously).  Therefore, civil rights staff could not properly track these incidents to proactively identify trends and offer the Academy assistance.  In addition, in one incident involving a potential hate allegation, the Academy did not follow the Coast Guard process for hate incidents.  Finally, our review determined that race-based harassment is underreported at the Academy for various reasons, including concerns about negative consequences for reporting allegations.  Underreporting is especially concerning because our questionnaire results and interviews indicate harassing behaviors continue at the Academy.  We made five recommendations that will enhance the Academy’s ability to address harassment and hate allegations, including ensuring the Academy consistently investigates allegations, requiring the reasons for disciplinary decisions be documented after race- or ethnicity-based harassment investigations, informing civil rights staff of all misconduct that could reasonably relate to race or ethnicity; and improving training related to preventing and addressing race-based or ethnicity-based harassment or hate incidents.  The Coast Guard concurred with all recommendations

>The U.S. Coast Guard Academy Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Allegations of Race-Based Harassment and Prevent Such Harassment on Campus 		2020
OIG-15-31 The U.S. Coast Guard’s Travel to Obtain Health Care program is intended to ensure U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) members and their dependents have access to proper medical care while stationed in locations where access to specialty care may not be readily available. From October 2010 through June 2014, the Coast Guard spent almost $4.5 million on this program. We received allegations that unnecessary travel had been approved. As a result, we conducted this audit to determine if the program has sufficient controls to ensure travel is necessary. The program did not have sufficient controls to ensure that travel for medical purposes was necessary. The Coast Guard did not establish, distribute, or ensure implementation of clear policies and procedures for reviewing, approving, and maintaining program requests. Local offices were not provided criteria or training on how to evaluate the requests, did not document that travel was necessary, and did not adequately justify that the location for medical care was appropriate. Ninety-four percent of the records tested were missing essential information, such as physicians’ referrals and cost estimates. Without this information, approving officials may not have been able to evaluate whether the travel was necessary and cost effective. As a result, the Coast Guard may have approved requests for inappropriate health care travel, incurring unnecessary costs and lost productivity.

>The U.S. Coast Guard Travel to Obtain Health Care Program Needs Improved Policies and Better Oversight 		2015
OIG-10-23 The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Process for Authorizing Medical Care for Immigration Detainees 2010
OIG-12-29  

>The U.S. Virgin Islands Management of State Homeland Security Program Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2007 through 2009 		2012
OIG-22-79 The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases 2022
OIG-23-46 The United States Coast Guard Needs to Determine the Impact and Effectiveness of Its Streamlined Inspection Program 2023
OIG-23-23 The United States Coast Guard Needs to Improve Its Accounting for Non-Capitalized Personal Property Assets 2023
OIG-09-107  

>The United States Coast Guard's Program for Identfying High Interest Vessels ( 		2009
OIG-15-21 The United States Secret Service’s acquisition management program office, established in 2011, has adequate oversight and management of its acquisition process, complies with DHS acquisition guidance, and has implemented some best practices. However, the Secret Service does not have its own guidance for acquisitions valued at less than $300 million and, at the time of our audit, the component did not have a designated Component Acquisition Executive.

>The United States Secret Service Has Adequate Oversight and Management of its Acquisitions (Revised) 		2015
OIG-16-36-D The University of Wisconsin-Superior received an $8.6 million FEMA grant from Wisconsin Emergency Management, and FEMA grantee, for damages resulting from severe storms and flooding in June 2012. Our audit objective was to determine whether the University accounted for and expended FEMA funds according to Federal requirements. The University effectively accounted for and expended FEMA Public Assistance grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.

