ICE

DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

We determined that children brought to Port Isabel on July 15, 2018, waited extended periods, and in many cases overnight, to be reunited with their parents.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was not prepared to promptly reunify all children who arrived at Port Isabel on the first day of attempted mass reunifications.  ICE and U.S. Health and Human Services had fundamentally different understandings about the timing and pace of reunifications, and ICE personnel at Port Isabel underestimated the resources necessary to promptly out-process the parents of arriving children.  As a result, some children waited in vehicles at Port Isabel, while others waited in unused detention cells, though all children were in climate-controlled environments and had continuous access to food, water, and restrooms.  As the mass reunifications continued, ICE personnel responded to processing and space issues, which generally resulted in shorter wait times for children who arrived at Port Isabel closer to the court’s July 26, 2018 deadline.  The report contains no recommendations.

determined ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is effectively contributing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) counterterrorism efforts by leveraging its authorities, experience, skills, and staffing.  However, existing agreements and guidance on HSI’s participation in the JTTF and its terrorism financing investigations are outdated.  Additionally, we determined existing agreements and policy impose restrictions that delay and hinder sharing and access to information in the JTTF.  We recommended DHS JTTF contributors evaluate and update agreements governing JTTF participation as needed.  HSI should renegotiate and update the 2003 agreement on terrorism financing, as well as update its related guidance accordingly.  We also recommended DHS coordinate with Department of Justice and Department of State, as well as within the DHS, to develop agreements to allow for the more direct sharing of critical investigative information.  We made five recommendations that aim to improve counterterrorism efforts and information sharing.  DHS concurred with two recommendations and non-concurred with three.

U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not follow its written policy when conducting disciplinary reviews of Senior Executive Employees (SES) employees, which risks creating an appearance that SES employees receive more favorable treatment than non-SES employees.  We reviewed the disciplinary proceedings of the former SES official to evaluate whether ICE’s deviation from the written policy, or any other evidence, in that case indicated that the official received favorable treatment, as alleged.  We did not find evidence of actual favoritism or inappropriate influence in the official’s disciplinary or security clearance review processes.  We recommended that ICE finalize and issue its draft policy documenting the process for disciplining SES members.  We made one recommendation that will enhance transparency in ICE’s disciplinary program.  ICE concurred with our recommendation and took action to resolve and close it.

We found violations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards undermining the protection of detainees’ rights and the provision of a safe and healthy environment.  Although the conditions varied among the facilities and not every problem was present at each, our observations, interviews with detainees and staff, and review of documents revealed several common issues.  At three facilities, we found segregation practices infringing on detainee rights.  Detainees at all four facilities had difficulties resolving issues through the grievance and communication systems, including allegations of verbal abuse by staff.  Two facilities had issues with classifying detainees according to their risk levels, which could affect safety.  Lastly, we identified living conditions at three facilities that violate ICE standards.  We recommended the Acting Director of ICE ensure the Enforcement and Removal Operations field offices overseeing the detention facilities covered in the report address identified issues and ensure facility compliance with relevant detention standards.  We made one recommendation that will help ICE ensure compliance with detention standards. ICE concurred with the recommendation.

We surveyed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facilities from April 8-20, 2020 regarding their experiences and challenges managing COVID-19 among detainees in their custody and among their staff.  The facilities that responded to our survey described various actions they have taken to prevent and mitigate the pandemic’s spread among detainees.  These actions include increased cleaning and disinfecting of common areas, and isolating new detainees, when possible, as a precautionary measure.  However, facilities reported concerns with their inability to practice social distancing among detainees, and to isolate or quarantine individuals who may be infected with COVID-19.  Regarding staffing, facilities reported decreases in current staff availability due to COVID-19, but have contingency plans in place to ensure continued operations.  The facilities also expressed concerns with the availability of staff, as well as protective equipment for staff, if there were an outbreak of COVID-19 in the facility.  Overall, almost all facilities stated they were prepared to address COVID-19, but expressed concerns if the pandemic continued to spread.  At the time of our survey, 23 facilities reported having detainees who had tested positive for COVID-19; this number had risen to 48 facilities as of May 11, 2020.

Through its Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) can successfully identify aliens charged with or convicted of crimes.  However, because ICE relies on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies, it sometimes faces challenges apprehending aliens in uncooperative jurisdictions.  ICE’s inability to detain aliens identified through CAP contributes to increased risk those aliens will commit more crimes.  Furthermore, having to arrest “at-large” aliens may put officer, detainee, and public safety at risk and strains ICE’s staffing resources.  We made four recommendations to ICE focused on improving CAP.  ICE concurred with all four recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings.