Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number	Title	Issue Date Sort descending	Fiscal Year
OIG-16-34	The mission of CBP’s Special Operations Group (SOG) is to train, organize, equip, resource, and deploy tactical and emergency response personnel worldwide to protect America. Based in El Paso, Texas, SOG plans, coordinates, and executes national, regional, and international level operations. We reviewed the SOG program to determine its cost and effectiveness. We determined that CBP does not have formal performance measures for its SOG program and does not track SOG’s total program cost. The incomplete records of SOG and other components of CBP that support SOG limited the determination of the SOG program’s total cost. SOG program efficiency and effectiveness cannot be accurately determined without total program costs or formal performance measures. As a result, CBP may be missing opportunities to improve effectiveness and identify potential cost savings in the SOG program. >CBP's Special Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness are Unknown	01/29/2016	2016
OIG-16-37	To sustain border security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has established permanent facilities in forward or remote locations, called Forward Operating Bases. We determined whether Forward Operating Bases provide adequate living conditions, security, and safety for employees. Of the seven Forward Operating Bases we inspected along the southwest border, six have adequate living conditions. One Forward Operating Base has security issues, safety and health concerns, and inadequate living conditions. At the other six Forward Operating Bases, we identified security issues, such as inoperable security cameras, as well as an ongoing challenge to provide safe drinking water. In addition, we determined that CBP is not performing all required Forward Operating Base inspections or adequately documenting maintenance and repairs. Without regular inspections and timely maintenance and repairs, CBP cannot ensure it will continue to provide adequate security, safety, and living conditions for its personnel working at these remote facilities. >Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border (Redacted)	02/08/2016	2016
OIG-16-54	In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, CBP’s financial position as of September 30, 2015. The report identifies four significant deficiencies in internal control, two of which are considered material weaknesses. The material weaknesses are in drawback of duties, taxes, and fees and information technology. The two other significant deficiencies were in internal control in the entry process and entity-level controls. >Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements	03/21/2016	2016
OIG-16-51	We conducted this review to determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) regulations. The DHS PREA regulations set standards for CBP to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault. The regulations also require CBP to complete audits of holding facilities that “house detainees overnight” by July 2018. Since DHS issued its PREA regulations, CBP has taken measures, including issuing its zero-tolerance policy and designating a full-time Prevention of Sexual Assault Coordinator, to ensure its offices, stakeholders, and managers are aware of CBP’s roles and responsibilities. However, CBP’s implementation actions lack adequate planning, a budget, a component-wide policy to coordinate the efforts of all offices and personnel, and criteria to determine which facilities should be defined as overnight facilities and therefore subject to audits. Further, at the time of our review, CBP had not determined the feasibility of securing a joint PREA audit contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These problems may hinder CBP’s implementation of the DHS PREA regulations and ultimately, its ability to meet PREA’s goal to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual abuse and assault. >CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations	03/31/2016	2016
OIG-16-75	U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Internal Affairs (IA) has oversight authority for all aspects of CBP operations, personnel, and facilities to ensure compliance with all CBP-wide programs and policies relating to corruption, misconduct, or mismanagement. From October 1, 2010, through March 12, 2015, CBP received 11,367 allegations of misconduct by its employees. IA investigated 6,524 of those allegations, of which 819 were classified as criminal. >CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing	04/29/2016	2016
OIG-16-68	Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report. >Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2015 U.S. Customs and Border Protection	05/11/2016	2016
OIG-16-90	KPMG LLP, under contract with the DHS Office of Inspector General, audited the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal year (FY) 2015. The resulting management letter contains 16 observations related to internal controls and other operational matters for management’s consideration. KPMG LLP noted internal control deficiencies and the need for improvement in several processes including control over settlement assets; the trade compliance measurement review process; review of Federal Employee Compensation Act Claims; controls in the seized and forfeited property inventory process; and reviews over the Performance and Accountability Report. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements, dated March 21, 2016.These observations are intended to improve internal control or result in other operating efficiencies. >Management Letter for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit	05/13/2016	2016
OIG-12-84	Free and Secure Trade Program – Continued Driver Eligibility	05/21/2016	2012
OIG-16-123	In response to a request from Senator Tom Coburn, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Professional Responsibility’s (OPR) actions to determine whether its collection, storage, and sharing of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) violated the Privacy Act of 1974 or Department policies. We also sought to determine whether CBP OPR’s policies and training for protecting sensitive PII are adequate. >CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices	08/29/2016	2016
