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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-15-144 We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for TopSecret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. We assessed DHS programs for continuous monitoring management, configuration management, identify and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, remote access management, contingency planning, and contractor systems. This report will be issued to the Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

>Review of DHS' Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2015 		2015
OIG-16-06 The independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP has issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on DHS' consolidated financial statements. In the independent auditors’ opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2015. KPMG LLP issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting of its financial statements as of September 30, 2015. The report identifies seven significant deficiencies in internal control; three of which are considered material weaknesses. The material weaknesses are in financial reporting; information technology controls and financial system functionality; and property, plant, and equipment. The report also identifies instances of noncompliance with four laws and regulations.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2016
OIG-16-07 DHS’ mission to protect the Nation entails a wide array of responsibilities. These range from facilitating the flow of commerce and travelers, countering terrorism, and securing and managing the border to enforcing and administering immigration laws and preparing for and responding to natural disasters. This report identifies major challenges that affect the Department as a whole, as well as its individual components, who work together to achieve this multi-faceted mission. We identified nine areas of most persistent concern for the Department: (1) DHS Management and Operations Integration; (2) Acquisition Management; (3) Financial Management; (4) Information Management and Technology; (5) Transportation Security; (6) Border Security and Immigration Enforcement; (7) Disaster Preparedness and Response; (8) Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity; (9) Employee Accountability and Integrity.

>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 		2016
OIG-16-15 We reviewed the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) information security program for intelligence systems in accordance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act. The objective of our review was to determine whether DHS’ information security program and practices are adequate and effective in protecting the information and the information systems that support DHS’ intelligence operations and assets. We assessed DHS programs for continuous monitoring, configuration management, identity and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, remote access management, contingency planning, and contractor systems.

>Fiscal Year 2015 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with FISMA Requirements for Intelligence Systems 		2016
OIG-16-08 We reviewed the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) information security program in accordance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. Our objective was to determine whether DHS’ information security program is adequate, effective, and complies with FISMA requirements. DHS has taken actions to strengthen its information security program. For example, DHS developed and implemented the Fiscal Year 2015 Information Security Performance Plan to define the performance requirements, priorities, and overall goals of the Department. DHS has also taken steps to address the President’s cybersecurity priorities, such as Information Security Continuous Monitoring; Identity, Credential, and Access Management; and anti-phishing and malware defense. Nonetheless, the Department must ensure compliance with information security requirements in other areas.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2015 (Revised) 		2016
OIG-16-19 DHS does not have adequate oversight of its workforce training. DHS lacks reliable training cost information and data needed to make effective and efficient management decisions. In addition, it does not have an effective governance structure for its training oversight, including clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and delegated authorities. Finally, DHS has not adequately addressed 29 different recommendations to improve training efficiencies made since 2004 by various working groups. As a result, DHS cannot ensure the most efficient use of resources.

>DHS' Oversight of Its Workforce Training Needs Improvement 		2016
OIG-16-39 In fiscal year 2014, DHS spent a total of $12.5 billion using interagency agreements. Past Office of Inspector General audit reports found that a component used Intra/Interagency Reimbursable Work Agreements (RWA) to bypass key internal controls rather than properly implement Interagency Acquisitions. We conducted a department-wide audit to determine whether DHS’s use of RWAs is in compliance with statutory, regulatory, departmental, and component requirements. Components are not issuing RWAs in compliance with the Department’s policy. Specifically, 100 percent of the 43 RWAs we tested—totaling approximately $88 million—had not been reviewed by a Certified Acquisition Official (CAO). In January 2015, DHS issued a policy requiring components to have a CAO review RWAs to ensure they are being issued properly prior to obligating funds. The CAO plays a critical role in ensuring high-risk transactions receive proper oversight. However, 70 percent of the RWAs we tested did not include enough information for a CAO to make an informed decision. DHS did not ensure components updated their policies and procedures to reflect the new requirements. Without a CAO review, components may continue to improperly issue RWAs, circumventing acquisition controls.

