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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-16-54 In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, CBP’s financial position as of September 30, 2015. The report identifies four significant deficiencies in internal control, two of which are considered material weaknesses. The material weaknesses are in drawback of duties, taxes, and fees and information technology. The two other significant deficiencies were in internal control in the entry process and entity-level controls.

>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements 		2016
OIG-12-65  

>Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2011 Financial Statements 		2012
OIG-13-53 We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a Component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as of September 30, 2012 and 2011, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statements of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as “consolidated financial statements”) for the years then ended. The objective of our audits was to express an opinion on the fair presentation of these consolidated financial statements. In connection with our fiscal year 2012 audit, we also considered CBP’s internal control over financial reporting and tested CBP’s compliance with certain provisions of applicable laws, regulations, and contracts that could have a direct and material effect on these consolidated financial statements.

>Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2012 Financial Statements 		2013
OIG-14-59 We have audited the accompanying consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which comprise the consolidated balance sheets as of September 30, 2013 and 2012, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and combined statements of budgetary resources for the years then ended, and the related notes to the consolidated financial statements.

>Independent Auditors’ Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s FY 2013 Financial Statement 		2014
OIG-09-20  

>Independent Review of the U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement Reporting of  FY 2008 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2009
OIG-05-14 Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Reporting of FY 2004 Drug Control Funds 2005
OIG-08-41 Independent Review of The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management Assertions on the 2007 Drug Control Performance Summary 2008
OIG-07-69 Independent Review of The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Funds 2007
OIG-06-26 Independent Review of The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2005, Drug Control Funds 2006
OIG-08-39 Independent Review of The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Obligations 2008
OIG-08-40 Independent Review of The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2007 Drug Control Performance Summary 2008
OIG-10-43  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2009 Drug Control Obligations 		2010
OIG-10-44  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2009 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2010
OIG-11-37  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Obligations 		2011
OIG-11-36  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2010 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2011
OIG-12-35  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2011 Drug Control Obligations 		2012
OIG-12-36  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2011 Drug Control Performance Summary Report ( 		2012
OIG-09-21  

>Independent Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protections's Reporting of FY 2008   Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2009
OIG-14-40 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 10, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Performance Summary Report. This report contains no recommendations

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2013 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2014
OIG-13-34 We have reviewed the accompanying Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. CBP’s management is responsible for the preparation of the Table of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations, related disclosures, and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Obligations 		2013
OIG-13-35 We have reviewed the accompanying Performance Summary Report of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management’s assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. CBP’s management is responsible for the Performance Summary Report and the assertions.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2013
OIG-14-41 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants’ report, dated February 10, 2014, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Detailed Accounting Submission and related disclosures. This report contains no recommendations.

>Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Reporting of FY 2013 Detailed Accounting Submission 		2014
OIG-08-50 Information Technology Management Letter for CBP Component of the FY 2007 Financial Statement Audit Redacted 2008
OIG-06-41 Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2005 Customs and Border Protection Balance Sheet Audit (Redacted) 2006
OIG-09-59  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2008 Customs and Border Protection Financial Statment Audit (Redacted) 		2009
OIG-10-109  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2009 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Financial Statement Audit 		2010
OIG-11-90  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2010 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit (Redacted) 		2011
OIG-12-77  

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2011 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2012
OIG-13-88 We have audited the consolidated balance sheets of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a Component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as of September 30, 2012, and 2011, and the related consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, and custodial activity, and the combined statements of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as “consolidated financial statements”) for the years then ended. In planning and performing our audit engagement of CBP’s consolidated financial statements, we considered CBP’s internal control over financial reporting in order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the consolidated financial statements.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2012 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit (Revised) 		2013
OIG-14-96 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to conduct the audit of Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2013 consolidated financial statements. The contract required that KPMG perform its audit according to generally accepted government auditing standards and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office. KPMG is responsible for the attached management letter dated March 11, 2014, and the conclusion expressed in it.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2013 United States Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2014
OIG-15-60 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the year ended September 30, 2014. KPMG LLP evaluated selected general information technology controls, entity level controls, and business process application controls. KPMG LLP determined that CBP took corrective action by designing and consistently implementing certain account management controls.