OIG-17-29	CBP’s management prepared the Table of FY 2016 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP’s Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the underlying assumptions used to calculate Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2016 Drug Control Obligations. As a result, KPMG was unable to complete its review procedures over those assumptions. Except as noted above, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the ONDCP Circular. >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Detailed Accounting Submission	02/01/2017	2017
OIG-17-36	KPMG, LLC expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on CBP’s FY 2016 consolidated financial statements. However, KPMG identified five significant deficiencies in internal control, three of which KPMG considers material weaknesses in the areas of information technology controls and financial systems functionality; financial reporting; and refunds and drawbacks of duties, taxes, and fees. The two other significant deficiencies in internal control are related to entity-level controls and custodial revenue - entry process. KPMG made 18 recommendations to improve these areas. >Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements	02/06/2017	2017
OIG-17-28	CBP’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. Based on its review, nothing came to KPMG’s attention that caused it to believe that CBP’s FY 2016 Performance Summary Report is not presented in conformity with the criteria in ONDCP’s Circular. KPMG did not make any recommendations as a result of its review. >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	02/07/2017	2017
OIG-17-39	We determined that CBP likely did not act in direct response to the Sandia report, but it has instituted many border security programs and operations that align with the report’s recommendations. However, our review and analysis of these reports also highlighted some continuing challenges to CBP in its efforts to secure the southwest border. In particular, CBP does not measure the effectiveness of its programs and operations well; therefore, it continues to invest in programs and act without the benefit of the feedback needed to help ensure it uses resources wisely and improves border security. CBP also faces program management challenges in planning, resource allocation, infrastructure and technology acquisition, and overall efficiency. Finally, coordination and communication with both internal and external stakeholders could be improved. This final report does not contain recommendations. >CBP’s Border Security Efforts – An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of Entry	02/27/2017	2017
OIG-17-55	KPMG, LLP determined that CBP made improvements by designing and implementing certain account management, audit logging, and configuration management controls. However, KPMG continued to identify financial system functionality and general information technology control deficiencies related to access controls and configuration management for CBP’s core financial, feeder, and General Support Systems environments. The deficiencies collectively limited CBP’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We recommend that CBP, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to CBP’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program. >Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit	05/15/2017	2017
OIG-17-60	We determined that CBP has made improvements to and continues to develop, its ethics and integrity training for officers and agents. The agency tracks training completion using various methods and evaluation tools to measure and assess training effectiveness. As a result, CBP has created, expanded, and redesigned training courses to promote ethics and integrity at the Advanced Training Center, the academies, and in the field. However, CBP has not effectively communicated or conducted follow up with the field on its overall integrity strategy. As a result, CBP cannot fully accomplish this important strategy. We recommended CBP create a repository for the field offices to maintain and share unique field-developed training, highlight the importance of CBP’s integrity strategy throughout the agency and follow up with field staff to ensure it is effectively communicated. We made two recommendations and CBP concurred with our recommendations, and prior to issuance of the final report took action to close recommendation 2. >CBP Continues to Improve its Ethics and Integrity Training, but Further Improvements are Needed	05/31/2017	2017
OIG-17-70-SR	We determined that FEMA did not implement our recommendations and suspended improvements on existing information technology systems. We recommended that FEMA include an enterprise solution in its Grants Management Modernization platform for tracking applicant compliance with the Public Assistance Program insurance requirements that are a condition of receiving a disaster assistance grant. We made five recommendations and FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations. >Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border	06/12/2017	2017
OIG-17-90	KPMG, under contract with DHS OIG, audited Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fiscal year (FY) 2016 consolidated financial statements. The resulting management letter discusses 12 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration. The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in a number of processes, including deobligation of undelivered orders, review of Federal Employee Compensation Act claims, and the seized and forfeited property inventory. These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements, dated January 18, 2017, included in CBP’s FY 2016 Performance and Accountability Report. >Management Letter for U.S Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit	06/30/2017	2017
OIG-17-99-MA	We found that CBP administered polygraph examinations to unsuitable applicants who provided disqualifying information during the pre-test interview. This occurred because CBP’s process is not sufficient to prevent unsuitable applicants from continuing the polygraph examination. We made two recommendations to CBP to improve its screening by establishing an in-person pre-security interview process, requiring examiners to use the on-call adjudication process, and discontinue testing of unsuitable applicants. CBP concurred with both recommendations and agreed that conducting the in-person pre-security interview prior to the polygraph examination is a best practice. CBP has implemented one of the recommendations and has initiated a pilot program for a new polygraph format. >Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants (OIG-17-99-MA)	08/04/2017	2017
