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Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

Report Number Title Issue Date Fiscal Year
OIG-20-46 We contracted this audit with Cotton & Company LLP, which found FEMA did not ensure Collier County, Florida (the County) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend Public Assistance (PA) program grant funds awarded in disaster areas in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically, the County could not provide documentation to support $4,602 in force account costs claimed.  Additionally, the subrecipient monitoring process needs improvement.  The State has not evaluated the risk of subrecipients’ noncompliance with Federal requirements, obtained subrecipient audit reports, or developed plans for monitoring subrecipients.  We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve Collier County, Florida’s management of FEMA PA funds.  FEMA concurred with our four recommendations. 

>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Collier County, Florida 		2020
OIG-20-41 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Missouri, and Joplin Schools did not properly manage and oversee this disaster award.  Specifically, FEMA and Missouri did not provide proper grant management and oversight of Joplin’s subgrant activities.  Joplin Schools disregarded Missouri’s authority as the grantee and did not always comply with Federal requirements and FEMA policies as required.  This occurred because Joplin Schools heavily relied on the advice of its grant management contractor.  As a result of the grant management and oversight issues, Joplin Schools did not follow Federal procurement standards when it awarded $187.3 million in non-exigent disaster-related contracts, including $609,676 in ineligible contractor direct administrative costs.  We provided five recommendations to help improve FEMA and Missouri’s grant oversight and management process.  We also included four recommendations for FEMA to disallow or not fund $187.3 million in ineligible contract costs.  FEMA determined approximately $56 million, the net obligated amount, was eligible for reimbursement.  FEMA concurred with all nine recommendations and completed actions to close recommendations 1 to 4 and 8.  Recommendations 5 to 7 are resolved and open with a target completion date of June 1, 2020. Recommendation 9 is considered unresolved and open

>Inadequate Management and Oversight Jeopardized $187.3 Million in FEMA Grant Funds Expended by Joplin Schools, Missouri 		2020
OIG-20-39 KPMG found FEMA did not always ensure that the Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA), and Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (VIWAPA) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend PA disaster grant funds in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically: 1) VITEMA did not have policies and procedures to ensure the timely submission of management costs for reimbursement; 2) VIWAPA did not fully ensure contract costs were reasonable and allowable; and 3) Neither VITEMA nor VIWAPA had fully implemented FEMA’s Grants Manager and Grants Portal system.  This occurred because FEMA did not consistently provide adequate oversight.  Because of these deficiencies, there is increased risk the PA program may be mismanaged and funds may be used for unallowable activities.  We made three recommendations that, when implemented, should improve FEMA’s, VITEMA’s, and VIWAPA’s management of FEMA PA funds.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the USVI Water and Power Authority 		2020
OIG-20-32 FEMA is not effectively designating Surge Capacity Force (SCF) volunteers and managing the SCF program during disaster operations.  In 2017, FEMA was not prepared to deploy SCF Tier 4 volunteers rapidly and efficiently because FEMA had neither a clear commitment from agencies outside DHS to participate in SCF, nor a roster of volunteers capable of rapidly deploying.  FEMA did not adequately measure SCF performance because it did not have mechanisms to collect data and feedback to gauge program success.  FEMA did not effectively manage the SCF financial program because it relied heavily on the financial controls of volunteers’ home agencies without guarding against breakdowns in those controls.  Finally, FEMA did not close mission assignments promptly because it did not make closing them a priority in what officials described as a series of “overwhelming” catastrophes.  We made four recommendations for FEMA to improve designation of SCF volunteers and management of the SCF program.  FEMA concurred with three of our four recommendations.

>FEMA Needs to Effectively Designate Volunteers and Manage the Surge Capacity Force 		2020
OIG-20-30 KPMG, LLP found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not always ensure Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA) and the Virgin Islands Department of Education (VIDE) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend Public Assistance (PA) grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  For example, VIDE did not have policies and procedures to address procurement-related conflicts of interest and related disciplinary actions.  This occurred because FEMA did not adequately train VIDE personnel and did not review these policies and procedures.  We made five recommendations that, when implemented, should improve management of FEMA PA grant funds, ensuring the funds are expended according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Education 		2020
OIG-20-29 KPMG, LLC found the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not provide adequate guidance to the Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA) and the Virgin Islands Housing Finance Agency (VIHFA) and that VITEMA and VIHFA did not adequately manage FEMA Public Assistance (PA) funds.  Also, VITEMA and VIHFA did not always ensure the accuracy of project funding information or promptly notify FEMA about significant project cost overruns.  This occurred because FEMA did not provide the necessary guidance to and oversight of VITEMA and VIHFA to properly manage PA funds.  Because of these deficiencies, PA programs are at increased risk of mismanagement and expenditure of funds for unallowable activities.  We made seven recommendations to improve VITEMA’s and VIHFA’s management of FEMA PA funds, ensuring they are expended according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations.