>The University of Wisconsin-Superior Effectively Managed FEMA Grant Funds Awarded for Severe Storms and Flooding in June 2012 		2016
OIG-14-42 The April 20, 2010, oil spill that followed the explosion of the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit, Deepwater Horizon, was the largest in United States history. This spill was also the first Spill of National Significance—a spill so complex that it required extraordinary coordination of Federal, State, local, and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the discharge. As the lead Federal agency for oil spill or hazardous material incidents in United States coastal waters, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) served as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for response to this oil spill. Seven after action reports containing 549 recommendations were issued in the wake of this incident. Our objective was to determine whether the USCG’s oversight of recommendations made in Deepwater Horizon oil spill after action reports was effective for tracking corrective actions.

>The USCG's Oversight of Recommendations from Deepwater Horizon After Action Reports 		2014
OIG-17-25-D We determined that the Authority did not comply with Federal regulations in its award and administration of three contracts totaling $31.7 million. As a result, FEMA has no assurance that these costs were reasonable or that the Authority selected the most qualified contractors. Specifically, the Authority did not: perform cost/price analyses of bid proposals to ensure fair and reasonable costs; follow its own procurement policy and Federal regulations when evaluating and selecting its contractors; include all mandatory Federal provisions in contracts to document rights and responsibilities of the parties; maintain records sufficient to detail the significant history of its procurements; maintain an adequate contract administration system that included careful review of invoices; or include a ceiling price in time-and-material contracts that contractors exceed at their own risk. Therefore, we recommended that FEMA should ineligible contract costs, review costs associated with the Authority’s other large projects and disallow any costs that are ineligible; review the process the Authority used to procure its engineering contract; and direct the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, to provide increased guidance to the Authority and more closely monitor its performance to ensure the Authority complies with mandatory Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.

>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage $32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds 		2017
OIG-14-143-D Our audit objective was to determine whether the Village’s policies, procedures, and business practices are adequate to account for and expend Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. We conducted this audit early in the Public Assistance process to identify areas where the Village may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance. In addition, by undergoing an audit early in the grant cycle, grant recipients have the opportunity to correct non-compliance with Federal regulations before they spend the majority of their funding. It also allows them the opportunity to supplement deficient documentation or locate missing documentation before too much time elapses.

>The Village of Corrales, New Mexico, Needs Assistance to Ensure Compliance with FEMA Public Assistance Grant Requirements 		2014
OIG-16-114-D The Village of Pilger, Nebraska (Village), received a $5.6 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) award for damages resulting from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding in June 2014. We conducted this audit early in the grant process to identify areas where the Village may need additional technical assistance or monitoring to ensure compliance.

>The Village Of Pilger, Nebraska, Took Corrective Actions to Comply with Federal Grant Award Requirements 		2016
OIG-14-58-D The New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (State), a FEMA grantee, awarded Saltaire $13.2 million for damages resulting from Hurricane Sandy, which occurred on October 29, 2012. The award provided 90 percent funding for debris removal (Category A), emergency protective measures (Category B), and permanent work (Categories C–G) for 13 projects (9 large and 4 small projects).1 We audited 10 of the 13 projects totaling $12.97 million or 98 percent of the award (see exhibit). The audit covered the period October 27, 2012, through July 23, 2013, during which Saltaire claimed $347,288 for work in our audit scope. At the time of our fieldwork, insurance covered a small amount of storm-related damage. 1

>The Village of Saltaire, New York, Generally Managed FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Funds Effectively 		2014
OIG-13-07 The Visa Waiver Program was established in 1986 to promote international tourism without jeopardizing U.S. security. The program allows nationals from designated countries to enter the United States and stay for up to 90 days without obtaining a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate. Currently, there are 36 Visa Waiver Program countries. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to assess the law enforcement and security risks of Visa Waiver Program countries, and terminate a country from the Visa Waiver Program if necessary.

>The Visa Waiver Program 		2013
OIG-16-86-D The April 2013 fertilizer plant explosion devastated the City of West, Texas, killing 15 people and leveling homes in a 5-block radius. The West School Administration received a $5.1 million Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant from the Texas Division of Emergency Management, a FEMA grantee, for emergency measures. Our audit objective was to determine whether West School Administration accounted for and expendedFEMA funds according to Federal requirements.

