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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-09-35  

> Transportation Security Administration's Known Shipper Program (Redacted) 		2009
OIG-12-105  

> Costs Invoiced by the City of Phoenix for Checked Baggage Screening Projects at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport 		2012
OIG-12-26  

>(U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas 		2012
OIG-12-06 (U) TSA Penetration Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology 2012
OIG-22-61 (U) Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening 2022
OIG-14-142 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for protecting the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. As part of its mission, TSA screens checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any prohibited items, such as explosives and incendiaries, onboard passenger commercial aircraft. TSA primarily relies on its screening workforce and two types of equipment to screen checked baggage - explosives detection systems and explosives trace detection. Through covert testing conducted at domestic airports, we determined whether Transportation Security Officers were following established policies and procedures to prevent threat items from being placed onto commercial aircraft. We also determined the operational effectiveness of TSA's checked baggage screening technology. We identified vulnerabilities in this area caused by human and technology-based failures.

>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations 		2014
OIG-07-67 A Follow-up Review of the Transportation Security Officer Background Check Process 2007
OIG-04-08 A Review of Background Checks for Federal Passenger and Baggage Screeners at Airports, January 2004 ( 2004
OIG-05-17 A Review of Procedures to Prevent Passenger Baggage Thefts 2005
OIG-11-19 Ability to Communicate with Federal Air Marshals While in Mission Status 2011
OIG-07-43 Additional Physical, System, and Management Controls Can Enhance Security at Plum Island (Redacted) 2007
OIG-15-45 The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure alleging a sufficiently notorious convicted felon was improperly cleared for TSA PreCheck screening, creating a significant aviation security breach. The disclosure identified this event as a possible error in the TSA Secure Flight program since the traveler’s boarding pass contained a TSA PreCheck indicator and encrypted barcode. On October 16, 2014, OSC referred this allegation to the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation. We determined that TSA did not grant the traveler TSA PreCheck screening through the TSA PreCheck Application Program or managed inclusion (MI). TSA granted the traveler TSA PreCheck screening through risk assessment rules in the Secure Flight program.

>Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (Redacted) 		2015
OIG-12-28  

>Allegations of Misconduct and Illegal Discrimination and Retaliation in the Federal Air Marshal Service 		2012
OIG-04-45 An Evaluation of the Transportation Security Administration's Screener Training and Methods of Testing, September 2004 2004
OIG-04-46 Assessment of Expenditures Related to the First Annual Transportation Security Administration Awards Program and Executive Performance Awards, September 2004 2004
OIG-07-35 Audit of Access of Airport Secured Areas (Unclassified Summary) 2007
OIG-08-25 Audit of Airport Passenger and Checked Baggager Screening Performance 2008
OIG-07-64 Audit of Implementation of Aviation Security Requirements at Foreign Airports (Unclassified Summary) 2007
OIG-04-37 Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures At Domestic Airports, September 2004 2004
OIG-04-25 Audit of Passenger Processing Reengineering, March 2004 2004
OIG-15-18 As part of our Technical Security Evaluation Program, we evaluated technical and information security policies and procedures of Department of Homeland Security components at the John F. Kennedy International Airport. Four Department components – the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U. S. Secret Service – operate information technology systems that support homeland security operations at this major airport. Our evaluation focused on how these components have implemented operational, technical, and management controls for computer security at the airport and nearby locations. We performed onsite inspections of the areas where these assets were located, interviewed departmental staff, and conducted technical tests of computer security controls. We also reviewed applicable policies, procedures, and other relevant documentation. The Department’s sensitive system security policies, the information technology security controls implemented at several sites had deficiencies that, if exploited, could have resulted in the loss of confidentiality, inte grity, and availability of the components’ information technology systems.

>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport (Redacted) (Revised) 		2015
OIG-14-132 We audited security controls for Department of Homeland Security Information technology systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. Four Department components—the Management Directorate, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—Operate information technology systems that support homeland security operations at this airport. Our audit focused on how these components have implemented computer security operational, technical, and management controls for their systems at the airport and nearby locations.

>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 		2014
OIG-15-88 We audited security controls for Department of Homeland Security information technology systems at San Francisco International Airport. Five Department components—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Management Directorate, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard—operate information technology systems that support homeland security operations at this airport. Our audit focused on how these components have implemented computer security controls for their systems at the airport and nearby locations. We performed onsite inspections of the areas where information technology systems and equipment were located, interviewed departmental staff, and conducted technical tests of computer security controls. The information technology security controls implemented at these sites had deficiencies that, if exploited, could result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the components’ systems.