>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the U.S. Virgin Islands Housing and Finance Authority 		2020
OIG-20-27 Harris County, Texas needs additional technical assistance and monitoring to ensure grants management comply with Federal procurement regulations.  The County’s procurement policies, procedures, and business practices were not adequate to expend disaster grant funds in accordance with Federal procurement regulations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines.  We recommended FEMA disallow $2.7 million in ineligible costs and require Texas to work with the County to incorporate Federal procurement regulations when using Federal funds, and review procurement activities before the County awards future contracts.  We made three recommendations that will help improve the procurement capability of Harris County, Texas.  FEMA concurred with all three recommendations. 

>Harris County, Texas, Needs Continued Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant 		2020
OIG-20-26 Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Education 2020
OIG-20-24 Williams-Adley determined that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure the Puerto Rico Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resiliency (COR3) and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) establish and implement policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend Public Assistance (PA) grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically, PRASA did not follow established policies and procedures for: (1) recording the capacity size and rate of its force account equipment; and (2) ensuring each vendor had a certificate of eligibility before receiving a contract award.  We made two recommendations to improve PRASA’s management of FEMA PA funds, ensuring they are expended according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.

>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to The Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority 		2020
OIG-20-25 Williams-Adley determined that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not always ensure that Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTOP) established and implemented policies, procedures, and practices to account for and expend PA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  Specifically, DTOP did not have (1) an effective grants management process; (2) sufficient internal controls in the procurement process; and (3) sufficient controls over its processes for claiming Force Account Labor costs.  This occurred because FEMA and Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency (COR3) did not adequately oversee DTOP’s grant management activities.  We made three recommendations to improve COR3’s and DTOP’s management of FEMA Public Assistance funds, ensuring they are expended according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidance.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations.

>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works 		2020
OIG-20-23 The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and Households Program (IHP) has a robust process for collecting and verifying information provided by underinsured disaster applicants.  However, FEMA does not collect sufficient supporting documentation or verify applicants claiming to have no insurance are eligible for home repair assistance.  Rather, according to FEMA, it relies on applicant self-certifications because no comprehensive repository of homeowner’s insurance data exists, and any additional verification processes would delay home repair payments.  As a result, FEMA made and we are questioning, more than $3 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to individuals since 2003.  Additionally, FEMA did not properly assess and report improper payment risks within IHP because it disregarded significant internal control deficiencies and prior audit findings when it evaluated program risks.  Therefore, IHP applicants who claimed no homeowner’s insurance received less oversight even though they posed the greatest risk for improper and fraudulent payments.  Without implementing changes to its home repair assistance processes, FEMA cannot ensure it is being a prudent steward of Federal resources and adequately assessing its risks of improper payments and fraud.  We made two recommendations to FEMA to improve its IHP home repair documentation, verification, and risk management processes.  FEMA non-concurred with the two report recommendations, resulting in both recommendations being unresolved and open.

>FEMA Has Made More than $3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003 		2020
OIG-20-21 Management of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans Related to Hurricanes Katrina, Isaac, and Gustav 2020
OIG-20-22 Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Housing 2020
OIG-20-20 Following Hurricane Maria, FEMA did not maximize the use of advance contracts to address identified capability deficiencies and needs in Puerto Rico.  Specifically, we identified 49 of 241 new contracts issued in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria for the same goods or services covered by existing advance contracts.  We attributed FEMA’s limited use of advance contracts to its lack of a strategy and documented planning process for ensuring maximum use of advance contracts. Further, FEMA did not maintain contract files in accordance with Federal acquisition regulations and departmental or its own policy.  This occurred because FEMA’s Office of the Chief Procurement Officer did not have controls in place to ensure contract personnel follow Federal regulations and departmental or its own internal policy.  As a result, FEMA’s ability to hold contractors accountable for deliverables is hindered if contract files are not easily located. We made four recommendations to help FEMA improve its strategy for advance contracts, its process for identifying capability needs and gaps, and its contract file management practices. FEMA concurred with all four recommendations and described corrective actions it plans to take.

