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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-18-88 DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law.  This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort.  As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment.  This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities.  Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents.  Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities.  During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list.  This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life.  Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures.  This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards.  The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.

>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program 		2018
OIG-18-89-UNSUM We conducted our review of the Science and Technology’s (S&T) insider threat program between January 2017 and June 2017.  S&T is the primary research arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Its mission is to strengthen the Nation’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative solutions to support DHS mission operations.  Specifically, Congress created S&T in 2003 to conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of the Department.  S&T oversees laboratories where scientists perform mission-critical research on chemical and biological threats, radiological and nuclear detection, animal diseases, transportation security, and explosives trace identification.  S&T employees, contractors, and business partners—especially those with special or elevated privileges—can potentially use their inside knowledge and access to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to mission-critical systems and operations.  We made nine recommendations that, if implemented, should strengthen S&T’s management of insider threat risks.  The Department concurred with all of the recommendations.

>(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain 		2018
OIG-18-87 CBP facilities we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search.  With the exception of inconsistent cleanliness of the hold rooms, we observed that unaccompanied alien children had access to toilets and sinks, drinking water, beverages (including milk and juice drinks), as well as snacks and food.  Unaccompanied alien children had access to hygiene items and clean bedding at all facilities we visited.  We did not encounter issues with temperatures or ventilation, access to emergency medical care, inadequate supervision, or access to telephones.  We also observed that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry had offices and storage spaces redesigned into hold rooms to be able to detain more unaccompanied alien children, family units, and other border crossers referred for processing. We made no recommendations in this report.

>Results of Unannounced Inspections into Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody 		2018
OIG-19-02 CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector 2019
OIG-19-03 The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an investigation into allegations that the whistleblower was retaliated against for, among other things, communicating with Members of Congress regarding discrimination and retaliation against the whistleblower. The whistleblower alleged being subjected to retaliatory investigations by CGIS in violation of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). We recently learned that CGIS executed a search warrant against the whistleblower several months after the whistleblower retired from the Coast Guard, but soon after CGIS became aware of the OIG’s whistleblower retaliation investigation. Our information indicates that a CGIS agent obtained the search warrant in connection with a CGIS-directed investigation.

>Management Alert - Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications 		2019
OIG-19-01 Annual report, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. Pursuant to the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, the Office of Inspector General is required to issue a statement that summarizes what the Inspector General considers to be the most serious management and performance challenges facing the agency and briefly assess the agency’s progress in addressing those challenges. We acknowledge past and ongoing efforts by Department’s senior leadership to address the challenges identified in this report. At the same time, our aim in this report is two-fold ― to identify areas that need continuing focus and improvement and to point out instances in which senior leadership’s goals and objectives are not executed throughout the Department. We highlight persistent management and performance challenges that hamper the Department’s efforts to accomplish the homeland security mission efficiently and effectively.

>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security 		2019
OIG-19-04 The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) and the Department Of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act (Public Law 108-330) require us to conduct an annual audit of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) consolidated financial statements and internal control over financial reporting. KPMG noted that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, DHS’ financial position as of September 30, 2018.

KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS’ internal control over financial reporting of its financial statements as of September 30, 2018. The report identifies the following six significant deficiencies in internal control, the first two of which are considered material weaknesses, and four instances where DHS did not comply with laws and regulations.

>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 		2019
OIG-19-05 We conducted this audit to determine whether the Board accounted for and expended FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. The Board sustained an estimated $90.6 million in damages caused by severe storms and flooding that occurred in August 2016. The Ascension Parish School Board (Board) accounted for disaster-related costs correctly, as Federal regulations require. However, the Board did not follow all Federal procurement regulations in awarding $25.6 million in disaster-related contracts, resulting in $9.1 million in ineligible costs. Additionally, there were issues with direct administrative costs related to a Recovery Program and Grants Management services contract. This occurred because the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (Louisiana) monitored the Board’s subgrant activities for compliance with Federal procurement requirements.