>The West School Administration Effectively Accounted for the FEMA Emergency Grant Funds Awarded for the West, Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion 		2016
DD-11-04 Town of Abita Springs, Louisiana 2011
DD-11-03 Town of Franklinton, Louisiana 2011
DA-11-04 Town of Lincoln, Vermont, FEMA Disaster No. 1288-DR-VT 2004
DA-06-04 Town of Randolph, Vermont, FEMA Disaster No. 1228-DR-VT 2004
DD-10-06 Town of Vinton, Louisiana, FEMA Disaster Number 1607-DR-LA, Public Assistance Identification Number 019-78820-00, Audit Report Number DD-10-06 2010
OIG-11-96  

>Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Vetting of Airmen Certificates and General Aviation Airport Access and Security Procedures 		2011
OIG-06-60 Transportation Security Administration Continuity of Operations Program Redacted 2006
OIG-12-120  

>Transportation Security Administration Has Taken Steps To Address the Insider Threat But Challenges Remain (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-13-101 We conducted a follow-up audit to determine TSA’s progress in establishing key information technology management capabilities to support mission needs. Appendix A describes the audit’s scope and methodology. The TSA Chief Information Officer has established key information technology management capabilities to support TSA’s mission. Specifically, the Chief Information Officer updated the information technology strategic plan, implemented a systems engineering life cycle process to manage information technology programs, implemented information technology acquisition review processes, and developed an enterprise architecture. Not all information technology procurements, however, have gone through the information technology acquisition review process because they were not categorized as information technology procurements. As a result, there is little assurance that all information technology investments are aligned with the Chief Information Officer’s strategy or TSA’s future information technology mission needs.

>Transportation Security Administration Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges 		2013
OIG-13-82 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) operates three warehouses in Texas, collectively known as the TSA Logistics Center. The warehouses store various types of Government equipment used at airports to screen passengers and baggage. Equipment used at airports, but not specifically used for screening operations, is also stored in the warehouses. As of May 31, 2012, TSA had more than 17,000 items in its warehouse inventory, with an estimated cost of $185.7 million. We performed this audit to determine whether TSA effectively managed the Logistics Center.

>Transportation Security Administration Logistics Center – Inventory Management 		2013
OIG-16-134 We sought to determine whether the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has an intelligence-driven, risk-based security strategy that informs security and resource decisions across all transportation modes.

>Transportation Security Administration Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy 		2016
OIG-13-123 The Office of Inspection in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducts inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of TSA's operations and administrative activities, and to identify vulnerabilities in TSA security systems. Additionally, the office carries out internal investigations of theTSA workforce to ensure its integrity. We conducted an audit of this office to determine whether it is efficient and effective in its efforts to enhance transportation security. The Office of Inspection did not operate efficiently. Specifically, the office did not use its staff and resources efficiently to conduct ost ‐ effective inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing. The office employed personnel classified as “criminal investigators,” even though their primary duties may not have been criminal investigations as required by Federal law and regulations.

>Transportation Security Administration Office of Inspection’s Efforts To Enhance Transportation Security 		2013
OIG-09-97  

>Transportation Security Administration Privacy Stewardship 		2009
OIG-04-47 Transportation Security Administration Review of the TSA Passenger and Baggage Screening Pilot Program, September 2004 2004
OIG-08-67 Transportation Security Administration Single Source (noncompetitive) Procurements 2008
OIG-10-72  

>Transportation Security Administration's Acquisition of Support Services Contracts 		2010
OIG-06-23 Transportation Security Administration's Information Technology Managed Services Contract 2006
OIG-17-69 KPMG LLP, under contract DHS OIG, audited the Transportation Security Administration’s financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses 15 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in a number of processes, including personnel actions; property, plant, and equipment; Time and Attendance Process and Financial Disclosure Forms; and the Accounts Receivable Estimate.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>Transportation Security Administration's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-15-56 KPMG LLP reviewed the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) internal control over financial reporting. The management letter contains 15 observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s considerations. KPMG LLP noted deficiencies and the need for improvements in certain TSA processes. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2014, included in DHS’ fiscal year 2014 Agency Financial Report. These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies.