>FEMA’s Advance Contract Strategy for Disasters in Puerto Rico 		2020
OIG-20-17 Colorado’s Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (Colorado) did not effectively oversee its subrecipient, Frasier Meadows, to ensure it was aware of and followed Federal procurement regulations and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines.  In addition, FEMA should have ensured Colorado delivered assistance to Frasier Meadows consistent with the FEMA-State Agreement and the State Administrative Plan.  We recommended the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VIII, disallow $5.57 million for contracts and direct Colorado to work with Frasier Meadows officials to ensure they implement their updated Federal procurement policies and procedures in the event of a future disaster.  FEMA officials agreed with both recommendations.  Prior to final issuance of this report, FEMA took action to resolve and close both recommendations.  No further action is required.

>FEMA Should Recover $5.57 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Frasier Meadows Manor, Inc., Boulder, Colorado 		2020
OIG-20-15 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not balance its Manufactured Housing Unit (MHU) program costs with disaster-related housing needs.  In response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas, FEMA overestimated the number of MHUs it needed by nearly 2,600, which amounted to purchase, transportation, and storage costs of at least $152 million.  The agency also overestimated the number of tank and pump systems (TPS) it needed to operate the fire sprinklers, by nearly 2,400, which amounted to purchase and transportation costs of approximately $29 million.  Following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA focused on providing prompt assistance and did not emphasize financial accountability and recordkeeping.  Had FEMA better managed and overseen the MHU program, it could have put an estimated $182 million to better use to assist survivors from Hurricane Harvey or other disasters.  We made four recommendations that will help FEMA better manage its MHU program.  FEMA concurred with the recommendations. 

>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey 		2020
OIG-20-14-VR We determined that the Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management’s technical assistance and monitoring of the City of Evans’ (City) procurement and project-related activities are effective and that FEMA’s corrective actions met the intent of our recommendation 2.  We also determined that the City awarded contracts according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  If Colorado’s technical assistance and monitoring continue, FEMA should have reasonable assurance the City will spend the remaining $7.17 million in grant funds for eligible disaster work according to Federal regulations.

>Verification Review of the City of Evans, Colorado - OIG Audit Report (OIG-16-78-D) 		2020
OIG-20-11 Weld County, Colorado did not always follow Federal procurement standards in awarding contracts for disaster work.  As a result of our review, we identified and discussed with FEMA various areas where it should review and adjust for cost reasonableness the funding amounts that a project and program management contractor charged related to Weld County.  FEMA agreed to review the costs for reasonableness, unless if FEMA disallowed all of the costs for procurement violations.  We subsequently reviewed FEMA’s cost analysis documentation for Weld County project closeouts related to this disaster.  We found that FEMA appropriately reduced final project amounts due to improper procurements and cost reasonableness concerns, including unreasonable contractor hourly rates.  Consequently, made no recommendations. 

>Review of Weld County, Colorado FEMA Grant Award Disaster No. 4145-DR-CO, Applicant No. 123-99123-00 		2020
OIG-20-12 Aransas County’s procurement policies and procedures are not adequate to meet minimum Federal procurement regulations or address key procurement elements despite guidance and contacts with the Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Division of Emergency Management (Texas).  We recommended the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region VI, require Texas to continue providing additional technical assistance and monitoring to the County, and provide to DHS OIG documentation supporting FEMA’s actions to that end.  FEMA officials agreed with both recommendations.  Prior to final issuance of this report, FEMA took action to resolve and close both recommendations.  No further action is required. 

>Aransas County, Texas, Needs Continued Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant 		2020
OIG-20-10 As required under the Grants Oversight and New Efficiency (GONE) Act of 2016, Public Law 114-117, we conducted a risk assessment of FEMA’s grant closeout process to determine whether a full audit is warranted in the future.  We identified risks in three overarching areas:  Unreliable Systems of Record, Lack of Integration in Grant Closeout Policies and Guidance, and Delays in Grant Closeout and Deobligation of Funds.  As a result, we may conduct a full audit of FEMA’s grant closeout process at a future date.  DHS and FEMA concurred with our risk assessment results.  We made no recommendations to FEMA.