>FEMA Should Disallow $9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana 		2019
OIG-19-08 Following the January 13, 2018, false missile alert in Hawaii, Congress requested we examine the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) role in the incident. We concluded that FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending and canceling of state and local alerts. Following the Hawaii false missile alert, three U.S. Senators proposed legislation to define the federal government’s role during false missile alerts, as well as to direct FEMA to recommend best practices in the alerting process. We also identified two areas of concern regarding FEMA’s overall oversight of IPAWS. Although FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform, state and local alerting authorities must obtain commercially-available emergency alert software to generate a message which passes through IPAWS for authentication and delivery. However, we found that FEMA does not require that this software perform functions critical to the alerting process, such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead, FEMA only recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as “best practices.”

>FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) 		2019
OIG-19-07 On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers 		2019
OIG-19-06 FEMA awarded the Chippewa Cree Tribe a $32.4 million Public Assistance Program grant for damages from a June 2010 flood disaster. The award provided 100 percent Federal funding to replace the Tribe’s severely damaged health clinic. The Tribe failed to manage a $32.4 million Public Assistance Program grant from FEMA according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. As a result, FEMA has no assurance that expenditures the Tribe claimed for Project 2 (engineering and design), and plans to claim for Projects 132 (facility construction) and 133 (site preparation) are valid, allowable, or eligible. Therefore, FEMA should disallow about $22.3 million of the grant award for these three projects.

>FEMA Should Disallow $22.3 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, Montana 		2019
OIG-19-09 FEMA Should Recover $413,074 of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, for a May 2010 Flood 2019
OIG-19-10 The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. We determined that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not always conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs. Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.

>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry 		2019
OIG-19-12 The County received about $28.1 million in Public Assistance grant awards from Florida — a FEMA grantee — for damages from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding in April and May 2014. Jackson County was the first subgrantee in Florida to be approved for a grant award obligation under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) pilot program. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 20131 authorized PAAP and authorized FEMA to implement alternative procedures through the PAAP pilot program. Florida did not fulfill its grantee responsibility to ensure the County followed applicable Federal grant management requirements, and FEMA did not ensure the grantee carried out its responsibilities.

>FEMA Should Recover $3,061,819 in Grant Funds Awarded to Jackson County, Florida 		2019
OIG-19-11 CBP has a statutory responsibility to collect revenue owed to the U.S. Government that arises from the importation of goods into the United States. Although in fiscal year 2017 CBP collected $40 billion in duties, taxes, and fees, more than $4.3 billion in its allowance for doubtful account for cumulative duties, taxes, and fees remained delinquent and uncollectible — some dating back almost 40 years This outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase without completing the viability analysis worksheets to enable the timely pursuit or termination of delinquent debt, and the ability to monitor and properly track debt collection and write-offs.

>CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers 		2019
OIG-19-13 In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government.

>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract 		2019
OIG-19-14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigative offices accurately maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. Investigative staff were diligent in complying with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, we found that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis.

>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division 		2019
OIG-19-15 National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Chief of Staff requested a review to determine whether Federal Protective Service (FPS) inspectors’ positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors’ excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Specifically, 11 of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This kind of extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States. Furthermore, FPS’ increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for fiscal year 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk. The inspectors were able to accumulate the extensive overtime because of poor internal controls, such as management not monitoring the use of overtime.

>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively 		2019
OIG-19-16 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278. Specifically, DHS delayed commissioning a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program in enhancing security and reducing security risks for facilities and vessels. The public law required the assessment to begin no later than 60 days after its enactment. However, DHS did not award a work order for the assessment for more than a year after the deadline.  TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. We have concerns with aspects of TSA’s responses to all of the required actions.

>DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment 		2019
OIG-19-17 As a follow-up to our 2017 report on TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) domestic flight operations, we conducted this audit to determine the extent to which FAMS can interdict an improvised explosive device during flight. We identified vulnerabilities with FAMS’ contribution to international flight security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made two recommendations.

>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable 		2019
OIG-19-18 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In FY 2017, these 106 facilities held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors operating these 106 facilities. Despite documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose penalties when those standards are not maintained.

>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards 		2019
OIG-19-19 DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs 2019
OIG-19-20 This inspection is part of an ongoing review of ICE detention facilities. While conducting an unannounced visit to the Essex County Correctional Facility using ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards, we identified serious violations. As part of this assessment, ICE must review and ensure compliance with those standards addressing unreported security incidents, food safety, and facility conditions that include ceiling leaks, unsanitary shower stalls, bedding, and outdoor recreation areas.

>Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey 		2019
OIG-19-21 The objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation’s airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA’s security requirements to control access to these areas.

