FEMA does not always appropriately report and investigate employee allegations of sexual harassment and workplace sexual misconduct.  For FYs 2012 to 2018, we identified 305 allegations from FEMA employees potentially related to sexual harassment and sexual misconduct such as sexual assault, unwelcome sexual advances, and inappropriate sexual comments.  However, we were unable to determine whether FEMA properly handled 153 of these allegations, because it could not provide complete investigative and disciplinary files.  For allegations that had complete files available, at times we were unable to determine whether FEMA conducted an investigation.  Finally, we found FEMA did not document whether it investigated some sexual harassment EEO complaints as potential employee misconduct.  We attribute the inconsistent investigations and incomplete files to inadequate policies, processes, and training. These shortcomings may fuel employee perceptions that FEMA is not addressing sexual harassment and sexual misconduct and is not supportive of employees reporting that type of behavior.  We made five recommendations to improve FEMA’s handling of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations including establishing a comprehensive case management system; developing and implementing formal processes and procedures to appropriately address all harassment allegations; providing investigative training; and ensuring allegations are appropriately referred to DHS OIG.

FEMA did not have reliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure accurate adjudication of resource requests, it did not have a process to allocate the limited supply of PPE, and FEMA’s strategic documents did not clearly outline roles and responsibilities to lead the Federal response.  We made three recommendations that FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC, formally document the policies and procedures for allocating critical lifesaving supplies and equipment, and that FEMA work with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to clarify the agencies’ pandemic response roles and responsibilities under Stafford Act declarations.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations which remain open and resolved.

FEMA did not use its SFM initiative to ensure that Public Assistance (PA) funds were obligated in accordance with Federal, Department, and component requirements.  Specifically, FEMA obligated PA funds for 83 projects from fiscal years 2017 through 2019 that we reviewed, even though the subrecipients did not need the funding until after 180 days, which made them eligible for incremental obligation under SFM.  This occurred because FEMA did not provide adequate oversight to its Regions.  FEMA relied on the Regions’ decisions to determine whether subrecipients’ projects were eligible for SFM funding, without ensuring there was sufficient supporting documentation to validate the determinations.  This increases the risk of projects being over obligated.  As a result, FEMA is not meeting the intent of SFM, which is to better manage resources in the Disaster Relief Fund to fulfill present and future disaster funding requirements.  We made two recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s management and oversight of the Disaster Relief Fund.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

FEMA did not ensure Louisiana adequately managed and provided oversight of PA grants to make certain they complied with Federal regulations.  Specifically, Louisiana had a backlog of 600 incomplete projects beyond their approved completion dates.  We attributed this to the State not conducting regular site visits to assess subrecipients’ ongoing projects, identify and resolve issues as they arose, or ensure prompt project completion.  In addition, FEMA had a backlog of 2,150 completed grant projects it had not closed out due to inadequate oversight of its Region 6 staff to ensure they promptly carried out this responsibility.  As of the fourth quarter of 2018, the combined backlog of 2,750 grant projects represented nearly $6.6 billion in obligated funds.  By May 2020, FEMA had reduced the backlog, but the significant number of remaining projects could lead to delays reimbursing applicants as well as deobligating funds that could be put to better use.  We made three recommendations to FEMA to strengthen its oversight of project completion and closeout processes to ensure they are timely and compliant.  FEMA concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two.  However, FEMA’s responses resulted in all three recommendations being considered open and unresolved.

Specifically, in reviewing 16 contract files, we found files that did not have relevant Federal tax information, were missing information on the contractor’s past performance evaluations, and contained incomplete and inconsistent documentation.  We attribute these deficiencies to FEMA not providing guidance on procedures for implementing Federal regulations to contracting personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security removing guidance from its acquisition manual that is used by component personnel.  As a result of inadequate guidance, FEMA personnel awarded contracts without making fully informed determinations as to whether prospective contractors could meet contract demands.  If contractors cannot meet demands, FEMA may have to cancel contracts it has awarded, which has happened in the past and continues.  In fact, between March and May 2020, FEMA awarded and canceled at least 22 contracts, valued at $184 million, for crucial supplies in response to the national COVID-19 pandemic.  By awarding contracts without ensuring prospective contractors can meet contract demands, FEMA will continue wasting taxpayer dollars and future critical disaster and pandemic assistance will continue to be delayed.  We made one recommendation that, when implemented, should help strengthen FEMA’s responsibility determination process.  The Department concurred with our recommendation. 

FEMA has not prioritized compliance with the DMA 2000.  According to FEMA officials, the agency has instead focused on immediate needs of disaster operations and other high- profile initiatives necessary to carry out its mission.  As such, FEMA has not published regulations and related policies as required by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to reduce repetitive damages to facilities, including the Nation’s roads and bridges.  We made four recommendations to FEMA, including that FEMA should prioritize the DMA 2000 by addressing the unresolved implementation issues and publishing a regulation as required. 

FEMA’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with the Texas General Land Office (TxGLO) was appropriate to ensure direct housing assistance program compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  However, FEMA initiated the IGSA without first developing the processes and controls TxGLO needed to administer the program.  As a result, FEMA and the State had to develop and finalize implementation guidelines after signing the IGSA, delaying TxGLO’s disaster response.  In addition, FEMA disaster personnel had to prepare the necessary guidance, toolkits, and training resources while simultaneously responding to Hurricane Harvey.  Also, FEMA used workarounds and TxGLO set up a separate system, creating additional operational challenges and inefficiencies.  We made three recommendations to improve future state administered direct housing assistance efforts.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

We determined that FEMA followed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance in its efforts to provide funding for reconstruction of the Vieques’ Community Health Center.  FEMA’s assessment of the funding needs for the project is complete and $39,569,695 (Federal share) was obligated on January 21, 2020 for a full facility replacement.  We did not make any recommendations but announced an audit to assess FEMA’s Public Assistance Program Alternative Procedures process for all permanent work projects.