>Risk Assessment of FEMA's Grant Closeout Process 		2020
OIG-20-08 We verified that Refugio County, Texas awarded contracts that complied with Federal procurement regulations and FEMA guidelines.  We determined that the County initially did not have written procurement policies to comply with all Federal procurement regulations.  Instead, for purchases and contracting, County officials said they followed Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 262.  In response to our audit, the County adopted written procurement procedures to comply with Federal requirements.  The report contains no recommendations.  FEMA did not submit a formal response to our draft report, but informally replied that it did not identify any issues requiring further action by FEMA.

>Refugio County, Texas, Has Implemented Adequate Procurement Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant 		2020
OIG-20-01 At the time of our onsite work in July 2017, Box Elder County had not awarded any contracts under this grant. Therefore, we could not determine whether the County had complied with Federal procurement regulations. However, in reviewing Box Elder County’s written procurement policies and procedures we noted the County did not include procedures to ensure opportunities for small and minority businesses, women’s business enterprises, and labor surplus area firms to bid for federally funded work.  In addition, Box Elder County’s procurement policies did not require federally mandated provisions be incorporated in all contracts funded by Federal grants.  In response to our review, Box Elder County revised its procurement policies and procedures to include these Federal procurement requirements.  Consequently, we made no recommendations.

>Review of Box Elder County, Utah's Procurement Policies and Procedures for Disaster No. 4311-DR-UT, Grant No. 003-99003-00 		2020
OIG-19-66 FEMA did not take sufficient actions to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of transportation assistance funds for vehicles considered damaged or destroyed by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in FY 2017.  These weakness occurred because FEMA does not require that agencies collect and retain documentation used to establish applicant eligibility; consider pre-disaster vehicle market value when determining award amounts; provide guidance to state, territorial and tribal governments on how to set transportation assistance thresholds; and conduct post-payment reviews to ensure funds are spent appropriately.  We made three recommendations that, when implemented, will help FEMA ensure it is spending Federal funds for transportation assistance properly.  FEMA concurred with one recommendation and non-concurred with two recommendations.

>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds 		2019
OIG-19-63 Richland County did not always properly account for and expend Federal funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  FEMA did not hold North Dakota accountable for fulfilling its grant management responsibilities, and North Dakota did not adequately manage the FEMA grant by monitoring the County to ensure it complied with applicable regulations and guidelines.  The County failed to follow all Federal procurement regulations when awarding about $1.9 million in disaster-related contracts.  We recommended that FEMA disallow $1,146,921 in ineligible contract costs and direct North Dakota to work with the County to verify that the County complies with all Federal grant requirements and establishes effective accounting systems.  FEMA concurred with our three recommendations for improving County compliance in managing future Federal grants. 

>FEMA Should Disallow $1.1 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Richland County, North Dakota 		2019
OIG-19-64 In two of the four areas – training and collaboration – Washington’s Emergency Management Division (EMD) and FEMA complied with applicable policies, procedures, and regulations.  In the third functional area – project execution, monitoring and oversight – we did not identify any significant deficiencies.  We found, however, EMD lacked position-specific guidance for all personnel with programmatic responsibilities.  In the last functional area – project and grant closeout – neither EMD nor its subrecipients submitted timely project closeout requests.  In addition, FEMA did not enforce compliance with its own guidance for processing closeouts.  We recommended FEMA ensure EMD complies with its State Administrative Plan by issuing and regularly updating desk manuals.  In addition, we recommended FEMA coordinate with EMD to initiate closeout on behalf of subrecipients for all open, large projects whose period of performance end dates exceed the 90-day regulatory requirement, and submit closeout requests to FEMA for projects exceeding the 180-day requirement.  We made five recommendations to strengthen EMD’s internal controls to improve its oversight of FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program.  FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations.

>The State of Washington's Oversight of FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program for Fiscal Years 2015-2017 Was Generally Effective 		2019
OIG-19-61 FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for $306 Million in Public Assistance Funds 2019
OIG-19-58 FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations 2019
OIG-19-54 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not properly oversee the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (Louisiana or State) to ensure it complied with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  Louisiana and the Office of Community Development (OCD), in turn, did not always properly account for and expend Federal grant funds.  Specifically, Louisiana did not provide adequate documentation to support costs, as required by Federal regulations, and FEMA is not requiring the State to provide mandatory documentation to close out the $706.6 million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) grant.  Louisiana also has not provided FEMA with required documentation showing that homeowners paid $79.7 million in promissory notes for state-funded mitigation work on their homes.  Finally, Louisiana drew down funds exceeding project obligations by $50.4 million due to a lack of FEMA controls.  These issues arose primarily because FEMA did not ensure Louisiana exercised proper oversight of the HMGP grant and the State did not comply with Federal regulations.  As a result, Federal funds are at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.  We provided five recommendations to FEMA to postpone project closeout until Louisiana provides adequate documentation that supports $706.6 million in costs and that FEMA ensures compliance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.  FEMA’s responses were sufficient to close all but one recommendation, which we consider open and unresolved.  