OIG-17-103-MA	We determined that two DHS Components – CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details and staffed them without clear legal authority. We made two recommendations to the DHS secretary to direct CBP and ICE to (1) discontinue security details pending a legal review by the DHS General Counsel and (2) develop directive regarding the scope and circumstances when a security detail is permitted for DHS component heads including the requirements for departmental level authorization; pending the results of the legal review. >Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns (OIG-17-103-MA)	09/14/2017	2017
OIG-17-114	We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country. The slow performance of a critical system used for pre-screening travelers reduced Office of Field Operations officers’ ability to identify any passengers who may pose concerns, including national security threats. Further, incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports was hampered by system outages that created passenger delays and public safety risks. IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations border security activities between ports of entry. Poor systems performance and network instability resulted in processing backlogs and agents’ inability to meet deadlines for submitting potential criminal alien prosecution cases. Also, network outages hindered air and marine surveillance operations, reducing the situational awareness needed to detect inadmissible aliens and cargo approaching U.S. borders. CBP has not yet addressed these long-standing IT systems and infrastructure challenges, due in part to ongoing budget constraints. We recommended that CBP take steps to address passenger screening and border security IT systems and infrastructure challenges. We made seven recommendations and CBP concurred with all seven of our recommendations. >CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations	09/28/2017	2017
OIG-17-115-MA	We conducted unannounced inspections of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) immigration holding facilities to determine if conditions are adequate, the quality of care provided is reasonable, and standards outlined in CBP’s National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search are being met. During these inspections, we identified physical security issues that pose a potential threat to Border Patrol agents, assets, and operations at Border Patrol stations. We also identified security issues related to cameras and access at other Border Patrol stations. As a result, we are recommending that CBP promptly address the physical security issues, ensure cameras are operable, and facility access is secure. >Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector (Redacted)	09/29/2017	2017
OIG-18-18	CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption. >Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509	11/16/2017	2018
OIG-18-19	Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017 (Redacted)	11/21/2017	2018
OIG-18-37	Following news reports that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel implementing Executive Order#13769 (EO) “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”(January 27, 2017) potentially violated the civil rights of individual travelers, we received a congressional request to investigate DHS’s implementation of the EO. In response, we investigated how DHS and CBP, the DHS entity primarily responsible for implementation of the EO, responded to challenges presented by the EO, including the consequence of court orders and CBP’s compliance with them. In our investigation, we found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which categories of travelers were affected by the EO. We found that the bulk of travelers affected by the EO who arrived in the United States, particularly LPRs, received national interest waivers. In addition, we observed that the lack of a public or congressional relations strategy significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image. >DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017) (Redacted)	01/18/2018	2018
OIG-18-47	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. This Performance Summary Report contains the performance measures aligned to drug control decision units as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular: Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The drug control decision units are as follows: (1) Salaries and Expenses, (2) Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement and (3) Border Security Fence, Infrastructure and Technology. >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	01/30/2018	2018
OIG-18-48	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit to the ONDCP Director, not later than February 1 of each year, a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during FY 2017. There are six program offices within CBP that are tasked with drug-control responsibilities: the United States Border Patrol (USBP), the Offices of Field Operations (OFO), Information and Technology (OIT), Training and Development (OTD), Acquisition (OA), and Air and Marine (AMO)). >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds	01/30/2018	2018
OIG-18-68	Although CBP had controls over its polygraph examination process, a key control over its review and approval process was not always operating as intended. Specifically, the polygraph quality control program may not have always conducted independent and objective reviews (blind reviews) of polygraph examination results, as required. We also determined that 96 percent of the complaints we reviewed were unfounded or ambiguous. Nevertheless, CBP did not have a formal complaint review process, which led to inconsistent and subjective reviews. This approach risks not finding or properly addressing issues contained in the complaints. >Most Complaints about CBP's Polygraph Program Are Ambiguous or Unfounded	07/26/2018	2018
OIG-18-76	We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased. >Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers	09/07/2018	2018