 

We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training.

>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas 		2019
OIG-19-22 We intended to verify whether the U.S. Coast Guard is properly reporting service members who are prohibited from possessing a firearm (“prohibited individuals”) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, in comparing relevant databases with data into the National Instant Background Check System (NICS), We identified a number of issues that led us to question the reliability of the Coast Guard’s data.  As a result, OIG cannot identify the full scope of prohibited individuals or verify that the Coast Guard properly reported prohibited individuals to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and to Congress.  Despite our concerns about the quality of Coast Guard’s data, OIG identified 210 service members who committed offenses that placed them in one of the categories of prohibited individuals.  Of these 210, Coast Guard did not enter 16 service members (8 percent) into NCIS.  This underreporting occurred because Coast Guard policy did not require attorneys to forward information about all individuals referred for trial by general court martial for reporting to the FBI.  Additionally, Coast Guard’s reporting to the FBI is centralized, and does not allow investigators in field offices to have direct access to NICS.  We made eight recommendations that will enhance Coast Guard’s reporting of prohibited individuals to the FBI.  The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations.

>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 		2019
OIG-19-23 Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol agents are responsible for patrolling our international land borders and coastal waters surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico. We conducted this audit to determine to what extent Border Patrol agents meet workload requirements related to investigative and law enforcement activities. Border Patrol needs to manage its workforce more efficiently, effectively, and economically. CBP and Border Patrol must expedite the development and implementation of a workforce staffing model for Border Patrol as required by Congress. Without a complete workforce staffing model, Border Patrol senior managers are unable to definitively determine the operational needs for, or best placement of, the 5,000 additional agents DHS was directed to hire per the January 2017 Executive Order.

>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents 		2019
OIG-19-24 Prompted by the suspicious cyber activities on election systems in 2016, Secretary Jeh Johnson designated the election infrastructure as a subsector to one of the Nation’s existing critical sectors. Our audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department’s efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation’s election infrastructure. DHS has taken some steps to mitigate risks to the Nation’s election infrastructure; however, improved planning, more staff, and clearer guidance could better facilitate the Department’s coordination with state and local officials. Specifically, despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, or established metrics to measure progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and insufficient guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS’ ability to accomplish such planning.

>Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure 		2019
OIG-19-25 Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 2019
OIG-19-26 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) FY 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. 

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-30 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year (FY). ICE’s management prepared the Performance Summary Report and the related disclosures in accordance with the requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Williams Adley was unable to assess the accuracy of the number of products reported in Metric 2, “Number of counter-narcotics intelligence requests satisfied,” as part of the PSR.

>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-27 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) fiscal year (FY) 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report.

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report 		2019
OIG-19-29 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. CBP’s management was unable to provide supporting documentation for the drug control methodology used to estimate the percentages of obligations allocated between interdiction and intelligence. These percentages are used to derive the dollar-value of obligations reported as Drug Resources by Budget Decision Unit and Drug Control Function in the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations presented in CBP’s Detailed Accounting Submission.

>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2019
OIG-19-28 The Department of Homeland Security U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. Our case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within the prescribed 90-day timeframe revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation are external and beyond ICE’s control. The two predominant factors delaying repatriation are legal appeals and obtaining travel documents. Internally, ICE’s challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process.

>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens 		2019
OIG-19-31 We could not fully assess whether Oregon’s State Administrative Agency (OEM) expenditures for State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) funding awarded from FY 2013 through FY 2015 enhanced its preparedness and security because we found some issues. These issues occurred because OEM did not obtain written consent when withholding more than 20 percent of funds, coordinate with subrecipients after award receipt, have approved indirect cost rate agreements, adhere to its subrecipient monitoring procedures, have a tracking system, or provide guidance to subrecipients. FEMA concurred with all 10 recommendations and plans to take corrective action.