>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a $706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes 		2019
OIG-19-55 FEMA has instituted several effective mechanisms to demonstrate the importance of fraud prevention in its disaster assistance programs, but it needs to do more.  In line with our 2011 audit report recommendations, FEMA now uses standard system queries and additional business rules to flag potentially fraudulent disaster assistance applications.  However, FEMA must take additional, proactive steps to create and sustain a culture of fraud prevention and awareness.  This includes adequately staffing the Fraud and Internal Investigations Division, implementing an effective process to monitor and discourage staff noncompliance with required fraud training requirements, and establishing a clear and consistent process for reporting suspected fraud.  We made five recommendations for FEMA to demonstrate its commitment to fraud prevention in carrying out its disaster assistance programs.  FEMA concurred with all of our recommendations and has begun implementing corrective actions.

>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 		2019
OIG-19-52 FEMA's Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC 2019
OIG-19-45 Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions 2019
OIG-19-38 FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC 2019
OIG-19-37 This interim report is part of an ongoing audit to determine the extent FEMA is meeting disaster survivors’ transitional shelter needs after the California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. We determined that FEMA does not require disaster survivors to notify the agency when they vacate hotels participating in the TSA program, thus allowing the hotels to continue to bill FEMA for unoccupied rooms. Because FEMA is unaware when disaster survivors vacate the hotels, the agency does not know the magnitude of unnecessary hotel charges. Consequently, FEMA could not account for associated TSA payments it may have paid since August 2017, related to the 2017 hurricane season and California wildfires.

>Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program 		2019
OIG-19-36 Williams, Adley and Company - DC, LLP completed an audit of Missouri’s management of State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants awarded during fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Williams Adley concluded that Missouri’s State Administrative Agency generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations. Although Williams Adley did not identify any duplicate benefits received by the state, it did identify instances in which the state did not fully comply with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) FYs 2012–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance.

>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-32 Through the TSA program, FEMA provides transitional sheltering in hotels to disaster survivors displaced by emergencies or major disasters. TSA reduces the number of survivors in congregate emergency shelters by providing hotel lodging. During our ongoing audit of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, we determined that FEMA violated the Privacy Act of 19741 and Department of Homeland Security policy2 by releasing to the PII and SPII of 2.3 million survivors of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires in 2017.3

>Management Alert - FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED) 		2019
OIG-19-31 We could not fully assess whether Oregon’s State Administrative Agency (OEM) expenditures for State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) funding awarded from FY 2013 through FY 2015 enhanced its preparedness and security because we found some issues. These issues occurred because OEM did not obtain written consent when withholding more than 20 percent of funds, coordinate with subrecipients after award receipt, have approved indirect cost rate agreements, adhere to its subrecipient monitoring procedures, have a tracking system, or provide guidance to subrecipients. FEMA concurred with all 10 recommendations and plans to take corrective action.

>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015 		2019
OIG-19-12 The County received about $28.1 million in Public Assistance grant awards from Florida — a FEMA grantee — for damages from severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and flooding in April and May 2014. Jackson County was the first subgrantee in Florida to be approved for a grant award obligation under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) pilot program. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 20131 authorized PAAP and authorized FEMA to implement alternative procedures through the PAAP pilot program. Florida did not fulfill its grantee responsibility to ensure the County followed applicable Federal grant management requirements, and FEMA did not ensure the grantee carried out its responsibilities.

>FEMA Should Recover $3,061,819 in Grant Funds Awarded to Jackson County, Florida 		2019
OIG-19-09 FEMA Should Recover $413,074 of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, for a May 2010 Flood 2019
OIG-19-06 FEMA awarded the Chippewa Cree Tribe a $32.4 million Public Assistance Program grant for damages from a June 2010 flood disaster. The award provided 100 percent Federal funding to replace the Tribe’s severely damaged health clinic. The Tribe failed to manage a $32.4 million Public Assistance Program grant from FEMA according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. As a result, FEMA has no assurance that expenditures the Tribe claimed for Project 2 (engineering and design), and plans to claim for Projects 132 (facility construction) and 133 (site preparation) are valid, allowable, or eligible. Therefore, FEMA should disallow about $22.3 million of the grant award for these three projects.

>FEMA Should Disallow $22.3 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, Montana 		2019
OIG-19-08 Following the January 13, 2018, false missile alert in Hawaii, Congress requested we examine the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) role in the incident. We concluded that FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending and canceling of state and local alerts. Following the Hawaii false missile alert, three U.S. Senators proposed legislation to define the federal government’s role during false missile alerts, as well as to direct FEMA to recommend best practices in the alerting process. We also identified two areas of concern regarding FEMA’s overall oversight of IPAWS. Although FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform, state and local alerting authorities must obtain commercially-available emergency alert software to generate a message which passes through IPAWS for authentication and delivery. However, we found that FEMA does not require that this software perform functions critical to the alerting process, such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead, FEMA only recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as “best practices.”

>FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) 		2019
OIG-19-05 We conducted this audit to determine whether the Board accounted for and expended FEMA grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. The Board sustained an estimated $90.6 million in damages caused by severe storms and flooding that occurred in August 2016. The Ascension Parish School Board (Board) accounted for disaster-related costs correctly, as Federal regulations require. However, the Board did not follow all Federal procurement regulations in awarding $25.6 million in disaster-related contracts, resulting in $9.1 million in ineligible costs. Additionally, there were issues with direct administrative costs related to a Recovery Program and Grants Management services contract. This occurred because the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure the Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (Louisiana) monitored the Board’s subgrant activities for compliance with Federal procurement requirements.

>FEMA Should Disallow $9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana 		2019
OIG-18-85 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its Public Assistance (PA) Program, is currently responding to Hurricane Irma — one of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history.  FEMA’s damage estimates for Florida and Georgia exceed $4.2 billion, with debris removal operations constituting approximately 36 percent of the total PA cost.  Debris removal costs in Florida and Georgia are estimated to reach approximately $1.5 billion as of May 2018.  FEMA’s guidance for debris monitoring lacks sufficient information to ensure adequate oversight.  In the 2011 OIG report, FEMA’s Oversight and Management of Debris Removal Operations, we identified deficiencies in FEMA’s debris removal guidance.  To resolve these deficiencies, we made 10 recommendations to, in part, strengthen FEMA’s debris removal guidance and procedure.  In response, FEMA released additional criteria pertaining to debris estimating and monitoring to enhance the overall effectiveness of the process.  FEMA removed the detailed responsibilities when it released its Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG).  Going forward from the PAPPG version 1.0, FEMA relies solely on the subrecipient to monitor the debris removal operations, and removes monitoring responsibilities from both FEMA and the State.  Subrecipients now have a greater responsibility to identify issues or concerns during debris removal operations.  We made three recommendations that when implemented will strengthen FEMA’s debris monitoring operations.  FEMA concurred with all recommendations.

>Management Alert - Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma 		2018
OIG-18-75 Collectively, our FY 2017 work shows that FEMA continues to face systemic problems and operational challenges, as the variety of findings summarized in this report illustrates In FY 2017, FEMA did not manage disaster relief grants and funds adequately and did not hold grant recipients accountable for properly managing disaster relief funds. We continue to identify problems such as improper contract costs, and ineligible and unsupported expenditures.

In FY 2017, we identified $2.08 billion in questioned costs, which represents 96 percent of the $2.16 billion audited.2 We issued 37 reports concerning FEMA grants, programs, and operations funded by the DRF. Specifically, we conducted 16 grant audits, 13 proactive audits, and 8 program audits. In the last 9 fiscal years, we audited grant funds totaling $13.75 billion and reported potential monetary benefits of $6.55 billion.

>Summary and Key Findings of Fiscal Year 2017 FEMA Disaster Grant and Program Audits 		2018
OIG-18-74 FEMA needs to continue providing technical assistance to and monitoring of California’s Public Assistance grant funding management.  This helps avoid the risk of exposing millions of taxpayer dollars to fraud, waste, or mismanagement and violating the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. In doing so, FEMA can assist California in providing reasonable, but not absolute assurance that Public Assistance subgrant funds are spent in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines.