>Information Technology Management Letter For the FY 2014 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2015
OIG-16-68 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2015 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 		2016
OIG-17-55 KPMG, LLP determined that CBP made improvements by designing and implementing certain account management, audit logging, and configuration management controls.  However, KPMG continued to identify financial system functionality and general information technology control deficiencies related to access controls and configuration management for CBP’s core financial, feeder, and General Support Systems environments.  The deficiencies collectively limited CBP’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that CBP, in coordination with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to CBP’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-15-13 In most instances, the CBP Miami Field Office complied with CBP policies and procedures. We found only minor deficiencies in CBP Miami Field Office operations for cargo targeting and seized asset management. For passenger screening, Miami International Airport leveraged an existing system to track passengers who have records for violations of laws or other significant events. Other Miami Field Office ports of entry could benefit from this “one-stop system” that would allow them to document, monitor, and report on targeting passengers in real time. The field office could improve the consistency of its recordkeeping for changes to the biometric watchlist. Also, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to improve its compliance with safeguards for using high security bolt seals during cargo screening. Lastly, the CBP Miami Field Office needs to update its policy and procedures for agriculture inspections so they align with current U.S. Department of Agriculture procedures.

>Inspection of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Miami Field Office Ports of Entry 		2015
OIG-23-24 Intensifying Conditions at the Southwest Border Are Negatively Impacting CBP and ICE Employees' Health and Morale 2023
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel (OSC File No. DI-18-5034); OSC Final Letter to President; OSC Referral to DHS 2020
OIG-20-07 Between 2011 and 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processed an average of $896 million in drawback claims annually; however, a lack of internal controls could affect the validity and accuracy of the drawback claims amount.  This occurred, in part, because CBP did not address internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  The Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2018 Independent Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting identified reoccurring CBP internal control deficiencies over drawback claims.  CBP has outlined plans to correct these deficiencies by implementing an updated data processing system and revising legislative procedures.  Without correcting these repeated control deficiencies, CBP cannot determine drawback claims’ validity and accuracy.  These corrective actions are ongoing; therefore, we could not verify during our audit whether CBP remedied the identified internal control deficiencies. Our report contains no recommendations.  

>Lack of Internal Controls Could Affect the Validity of CBP’s Drawback Claims 		2020
OIG-17-70-SR We determined that FEMA did not implement our recommendations and suspended improvements on existing information technology systems.  We recommended that FEMA include an enterprise solution in its Grants Management Modernization platform for tracking applicant compliance with the Public Assistance Program insurance requirements that are a condition of receiving a disaster assistance grant.  We made five recommendations and FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations.

>Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border 		2017
OIG-06-08 Letter Report: A Review of Border Patrol's Compliance with Public Law 108-334 and the Use of Checkpoints within the Tucson Sector 2006
OIG-09-44  

>Letter Report: Review of Customs and Border Protection's Certification of Automated Targeting System Passenger Enhancements 		2009
OIG-19-67 Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics 2019
OIG-19-53 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a critical role in the Nation’s efforts to interdict dangerous substances and prohibited items at U.S. ports of entry and keep these materials from harming the American public. An important part of CBP’s mission is preventing foreign countries from importing illegal drugs such as opioids into the U.S. CBP is experiencing a rise in seizures of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that upon exposure can kill in minutes.  CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) Fines Penalties and Forfeitures Division stores, manages, and disposes seized property, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl.  During our ongoing audit of CBP’s storage of seized drugs at permanent drug vaults we visited, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids.  Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure.  This occurred because CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure.  In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure.  As a result, CBP staff is at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure.  We made one recommendation to help CBP provide its components with guidance, knowledge, and tools to handle and reverse overdoses from fentanyl and other opioids.

>Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure 		2019
OIG-19-13 In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government.

>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract 		2019
OIG-20-70 Management Alert - CBP Needs to Award A Medical Services Contract Quickly to Ensure No Gap in Services 2020
OIG-23-06 Management Alert - CBP Needs to Provide Adequate Emergency Back-Up Power to its Video Surveillance Systems at the Blaine Area Ports to Ensure Secure and Safe Operations - Law Enforcement Sensitive - (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-17-99-MA We found that CBP administered polygraph examinations to unsuitable applicants who provided disqualifying information during the pre-test interview.  This occurred because CBP’s process is not sufficient to prevent unsuitable applicants from continuing the polygraph examination.  We made two recommendations to CBP to improve its screening by establishing an in-person pre-security interview process, requiring examiners to use the on-call adjudication process, and discontinue testing of unsuitable applicants.  CBP concurred with both recommendations and agreed that conducting the in-person pre-security interview prior to the polygraph examination is a best practice.  CBP has implemented one of the recommendations and has initiated a pilot program for a new polygraph format.

>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants (OIG-17-99-MA) 		2017
OIG-18-18 CBP issued the summons to Twitter regarding the @ALT_USCIS account for the purpose of identifying the owner of the account. CBP took the position that it needed this information in order to “insure compliance with the laws of the United States administered by the [Service]” - investigate possible criminal violations by CBP officials, including murder, theft, and corruption.

>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509 		2018
OIG-19-46 According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose  is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT).

>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center 		2019
OIG-19-51 Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley 2019
OIG-21-05 Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) 2021

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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