>DHS Needs to Improve Implementation of OCFO Policy Over Reimbursable Work Agreements 		2016
OIG-14-64 (Revised) Our audit objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) complied with the Act in fiscal year 2013. In addition, we also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and its efforts to reduce and recover improper payments for fiscal year 2013. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each program deemed susceptible to improper payments. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA. We reviewed the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and DHS’ efforts to reduce and recover improper payments.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2013 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 		2014
OIG-13-47 In fiscal year 2010, the Federal Government’s total improper payment amount was at a high of $121 billion. In that same year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010.(IPERA or the Act) in an effort to reduce improper payments. Our audit objective was to determine whether DHS complied with the Act. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of the Act, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high‐risk program as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2012 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 		2013
OIG-15-94 (Revised) Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). We also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting and DHS’ performance in reducing and recapturing improper payments. Although DHS met all the reporting requirements of IPERA, it did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high-risk program as required by OMB. As such, we concluded that DHS did not fully comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised) 		2015
OIG-16-44 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP to perform the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for the year ended September 30, 2015. KPMG, LLP evaluated selected general IT controls and business process application controls at the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). KPMG, LLP determined that Coast Guard took corrective actions to address one prior-year IT control deficiency. Specifically, Coast Guard made improvements over implementing certain account management and audit log controls. KPMG, LLP continued to identify general IT controls deficiencies related to access controls, segregation of duties, and configuration management of Coast Guard’s core financial and feeder systems. In many cases, new control deficiencies reflected weaknesses over controls and systems that were new to the scope of the FY15 audit Such deficiencies limited Coast Guard’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-45 KPMG LLP evaluated selected general IT controls, IT entity-level controls, and business process application controls at DHS components. KPMG determined that the DHS components had made progress in remediating certain IT deficiencies we reported in FY 2014. Approximately 48 percent of the prior year IT deficiencies identified were repeated. The majority of the deficiencies identified by KPMG resulted from a lack of properly documented, fully designed and implemented, adequately detailed, and consistently implemented financial system controls to comply with requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Information Technology Security Program, and National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance. The deficiencies collectively limited DHS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The deficiencies at Customs and Border Protection, the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement adversely impacted the internal controls over DHS’ financial reporting and its operation, and collectively represent a material weakness reported in the FY 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-55 We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to audit DHS’ fiscal year (FY) 2015 consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. KPMG expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on the consolidated financial statements, and issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting for FY 2015. The management letter contains 89 observations related to internal control and other operational matters for management’s consideration. KPMG noted deficiencies and the need for improvement in certain processes. These deficiencies did not meet the criteria to be reported in the Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 13, 2015, included in the DHS FY 2015 Agency Financial Report.

>Management Letter for the Audit of DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2016
OIG-16-58 On March 4, 2015, Congress enacted Public Law 114–4, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015. According to Section 518(a), the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall submit a report not later than October 15, 2015, to the Office o Inspector General, listing all grants and contracts awarded by any means other than full and open competition during fiscal year (FY) 2015. As required, we reviewed the report and assessed departmental compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and departmental procedures.

>DHS Contracts and Grants Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition FY 2015 		2016
OIG-16-62 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>Management Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-65 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101- 576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homelan Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>Office of Financial Management's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-71 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. For

>Office of Health Affairs’ Management Letter for DHS’ FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-74 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. For

>Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-76 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>Science and Technology Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit 		2016
OIG-16-83 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Office of Financial Management and Office of Chief Information Officer Components of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-84 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year (FY) 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the National Protection and Programs Directorate Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-82 Each year, our independentauditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the Science and Technology Directorate Component of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-88 Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). We also evaluated the accuracy and completeness of DHS’ improper payment reporting.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 		2016
OIG-16-89 Each year, our independent auditors identify component-level information technology (IT) control deficiencies as part of the DHS consolidated financial statement audit. This letter provides details that were not included in the fiscal year 2015 DHS Agency Financial Report.

>Information Technology Management Letter for Other Department of Homeland Security Components of the FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2016
OIG-16-95 The Department of Homeland Security has a substantial number of employees who travel and work abroad. Off-duty misconduct can undermine the Department’s credibility and integrity and hinder its ability to achieve its mission. Our objective was to determine whether DHS has adequate policies and training governing off-duty conduct while abroad.

>DHS Does Not Have Comprehensive Policies or Training for Off-duty Conduct of Employees Traveling and Working Abroad 		2016
OIG-16-101 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of HomelandSecurity’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.

>National Flood Insurance Program's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2015 Financial Statements Audit (Redacted) 		2016
OIG-16-105 Based on GSA’s eRETA system, between fiscal years 2003 and 2014, DHS and its components authorized more than 18,000 RWAs with GSA, totaling $4.1 billion. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department’s use of RWAs was in compliance with statutory, regulatory, departmental, and component requirements.

>DHS' Use of Reimbursable Work Agreements with GSA 		2016
OIG-16-108 Management Advisory - DHS Should Better Evaluate the Performance of Its Working Capital Fund 2016
OIG-16-129 The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires the Office of Inspector General to conduct an annual risk assessment on agency charge card programs. We conducted this risk assessment to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security implemented sufficient internal controls to prevent illegal, improper, and erroneous purchases and payments.

>Fiscal Year 2015 Risk Assessment of the DHS Bank Card Program Indicates Moderate Risk 		2016
OIG-16-131 We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. We assessed DHS programs for continuous monitoring management, configuration management, identity and access management, incident response and reporting, risk management, security training, plans of actions and milestones, remote access management, contingency planning, and contractor systems. This report will be issued to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in accordance with reporting instructions dated May 10, 2016.