>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports Related to California's Practice of Managing Public Assistance Grant Funds 		2018
OIG-18-71 We found that FEMA overpaid its employees because it mistakenly believed the Department’s payroll provider had an automated control to prevent payments over the annual cap, and because it did not follow its own premium pay policy. We also found that FEMA has no effective policy or practice to determine the Fair Labor Standards Act status of FEMA employees during disaster deployments, which also contributed to this issue. Since discovering the overpayments, FEMA has been working to calculate how many people were overpaid, but it cannot finish that analysis until it addresses a number of outstanding questions.

>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap 		2018
OIG-18-66 In July 2017, FEMA reported that it awarded 252 projects under the PA alternative procedures pilot program valued at $11.9 billion, with just 26 of those projects (10.32 percent) closed. During our fieldwork, we gained access to FEMA’s grant management system of record and reviewed supporting documentation for the project worksheets in our scope to determine if FEMA followed its criteria when validating cost estimates. However, FEMA did not sufficiently document actions that it took to validate subrecipient cost estimates to ensure costs are reasonable. Of the three obligated projects we reviewed during our fieldwork, we did not find evidence that FEMA completed the required steps identified to validate the reasonableness of subrecipient cost estimates.

>Sandy Recovery Improvement Act Review 		2018
OIG-18-64 The County estimated that it had sustained $2.7 million in damages from severe storms and flooding in February 2017. We conducted the audit early in the grant process to identify areas in which the County may need additional technical assistance and monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements. DHS OIG found that the County does not have adequate procurement policies, procedures, and business practices that comply fully with all Federal standards for its planned procurements, totaling approximately $500,000. At the time of our fieldwork, FEMA had not completed project worksheets to define the scope of disaster work. At this early stage in the grant process, Utah needs to provide the County with additional technical assistance and increased monitoring. Doing so should provide FEMA reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the County will spend the $2.7 million in total estimated disaster-related costs according to Federal requirements.

>Cache County, Utah, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant 		2018
OIG-18-63 The Diamondhead Water and Sewer District (District), received a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant award of $49.3 million from the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (Mississippi) for damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We had concerns because it took the District about 10 years to break ground on its new wastewater treatment plant. We also wanted to determine whether FEMA accurately applied its “50 Percent Rule.” we identified $1.5 million of improper procurement, unsupported costs, duplicate insurance benefits, and uncompleted project costs that FEMA should disallow to the District. These problems were largely the result of Mississippi not fulfilling its grantee responsibility to ensure the District properly managed FEMA funds. Mississippi is responsible for monitoring subgrant activities, and is compensated with Federal funds to support subgrant management and oversight. It is FEMA’s responsibility to hold Mississippi accountable for proper grant administration.

>FEMA Should Recover $20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi 		2018
OIG-18-62 The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, through its main engineering contractor (Contractor C), presented incorrect data and misinformed FEMA in obtaining a Federal grant of more than $33 million for its pipeline replacement and relocation project. Authority officials wanted to move the pipeline outside of the Mojave Riverbed, but noted the high cost to do so. Authority officials knew that replacing and relocating the pipeline was the most expensive repair option, as their Contractors A and C informed them. However, through Contractor C, Authority officials repeatedly provided FEMA incorrect data that made Alternative 2 appear to be the least expensive. Based on the incorrect information Authority officials provided, FEMA funded $11 million for the replacement and relocation project in 2013 and an additional $22 million in 2014, a total of $33 million. We question the entire $33 million as ineligible because the Authority did not comply with Federal regulations, and FEMA policies and procedures, in preparing cost estimates for FEMA.

>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its $33 Million Project 		2018
OIG-18-60 At the time of our audit, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the City of Waterloo, Iowa (City), sustained approximately $1.9 million in damages from severe storms and flooding from September 21 through October 3, 2016. The City did not provide all requested information and explanations necessary to perform our review; therefore, we were unable to assess whether the City’s policies, procedures, and business practices were adequate to account for FEMA Public Assistance grant funds properly. The City’s failure to cooperate with a Federal audit put approximately $1.9 million dollars in potential FEMA grant funding at risk of being deobligated or not funded.

>The City of Waterloo, Iowa Jeopardizes $1.9 Million in Estimated FEMA Grant Funding 		2018

*NDAA, Pub. L. 117-263, section 5274 Response Received. View responses

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