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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-20-40 Two years since enactment, DHS and its components have mostly complied with SAVE Act requirements.  The SAVE Act requires the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), as delegated by DHS, to collect and review components’ vehicle use data, including their analyses of the data and plans for achieving the right types and sizes of vehicles to meet mission needs.  Most components developed their plans as required.  However, only two of the 12 components we reviewed fully met requirements to analyze and document vehicle use and cost data to help them achieve the right type and size of fleet vehicles to meet their missions.  This occurred because DHS did not require components to include data analyses in their OCRSO-reviewed submissions, as mandated by the SAVE Act.  Had ORSCO thoroughly evaluated component submissions, it would have identified that components did not fully comply with SAVE Act requirements.  DHS concurred with all four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the Department’s oversight over its vehicle fleets. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management 		2020
OIG-20-62 Since 2017, DHS has continued to make progress in meeting its Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) reporting requirements, but challenges remain.  To enable more effective tracking of Federal spending, DHS must continue to take action to accurately align its budgetary data with the President’s budget, reduce award misalignments across DATA Act files, improve the timeliness of financial assistance reporting, implement and use government-wide data standards, and address risks to data quality.  Without these actions, DHS will continue to experience challenges in meeting its goal of achieving the highest possible data quality for submission to USAspending.gov.  We made five recommendations to help strengthen DHS’ controls for ensuring complete, accurate, and timely spending data.  The Department concurred with all five recommendations. 

>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain 		2020
OIG-23-07 DHS Has Made Progress in Fulfilling Geospatial Data Act Responsibilities, But Additional Work is Needed 2023
OIG-21-38 We determined DHS had not yet strengthened its cybersecurity posture by implementing a Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program.  DHS spent more than $180 million between 2013 and 2020 to design and deploy a department-wide continuous monitoring solution but faced setbacks.  DHS initially planned to deploy its internal CDM solution by 2017 using a “One DHS” approach that restricted components to a standard set of common tools.  We attributed DHS’ limited progress to an unsuccessful initial implementation strategy, significant changes to its deployment approach, and continuing issues with component data collection and integration.  As of March 2020, DHS had developed a key element of the program, its internal CDM dashboard.  However, the dashboard contained less than half of the required asset management data.  As a result, the Department cannot leverage intended benefits of the dashboard to manage, prioritize, and respond to cyber risks in real time.  Finally, we identified vulnerabilities on CDM servers and databases.  This occurred because DHS did not clearly define patch management responsibilities and had not yet implemented required configuration settings.  Consequently, databases and servers could be vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, and the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data could be at risk.  We made three recommendations for DHS to update its program plan, address vulnerabilities, and define patch management responsibilities

>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program 		2021
OIG-20-43 DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities.  This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability.  We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities.  The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.      

>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems 		2020
OIG-22-53 DHS Has Controls to Safeguard Watchlist Data. 2022
OIG-24-24 DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees 2024
OIG-21-31 Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities 		2021
OIG-11-93  

>DHS Grants Used for Mitigating Risks to Amtrak Rail Stations (Redacted) 		2011
OIG-21-17 Based on our review of 45 judgmentally sampled awards (15 non-competitive grants and 30 other than full and open competition [OTFOC] contracts), we found DHS complied with applicable laws and regulations.  We made two recommendations to help improve DHS’ procedures and ensure future reporting submissions are accurate.  The Department concurred with the two recommendations.  

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019 		2021
OIG-18-82 Department of Homeland Security shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2017, to the DHS Office of Inspector General listing all grants and contracts awarded by other than full and open competition (OTFOC) during fiscal years 2016 and 2017. We contracted with Williams, Adley & Company-DC, LLC to review the OTFOC report and assess DHS compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.  Williams Adley concluded that DHS complied with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies governing grants and contracts awarded by OTFOC in FY 2017. During that year, DHS awarded 62 noncompetitive grants worth about $140 million and 121 noncompetitive contracts worth about $118 million through OTFOC. The independent auditors determined that DHS’ Report on OTFOC for FY 2017 as well as the information related to these grants and contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation and USASpending.gov were accurate. The auditors also found that DHS followed written policies and procedures and the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 when awarding grants and contracts

noncompetitively.