>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport 		2015
OIG-09-42  

>Audit of the Effectiveness of the Checked Baggage Screening System and Procedures Used to Identify and Resolve Threats (Unclassified Summary) 		2009
OIG-23-57 Better TSA Tracking and Follow-up for the 2021 Security Directives Implementation Should Strengthen Pipeline Cybersecurity - (REDACTED) 2023
OIG-12-99  

>Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of a Security Clearance and Suitability Determination to a General Manager at TSA’s Legacy Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office 		2012
OIG-12-123 Costs Invoiced by Sacramento County for a Checked Baggage Screening Project Under Agreement Number HSTS04-09-H-REC148 2012
OIG-12-40  

>Costs Invoiced by San Jose for a Checked Baggage Screening Project at the Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport 		2012
OIG-12-121  

>Costs Invoiced by the Omaha Airport Authority for Closed Circuit Television Cameras at Omaha Eppley Airfield Airport 		2012
OIG-12-129 Costs Invoiced for Checked Baggage Inspection Systems and Closed-Circuit Television Cameras at Orlando International Airport 2012
OIG-19-21 The objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation’s airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA’s security requirements to control access to these areas.

 

We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training.

>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas 		2019
OIG-15-150 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducts or oversees passenger checkpoint screening at 450 federalized airports. Passenger checkpoint screening is a process by which passengers are inspected to deter, detect, and prevent explosives, incendiaries, weapons, or other security threats from entering sterile areas of an airport or getting onboard an aircraft. As threats to transportation security evolved, TSA needed a screening technology to detect nonmetallic threats. TSA developed Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to screen passengers for both metallic and nonmetallic threats concealed under clothing—without physical contact. In 2013, TSA equipped all AIT with Automated Target Recognition software, which displays a box around anomalies on a generic outline of a body. Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of TSA’s AIT, Automated Target Recognition software, and checkpoint screener performance in identifying and resolving anomalies and potential security threats at airport checkpoints. The compilation of the number of tests conducted, names of the test airports, and quantitative and qualitative results of our testing is classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made one recommendation that when implemented should strengthen the effectiveness of identifying and resolving security threats at airport checkpoints.

>Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes at Airport Security Checkpoints 		2015
OIG-17-112 We conducted covert tests to determine the effectiveness of TSA's checkpoint screening equipment and screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. We identified vulnerabilities with TSA's screener performance, screening equipment, and associated procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information. We are making eight recommendations that when implemented, should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness.

>Covert Testing of TSA’s Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness 		2017
OIG-23-44 Cybersecurity System Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Selected High Value Asset 2023
OIG-21-09 DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment 2021
OIG-11-47  

>DHS Department-wide Management of Detection Equipment 		2011
OIG-21-69 TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities.  These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems.  DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds.  However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance.  In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters.  DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system.  As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.  We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition.  DHS concurred with all three recommendations.  

>DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems 		2021
OIG-21-66 DHS did not fully comply with the public law.  TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020.  Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant.  We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP.  DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.

>DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2021
OIG-11-93  

>DHS Grants Used for Mitigating Risks to Amtrak Rail Stations (Redacted) 		2011
OIG-09-03 DHS Plan for Implementation of Secure Systems of Transportation 2009
OIG-19-16 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278. Specifically, DHS delayed commissioning a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program in enhancing security and reducing security risks for facilities and vessels. The public law required the assessment to begin no later than 60 days after its enactment. However, DHS did not award a work order for the assessment for more than a year after the deadline.  TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. We have concerns with aspects of TSA’s responses to all of the required actions.

>DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2019
OIG-09-66  

>DHS' Progress in Addressing Technical Security Challenges at Washington Dulles International Airport (Redacted) 		2009
OIG-09-24  

>Effectiveness of TSA's Surface Transportation Security Inspectors ( 		2009
OIG-12-103  

>Efficiency and Effectiveness of TSA's Visible Intermodel Prevention and Response Program Within Rail and Mass Transit Systems (Redacted) 		2012
OIG-10-75  

>Evaluation of Newly Deployed and Enhanced Technology and Practices at the Passenger Screening Checkpoint (Unclassified Summary) 		2010
OIG-10-119  

>Evaluation of Screening of Air Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft 		2010
OIG-04-32 Evaluation of the Federal Air Marshal Service, August 2004 (PDF, 54 pages - 577 KB) 2004
OIG-04-44 Evaluation of TSA's Contract for the Installation and Maintenance of Explosive Detection Equipment at United States Airports, September 2004 2004
OIG-18-70 Despite dedicating approximately $272 million to ground-based activities, including VIPR operations, FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA’s mission. Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations, in which VIPR teams collaborate with local law enforcement to augment security at transportation hubs through an increased visible deterrent force.

FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA’s mission. During our assessment of FAMS’ contributions to TSA’s layered approach to security, we determined that FAMS lacked performance measures for the 24 strategic initiatives and most ground-based activities outlined in its strategic plan. Additionally, FAMS’ VIPR operations performance measures fail to determine the program’s effectiveness. FAMS could not provide a budget breakout by division or operational area.

>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission 		2018
OIG-19-17 As a follow-up to our 2017 report on TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) domestic flight operations, we conducted this audit to determine the extent to which FAMS can interdict an improvised explosive device during flight. We identified vulnerabilities with FAMS’ contribution to international flight security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made two recommendations.

>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable 		2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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