>Transportation Security Administration's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements Audit 		2015
OIG-11-58  

>Transportation Security Administration's Management Letter for FY 2010 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2011
OIG-14-79 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of the DHS’ FY 2013 financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG is responsible for the attached management letter dated January 15, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it.

>Transportation Security Administration's Management Letter for FY 2013 DHS Financial Statements Audit 		2014
OIG-15-118 This audit is a follow-up to a 2007 Inspector General audit (OIG-07-5) of Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Program. Our objective was to determine whether TSA effectively and efficiently processed and managed workers’ compensation claims. TSA was responsive to our 2007 report recommendations and implemented internal controls across its workers’ compensation program. For example, TSA developed and implemented comprehensive policies and procedures for the submission and management of workers’ compensation claims. TSA also increased the number of workers’ compensation staff and implemented a strategy to address long-term, high-cost claims. Although TSA has made progress in addressing our prior report recommendations, we noted some additional concerns. Specifically, TSA used similar but separate functions for processing workers’ compensation claims without demonstrating increased effectiveness or efficiency in the processing or management of those claims. We also noted that TSA’s process for reviewing the accuracy of Department of Labor’s charges billed to TSA was not formally documented in its workers’ compensation policy.

>Transportation Security Administration's Management of Its Federal Employees' Compensation Act Program 		2015
OIG-11-05 Transportation Security Administration's Management of Its Screening Workforce Training Program Can Be Improved 2011
OIG-07-57 Transportation Security Administration's Oversight of Passenger Aircraft Cargo Security Faces 2007
OIG-05-52 Transportation Security Administration's Procedures For Law Enforcement Officers Carrying Weapons On Board Commercial Aircraft (Unclassified Summary) 2005
OIG-05-51 Transportation Security Administration's Revised Security Procedures 2005
OIG-12-38  

>Transportation Security Administration's Use of Back Scatter Units 		2012
OIG-13-42 TSA reported that 446 airports currently are responsible for issuing badges to employees for access to secured areas of the airports. As of August 27, 2012, TSA reported that approximately 3.7 million badged employees had access to secured areas within the Nation’s airports. The badge vetting process is initiated when the airport transfers an applicant’s biographical and fingerprint information to a Designated Aviation Channeler (DAC), referred to in our report as a vendor. The vendor ensures that the information is properly formatted and complete before relaying the information to TSA for vetting against Federal criminal and immigration databases. Appendix C provides more details about the Aviation Channeling Services Provider (ACSP) process.

>Transportation Security Administration’s Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project 		2013
OIG-08-92 Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards (Redacted) 2008
OIG-13-120 TSA began deploying advanced imaging technology in 2007 and accelerated its deployment after the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009. In 2012, Representative John Mica requested that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether TSA is effectively deploying advanced imaging technology and is fully utilizing the equipment at airports. TSA created and followed deployment schedules. However, it did not develop a comprehensive deployment strategy to ensure all advanced imaging technology units were effectively deployed and fully used for screening passengers.

>Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology (Revised) 		2014
OIG-12-80  

>Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts To Identify and Track Security Breaches at Our Nation’s Airports 		2012
OIG-08-62 Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Proactively Address Employee Concerns 2008
OIG-13-79 We have audited the balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) as of September 30, 2012 and the related statements of net cost, changes in net position and custodial activity, and combined statement of budgetary resources for the year then ended (referred to herein as the fiscal year (FY) 2012 financial statements”). The objective of our audit was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these financial statements. We were also ngaged to examine the Department’s internal control over financial reporting of the FY 2012 financial statements, based on the criteria established in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix A.

>Transportation Security Administration’s Management Letter for FY 2012 DHS Consolidated Financial Statements Audit 		2013

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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