>Review of DHS’ Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2016 		2016
OIG-16-138 In 2012, we reported on DHS’ challenges in implementing an effective information technology (IT) management program. FITARA was enacted in 2014 to institutionalize IT reform across the Federal Government. We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS has implemented FITARA to improve department-wide IT management and oversight.

>DHS’ Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act 		2016
OIG-16-141 The Reducing Over- Classification Act requires Federal Government Inspectors General of departments that make original classification determinations to conduct no less than two evaluations of their agencies’ classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the two recommendations from our first evaluation. In this second evaluation, we assessed DHS’ progress in its classification management program after implementing the recommendations. What We

>DHS Has Not Trained Classified Network Users on the Classification Management Tool 		2016
OIG-16-142 Title IV, Section 406 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 requires Inspectors General to assess agency National Security Systems (NSS) and other systems that provide access to personally identifiable information (PII). We reviewed information security policies and practices for logical access and data protection at the Department of Homeland Security in four key areas, asrequired by the Act.

>Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 		2016
OIG-17-05 We determined that CBP, ICE and USSS have been able to maintain staffing levels close to the authorized number of law enforcement personnel, but they continue to have significant delays in hiring. The additional steps in the hiring process add to the time it takes to hire law enforcement officers, but the components also do not have the staff or comprehensive automated systems needed to hire personnel as efficiently as possible.  Although they have taken steps to reduce the time it takes to hire law enforcement personnel, it is too early to measure the long-term effects of the Department’s and the components’ recent actions. We made five recommendations to make the law enforcement hiring process more efficient.

>DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel 		2017
OIG-17-08 This report summarizes what we consider the most serious management and performance challenges to both the Department as a whole, as well as individual components challenges.  We remain concerned about the systemic nature of these challenges, some of which span multiple Administrations and changes in Department leadership.  We also assess the Department’s progress in addressing those challenges.  This year, we are reporting the Department’s major challenges in the following areas: Unity of Effort, Employee Morale and Engagement, Acquisition Management, Grants Management, Cybersecurity, Management Fundamentals.  We did not make any new recommendations in this report.

>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 		2017
OIG-17-09 We determined that the Department’s oversight of its drug interdiction efforts did not align with the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy.  .  This occurred because DHS lacks formal oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure its drug interdiction performance activities met both ONDCP and legislative requirements.  As a result, DHS could not ensure its drug interdiction efforts met required national drug control outcomes nor accurately assess the impact of the approximately $4.2 billion it spends annually on drug control activities.  We made two recommendations that, if implemented, will improve DHS’ drug interdiction efforts.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement 		2017
OIG-17-12 KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with DHS OIG, conducted an integrated audit of DHS’ FY 2016consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. KPMG expressed an unmodified (clean) opinion on the Department’s FY 2016 financial statements. However, KPMG identified six significant deficiencies in internal control; three of which are considered material weaknesses. Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting. KPMG also reported instances in which DHS did not comply with four laws and regulations. The Department concurred with all of the recommendations in the report.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2017
OIG-17-15 We determined that in most instances, Texas distributed and spent the awards in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; however, the State lacked adequate controls over more than $1 million in grant funds we reviewed.  This occurred because the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State did not ensure adequate management and oversight of Homeland Security Grant Program funds.  We made three recommendations, which when implemented, should enhance Texas’ effectiveness in the overall use of the grant funds to improve preparedness and response capabilities.  Better management and oversight should also reduce the risk associated with the State’s management of grant funds.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations.

>Texas Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2012-14 		2017
OIG-17-22 We determined that DHS has not done enough to minimize the risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers.  Specifically, the Department does not:  (1) have an office responsible for managing and overseeing component use of force activities; (2) ensure the collection and validation of component data needed to assess use of force activities, minimize risks, and take corrective actions; (3) ensure use of force policies have been updated to reflect current operations and lessons learned; or (4) establish consistent requirements for less-lethal recurrent training and ensure training was completed as required.  Additionally, each component varies on their use of force activities.  Without improvements in the management and oversight of use of force activities, the Department may increase its risk of improper use of force by law enforcement officers.  DHS concurred with our two recommendations, which, if implemented, will help the Department actively oversee and assist with component use of force activities, update policies, and improve training.

>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted) 		2017
OIG-17-24 Despite the progress made, Components were not consistently following DHS’ policies and procedures to maintain current or complete information on remediating security weaknesses timely. Components operated 79 unclassified systems with expired authorities to operate.  Further, Components had not consolidated all internet traffic behind the Department’s trusted internet connections and continued to use unsupported operating systems that may expose DHS data to unnecessary risks.  Our review identified deficiencies related to configuration management and continuous monitoring. We made four recommendations to the Chief Information Security Officer.  The Department concurred with all four recommendations.