OIG-18-80	In 2017, CBP made considerable progress developing and implementing a biometric capability to track air passenger exits using facial recognition technology. CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program conducted a pilot at nine airports and demonstrated ability using this technology to match 98 percent of passengers’ identities at departure gates. However, During the pilot, CBP encountered various technical and operational challenges that limited biometric confirmation to only 85 percent of all passengers processed. These challenges included poor network availability, a lack of dedicated staff, and compressed boarding times due to flight delays. Further, due to missing or poor quality digital images, CBP could not consistently match individuals of certain age groups or nationalities. >Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures Nationwide	09/19/2018	2018
OIG-18-79	In December 2014, OIG previously reported on the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.2 Our report disclosed CBP had not developed performance measures needed to accurately assess program effectiveness and make informed decisions. CBP also did not recognize all UAS operating costs and, as such, the Congress and public may be unaware of the amount of resources invested in the program. This audit determined that CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for surveillance information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Without a privacy assessment, CBP could not determine whether ISR Systems contained data requiring safeguards per privacy laws, regulations, and DHS policy. CBP’s failure to implement adequate security controls according to Federal and DHS policy could result in potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ISR Systems and its operations. >CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems	09/19/2018	2018
OIG-18-83	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for inspecting all international mail arriving at U.S. airports, with limited exceptions. A major challenge for CBP is preventing imports of opioids and other illegal items mailed from overseas through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP's air mail inspection processes at JFK airport are effective and have adequate information technology (IT) security controls. CBP has ineffective processes and IT security controls to support air mail inspection operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), the largest of nine USPS facilities that receive and handle incoming international mail. Despite legislative requirements to systematically target and widely prevent illegal imports, CBP inspects only a limited number of the hundreds of thousands of pieces of incoming air mail each day, largely due to difficulty inventorying and locating targeted mail, as well as having inadequate guidance, equipment, and resources. These air mail inspection deficiencies hinder CBP's efforts to prevent prohibited items (particularly opioids) from entering the United States. >CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport	09/24/2018	2018
OIG-18-84	Special Review - Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy	09/27/2018	2018
OIG-18-87	CBP facilities we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search. With the exception of inconsistent cleanliness of the hold rooms, we observed that unaccompanied alien children had access to toilets and sinks, drinking water, beverages (including milk and juice drinks), as well as snacks and food. Unaccompanied alien children had access to hygiene items and clean bedding at all facilities we visited. We did not encounter issues with temperatures or ventilation, access to emergency medical care, inadequate supervision, or access to telephones. We also observed that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry had offices and storage spaces redesigned into hold rooms to be able to detain more unaccompanied alien children, family units, and other border crossers referred for processing. We made no recommendations in this report. >Results of Unannounced Inspections into Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody	09/28/2018	2018
OIG-19-02	CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector	10/18/2018	2019
OIG-19-07	On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers. Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority. >DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers	11/20/2018	2019
OIG-19-10	The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. We determined that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not always conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs. Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography. >CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry	12/03/2018	2019
OIG-19-11	CBP has a statutory responsibility to collect revenue owed to the U.S. Government that arises from the importation of goods into the United States. Although in fiscal year 2017 CBP collected $40 billion in duties, taxes, and fees, more than $4.3 billion in its allowance for doubtful account for cumulative duties, taxes, and fees remained delinquent and uncollectible — some dating back almost 40 years This outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase without completing the viability analysis worksheets to enable the timely pursuit or termination of delinquent debt, and the ability to monitor and properly track debt collection and write-offs. >CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers	12/04/2018	2019
OIG-19-13	In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government. >Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract	12/06/2018	2019
OIG-19-26	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) FY 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report	03/08/2019	2019
OIG-19-29	The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the drug control methodology used to estimate the percentages of obligations allocated between interdiction and intelligence. These percentages are used to derive the dollar-value of obligations reported as Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations presented in CBP’s Detailed Accounting Submission. >Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds	03/08/2019	2019
OIG-19-46	According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT). >Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center	05/30/2019	2019