>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2017 		2018
OIG-23-15 DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition Fiscal Year 2022 2023
OIG-24-19 DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded by Any Means Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2023 2024
OIG-11-10 DHS Financial Assistance to the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and Its Affiliates 2011
OIG-20-73 DHS has not fulfilled most of the 13 responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act.  To comply with one responsibility, DHS has a Geospatial Information Officer and a dedicated Geospatial Management Office whose duties include overseeing the Act’s implementation and to coordinate with other agencies.  However, DHS has only partially met, or not met, the remaining 12 responsibilities in the Act.  DHS’ lack of progress in complying with the responsibilities outlined in the Act can be attributed to multiple external and internal factors.  External factors include the need for additional guidance from the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Office of Management and Budget to properly interpret and implement certain responsibilities.  Internal factors include competing priorities that diverted resources away from fulfilling the Act’s 13 responsibilities.  We made three recommendations that focus on increasing the resources necessary to comply with DHS’ 13 responsibilities under the Act.  The Department concurred with all three recommendations.

>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 		2020
OIG-22-64 DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (REDACTED) 2022
OIG-09-53  

>DHS Efforts to Address Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of Top Officials Exercises 		2009
OIG-17-09 We determined that the Department’s oversight of its drug interdiction efforts did not align with the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy.  .  This occurred because DHS lacks formal oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure its drug interdiction performance activities met both ONDCP and legislative requirements.  As a result, DHS could not ensure its drug interdiction efforts met required national drug control outcomes nor accurately assess the impact of the approximately $4.2 billion it spends annually on drug control activities.  We made two recommendations that, if implemented, will improve DHS’ drug interdiction efforts.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement 		2017
OIG-16-95 The Department of Homeland Security has a substantial number of employees who travel and work abroad. Off-duty misconduct can undermine the Department’s credibility and integrity and hinder its ability to achieve its mission. Our objective was to determine whether DHS has adequate policies and training governing off-duty conduct while abroad.

>DHS Does Not Have Comprehensive Policies or Training for Off-duty Conduct of Employees Traveling and Working Abroad 		2016
OIG-23-47 DHS Does Not Have Assurance That All Migrants Can be Located Once Released into the United States (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-14-126 In fiscal year 2012, Federal agency fleets consisted of more than 650,000 motor vehicles around the world. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had the second largest civilian motor vehicle fleet in the Federal Government, owning or leasing about 56,000 vehicles, with reported annual operating costs of about $534 million. Our audit objective was to determine whether, for fiscal year 2012, DHS met requirements to right-size its motor vehicle fleet composition, eliminate underused vehicles, and acquire vehicles that reduce petroleum use and greenhouse gas emissions.

>DHS Does Not Adequately Manage or Have Enforcement Authority Over Its Components' Vehicle Fleet Operations 		2014
OIG-21-66 DHS did not fully comply with the public law.  TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020.  Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant.  We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP.  DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.

>DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2021
OIG-21-69 TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities.  These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems.  DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds.  However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance.  In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters.  DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system.  As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.  We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition.  DHS concurred with all three recommendations.  

>DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems 		2021
OIG-23-05 DHS Did Not Consistently Comply with National Instant Criminal Background Check System Requirements 2023
OIG-23-04 DHS Did Not Always Promptly Revoke PIV Card Access and Withdraw Security Clearances for Separated Individuals 2023
OIG-22-54 DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome 2022
OIG-11-100  

>DHS Detainee Removals and Reliance on Assurances 		2011
OIG-11-47  

>DHS Department-wide Management of Detection Equipment 		2011
OIG-22-49 DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism 2022
OIG-10-41  

>DHS Controls Over Firearms  		2010
OIG-10-10 DHS Contracts With Low Wage Payments  2010
OIG-13-36 The Department obligated about $389 million for noncompetitive contracts during fiscal year 2012. Our review of 40 contract files with a reported value of more than $174 million showed that, compared with previous reviews of noncompetitive contracts awarded during fiscal years 2008 through 2011, the Department continued to improve its management oversight of acquisition personnel’s compliance with policies and procedures. However, these personnel did not always document their consideration of vendors’ past performance when researching background on eligible contractors. As a result, the Department cannot be assured that acquisition personnel always awarded government contracts to eligible and qualified vendors as required.

