Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number	Title Sort ascending	Issue Date	Fiscal Year
OIG-05-45	A Review of DHS' Responsibilities For Juvenile Aliens	09/01/2005	2005
OIG-07-40	A Review of CBP and ICE Responses to Recent Incidents of Chinese Human Smuggling in Maritime Cargo Containers (Redacted)	04/23/2007	2007
OIG-04-08	A Review of Background Checks for Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports, January 2004 (	01/01/2004	2004
OIG-06-32	A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina	03/31/2006	2006
OIG-19-57	A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations	07/31/2019	2019
OIG-07-67	A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process	08/16/2007	2007
OIG-16-64	We conducted this review of the Secret Service as part of an overall review of the Secret Service’s presidential protective function to determine whether in three incidents the Secret Service followed its own protective policies, what actions were taken to correct identified deficiencies, and whether these corrections are adequate. >2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident (Redacted)	04/12/2016	2016
OIG-09-16	>2007 Debris Removal Pilot Program and Initiatives	01/15/2009	2009
OIG-07-27	110'/123' Maritime Patrol Boat Modernization Project, United States Coast Guard	02/09/2007	2007
OIG-14-142	The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for protecting the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. As part of its mission, TSA screens checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any prohibited items, such as explosives and incendiaries, onboard passenger commercial aircraft. TSA primarily relies on its screening workforce and two types of equipment to screen checked baggage - explosives detection systems and explosives trace detection. Through covert testing conducted at domestic airports, we determined whether Transportation Security Officers were following established policies and procedures to prevent threat items from being placed onto commercial aircraft. We also determined the operational effectiveness of TSA's checked baggage screening technology. We identified vulnerabilities in this area caused by human and technology-based failures. >(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations	09/16/2014	2014
OIG-22-61	(U) Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening	08/18/2022	2022
OIG-12-06	(U) TSA Penetration Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology	11/07/2011	2012
OIG-18-89-UNSUM	We conducted our review of the Science and Technology’s (S&T) insider threat program between January 2017 and June 2017. S&T is the primary research arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its mission is to strengthen the Nation’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative solutions to support DHS mission operations. Specifically, Congress created S&T in 2003 to conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of the Department. S&T oversees laboratories where scientists perform mission-critical research on chemical and biological threats, radiological and nuclear detection, animal diseases, transportation security, and explosives trace identification. S&T employees, contractors, and business partners—especially those with special or elevated privileges—can potentially use their inside knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to mission-critical systems and operations. We made nine recommendations that, if implemented, should strengthen S&T’s management of insider threat risks. The Department concurred with all of the recommendations. >(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain	09/28/2018	2018
OIG-14-135	We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. Pursuant to the Federal Information Security anagement Act, we reviewed the Department’s security program including its policies, procedures, and system security controls for enterprise-wide intelligence systems. In doing so, we assessed the Department’s continuous monitoring, configuration management, identity and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, remote access, contingency planning, contractor systems and security capital planning. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has migrated the Coast Guard Intelligence Support System into a new system that is supported by DHS, the Defense ntelligence Agency and USCG. >(U) Review of DHS' Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2014	09/09/2014	2014
OIG-06-58	(U) Office of Inspector General Laptop Computers are Susceptible to Compromise (Unclassified and Redacted)	08/08/2006	2006
OIG-13-21	Since our fiscal year 2011 evaluation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has improved its oversight of Department-wide systems and established programs to monitor ongoing security practices. I&A has developed and implemented a training program to educate DHS’ growing number of personnel assigned security duties on intelligence systems. In addition, progress has been made in collaboration with other DHS components in centralizing the planning and prioritization of security weakness remediation, streamlining system configuration management, and maintaining a current systems inventory. However, we identified deficiencies at the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in system authorizations and specialized training and incident response, contingency planning, and security capital planning at the United States Secret Service (USSS). >(U) Further Development and Reinforcement of Department Policies Can Strengthen DHS' Intelligence Systems Security Program	01/10/2013	2013
OIG-14-27	We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act, we reviewed the Department’s security program including its policies, procedures, and system security controls for enterprise-wide intelligence systems. In doing so, we assessed the Department’s continuous monitoring, configuration management, identity and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, contingency planning, and security capital planning. As of May 2012, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) authorizing official assumed oversight for USCG's shore-side intelligence systems from Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). USCG is migrating portions of its Coast Guard Intelligence Support System to a multi-authorizing official structure including DHS, USCG, and Defense Intelligence Agency. >(U) Evaluation of DHS' Intelligence Systems Compliance with FISMA Requirements for FY13	01/27/2014	2014
