CBP
- Report NumberOIG-23-62Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2023
CBP, ICE, and Secret Service Did Not Adhere to Privacy Policies or Develop Sufficient Policies Before Procuring and Using Commercial Telemetry Data - (REDACTED)
Report NumberOIG-23-61Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2023CBP Needs to Improve Its Video and Audio Coverage at Land Ports of Entry
CBP Did Not Effectively Conduct International Mail Screening or Implement the STOP Act - (REDACTED)
Report NumberOIG-23-56Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2023Results of Unannounced Inspections of CBP Holding Facilities in the El Paso Area
Report NumberOIG-23-50Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2023CBP's Management of International Mail Facilities Puts Officer Safety and Mission Requirements at Risk
Report NumberOIG-23-48Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2023CBP Could Do More to Plan for Facilities Along the Southwest Border
Report NumberOIG-23-45Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2023DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking
Executive SummaryDHS could not provide any performance measures and provided only limited data to demonstrate the full extent or effectiveness of its efforts to enforce wildlife trafficking laws. In addition, CBP personnel inconsistently recorded data on wildlife encounters, and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents did not always completely or accurately record actions and data related to wildlife trafficking. CBP personnel also did not always demonstrate that they involved ICE HSI special agents when suspecting wildlife trafficking crimes. Finally, DHS did not establish performance goals to measure the results of its efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. We attributed these issues to DHS, CBP, and ICE not providing adequate oversight, including clear and comprehensive policies and procedures, of wildlife trafficking efforts. As a result, DHS may be missing opportunities to curtail the spread of zoonotic viruses and disrupt transnational criminal organizations that use the same networks for other illicit trafficking, such as narcotics, humans, and weapons. We made one recommendation to improve the Department’s efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. The Department concurred with the recommendation and provided a plan to improve its efforts.
Report NumberOIG-22-02Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2022CBP Continues to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry - Law Enforcement Sensitive (REDACTED)
Executive SummarySummary: OFO continues to experience challenges managing searches of electronic devices, similar to those identified in our first audit report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry, issued in December 2018. Specifically, OFO did not properly document and conduct searches of electronic devices, fully assess the effectiveness of the electronic device search program, or adequately manage electronic device search equipment. This occurred because, although it plans to do so, OFO has not yet fully implemented corrective actions for four of the five recommendations in our previous audit report, including establishing training for staff. According to an OFO official, there have been delays in fully implementing the prior recommendations due to reviews of existing policy and a capabilities analysis report, and development of additional training. In addition, OFO does not have adequate processes for auditing electronic device searches, does not track prosecutions and convictions resulting from referrals to other Federal agencies, and does not adequately monitor search equipment usage, functionality, and inventory. Unless it corrects previously identified deficiencies and better manages searches and equipment, OFO will limit its ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism; national security; human, drug, and bulk cash smuggling; and child pornography. We made five recommendations to improve CBP’s oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports of entry. CBP concurred with all five recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-21-63Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2021CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
Executive SummaryCBP officials had legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on American journalists, attorneys, and others suspected of organizing or being associated with the migrant caravan. However, many CBP officials were unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts and, therefore, may have inadvertently placed lookouts on these Americans, which did not fully comport with the policy. Additionally, CBP officials did not remove lookouts promptly once they were no longer necessary and, as a result, subjected some of these U.S. citizens to repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections. During the same time period, a CBP official requested that Mexico deny entry to caravan associates, including 14 Americans. Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on these U.S. citizens, CBP had no genuine basis for requesting Mexico to deny entry to these individuals. On several other occasions throughout Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also improperly shared the names and sensitive information of U.S. citizens with Mexico. We made six recommendations that will improve CBP’s controls on placing and removing lookouts and sharing Americans’ sensitive information with foreign countries. CBP concurred with all six recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-21-62Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2021