OIG-19-49	CBP’s controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. This occurred because CBP officers did not always comply with policies when reviewing Global Entry applications nor do CBP’s policies sufficiently help officers determine an applicant’s level of risk. Additionally, during the airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. These weaknesses were due to officers not following policy, as well as CBP’s insufficient verification procedures. Unless CBP officers authenticate kiosk receipts, someone could use a fake receipt to enter the United States. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. In particular, CBP did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program effectively. CBP’s lack of adherence to its compliance program’s policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry by allowing potentially ineligible members to continue to participate. >CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation	06/24/2019	2019
OIG-19-51	Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley	07/02/2019	2019
OIG-19-53	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a critical role in the Nation’s efforts to interdict dangerous substances and prohibited items at U.S. ports of entry and keep these materials from harming the American public. An important part of CBP’s mission is preventing foreign countries from importing illegal drugs such as opioids into the U.S. CBP is experiencing a rise in seizures of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that upon exposure can kill in minutes. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) Fines Penalties and Forfeitures Division stores, manages, and disposes seized property, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl. During our ongoing audit of CBP’s storage of seized drugs at permanent drug vaults we visited, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids. Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure. This occurred because CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure. In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure. As a result, CBP staff is at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure. We made one recommendation to help CBP provide its components with guidance, knowledge, and tools to handle and reverse overdoses from fentanyl and other opioids. >Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure	07/16/2019	2019
OIG-19-67	Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics	09/30/2019	2019
OIG-20-06	DHS did not have the Information Technology (IT) system functionality needed to track separated migrant families during the execution of Zero Tolerance. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) adopted various ad hoc methods to record and track family separations, but this practice introduced widespread errors. These conditions persisted because CBP did not address known IT deficiencies before the Zero Tolerance Policy was implemented in May 2018. DHS also did not provide adequate guidance to personnel responsible for executing the policy. Because of the IT deficiencies, we could not confirm the total number of families DHS separated during the Zero Tolerance period. DHS estimated Border Patrol agents separated 3,014 children from their families while the policy was in place. DHS also estimated it completed 2,155 reunifications, although this effort continued on for seven months beyond the July 2018 deadline for reunifying children with their parents. However, we conducted a review of DHS data during the Zero Tolerance period and identified 136 children with potential family relationships that were not accurately recorded by CBP. In a broader analysis of DHS data between the dates of October 1, 2017 to February 14, 2019, we identified an additional 1,233 children with potential family relationships not accurately recorded by CBP. Without a reliable accounting of all family relationships, we could not validate the total number of separations, or the completion of reunifications. Although DHS spent thousands of hours and more than $1 million in overtime costs, it did not achieve the original goal of deterring “Catch-and-Release” through the Zero Tolerance Policy. Moreover, the surge in apprehended families during this time period resulted in children being held in CBP facilities beyond the 72-hour legal limit. The Department concurred with all five report recommendations. >DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families	11/27/2019	2020
OIG-20-07	Between 2011 and 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed an average of $896 million in drawback claims annually; however, a lack of internal controls could affect the validity and accuracy of the drawback claims amount. This occurred, in part, because CBP did not address internal control deficiencies over drawback claims. The Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting identified reoccurring CBP internal control deficiencies over drawback claims. CBP has outlined plans to correct these deficiencies by implementing an updated data processing system and revising legislative procedures. Without correcting these repeated control deficiencies, CBP cannot determine drawback claims’ validity and accuracy. These corrective actions are ongoing; therefore, we could not verify during our audit whether CBP remedied the identified internal control deficiencies. Our report contains no recommendations. >Lack of Internal Controls Could Affect the Validity of CBP’s Drawback Claims	12/16/2019	2020
OIG-20-16	DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components. We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities. We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices. DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2. >DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices	02/28/2020	2020
	Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel (OSC File No. DI-18-5034); OSC Final Letter to President; OSC Referral to DHS	03/23/2020	2020
OIG-20-34	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States. This occurred because neither CBP nor TSA developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately. We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program. CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations. >CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States	05/11/2020	2020

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