CBP

In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a $297 million contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. The contract includes 1 base year, with 4 option years, to hire 7,500 fully qualified applicants, including Customs and Border Protection Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Air and Marine Interdiction Agents. In its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture has already taken longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. Without addressing the issues we have identified, CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a hastily approved contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations. CBP must hold the contractor accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government.

CBP has a statutory responsibility to collect revenue owed to the U.S. Government that arises from the importation of goods into the United States. Although in fiscal year 2017 CBP collected $40 billion in duties, taxes, and fees, more than $4.3 billion in its allowance for doubtful account for cumulative duties, taxes, and fees remained delinquent and uncollectible — some dating back almost 40 years This outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase without completing the viability analysis worksheets to enable the timely pursuit or termination of delinquent debt, and the ability to monitor and properly track debt collection and write-offs.

The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. We determined that CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) did not always conduct the searches at U.S. ports of entry according to its SOPs. Specifically, because of inadequate supervision to ensure OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. These deficiencies in supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limit OFO’s ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography.

On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

CBP facilities we visited appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search.  With the exception of inconsistent cleanliness of the hold rooms, we observed that unaccompanied alien children had access to toilets and sinks, drinking water, beverages (including milk and juice drinks), as well as snacks and food.  Unaccompanied alien children had access to hygiene items and clean bedding at all facilities we visited.  We did not encounter issues with temperatures or ventilation, access to emergency medical care, inadequate supervision, or access to telephones.  We also observed that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry had offices and storage spaces redesigned into hold rooms to be able to detain more unaccompanied alien children, family units, and other border crossers referred for processing. We made no recommendations in this report.