>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016 		2017
OIG-17-52 The resulting management letter discusses 103 observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  These issues, which are not critical and are below the level of a significant deficiency, include:  a lack of internal controls related to undelivered orders, inaccurate financial data, and inadequate and/or untimely reviews of transactions.  Internal control weaknesses considered significant deficiencies were presented in our Independent Auditors’ Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>Management Letter for the Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-54 We determined that most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG resulted from a lack of properly documented, fully designed, adequately detailed, and consistently implemented financial system controls to comply with requirements of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300 A, Information Technology Security Program, and National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance.  The deficiencies collectively limited DHS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommended that the Acting Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer, in coordination with DHS components, make improvements to DHS’ financial management systems and associated information technology security program.

>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit 		2017
OIG-17-59 We determined that DHS did not fully comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because it did not publish accurate accompanying materials to the Agency Financial Report (AFR) as required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.  The Department also did not meet its annual reduction targets established for each high-risk program.  DHS did comply with Executive Order 13520 by properly compiling and making available to the public DHS’ FY 2016 Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment reports. Additionally, we determined DHS did not properly perform oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting.  We made five recommendations that would help DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division (RM&A) strengthen its oversight and review procedures for IPERA risk assessments.  We also recommended that RM&A follows OMB requirements to comply with IPERA.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2017
OIG-17-68 KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ financial statements and internal control over financial reporting.  The resulting management letter discusses three observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies across multiple processes including financial system reconciliation; review and approval of intra-governmental payment and collection expenses; and improper allocation of gross costs on the Statement of Net Cost and footnote.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report, dated November 13, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

>Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit 		2017
OIG-17-98-SR This is a DHS OIG special report regarding DHS’ efforts to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers.  This is the first in a series of reports.  This report describes lessons learned from prior DHS OIG, Government Accountability Office, and DHS departmental reports on challenges relating to hiring and other important areas of human capital management.  We made no recommendations in this report.

>Special Report: Challenges Facing DHS in Its Attempt to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2017
OIG-17-101 We determined that DHS had only approved implementation plans for 4 of 23 strategic objectives of the Enterprise Data Strategy, and planned to finalize the remaining plans in late FY 2017.  While we found that DHS had taken some effective actions to coordinate component investments in data sharing and management, component officials identified other ways that DHS could improve by coordinating Enterprise-wide tools and data integration efforts.  We recommended that DHS take actions to finalize implementation plans for the remaining 19 strategic objectives by the end of FY 2017, and work with components to identify and provide the training for Enterprise-wide data analysis and management tools.  We made two recommendations and Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of the Chief Information Officer concurred with both of our recommendations. 

>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals 		2017
OIG-17-109 We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, we reviewed the Department’s security program, including its policies, procedures, and system security controls for the enterprise-wide intelligence system. This report was issued to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG).

>Review of DHS' Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2017 (U) 		2017
OIG-17-116-VR We determined that due to changes DHS made to the process, political appointees do not influence Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processors to delay or withhold the release of FOIA information.  Unlike the former process, the new process does not provide opportunities for political appointees in headquarters to inappropriately interfere with releases of significant FOIA information, and we did not identify any instances in which headquarters officials used the process to engage in those activities.  However, because DHS has not issued final guidance for the process, it is vulnerable to misuse in the future.  We recommended that the Chief FOIA Officer/Chief Privacy Officer issue final guidance on the 1-Day Awareness Notification Process.  The guidance should state 1) the purpose of the process is to inform senior officials of the imminent release of information that may raise public interest and 2) FOIA staff determine whether information should be released or withheld under FOIA’s exceptions and exemptions.

 

>DHS Review of Responses to Significant Freedom of Information Act Requests (Verification Review of OIG-11-67) 		2017
OIG-18-05 DHS personnel do not always safeguard sensitive assets that, if lost, would result in critical mission impact or loss of life. Between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, the Department of Homeland Security personnel lost a total of 2,142 highly sensitive assets — 228 firearms; 1,889 badges; and 25 secure immigration stamps. Although this represents a slight improvement from our last audit, more than half of the lost items we reviewed (65 of 115) revealed that component personnel did not follow policy or used poor judgment when safeguarding these assets. In these cases, components did not always hold personnel accountable nor did they receive remedial training for failing to safeguard these sensitive assets.

>DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets 		2018
OIG-18-07 ICE, CBP, and USCIS continue to experience challenges with emerging immigration enforcement and administration activities. Although DHS has established unity of effort initiatives to break silos and centralize decision making related to immigration, problems remain. We identified challenges related to mission allocation and expenditure comparisons, the affirmative asylum application process, and the Department’s struggle to understand immigration outcomes and decisions. DHS will continue to allow vulnerabilities that may affect national security and public safety to persist.

 

>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration 		2018

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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