OIG-23-30	(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2022	06/26/2023	2023
OIG-22-60	(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021	08/18/2022	2022
OIG-19-34-UNSUM	We determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems is effective this year as the Department achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems. However, we identified deficiencies in DHS’ overall patch management process and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s weakness remediation and security awareness training activities. We made one recommendation to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and two recommendations to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to address the deficiencies identified. DHS concurred with all three recommendations. >(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018	03/21/2019	2019
OIG-11-24	>(U) DHS Has Made Improvements on the Security Program for Its Intelligence Systems	01/06/2011	2011
OIG-12-26	>(U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas	01/06/2012	2012
OIG-17-58-UNSUM	Since our fiscal year 2015 evaluation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has continued to provide effective oversight of DHS’ department-wide intelligence system and implemented programs for ongoing monitoring of its security practices. In addition, I&A has relocated its intelligence system to a DHS data center to improve network resiliency and support. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has migrated its sites that process Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information to a Defense Intelligence Agency owned system. However, USCG must continue to work with the Defense Intelligence Agency to clearly define the oversight responsibilities for this external system that supports its intelligence operations. We identified deficiencies in DHS’ information security program and are making two recommendations to I&A and three recommendations to USCG. I&A concurred with its two recommendations, while USCG non-concurred with its three recommendations. We conducted this review between May and September 2016. >(U) Annual Evaluation of DHS' INFOSEC Program (Intel Systems - DHS Intelligence and Analysis) for FY 2016	05/09/2017	2017
OIG-12-02	(U) Additional Department Oversight Can Improve DHS' Intelligence Systems Security Program	10/19/2011	2012
OIG-10-107	> Recommendations to Improve the USCG's System for Adjudicating Suspension and Revocation Matters	08/13/2010	2010
OIG-12-93	> Progress Has Been Made in Securing Laptops and Wireless Networks at FEMA	06/27/2012	2012
OIG-10-38	> Management and Oversight of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of International Affairs Internal Controls for Acquisitions and Employee Integrity Processes	01/25/2010	2010
OIG-14-17	A secure homeland is envisioned as a Nation that is safely protected from terrorism, as well as other manmade and natural hazards, but is also able to respond resiliently if necessary. DHS’ FY 2013 budget, including supplemental funding for Hurricane Sandy, was about $72 billion. > Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security	12/11/2013	2014
OIG-17-48-D	We determined that the Iron County Forestry and Parks Department’s (Department) accounting policies, procedures, and business practices are adequate to account for grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. However, the Department needs to revise its procurement policies and procedures to comply fully with all Federal procurement standards. If the Department makes these revisions and follows them, FEMA should have reasonable assurance that (1) small and minority businesses, women’s business enterprises, and labor surplus area firms will receive sufficient opportunities to compete for federally funded work; (2) the risk of misinterpretations and disputes relating to contracts will be minimized; and (3) contracts are awarded to individuals, companies, or recipients who do not pose a business risk to the government. Department officials acknowledged that they had improperly procured their contracts, but said they plan to seek FEMA reimbursement for the $72,235 in disaster-related contract costs they had incurred. We recommended that FEMA not fund $72,235 of ineligible contract costs and direct the Wisconsin Emergency Management Agency to provide additional technical assistance and monitoring to the Department to ensure it complies with applicable Federal procurement standards and to prevent the improper spending of approximately $3.2 million in estimated disaster work. FEMA concurred with all of our findings and recommendations. > Iron County Forestry and Parks Department, Wisconsin, Needs Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant	03/20/2017	2017
OIG-08-43	Independent Review of The U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Performance Summary	04/18/2008	2008
OIG-06-27	Independent Review of The U.S. Coast Guard's Reporting of FY 2005, Drug Control Funds	03/20/2006	2006
OIG-12-105	> Costs Invoiced by the City of Phoenix for Checked Baggage Screening Projects at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport	07/30/2012	2012
OIG-ISP-01-03	A Review of the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program	09/01/2003	2003
OIG-11-85	> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Privacy Stewardship	05/24/2011	2011
OIG-09-35	> Transportation Security Administration's Known Shipper Program (Redacted)	03/05/2009	2009
OIG-09-41	> Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Tracking and Transfer of Detainees	03/17/2009	2009
OIG-10-105	> Funding Plan for the United States Coast Guard Museum	08/03/2010	2010
OIG-11-40	> FEMA's Oversight and Management of Debris Removal Operation	02/23/2011	2011
OIG-09-31	> FEMA's Implementations of Best Practices in the Acquisition Process	02/19/2009	2009
OIG-11-92	> Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection’s Bonding Process	06/27/2011	2011
OIG-09-60	> DHS' Progress in Disaster Recovery Planning for Information Systems	04/16/2009	2009

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