>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-32 Through the TSA program, FEMA provides transitional sheltering in hotels to disaster survivors displaced by emergencies or major disasters. TSA reduces the number of survivors in congregate emergency shelters by providing hotel lodging. During our ongoing audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, we determined that FEMA violated the Privacy Act of 19741 and Department of Homeland Security policy2 by releasing to the PII and SPII of 2.3 million survivors of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires in 2017.3

>Management Alert - FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED) 		2019
OIG-19-33 The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to the ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. Williams, Adley & Company –DC, LLP (Williams Adley), under contract with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, issued an Independent Accountant’s Report on U.S. Coast Guard’s (Coast Guard) Detailed Accounting Submission. Coast Guard management prepared the Table of FY 2018 Drug Control Obligations and related disclosures in accordance with requirements of ONDCP Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated May 8, 2018 (the Circular). Based on its review, nothing came to Williams Adley’s attention that caused it to believe that the Coast Guard’s FY 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission is not presented in conformity with the criteria in the Circular. Williams Adley did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds 		2019
OIG-19-34-UNSUM We determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems is effective this year as the Department achieved “Level 4 – Managed and Measurable” in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems. However, we identified deficiencies in DHS’ overall patch management process and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s weakness remediation and security awareness training activities.

 

We made one recommendation to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and two recommendations to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to address the deficiencies identified. DHS concurred with all three recommendations.

>(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018 		2019
OIG-19-35 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs to continue to improve its retention, hiring, and training of Transportation Security Officers (TSO). Specifically, TSA needs to better address its retention challenges because it currently does not share and leverage results of TSO exit surveys and does not always convey job expectations to new-hires. TSA does not fully evaluate applicants for capability as well as compatibility when hiring new TSOs. Thus, the agency may be making uninformed hiring decisions due to inadequate applicant information and a lack of formally documented guidance on ranking potential new-hires

>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers 		2019
OIG-19-36 Williams, Adley and Company - DC, LLP completed an audit of Missouri’s management of State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants awarded during fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Williams Adley concluded that Missouri’s State Administrative Agency generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations. Although Williams Adley did not identify any duplicate benefits received by the state, it did identify instances in which the state did not fully comply with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) FYs 2012–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance.

>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-37 This interim report is part of an ongoing audit to determine the extent FEMA is meeting disaster survivors’ transitional shelter needs after the California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. We determined that FEMA does not require disaster survivors to notify the agency when they vacate hotels participating in the TSA program, thus allowing the hotels to continue to bill FEMA for unoccupied rooms. Because FEMA is unaware when disaster survivors vacate the hotels, the agency does not know the magnitude of unnecessary hotel charges. Consequently, FEMA could not account for associated TSA payments it may have paid since August 2017, related to the 2017 hurricane season and California wildfires.

>Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program 		2019
OIG-19-38 FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC 2019
OIG-19-40 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions 2019
OIG-19-41 Special Report: Review Regarding DHS OIG's Retraction of Thirteen Reports Evaluating FEMA's Initial Response to Disasters 2019
OIG-19-39 This report presents the results of KPMG LLP’s (KPMG) work conducted to address the performance audit objectives relative to the Audit of Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending. KPMG performed the work during the period of September 18, 2017 to August 30, 2018, and our scope period for testing was October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017. KPMG LLP (KPMG) found that DHS management has policies and procedures over conference spending and reporting, improvements are needed. KMPG made seven recommendations to improve conference spending reporting.

>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending 		2019
OIG-19-43 The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.

>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments 		2019
OIG-19-42 DHS expanded the Insider Threat Program from monitoring user activity on its classified networks to monitoring cleared and non-cleared employees’ activity on unclassified networks. We initiated a project to determine Insider Threat Program progress in monitoring, detecting, and responding to malicious insider threats on unclassified DHS systems and networks. Before continuing its planned expansion of the Insider Threat Program, DHS needs to address several deficiencies that may hinder program effectiveness and efficiency. Although the expanded program was approved in January 2017, the Office of the Chief Security Officer has yet to revise, obtain approval for, and reissue required documentation.

>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program 		2019
OIG-19-45 Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions 2019
OIG-19-44 Audit of DHS' Issuance and Management of Other Transaction Agreements Involving Consortium Activities 2019
OIG-19-46 According to CBP statistics, the number of southwest border migrant apprehensions during the first seven months of FY 2019 has in general already surpassed that of the total apprehensions for each of the previous four fiscal years. At the sector level, El Paso has experienced the sharpest increase in apprehensions when comparing the first seven months of FY 2019 to the same period in FY 2018. The purpose  is to notify you of urgent issues that require immediate attention and action. Specifically, we are recommending that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (PDT).

>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center 		2019
OIG-19-47 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities 2019

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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