ICE

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigative offices accurately maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. Investigative staff were diligent in complying with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, we found that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis.

On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department and its components — specifically FLETC, USBP, and ICE — have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new agents and officers.  Prior to the start of the hiring surge, FLETC’s capacity is already overextended. FLETC is not only responsible for accommodating the anticipated Department hiring surge, but also for an expected increase in demand from other Partner Organizations. Despite observing ongoing work in the development of hiring surge training plans and strategies, challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and current training conditions. Absent remedial action, these challenges may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. As a result, trainees will be less prepared for their assigned field environment, potentially impeding mission achievability and increasing safety risk to themselves, other law enforcement officers, and anyone within their enforcement authority.

We identified a number of serious issues that violate U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards and pose significant health and safety risks at the facility.  Specifically, we are concerned about nooses in detainee cells, improper and overly restrictive segregation, and untimely and inadequate detainee medical care.  We recommended that ICE conduct a full review and inspection of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center and the GEO Group’s management of the center to immediately to ensure compliance with ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards.  Specifically, ICE must review and ensure compliance with: Personal Care Required; Segregation; and Medical Care.  We made one recommendation to improve conditions at the facility.

We examined whether ICE is effectively overseeing and managing the 287(g) program as it expands. Under the 287(g) program, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) delegates authority to state and local law enforcement agencies to help ICE in its immigration enforcement mission in their jurisdictions. After the Executive Order was issued, the 287(g) program expanded quickly, it rose from 36 to 76.  ICE approved 40 additional applicants without planning for a corresponding increase in program management staffing, determining how to promptly deliver needed information technology (IT) equipment to participants, or ensuring participants are fully trained.  

Without effective oversight, it is difficult to monitor and measure performance to determine whether program participants are assisting ICE in its immigration enforcement mission. Further, without the necessary equipment and training, program participants may not be acting as a force multiplier to identify removable aliens. ICE may also not be able to fully expand the program and include new localities interested in participating.

We determined that, from fiscal years 2010 to 2017, the number of assaults against CBP law enforcement officers decreased from 1,089 to 856. During the same time period, assaults of ICE law enforcement officers remained the same at 48. However, the data does not show a clear trend over that time period and the number of assaults varied widely from year to year. Our analysis also shows that, for a number of reasons, the data is unreliable and does not accurately reflect whether assaults have increased or decreased.

Neither type of inspection ICE uses to examine detention facilities ensures consistent compliance with detention standards or comprehensive correction of identified deficiencies. Specifically, because the Nakamoto inspection scope is too broad, ICE’s guidance on procedures is unclear, and Nakamoto’s inspection practices are not consistently thorough, its inspections do not fully examine actual conditions or identify all compliance deficiencies. In contrast, ODO uses effective methods and processes to thoroughly inspect facilities and identify deficiencies, but the inspections are too infrequent to ensure the facilities implement all corrections. Moreover, ICE does not adequately follow up on identified deficiencies or systematically hold facilities accountable for correcting deficiencies, which further diminishes the usefulness of both Nakamoto and ODO inspections.

U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill asked us to review ICE’s modification of its intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) with the City of Eloy in Arizona to procure family detention space in Dilley, Texas. We also reviewed other selected IGSAs to determine whether they complied with applicable laws and regulations. (ICE) is responsible for the detention of removable aliens. ICE commonly uses a type of agreement called an IGSA to reserve space at detention facilities owned or operated by state or local governments. In September 2014, ICE improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy (Eloy) in Arizona to establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, more than 900 miles away. Although ICE could have contracted directly with the private company that operates the South Texas Family Residential Center, CCA, it instead created an unnecessary “middleman” by modifying its existing IGSA with Eloy. Eloy’s sole function under the modification is to act as the middleman between ICE and CCA; Eloy collects about $438,000 in annual fees for this service.