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2012 		2013
OIG-12-37  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2011 		2012
OIG-11-41  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2010 		2011
OIG-10-55  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2009 		2010
OIG-10-71  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2008 		2010
OIG-09-94  

>DHS Contracts Awarded Through Other Than Full and Open Competition During Fiscal Year 2007 		2009
OIG-15-59 On January 17, 2014, Congress enacted Public Law 113-76, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. According to Section 520 (a), the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2014, to the Office of Inspector General, listing all grants and contracts awarded by any means other than full and open competition during fiscal year (FY) 2014. As required, we reviewed the report and assessed departmental compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures. In FY 2014, DHS awarded 399 noncompetitive contracts worth about $306 million. This represents a continuing decrease of more than $3 billion obligated through noncompetitive contracts over a 6-year period. We reconciled the entire FY 2014 contract listing against the Federal Procurement Data System and found that the data between the two lists were 99.8 percent identical. Also in FY 2014, DHS awarded 66 noncompetitive grants worth about $126 million. Although three noncompetitive grants worth approximately $3.2 million did not meet accuracy, timeliness, or completeness standards, approximately 95.5 percent did meet the requirements as set forth in the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006.

>DHS Contracts and Grants Awarded through Other than Full and Open Competition, FY 2014 		2015
OIG-16-58 On March 4, 2015, Congress enacted Public Law 114–4, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015. According to Section 518(a), the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2015, to the Office o Inspector General, listing all grants and contracts awarded by any means other than full and open competition during fiscal year (FY) 2015. As required, we reviewed the report and assessed departmental compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.

>DHS Contracts and Grants Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2015 		2016
OIG-22-04 DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain 2022
OIG-11-116  

>DHS Continues to Face Challenges in the Implementation of Its OneNet Project 		2011
OIG-20-09 DHS developed a strategy to apply 29 lessons learned from prior system updates to the current Financial Systems Modernization (FSM) TRIO program. Since DHS’ actions provides a positive outlook on the future progress of the FSM TRIO project we made no recommendations for improvement.  The report’s limited objective and scope does not provide a complete assessment DHS’ efforts to incorporate lessons learned into their recently reinvigorated FSM efforts. 

>DHS Confirmed It Has Applied Lessons Learned in the Latest Financial System Modernization Effort 		2020
OIG-10-19 DHS Conference Spending Practices and Oversight 2010
OIG-14-82 According to DHS, during fiscal year 2012, DHS components hosted or sponsored 35 conferences exceeding $100,000 at atotal cost of$7.5 million. We conducted this audit as a follow-on to our prior report DHS' Policies and Procedures Over Conferences, OIG-13-96, to determine whether the DHS conference spending was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary. The amount DHS spent on conferences was appropriate, reasonable, and necessary in most instances. Conference packages submitted for approval stated the purpose of the conference. In addition, the conference agenda reflected appropriate content and encompassed full working days for the attendees. In many instances, the components made an effort to reduce conference costs by limiting the number of attendees and selecting a location within the local area.

>DHS Conference Spending 		2014
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-23-35 DHS Components Did Not Always Adhere to Internal Control Policies and Procedures for Ensuring That Bankcard Program Spending Limits Are Established Based on Procurement Needs 2023
OIG-22-67 DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited 2022
OIG-04-31 DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information, August 2004 2004
OIG-20-80 DHS has not effectively managed and coordinated Department resources for its Joint Task Forces (JTFs).  Specifically, DHS has not maintained oversight authority through changes in leadership, implemented and updated policies and procedures, identified optimal JTF staffing levels and resources, and established a process to capture total allocated costs associated with JTFs.  In addition, DHS has not fully complied with public law requirements to report to Congress on JTFs’ cost and impact, establish outcome-based performance metrics, and establish and maintain a joint duty training program.  We recommended the DHS Secretary designate a department-level office to manage and oversee JTFs and address public law requirements.  We made seven recommendations to improve DHS’ management and oversight of its JTFs and ensure compliance with legislative requirements.  DHS provided a management response, but declined to comment, since the Acting Secretary is currently reviewing the status and future of the JTFs

>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces 		2020
OIG-13-95 The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), which is primarily responsible for fulfilling DHS security missions, assumed this responsibility for the Department. Subsequent to the President’s issuance of Executive Order 13618 in July 2012, NPPD’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications was reorganized in an effort to promote security, resiliency, and reliability of the Nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure.

>DHS Can Take Actions To Address Its Additional Cybersecurity Responsibilities 		2013

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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